ML20235D862

Applicant Exhibit A-9,consisting of Excerpts of Aug 1979 Final Rept on Social Survey of TMI Residents. Results of Resident Questionairre Encl

ML20235D862
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	07/08/1987
From:	Brunn S, Jerrica Johnson, Zeigler D MICHIGAN STATE UNIV., EAST LANSING, MI
To:
References
OL-3-A-009, OL-3-A-9, NUDOCS 8709250386
Download: ML20235D862 (24)

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{{#Wiki_filter:_ 80.3 2 2 -0C~3 y 7/p/g1 DISASTIC:,3 ;& -':-; c. 7q &'-G IBE OHl0 STATE UNNERSL '87. SEP 17 All :44 ,;p DOC-7 r. FINAL REPORT ON A SOCIAL SURVEY OF THREE MILE ISLAllD RESIDENTS 1 Stanley D. Brunn James H. Johnson, Jr. Donald J. Zeigler 1 Department of Geography Michigan State University East Lansing, MI 48824 August 1979 i DR 0 15 0. S W D

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= 1e l CHAPTErt 3 A SOCIAL SUtVEY OF T".I AREA RESIDENTS 3.1 Introduction tiost of the reports regarding the nuclear mishap on Three title Island near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on t' arch 08, 1979, have focused on the technological causes of the accident. The social and environmental impacts of the accident have been largely *Dnored. That the technological causes of the breakdown sho61d be identified and corrected is unquestionable, as they may affect the operation of other nuclear power plants either in operation or under construction. There are also, however, a number of social questions --questions related to the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of the resi-dents of the area before, during, and after the accident--that also merit investigation and analysis. They include: -- Nhen did;thel residents. offSouth ?CentralLPennsylvanial find:out2 aboutitheJaccident::and how? -- yhoievacuated:and!why did..they! choose l to do so?: g -- Where1did the evacuees go and how;long:did. they; stay? -- Did ;the Laccident' have any; social and psychological effects, T on' theTrisidents ofmthe areaf - What are:the perceivediimpactsigf the,nucleaNaccidention!the area's environment::and economy? -- How:di d' the'. accident Laffect; the resi dents ' ? opinions j toward) <nuclea_rgower and; nuclear related issues 7; Answers to these and other related questions are important in order to assess the impact of the accioent on the T!!I area population and the local environment, and for developing efficient and effective plans in the event that a similar accident should occur again on T"I or at some other nuclear i power plant. 3.2 'he Survey Because answers to the questions posed above could only be obtained from the residents themselves, a questionnaire was designed and a social survey was taken. ;The questionnaire'was nailed tore sample'.of households: u_

so l l 5 iQhe;Tff!;a rea Wsouth 1 Centra 12ennsy.1 vani a;wi thi p;two; weeks!aftsFMe g 4accide$5 It was critical to query area: residents as soon after the acci-dent as possible because they might forget details about their actual behav-1 fors which may be important in planning subsequent evacuation strategies. l 1 '3.3 The Survey Instrument l l The survey was comprised of five different sets of questions, all of which were of a forced response nature: i 3.3.1 The Accidr,it The first 'et of questions inquired.about the residents' knowledge of the nuclear reactor on Three Mile' Island, the distance of their homes from the plant, and when and how they found out about the accident. s 3.3.2 The Evacuation Decision A second series of questions focused on evacuation: who left' the area during the crisis, when and why did they leave, where did they go, and when did they return. Conversely, those who remained in the area during the crisis were asked why they chose not to evacuate, did they ever consider evacuating e and if so, where would they most likely have gone. They were also queried with whom they would have stayed. In this section of the ques-tionnaire, the respondents were also asked if they thought there should have 1 been a full scale evacuation, and under these circumstances, where would I they have most likely gone. l l 3.3.3 Attitudes Toward 'luclear Enertly and Confidence in fleporting the - Accident The third set of questions concerned the residents' attitudes toward nuclear-related issues. The respondents were queried about their opinions i about having some of their electricity generated by nuclear power both be-fore and after the accident on THI; whether they would like to see the U.S. generate more or less electricity from nuclear power; whether they had 1 friends or relatives working at the TMI plant; who should pay for the clean-up i operations; what group of officials did they have most confidence in'during i l e

23 local officials generally agreed that the residents within five miles of the plant were in the greatest danger, the largest number of households were sel-ected from zone 1 (Table 3.2). Beyond 15 miles (24 kilometers), a-simple random sample of households from the Carlisle, Duncannon, and Lancaster urban areas was drawn from the Harrisburg and Lancaster (October 1978) telephone directories. Again, a random numbers. table was used;to identify page numbers,, columns, and names in the directories. While post office distance from Three Mile Island was used as the basis for sampling, the perceived distance f.om TMI as obtained from the questionnaire was used for the analysis of results. Each respondent was asked how far he or she lived from the reactor. Whether accurate or not. this was the estima-tion of distance which figured into each household's decision-making process. Thus, while two measures of distance (post office distance and perceived dis-tance) were recorded for each respondent, the latter is the most ccmpatible for use in a behavioral analysis such as this one. 3.5 The Response Rate Of the 300 questionnaires mailed to the sample households, 267 or 89% actually reached their destinations; 33 or 11% were returned by the post o f fi ces. More than half (150) of the number reaching.their destinations were completed and returned for a 56% response rate -(Table ~ 3.3). The response rate for each of the distance zones and the outlying communities was greater than 50% in every case except for zone 3 (11-15 miles) from which only 42% responded. i 1 b ____-----a-

E j ~ l 23 l TABLE 3.2 NUMBER OF QUESTIONNARIES MAILED BY ZONE Number of. 1 Number Which Number of Questionnaries-Reached. Replies Sant'Out Destination Received Zone 1 (1-5 miles) 63 55 32 Zone 2 (6-10 miles) 58 48 30 Zone 3 (11-15 miles) 57 48 20 Subtotal 178 151 82 8 } Carlisle 40 35 24 Duncannon 41 40 23 ) l Lancaster 41 41 21 l i Subtotal 122 116 68 TOTAL 300 267 150 Source: TMI Survey, MSU, April,1979. e

as TABLE 3.3 l RESPONSE RATE TO THE THREE MILE ISLAND QUESTIONNAIRE Zone Rate of Response 2one 1 (1-5 miles) 58.2% Zone 2 (6-10 miles) 62.5% l Zone 3 (11-15 miles) 41.'7% i Subtotal 54.3% Carlisle 68.5% l Duncannon 57.5% Lancaster 51.2% Subtotal 58.6% TOTAL 56.2% Source: TMI Survey, MSU, April,1979. I l l 1 i 1 l -__________--______--__a

aa I ad hoc evacuation; and -(3) there was a fear of producing' a more long-. lasting negative impact on the state,'the local area, and possibly' the' nuclear power j industry itself. l Because of the absence of an evacuation plan, state officials would ' have' been hard pressed to coordinate a full-scale evacuation during' the early stages of the accident when it was most needed. Interviews 'with pub-J u lic officials revealed that there was considerable uncertainty about how people would behave in the event of an evacuation order as well'as the goods and services.which they would require before leaving (like gas) and when they reached their destinations. Specifically, such unknowls as the following would have' presented problems in the event of an ad hoc evacuation: -{ -- how quickly would residents respond to an ordered evacuation; -- how congested would the highways be; -- in what direction would people be moving; -- would it be better to channel that movement in a'particular direction; -- what capacities should evacuation shelters be selected to hold; I -- where should shelters be located; i -- what services and essential goods (foods, medicines, blankets, counseling, etc.) would evacuees demand in designated shelters-and in other areas where they might be heavily concentrated;- -- how would security of property in the evacuated area be: assured; -- how would the aged and the infirm respond to an evacuation order and how would their needs be provided for; i -- how would institutionalized ' populations and the evacuation-resistent be handled; and -- how would transportation of the population without automobiles. l which comprised 3% of the TMI survey respon' dents, be handled. l Against the backdrop of these considerations, the scale of evacuation and the choice of site for a designated shelter were the ~ two major consider-ations which public officials at the state level had to handle with respect-to evacuation. On Friday, March 30, a very limited evacuation-of the area was ordered by the Governor: All pregnant women and children w.kr five - l living within 5 miles of the plant were ordered to leave the area. EATpublict l ishel ter, was7desTgnated li n Heme # aboutM OI ni l es tfrom ;TMI ; GThat; shel tsrb twas!used byconlyll38; evacuees, C.ewsweek, April 23,1979, p. 29). .j

ce and Carlisle'. 9% of the respondents from these three urban centers evacuated. The shadow was demonstrated to be most intense, however, up to a distance 10 to 12 miles from TMI because of the added impact of the Governor's advice to stay indoors. This suggestion apparently increased the likelihood of poten- ' tial danger as perceived by many families and thus triggered a personal decision to evacuate. AThels hadow scas t! byt the: e va cua ti on7 o rdeEwaEi niensiEMdl wi' des pread Ei n the? case l.o f0 TMI1fo t two basi c1 reasons Gfi rs t qthe ' pecul i a rj na, tu re t o flalnucl ea ra di s as terimakeE i tiimpos s i bl e; fogpeopl e ;toieval ua te[the fdangerato; w hi ch g ~ . thep2a re : ex posed Lwhi chZ when Ecombi ned ;wi thy con fl i cti n gl i n fbreati on ; from lal lj ) sources; 21 e ads 3GiW iddTgespaphi hal Eme rgi nT6fia fetyltolthe ; go ve rnment ' sl I procl ai med; radi us;o f; dan ge r gSecond, ; seri ouss tal k' o f; a Tfu11 ?s cal e ? eva~cua ti ong - contiiued evin?aftair allimited evacuationihadLbeenforderedQ This? discussion; F j prompted 1mo ret faisi l i eslo 51 ea ve!than l1 f; thef government; ha d; acted j con ft dently) 5E5Ethiloutcomelofitheiaccident, dropped talk of any further evacuation l measures, and offered a strong rationale for the extent of the partial evacuation which was ordered. 4.3.3.3 The Motivation to Evacuate As might be expected, the major motivating factor in generating an evacuation of the Three Mile Island area was ancern about safety, a response which was indicated by 91% of the sample (Figure 4.13). The other leading facters were conflicting reports from government and utility company officials. 57% of the evacuees cited reports from both government and utility company officials and 70% cited reports from one or the other or both. Eve ryone. I who evacuated indicated one of these two responses (safety or conflicting reports) and 61% indicated both. In addition, 20% of those who evacuated indicated that the news media had played a role in their decision.. Of the seven evacuees who both lived within five miles of the crippled plant and had preschool children, only two indicated that they left because they were ordered to evacuate. In addition, only three respondents indicated that they evacuated because everyone was evacuating. The low relative fre-quencies of both of these responses seem to suggest that residents were responding to neither the dictates of government nor ma'ss behavior but instead I to personal factors, especially concern for health and safety.

sa-Evacuation' units may further be classified by their composition. The; may comprise either entire families or partial' families. In the Three - Mile Island survey, two out of every three evacuation' units leaving home-were entire families. Not unexpectedly, when only part of a family evacuated, .1t was in most cases the wife-and children. 111 thin 6 miles of the plant, where concern 'about safety would have been.most intense, entire families-outnumbered partial families by more than three' to one. Only in - the - sample communities beyond.15 miles did more' partial families evacuate than entire families. 4.3.3.5 The-Timing and Duration ~of Evacuation Most (54%) of those who evacuated left on Friday, March 30 (Figure ~ 4.14 ). Only one person in the sample evacuated before Friday. The decision to leave on Friday was probably due to a combination of several factors : (1) The' Governor's partial evacuation order was' issued on Friday and serious talk of a full evacuation surfaced for_the first time'on Friday as well. (2) Since Friday is-the end of both the work week and the school week, two major constraints on evacuation were lifted so that many TMI area residents could take advantage of the weekend. Of those who did evacuate, 24% left on Saturday; 11% left on Sunday; and 9% left on Monday.. Results-of the survey indicated a tendency for residents closer to the plant to evacuate earlier than residents farther away. At least 77% of the evacuees who lived within 6' miles of the plant left on. Thursday or Friday and none left as late as Monday. On the other hand, only one-third of the evacuees who lived 10 miles or more from TMI (including outlying communities) evacuated on Friday;;27% left on Monday. All of the evacuees who.left on Monday lived 10 miles or more from the plant; none were entire families. In fact 80% of the evacuation units which left - on Sunday comprised only partial families (wives and children), which suggests that those who postponed an evacuation decision 'until later in the weekend usually decided that only part of the family needed to evacuate. The post - ponement of a decision by many may have resulted-from several factors: i (1) The certainty that schools would be closed on Monday, (2) the certainty that circumstances were not improving, and (3) the choice of a destination farther from Three Mile Island. a___ _

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H The. duration' of stay away from home ranged from one to 16 days, but 54% (25 out of 46 respondents) returned home 2.to 4 days-after leaving. (Figure 4.15). In the 3-mile' zone closest to TMI no one who evacuated returned home before Monday, April 2, and no one stayed away.less than. 3 days. The critical variable in determining how longl families, whose homes were close to the plant, stayed away was the presence of preschool children and pregnant women. Of those evacuees who lived within 3 miles-of the plant, 585 stayed away between 3 and 6 days and 42% stayed away between 9 and 13 days. None~of those in the first group (3 to 6 days away) had children 'under 5 whereas-all but one of those in the second group (9 to 13 days away) had children under 5. The average duration of evacuation in days shows a decided distance-decay relationship up to 15 miles of the plant with a rebound in duration of stay away from home in the sample communities beyond 15 miles. The greater proportion of partial families among evacuation units would account for the rebound since women and children often have fewer constraints on their behavior than working men. 4.3.3.6 Socioeconomic Characteristics of Evacuees In order to determine what socioeconomic sector of the population was likely to evacuate in the event of a nuclear accident, the following socio-economic and demographic characteristics were crosstabulated with the decision' i to evacuate or to consider evacuation: occupation, income, age of household head, length of residence in South Central Pennsylvania, and political ideology. No statistically significant results, using the Chi-square test, were identified but several tentative generalizations' may be offered. Occupation (Figure 4.16): All respondents were classified into one of four occupational categories: white collar, blue collar, retired, and un-- employed (including homemakers). Of the four, a greater proportion of white collar workers evacuated and a lesser proportion never considered evacuation' than in any other group. The group which was least likely to either evacuate d or consider evacuation was the retired population, 36% of whom never considered evacuating. Income (Figure 4.16): Six classes of annual family income, ranging fret less than $10,000 to more thar, $30,000, were offered as choices on the _.__A.--_-

~s7 questionnaire. That group earning.less. than $10,000 per year-had the lowest proportion (10%) of respondents evacuating. All.. other income ; groups had between 25% and 32% of their numbers. evacuating. The-lowest income group also had the highest proportion of families who never considered evacuation. hg Household Head (Figure 4.16): Six ' age groups were used to, aggregate responses to the age ~ question in the survey. Those respondents aged 40 and under were the-most likely to either evacuate or consider evacuation. Those over 70 had the highest proportion of respondents who did not even consider evacuating during the accident..The lowest proportion of evacuees though was.among those aged 41 to 50. -Those age cohorts'over 50 exhibited very similar profiles with 20-25% of their numbers. evacuating and 40-45% considering evacuation. Length of, Residence (Figure 4.17): Eight categories were used to sum-f marize the question which asked respondents how long they had been li_ving in South Central Pennsylvania. Those living in the area thirty years or-. less had a higher proportion of evacuees among theirl numbers than did those living in the area more than 30 years. Political Ideolony (Figure 4.17): Respondents were asked to identify themselves as conservative, moderate, or liberal. When stratified on this basis, there was a striking increase in the proportion of evacuees from the conservative group (12%), through the moderate group-(30%), to.the liberal group (57%). 4.3.4 The Geography of Evacuation from Three.'ille Island: Actual and Potential 4.3.4.1 Configuration of the Actual Evacuation Space The choice of an evacuation destination requi'res that a decision be made about two interrelated considerations, the choice of evacuation quarters and the choice of evacuation site. In dn attempt to delineate the spatial pattern-ing g evacuation behavior, the destinations of the 46 respondents who left their homes in the wake of the TMI accident were mapped. The patterns.which evolved suggest that despite the time constraints which required rather quick decision-making, those who evacuated chose destinations rationally and, in l

.se i general, in striking contrast to the types of destinations which might be projected to compri'se.the evacuation space of those fleeing a natural dis-- aster. The median distance which evacuations sites were away from-TMI was. 85 miles (Figure 4.18). 'Their distribution was decidedly to the north-and west of. the nuclear site (Figure 4.19). Half 'of all the evacue'es chose destinations between 45 and 90 miles from TMI thus defining a zone of perceptual desirability.y with an especially well-defined inner boundary to the north and west of the reactor. Just beyond the 45-mile are th'ere emerges a crescent of receiving communities. This are is not continued full circle to the south and east of TMI where there is a conspicuous void - of evacuation destinations between Harrisburg'and the Philadelphia-Wilmington area. Evacuees from the TMI vicinity sought destinations.far enough.away j from the plant to put a buffer between themselves and the. source of danger. The outer limit of this zone of perceptual desirability appears'to mater-ialize at a distance of about 90 milis from TMI. Beyond this distance the number of evacuation sites begins to decline. The reluctance on the part of most evacuees to go too far' from home determines the outer limit of this zone. It is also attributable to constraints imposed by concern about returning home quickly if needed, a need to keep close tabs on what was happening in the home area, and higher costs incurred with long-distance moves. A strong directional bias is apparent in Figure 4.19 with almost half of the evacuees choosing destinations in the quadrant northwest of TMI and only one out of 10 choosing ' destinations'in the, quadrant to the southeast. l Perhaps owing to the preference for locations north and west of the plant-at distances between 45 and 90 miles away, only about one-quarter of the evacuees chose destinations outside of Pennsylvania. From the survey data, however, one cannot assess the importance of state boundaries in influencing. the choice of destinations, even though there seems to be a preference-for in-state sites. ,I The directionality revealed in Figure 4.19 may be accounted for by two major factors: First, a consciousness of wind direction which would i " pull" evacuees upwind to the northwests Second, a. fear of evacuating to ~ ~

es-i I l l as widely as California, Arizona, and Florida. (4) The preference' for locations. north and west of MI.is not'nearly as distinct on the maps of potential destinations as it is; on the map of actual destinations. I In general, _ the potential. evacuation spaces, as delineated using re - sponses to two hypothetical questions on the MI questionnaire, comprise j less well-considered destinations than _ the actual evacuation. space. 'The contrast between' actual and potential evacuation spaces seems to suggest that centrifugal forces 'are more readily perceived than are the. centripetal i forces affecting the' choice of evacuation-sites in the wake'of a nuclear disaster. Centrifugal forces, that is,.those tending to dispel the resi- '1 I dent population away from a troubled nuclear site,!seem to create an evacuatio_n_ hollow in both the actual' and potential evacuation spaces. Those who did not actually leave their homes, however, more often gave potential destinations which indicate that they were possibly not as attuned to the forces which would tend to hold them within a reasonable ~ distance of home. This interpretation would explain why destinations - 1 ] indicated by potential evacuees are more distant than actual evacuation destinations. Nevertheless, it should not be ruled out that'the evacuation quarters open to many may be extremely limitad by the lack of family and friends living within the zone of perceptual desirability or the lack of funds to secure hotel or motel accommodations.- If there is little choice involved in the selection of a location and if the site which is decided upon is disadvantaged by being downwind or far away, such factors may actually influence the decision about whether to evacuate or not. Con-sequently, the map of destinations (Figure 4.22) of those who considered evacuation but did not take action, should and does illustrate a greater number of less desirable. locations in terms 'of both distance and direction-from Three title Island. 4'.3.4.4 Preferences for Evacuation Quarters i The ma'jority (57%) of those who evacuated stayed with relatives and - an additional 24% stayed with friends. (Figure 4.24). Only 17% stayed in ho te l s o r mo te l s. ;No tl a ; s i n gl e tavacueC i nTthel samp.l e ; s tayed;i ny thej des fnatedishelteCiniHersheyp The most popular destinations would seem to be those which require the fewest social and financial adjustments. - Undoubt-i l A

71 ed1y, one reasoniwhy;theidesijpiated;shalteriemerged;as;the< choice;otilastR reisitiTivEI657snOEipetedssocialfstpess? precipitated)byMifelin massi guartersgIn addition, Hershey.was a less than' ideal. site for' the desig ' nated shelter during the accident and this may have contributed to the 1 unexpectedly low utilization of the facility. The sports arena. is located only slightly beyond the 10-m11e zone wherein all residents were advised - to remain indoors. It is located within the 10-12 mile zone used in this j analysis from which 47% of the respondents evacuated.. At the same-time 1 1 the media reported people evacuating to Hershey, people were evacuating. g from Hershey. While Hershey is only 10 miles away from TMI, the median distance which residents evacuated was '85 miles, reficcting an inordinately l wide gap between the decision made by government and the decisions made by individuals with respect to the choice of avacuation sites. Si tes ' for evacuation shelters might be better located at " perceptually safe" dis-l tances from the source of danger rathergthan' at distances which government officials have arbitrarily deemed to be '" safe enough." l The responses of.both groups of potential evacuees closely parallel the responses of the actual evacuees in terms of the desirability of evacuation quarters. Among all three groups, a majority expressed their preference for relatives, although proportionately fewer of those who did not evacuate said they would have stayed with friends. The proportion of those who indicated a preference for second homes and hotel / motel was almost identical among all three groups. A designated shelter was the choice of 9% of both groups of potential evacuees. In planning for a potential 1NI-type disaster, the results of this survey would seem to indicate that evacuees will select destinations where friends and relatives are living. Local conditions, however, are likely to influence the shape which an evacuation space takes in response to a nuclear accident. First, populations wherein a greater proportion of residents have second homes outside the radius of danger, are likely to avail themselves of those quarters, seasonal conditions permitting. Areas of second home development therefore may exert a strong pull on evacuees if they are located at perceptually safe' distances from the source of danger. Second, the proportion of people who own recreational vehicles or who are used to camping out, may influence the pattern which evacuation takes.

7s l which would be associated with the various types of evacuation quarters.sut as the homes of friends and relatives, public shelters, motels, second homes, and campgrounds. Locational constraints, i.e., the distance and direction a possible site is from the source of danger, are ~used to accept or reject various evacuation quarters as possible destinations-. W1 thin a stress' management framework, therefore, each potential destin-ation would be perceived as generating a given level of stress which would be the sum of socioeconomic stress (that deriving from the nature of the site itself) and locational stress -(that t iving from the distance.and direction from the nuclear power plant). Data collected fmm the TMI survey penr.it. a generalized stress curve ) to be drawn with respect to distance and with respect to the types of evac-untion quarters. Judging from the map of actual evacuation destinations, the most desirable locations wem between.45 and 90 miles fmm the disabled reactor with a decided tendency for evacuees to choose sites to the north and west. The locational stress curve therefore may be conceived to decline precipitously somewhere around 45 miles from the reactor, the distance at g which must ir.dividuals apparently perceive themselves-to be far enough away to insure their safety. Likewise, the locational stress curve, after " bottoming out" between 45 and 90 miles from THI, may be conceived ta begin a rise about 90 miles away as individuals perceive destinations beyono that frontier to be too distant to maintain contact with the home area or to return home quickly if needed. A personal stress curve, representing the total social and financial stress perceived as being associated with various types of evacuation' quarters, may be conceived to parallel the preferences which survey respondents expressed: for various types of accommodations. Under this premise, a generalized stress curve would peak at public shelters and diminish through motels, friends, and family. While constraints of availability may limit. access to any category of evacuation quarters, they would be most serious in limiting the number of second homes and campgrounds chosen as destinations since only a small propor-tion of the population would have access to such accommodations..Second homes, however, if located at perceptually desirable distances fmm the accident site, may be hypothesized to be preferred evacuation quarters since the soc and financial adjustments necessary to take advantage of such quarters woulo L_--_____-_._.--._--._.-.--_--_.-.-_-____.__._.-

283 l I i CHAPTER 8 RECOMMENDATIONS ~ 8.1 Understanding Nuclesr Accidents 1. That. nuclear accidents be considered within the context of technological hazards (Chapter 2). 2. That the perception of nuclear accidents and human adjustment to them be l considered as differing in scope, scale, magnitude, and impact from natural hazards. 3. That the variety of' nuclear hazards that exist need to be dealt with individually since they differ in geographic scale, destructive impact, i and personal and environmental impacts. i 1 8.2 Evacuation plans 1 1. That a series of planning models be developed which take into consider-ation the following: variations in population density, rural-urban population mix, age structure, automobile ownership, accessibility to public transit, second home ownership, and other social and demographic characteristics unique to the area in question. 2. That social surveys be conducted to identify an -ordering of preferences for different types of evacuation shelters (relatives, public parks - evacuation shelters, etc.) at varying distances (25 miles, 50 miles, 100 miles, etc.) from a nuclear power plant. 3[ E That! publi Rhacuation 2 shel ters;. be;1.denti fied ca ti va ryi ng di s tances((up; 7 .: to:100? miles)1 from nuclearLpower? plants 1thatJare : based on"prevailingi l wi nd i esnM tNns '(iipEi dsi and downwi nd ) fand ithe Preferences Treveal ed j i.n. social!surveysh 4 That public evacuation shelters be equipped to administer on a short and long term basis the basic human needs (food, water, shelter, etc.) as well as recreation / leisure activities, psychological counseling, and telephone switchboard facilities. 5. That the public be informed of the facilities and services provided at public evacuation shelters. 6. That within the context of emergency preparedness prerecorded messages

. 234 relating to evacuation plans be available to anyone_ phoning specified -public offices (post offices, police, fire, hospitals, public transit, national guard, etc.) and tuning in.specifically. designated emergency radio bands, and that highways be designated as emergency evacuation routes. ~ 7. That emergency plans.be developed to handle populations affected by a. range of nuclear disasters, radioactive leakages (in air.. water, and soil), transit accidents, and core meltdowns. - 8.3 Reporting of Nuclear Disasters 1. That both utility company officials and federal government officials attempt at all costs to eliminate ambiguous and conflicting reporting in their coverage of nuclear hazards and disasters.. 2. That a pool of important and cualified rocial and physical scientists be identified who, in the event of. a TMJ-type-nuclear accident, could serve as an infonnation filter between the federal government ar.d ) utility company on one hand and the general public on. the other. The sole purpose of such a pool would be to clarify ambiguous.and con-flicting reporting. 3. That the channels of information at local and state levels of govern-ment be established to effectively disseminate information of any nuclear accident. 4. That the news media, u'tility companies, and federal government establish a modus operandi for reporting nuclear accidents. That coverage and reporting would include the combined efforts of social and behavioral scientists', journalists, 'pn'ysical scientists, engineers, and government agency employees. 8.4 Public Relations 1. That National Regulatory Offices at national and-regional levels and electric utility companies together should implement immediately programs designed to alert and educate the public near and distant from nuclear power plants about (a) the potential health and environmental dangers of repeated TMI-type accidents, (b) steps being taken to present the

p._. .q 20s i - i l recurrence, and (c) measures underway to deal' with potential massive and partial evacuation on a short and long term basis.- 2. That in view of the very strong interest among TMI area residents for greater consumer involvement in nuclear decisions, citizens representing 1 the public interest be included within the appropriate decision. making bodies of the utility companies,and the federal government.' 3. That representatives of the federal government' and citizens. represer. ting the public interest be included within the decision-making.. bodies of: those~ utility companies presently generating nuclear energy and those contemplating a shift to nuclear power. 4. That utility companies and the NRC. survey' populations in areas designated for new nuclear power plant construction and potential ' waste disposal j sites to determine public sentiments. 5. That populations and areas subjected to periodic and continual radiation dangers be informed of the potential dangers to human and' environmental well-being. 8.5 Research Fundina l 1. That increased research funds be allocated to measure. spatial and. a temporal variations in nuclear-related issues, for example, tucal and statewide referendums and social surveys at local, regional, and national scales. 2. That research funds be available to measure the attitudes'of residents 4 within 50 miles of nuclear power plants to determine their perception of l risk, planned actions in case of evacuation,.and perceived impact of nuclear facilities on health, safety, and property. 3. That research funds be made available to conduct longitudinal-studies. of Three Mile Island area residents and other areas-heretofore affected by nuclear accidents in order to measure the effects hazards have on i health, changing attitudes toward nuclear power, perceived risk, and impact on children. l 4. That research funds be increased to measure the perception, impact.-and 1 i response to technological hazards such as nuclear disasters and large _ _ _ _ _. _ _. _ _ _. _ _ _. _ _ _. _ _.. _ _ _.. _. ~ _. _ _,. -

2o8 scale power failures. 5. That a pool of research funds be established that would be readily available to measure the impact of short-lived technological disasters on human populations and the environment. 6. That increased research funds be made available for research by social and behavioral scientists into nuclear-related issues, 7. That trensdisciplinary and interdisciplinary research efforts be encouraged that focus on nuclear pclicy. 8. That fwiding be allocated to develop a series of scenarios of potential evacuation behavior in response to massive technological disasters. } O e

l a 215 l APPENDIX 2 RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE i j l l l l l l 1 l l 1 1 1 1

l 317 MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY I l espesf4541 orcdDGaApwy Ses? WeNuo a aumanse e emme j May 2$. 1979 Dear Residents i The pigliminary data gathering phase of our study investigating the public reaction regarding the Three Mile Island accident is completed. As you requested we are providing you with a sussary of those results. We are currently in the process of examining more ^j closely the changes in public opinion, the evacuation proc *ss itself, and the environmen-i tal and personal impacts of the incident. Our research team hopes to complete the anal. -l ysis of es:h area within the next month. Our results, as those provided you here. will' be made availanle to appropriate public officials and utility companies. I We went to thank you for your generous assistence and co" operation in helping us carry out our study. We hoge that the results will be useful to these working on the social and technological issues that relate to nuclear power. ctfully T e B~ anley 1. Bruno Phone: 1 Professer of Geography ($17) 155-4649 Michigan State University ($17) 353-8780 150 responses received Set response rate. 1. Befrre the accident did you know that there was a nuclear reactor en Three i Mile Island? 85%Yes - 5% no l 2. How far is your hous free Three Mile Islandt Swithin 1$ siles: Range.'2 - #2 miles. 3. The accident happened around 3:00 a.m. on u.a.anday, March 23. Whos did you first lepra about the incident? 35' Wednesday aserning. March 23. 0% Thursday aftorsoon. Mart.h 3 F undnesday aftornoon. March 28 TThursday evenias. March 29 F Wedoenday eventas. March 23 1Thursdayaerates. March 3 EFriday March 30 and later Saturday. March 31 or later 4 New did you first learn about the accidenef 51 Radio 14% Television ,jl, Newspaper 1 Family Maeber E Friend 5. Did you or anyone in your fsaily evsouata your hoes during the week after the accident? 31% Yes 69% no l12YES: S of those who evacuated. lIfNO:i Who evacuated? I* Why did you not evasustaf When did they leave? (geck as easy as necessary.) No place to go. 0% Wednesday 2S% Saturday W No apparaat reases to evacuate. T Thursday F 5unday MCould not lasve job or business. W Triday T Monday TWeeded to taks care of f ars/ livestock. M Home wee a safe distance from plaat. Where did ther sof UNo order to evacuate was issued. 'l City / Towns Median Distance w 85 miles TToo old to evacuate. States 7ht stayec a rennsyAvanta T Eendicapped. i Segedatorwsta M Ne childres to be concerned about. l 5 yamily "% Secoed Esas M Fear of Leeting. " N Friends W Estel/ Motel W Too many ceafliccias reports. 3Designat,ad Shelter W No one else in my area evacuated. Other 0% What anda them decide to evacuate! (Check as easy as oncessary.) 91% Concerned about safety. g Tes youevergensiderevacuatingt j 30 g, 4 Ordered to evaeuste. .j T tveryone was evacuattag. If you assunted yee to the proceding Neue Media. i questies, where would you most 11 haly l

• Conflicting reports from hace sentf j

soverummet officials. City / Towns 26% Conflicting reports free States utility company officials. To stay at or vita:% of those who answered yes. 40% Confliccias reports free both. 51% Family 1 $econd Home others 35% Erriends & Hotel /7:otal 9% Desinanted shelter Whee did they retura homet 0 Thursday. March 29 7% Thursday. April 5 O Friday. March 30 F Friday. April 6 T$aturday. March 31 M$sturday. April ? T sunday. April l' T Monday. April 2 % sunday. April 8 enaar. April 9 Tuesday. April 3 TTaosasy. April 10 day. April 4 Zwednesday. April 11 and after

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6.. In light of the information which has been reported since the incident at Three Itale Island, do you think there should have been a full eveduation of the immediate asea! 4fiYes hlle 7.

If a Presidential order had densaded an evacuacion of yourthoes area, where would you most likely have gone? City /Yount States To stay at or vitt 1 T Family ;ns 5% Secoed asac Friends alg8etal/Hetal 1<> Designated shelter

s. Refers the tacident at Three Ittle Island. how d&d feu feelsabeut having eens of your electricity generated by nuclear povert al% Favored auslear power 23% Opposed -}aar pouesh

& Indifferent 9. asw would yen doseribe your feelings on the sans issue todayf ' 1 1adifferent 1Feverauclearpower

1. 8% Oppose==elaar powere.

10, Would you like to see the Patted States derive more or lese: electricity frea

==elaar pouarf 1 More SJ% Jans 1 Indifferent 25% you have any friends or relatives oogleyed at Three teile Islandt 11. Did Yes 75% ge

12. Uhe de you think should pay for the cleam-up operettaes*at Three ItLie Islandt 21%Y; 17W ederal goveramast*90%Y 8%If Utility company out of profits F

1 6%Y 17WState goverummac 8%YI NCoesumare out of utility bills

13. Do you favor greater comeumer (eitisea) involvemmat in decisions related to

= M aae issusef 75% Yes 21% Me. r ~ ^

14. Ia which of the fo11sving did you have the most confidense.during the period after the ame4 dant? (Check ses.)

sotY; 17W Reports from federal of ficials.. 8%Yl91%If Reports fues. local efficials. l 21%Yi Eneports free state officials. 3%Yl93 Reports freerardf ry esapany efficials. l l

13. Regarding its impact es.the. local area do you think theciosident at Three ItLla Island willa Yes No 73% 21% Depress property values is the arest WW Discourage people from moving into the areaf M M stifle businese and Ladustrial growth is the armat M W Rave a negative impact on agriculture in the areaf W M Reduce the number of people osing the river for recreation?

W W Yaraisk the overall image of the areaf

16. Regarding its impact on your personal life. do you think.the imaidaat will:

Yes lio 27% 62% Affeet your peroseal health? W 'TT Affect the future unil-betag of your childreate (if applicable.) W W Affect the usy in which you make a livtag? W W Eaduce the value of your property or the proposty es which you live? l W W Make you consider moving out of the areaf I W W Drive up the price you pay for electricity? l l

17. Bow long have, you lived La South Central Pennsylvanist mm.H*= = sm...

l

18. Do you sua an antemobilef 87% Yes 3% No

19. 1Anat is the eee gation of the perses assuertas this questiseas1ref n2% white collar 20% blue collarl 15% retireds 13% ha===anr*=s and unemployed.

~

20. Bow do you identify yourself politically 33% Conservative SLModerate g liberal

21. Eso eney people are there in your householdt Median a 2.9 persons.

Eow easy children under 18 are there living at haunt

• n had children under 18 new many children under ST 13% had children.under 5 that is the age of the head or heads of your household? Iledian ame a h9 vaars

21. In which of the followies categories would you place your.grees annual haily incomet 14% aas thes 810.000 20.000 to $13.000 t

T W 810.000 to $13.000 823.000 to $30.000 E813.000 to 820.000 830.000 and over If you would like a summary of the results of this questisemaire please print your .esma and address here Name Addeses - _ _ _ _ _ _ ---}}