ML20235D793
| ML20235D793 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1987 |
| From: | Barnes V, Lindell M BATTELLE HUMAN AFFAIRS RESEARCH CENTERS |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-3-A-006, OL-3-A-6, NUDOCS 8709250349 | |
| Download: ML20235D793 (12) | |
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'87 Es? 17 fM M Protective Response to Technological Emergency:
Risk Perception and BehavioralIntention By M. K. Lindell* and V. E. Barnes*
Abstract: Thu arncte erarnmes ahn as suggested bi the Three Male Island Nualear Siation (TAlli event. the pu'hc as (24 km), also taacuated. Subsequent analyses have more inchned to evacuate on response to a raduatoon release cor:clud:d that the evacuation was orderl% which than to a natural ha:ard. Durms the TMI mcodent. for ex-ts a o typical Of natural disasters,3 but there has emple, dod authortnes present wntustne or conilaceme mfor.
been no satisfactory explanation of why the re-manon or dod the pubhc have on exagerrated perception o.f rodnatwn ruk. khovnoralmiennon studies are combmed u nh sponse was so much more extensive than expected.
r:3A percepnon analtsrr to ascertam (if the erfent to nhsch An explanation for the overresponse by the miennons to erotuate son be eenerah:ed from one sample to publiC would have practical as well as scientific another and from one ha:ard to another, Q) the Jegree to significance..lf, however, the overresponse to the uhich beharwrol miennons are related to spectftc dimenssons of ruk percepuon. and(J) hon puhhc pers epoons of ruk com-situation was a unique outcome of Confusing and pare u nh esumates of ruk prodused bi reacwr acuJent can' conflicting information, then the development of sequence analnes.
un orderly information dissemination process would be sufficient to resolve the problem.5 Es-tablishing an agreed-on emergency classification The extensive evacuations by local residents during system, installing reliable communications systems, the nuclear power-plant accident at Three Mile and predesignating the content of emergency mes-Island Nuclear Statian Unit 2 (TMI-2) created some si nificant doubts about probable public re-sages (all required by federal regulations ) would 6
F substantially lessen the likelihood of plant, local, sponse in the event of another major nuclear wate, and federal personnel disseminating conflict-power plant emergency. Prior to the TMI-2 ac-ing information.
cident, the public response to radiation hazard ifowever, if the overresponse were also attrib-was presumed to be similar to that for natural utable to exaggerated perceptions of the risks of hazards: The public would be difficult to convince radiation exposure, then the problem would be to evacuate when necessary.' However, studies of the experience at TMI-2 have documented that one cf content as well as of process. In this es.se, required corrective measures would include iden-many more people evacuated the 5-mile (8 km) radius than would be accounted for by the target tification of the specific erroneous beliefs held by' the public and an attempt to eliminate them f
group for the gcunor's evacuation advisory; preg-through the provision of accurate information.
nant women and preschool children.2" Moreover, many households in the area from 5 to 15 miles (8 to 24 km), and even some beyond 15 miles ALTERNATIVE STUDY APPROACHES
/
Behavioral Intention
" Michael K. Lindell is e research scientist at the Battelle Seattle Research Center and a sisiting associate professor of Confusion over conflicting information Con-rsychology at the Georgia institute of Technology. He holds tributed significantly to the scale of the evacua-the Ph.D. degree in psychology from the Unnersity of Col-tions at TMI: 78% of those who evacuated cited 2
e orth, Boulder (1975). where he first became irnnbed in re-confusing information as a reason for leaving,)
- g search on pubhc response to natura. and technoingical o
harards. He was the principal investigator for this project, However, recent studies of behavioral intentions j f which was conducted under Ltional Science Foundation in response to hypothesized nuclear power-plant P2 A43f 3n0. Current address GeorFia Institute of accidents suggest that excessive evacuations would [9 Grant Tecnnology School of Psychology. Atlanta, G A 30332.
occur again in the event of a major accident at?
"Valerte E. Barnes is a research scienust at the Battelle jn Seattle Research Center. She recened the Ph.D. degree in of households in the vicinity of.the Shoreham N
psychology from the University of washmyton in 1984. Cur, rent address: lo00 Northeast 41st Stree;. Seattle. WA 98105.
Nuclear Power Station, persons were asked how they would respond to each of three different an-8709250349 870708 PDR ADOCK 05000322 NUCLEAR SAFETY. Vol. 27. No 4. October-December 1986
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s ar-4 l 458 GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS l
nouncements about protective action recommen-tions. The forrner hase sought to explain the dations." The announcements adsised that:
behavior of respondents as a function of their (1) all persons within 5 miles (8 km) stay indoors, proximity to the hazard and demographic char-t l (2) all pregnant women and preschool children aeteristics--especially tho>e characteristics which within 5 miles (8 km) evacuate and everyone else affect who receives a warning: the latter have fo-within 10 miles (16 km) remain indoors, and cused on the interrelationships among beliefs of (3) everyone lising within 10 miles (16 km) evac-respondents about the hazards. Moreover, al-uate. All three announcements elicited significant though the risk perception studies have investi-overresponse. Forty percent of the residents gated perceptions of a number of different within 5 miles (8 km) reported an intention to hazards, each of the behavioral intention studies j
evacuate in response to the first adsisory (shel-has addressed only a single hazard.
-l tering within 5 miles (8 km)]. Over half (579) of The complementarily of these two types of
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those within 5 miles (8 km) said that they would studies suggests thal better prediction of protec.
evacuate in response to the second advisory (evac-tive response to technological emergencies would l
uation by pregnant wornen and preschool chil-be achieved if the two approaches could be com-I dren). ApproximaMis half of the residents living bined Assessment of behavioral intentions and between 10 and 35 miles (16 and 56 km) from the risk perceptions would make possible the achieve-plant said that they would evacuate in response ment of three research goals. The first is to de-to the third announcement [everyone within 10 termine the extent to which intentions to evacuate miles (16 km) advised to evacuate). In summary, generalize from one sample to another and from these behavioral intention studies'
- seem to in-one hazard to another. In this regard,it is notable dicate that the overresponse at TMI was not a that many studies have investigated evacuation unique phenomenon. (Their major limitation is intentions in response to a hypothuized radio-that they have not investigated local residents' logical emergency at sites where nuclear power-beliefs about radiation hazard that might prompt plant emergency planning was a highly politicized i
them to evacuate even though not advised te do issue." Use of a sample of impondents not so so.)
highly sensitized to the hazard ur der investigation Risk Perception may offer a different perspective t n the propensity to evacuate in an emergency. S.milarly, investi-Other investigations have asked respondents gating another technological hazard in addition to report on their perceptions of technological to radiation would reveal the degree to which the t
risk but have not addressed protective response.
public's response to a toxic chemical would be e!
Slovic, Fischhoff, and Liechtenstein," for example, the same as their response to radiation.
I asked respondents to rate several risk character.
The second goalis to determine the degree to isti9s of a number of technologies, from handguns which behavioralintentions are related to specific t.
to nuclear power. Statistical analysis showed that dimensions of risk perception. If intentions to fj the risk dimensions generally fell into two major evacuate can be reliably predicted on the basis
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categories: " dread" and " unfamiliar." Ratings of of individuals' perceptions of the ha:ard and of i
" dread" were highly correlated with ratings of alternative protective actions, one can have in-p f.
" severity not controllable,"" globally catastrophic creased confidence that the reasons for evacuating consequences,"" consequences certain to be fatal,"
have been identified. The third goalis to compare l
" exposure involuntary," " catastrophic conse-public perceptions of the risk characteristics with E'
quences," and " risks and benefits inequitable."
estimates of those risk characteristics produced
- 8, tr Ratings of" unfamiliar" were correlated with rat-by reactor accident consequence analyses
- 6 h ings of " damage producing proceues not observ-(R ACAs)(Refs.15 and 16).
- f able,"" risks unknown to those exposed," " risks The first step of an approach integrating,the '
L de-unknown to science," and " effects delayed." Other protective respon;c and perceived risk perspecy
- I studies have followed sir'ilar procedures."'"
tives is to identify characteristics of theihazarf
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integrated Analyses and of the alternative protective ' actions that might be salient to the public in choosing an ap-i Behavioralintention and risk perception stud-propriate protective response during an emer-ies are largely complementary in their orienta-gency. The risk dimensions studied by Slovic and g(
WUCLEAR SAFETY. Vol 27, No 4, October-December 1986 6
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L-GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 459 his colleagues" do not seem to be satisfactory for if the distribution of responses to this question this purpose. because they were developed for use were highly skewed toward low levels of confi-in comparing extremely disparate hazards de-dence, the representatiseness of the responses to scribed only at a very abstract lesel. A more im-the other questions would be called into question.
mediately reievant set of dimensions was proposed Data bearing on this issue are reported below.
by Lindeu and Perry,' who suggested that the pervasive voluntary evacuations during the TMI Scenario Construction accident could be explained by the beliefs of local residents about (1) the speed of onset, (2) the After the students nad read the introductory scope and duration of the radiation hazard, and p rti n f the scenario. they were asked to re-(3) the degree of emergency preparedness for the 3p nd to a series of questions concerning their hazard. Although Lindell and Perry interpreted beliefs about the hazard, their beliefs about al-scope of impact in terms of the geographic extent ternative pr tective actions, and their likely re-of the hazard, Houts et al." found that the like-sp nse to protective action recommendations lihood of evacuation at TMI was almost as high fr m the governor. At appropriate points in the for respondents who were similar to the target series of questions, new information was intro-groups in the governor's evacuation advisory as duced that described subsequent events in the
'C""N it was for the target groups themselves. The data reported by Houts and his colleagues suggest that For the determination of whether similar re-perceptions of the demographic scope of the haz-sponses would be given to different hazards, two ard impact would be as important as perceptions scenarios were constructed. The first described a of the geographic scope of impact in explaining release of radioactive material from a nuclear protective response.
power plant, and the second described a release The second step of the integrated approach is f dioxin from a herbicide factory. Radiation haz-to use a controlled presentation of information ard was selected for its obvious relevance to the and a response oriented sequence of questions.
studies of behavioral intent;ons in a nuclear Controlling the presentation of information power-plant accident. Dioxin was selected as a through a predetermined emergency scenario en.
basis for comparison because a major release of sures that all respondents evaluate the hazard this hazardous material from an industrial facility within the context of appropriate protective re-could result in similar problems of emergency sponses. A response-oriented sequence introduces management. This is particularly clear from a de-each question about perceived characteristics of scription of the dioxin release from the Icmesa the hazard, perceived characteristics of alternative plant in Seveso, Italy.'8 Moreover, because dioxin protective actions, and behavioral intentions in has received considerable attention frtw the news the order in which it would arise during an actual media in recent years, especially in connection j
cmergency.
with the contamination of Times Beach, Mo., the level of public awareness of this hazard was ex-pected to be comparable to that of radiation. An-f PROCEDURE other reason for selecting dioxin was that, although data collected by Slovic and his col-q A questionnaire that briefly described an emer.
leagues" indicate that the hazards of nuclear gency involving a release of hazardous material power are considered to be substantially different from an industrial facility was given to 137 un.
from those of all other technologies and societal dergraduate respondents from the University of activities, Lindell and EarleI3 found that the haz-Washington. E. ause university students are not ards of a toxic chemical disposal facility were demographically representative of the population thought to be similar to those of nuclear (power-as a whole, they might be expected to be unrep.
plant and waste-repository) facilities. Comparison resntative with respect to their perceptions of of radiation and dioxin hazards would therefore technological risks as well. A partial assestment help to resolve this disagreement.
of such differences can be provided by asking A common set of questions assessing percep-respondents question. about their confidence in tions of the hazards, perceptions of the alternative the ability of plant personnel to prevent a release.
protective actions, and intentions to evacuate was N.
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NUCLEAR SAFETY Vol 27, No 4. October-Decemtrer 1986 i
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l GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 460 in their homes, as requested; and (4) how far away g
embedded in both scenarios. Because written mate-rials for the two scenarios diffared only with re-from the plant would they have to be before there I
spect to the referent (e.g..
dioactive material was no chance of exposure to any health or safety r
from a nuclear power plant or dioxin from a her-hazard from the accidental release.
Heide factoryL responses to the questions about The scenarios then indicated that the governor the rcdiation release can be compared directly had recommended the evacuation of pregnant women and preschool children within 5 miles with those about the dioxin release.
(8 km) of the nuclear plant (herbicide factory).
Four forms of the questior 4 tire were con-Respondents were asked to indicate how suscep-structed to guard against the possibility of context tible to radiation (dioxin) each of the following i
effects-i.e.. that responses to the radioactive re.
individuals would be in comparison with the lease and diosin release scenarios might influence target group: a ten-year old child 5 miles (8 km) i one another. The first form consisted of the radi.
l from the plant, an adult (nonpregnant) woman ation release scenario followed by the dioxin re.
5 miles (8 km) from the plant, and an adult male i
lease scenario, in the second form, the order of 5 miles (8 km) from the plant. The final question the scenarios was reversed. The third and fourth asked them how long they believed it would be
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forms consisted of a radioactive release scenario before people could safely reenter the accident only and a dioxin release scenario only, respec.
zone without special protective clothing.
tively.
l RESULTS Questions Respondents were instructed to imacine work-Preliminary analyses m. dicated no statistically j
ing with their families outside in the vard at their signif cant c ntext. effects. Each form of the ques-homes 5 miles (8 km) from a nuclear power plant tionnaire was treated as an experimental group (or herbicide factory). They heard on the radio
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'8 that an accident had severelv damaged the plant indicated that responses to the questions about j
and that radioactive materials (or diosin) could the radiation hazard scenario were approximately
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possibiv escape from the building where thev were equal y = m ed evaWad n bebe
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being contained. Respondents were first asked to the dioxin hazard scenario, for those who eval-rate the likelihood that plant personrd could pre-uated it after the dioxin hazard scenario, and for i
vent a major release to the environment. Next, those who evaluated the radiation hazard scenario si they were informed that if they were out of doors when the radioactive (dioxin) release reached their xin hazard scenario as well.
i; home, they would be unprotected. They were asked how likely it would be that an unprotected Perception Responses f
exposure to radiation (dioxin) would lead to each of three consequences: immediate consequences, Confidence in Plant Personnel. Ratings of the such as death within one month; delayed conse-likelihood that plant personnel could prevent a g
quences, such as cancer; and genetic effects, such major release to the environment showed a slight y
tendency tor respondents to judge that a release g
as birth defects.
Respondents then were instructed that the gov-of radioactive materials was less likely to be pre-g ernor had advised everyone within 5 miles (8 km) vented. Overall, however, th: response distribu-y of the reactor (herbicide factory) to remain in-tions for the radiation and dioxin hazards were g
doors and to shut all doors and windows until very similar, in both cases just over 50% of the l
the radioac:ive (dioxin) release was terminated.
samMe believed that there was less than a 50:50 f
They were asked to indicate (1) how much pro-chance of preventing a release. A wide divergence e
tection sheltering would give, compared with W opinion among the members of the sample 3
standing outside the house;(2) how soon after the existed with respect to their level of confidence radioactive material (dioxin) escaped from the con-in the ability of both nt; clear power-plant and p
tainment building would the release reach their herbicide-plant personnel to perform effective cor-y homes 5 miles (8 km) from the plant;(3) how likely rective actions. The most pessimistic 20% of the 7
was i; that they would evacuate rather than stay respondents rated the likelihood of preventing a NUCLEAR SAFETY VM 27. No 4. October-December 1986
b GENER AL SAFETY CONSIDERMIONS 461 release as Glor, and the most optimistic.?0c
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rated the char, es at about 70re or better. This wide variation in confidence suggests that the sam.
p 90 O Radiaton pie as a nhole was not significantly biased toward g
- D unn an antitechnology or antinuclear positmo.
5 80 I
O Likelihood of Severe Consequences. The aser-o 70 age ratings of likelihood of each of the three con-l3 sequences (prompt fatality (death within
[ 60 one month); delayed cancer; and genetic effects, such j
as birth defects] were all 250Cc. An unprotected 50 exposure to either of the two hazards was judged E
to result in an approximately 50Tc chance of a 2
40 prompt fatality. The chances of delayed cancer O
and genetic effects were rated significantly higher b
3 than those of prompt fatality. Specifically, the
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likelihood for delayed cancers and for genetic ef-
, 20 -
fects resulting from a radiation exposure was j
c judged to be about 759c, and the likelihood of 8
,g those effects resulting from a dioxin exposure was thought to be less than 65Fc. The two types of
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delayed effects did not differ significantly from 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1
each other; that is, the ratings for delayed cancers LEVEL OF PROTECTION t%)
i and birth defects resulting from radiation expo-sure were tery nearly equal, as were the ratings Fig. I Judged level of protection from sheltering for two dif-for cancers and birth defects resulting from dioxin Terent hazards.
exposure.
Efficacy of Shelter. The judgments of respon-dents about the efficacy of sheltering indoors are spondents noted that arrival time depended en wind speed, but most answered without comment, indicated in Fig.1, which shows that sheltering Figure 2 indicates that 15Fe of the respondents was generally considered to be a more effective felt that the radiation exposure would begin al-response to a release of dioxin than to a release of radioactive materials. Almost 209c of the re-most instantly, whereas less than Src thought that this would be true for dioxin. Almost twice as
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spondents believed that shelterin,g would offer no many thought that a radioactive release would l
protection to the radiation hazard, and more than 509c thought that sheltering would reduce expo-arrive within 15 min (about 45c7c) as thought that a dio.;in release would arrive within this time sure by less than 30Fc. By contrast, almost none of the respondents believed that sheltering would (about 25Fo). Fewer than 159c of the respondents
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thought that the release would take four hours ofkr no protection to a dioxin release, and only or more to arrive.
257c of the sample believed that shelterin;; would c
offer less than 30Fe reduction in exposure. There Evacuation Intention. The distributions of the wM some convergence at the upper end of th; judgments of respondents of the IF elihood that distribution; less than 20Fc of the sample rated they would evacuate, rather than stay in their p
sheltering as more than 70Fc effective for either homes as requested by the gosernor, were quite E
hazard, and no one felt, that sheltering would offer siinitar for both the radiation and dioxin hazards.
complete protection.
Over 75cc of the sample indicated that they were likely to evacuate (p >50c). Only a few of the c
Speed of Onset. When asked to indicate their respondents (less than 10Vc for dioxin and less than beliefs about how soon after a release the ra-20c fcr radiation) were almost certain (p 2907c) c dioactive materials (or dioxin) would begin to that they would evacuate under the conditions de-reach their home 5 miles (8 km) away, a few re-scribed in the scenario.
'( i NUCLEAR SAFETY Vol 27. No 4. October December 1986 I
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462 GENERAL SAFETY CON 3IDERATIONS 1
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l mi graphic groups indicated hat a ten-year-old i!
1o0 e
child was believed to be 807c as susceptible to ji either.*adiation' or dioxin hazard as the target o n.o,,,,on go groups. The judgments of the respondents of sus-e o onn ceptibility to dioxin exposure for an adult female l
- so g
or male are only slightly lower than the judged y
susceptibility of a ten-year-old child. Virtually no
@ 70 decrease exists in the corresponding susceptibility g
ratings for radiation exposure.
I Duration of impact. Respondents indicated l
60 that they thought the amount of time that would 1
be required before people could safely reenter an l
o 50 E
accident zone without special protective clothing
$,o would be greater for a radiation hazard than for g
a dioxin hazard. Figure 4 shows that less than 207c of the sample believed that reentry could be w
$ 3U accomplished in one day or less for either hazard,
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5 Approximately 65Fe be.lieved that reentry could S 20 come within one month of a dioxin release, 8
whereas less than 409c felt that people could re-l turn to their homes this soon following a radioac-3n tive release. Although just under 90Fo thought that return to a dioxin-contaminated area within o
o 5
15 30 60 4
8 16 24 one year was possible, only a little more than 509c thought this would be true following a ra-m'"u
h *u' dioactive release. Almost 20Fe thought that reen-ME tering the area affected by a radiation release l
Fig. 2 Judged elapsed time until harerd arrival 5 miles (8 km) d from the plant for two different hazards.
DISTANCE (km) o 5 15 25 35 45 55 i
3 I
Scope of impact. The judgments of respon-dents of the minimum safe distance from the haz.
E ardous releases are shown in Fig. 3. A significant g6
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divergence existed between the two hazards with 5
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respect to this minimum safe distance. Less than
@ 50 257c of the sample thought that remaining within
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35 miles (56 km) of a radiation hazard would be o to g
l safe, whereas about 509c thought this would be 5
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l an acceptable distance from a dioxin hazard.
p 33 j
f More significantly, more than 407e of the sample o
y
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indicated that they would have to travel more g
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than 40 miles (more th3n 64 km) from the dioxin i 20 l
release to find a safe location, and more than j
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65Fc would expect to evacuate over 40 miles 3 in g
(64 km) to avoid radiatior risks.
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Relative Susceptibility. In general, the respon.
dents appeared to believe that persons in the three DISTANCE (mdes) 4 L
demographic groups are equally susceptible to harm from exposure to radiation and dioxin. Rat-Fig. 3 Judged dLtance to a safe loyion for two different ings of the relative susceptibility of different de-hasards.
NUCLEAR SAFETY. Vol. 27, No. 4. October-Decemner 1986
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v GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 463 100 i
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i Table 1 Correlations of Predictor Variables with Judgments of Likelihood of Evacuation 90 - O Radiation p
by Hazard S Dionn z ao Correlation Predictable 2
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variables Radiation Dioain U
c:
Reicase prevention 0 088 0.206 60 Prompt fatality 0.100 0.166 z
Delayed cancer 0.308 0.291 9 So Genetic effect, such as birth defects 0.260 0.258 2g Shelter efficacy
-0.106
-0.056 Speed of onset 0.168 0.127 e.
Distance to safety 0.233 0 41I y 30 Susceptibility i
f:
Ten-year-old child 0.296 0.256
$ 20 Female adult 0.329 0.278 j
G Male adult 0.277 0.258 p
Duration of impact 0.2 73 0.345 0 to M ultiple correlation 0457 0.555 I
0 0
1 8
16 1 7
1 6
1 5 never i
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i of plant personnel preventing a release was also nour oay monin year significantly related to evacuation inti:ntions in TIME response to the dioxin release.
l Fig. 4 Judged duration and persistence of impact for two Extremely high correlations (r >0.80) existed i
different hazards.
among some of the predictor variables. These in-cluded the correlations between the judged like-lihood of cancer and of birth defects and among would never be possible, whereas only about SFo the relative susceptibility variables. Because the believed this to be true for a dioxin telease.
mean ratings for delayed cancer and birth defects were almost identical, one can reasonably infer Predictability of Evacuation Intentions that respondents did not distinguish between these tw ute mes. The moderate differences in the Data from the responses to the questions about the perceived characteristics of the hazard ratings f r the relative susceptibihty of the ten-l and of the alternative protective actions were en-year-old child and the adult male suggest that a few I the respondents may have drawn distinc-tered into a multiple correlation analysis to try to predict. the judgments of respondents of their ti ns between the three demographic groups.
<j likelihood of evacuating rather than sheltering.
The predictor variables, taken as a group, had Analysir of data from the radiation release sce-a statistically s:gnificant multiple correlation with nario indicated that 7 of the 11 potential predictor the evacuation intentions variable. These multiple variables had correlations with evacuation inten-correlations,0.457 for the radioactive release data tions that were statistically significant (r >0.20 and 0.555 for the dioxin release data, indicate
'significant at p <0.05). These variables were the that perceptions of the characteristics of the haz-r likelihood of delayed cancers; the likelihood of ard and of the alternative protective actions, as t
genetic effects, such as birth defects;the distance measured in th,is study, accounted for about 259o to a safe location, all three of the relative sus-f the variance in evacuation intentions.
ceptibility items (ten year-old child, adult woman, and adult male); and the duration of the hazard DISCUSSION (Table 1). A similar pattern was found in the correlations for the dioxin release scenario. The The data collected are useful in achieving all single difference was that the judged likelihood three of the goals of the study. The information g
i NUCLEAR SAFETY. Vol. 27. No. 4. October-December 1986 I
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464 GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS helps to (1) assess the extent to which the results among demographic groups, require a greater di>-
of preuous esacuation intentions studies can be tance to reach a safe location. persist for a longer i
generalized to encompass other samples and other duration, and more appropriately require evac-hazards, (2) determine the degree to w hich evac-uation rather than sheltering. One significant dif-uation intentions are related to specific dimen-ference between tne results of the present study sions of risk perception. and (3) compare public and those of Slosic and his colleagues is that the l
perceptions of these risk characteristics with es-latter study found the hazards of nuclear power timates drawn from R ACAs.
to be substantially different from those of other technologies and societal activities. The present I
Generalizability of Evacuation intentions data indicate that radiation hazard is considered I
to be relatiselv Similar to dioxin hazard. In this l
The results of this study indicate that inten-respect, these 21ata are similar to those of Lindell tions to evacuate rather than shelter as requested and Earle."
are not limited to sites where the local population I
has been sensitized to the t. sue of nuclear power-l l
plant emergency preparedness. In a sample of Comparison of Risk Perceptions i
Shoreham area residents,40% of the respondents and RACAs l
intended to evacuate,' but only 25cc of the res-The predictive power of the risk characteristics j
l idents in the vicinity of the Indian Point Station s of considerable significance because they nave l
l reactor would evacuate if advised to shelter.8 directiv interpretable units of measurement, such l
About 20F of the University of Washington sam-as time, distance, and probability. Consequently c
l pie felt certain that they would evacuate if advised many judgments of the respondents can be com-to. shelter, whereas another 45cc can be considered pared with the results of R ACA models. For ex-(
l to be " evacuation prone"(i.e., those who reported ample Table 6.7 in the report by Burke, Heising, l
a more than 50cc chance of evacuating). Contrary and Aldrich" shows the likelihood of a prompt l
)
to the hypc:hesis that residents of areas close t fatWity resulting from an unprotected exposure I
the reactor sites may be more sensitized to risks to a worst-case core-melt release [ category PWR l
of nuclear power and thus more inclined to report i A in WASH-1400 (Ref.15)] at a distance of 4 l
intentions to evacuate, the student sample seems to 6 miles (6.4 to 9.6 km) from the plant to be l
more prone to overreact. Moreover, the data less than 0.01 This estimate is considerably lower i
show that the intention to evacuate when shelter l
than the value of 0.50 judeed by the sample. The is adsised extends to a toxic chemical hazard as corresponding probability for contracting a latent well. Although evacuation intentions in response cancer from exposure to a PWR l A release at
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to dioxin hazard show a less extreme pattern of 5 miles (8 km) is about 0.002 (WASH-1400, Ap-overresponse, the differences between the two haz-mendix VI, Figs.13 to 26) (Ref.15). This figure ards are not large.
s also substantially below the probability judged by the memoers of the sample.
Relationship to Risk Perception Data The data on judged relative susceptibilities of The regression analyses show a statistically sig-a ten-year old child, an adult female, and an adult nificant relationship between behavioral inten-male suggest that the student sample in the pres-tions and t'ae perceived characteristics of the haz-ent study responded to the target group in much ard and of the alternative protective actions. In the same way as did the residents of the Three addition, the data are consistent with those of Mile Island area. That is, the reference to a preg, risk perception studies, such as Slovie et al.," in nant woman.resulted in an incorrect inference demonstrating how negatively radiation hazard that it was the woman, rather than the fetus, who f
is viewed. In comparison wi'h a dioxin release, was at risk. Thus an adult female was judged to a radioactive rele ise was belieeed to be more be almost as susceptible (79 on a scale from 0 l
}
likely to occur, more likely to result in delayed to 100) as the target group. By extension, an adult J
cancers and genetic effects, and less likely to be male was judged to be almost as susceptible (77 effectively reduced by sheltering. Radiation ex-on the 100-point scale) a, the adult female. A l
posure was believed to have a more rapid onset, ten-year-old child was judged to be slightly more involve smaller differences in susceptibility susceptible than either of the adults.
NUCLEAR SAFETY, Vol 27. No 4. October-December 1986 1
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w GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 465 Data cited in WASH-1400, Appendix VI Ta-the fact that they were gisen no information on ble F-8 (Ref.15). indicate that the median lethal wind direction if they assumed that they were dose for whole-body exposure at one day after directly downwind or, alternatively, that a wind conception is just less than i Gy (less than shift could occur at any time. The 25Q of the 100 rad), whereas the corresponding doses are sample who thought that the radiation exposure about 3.5 Gy (about 350 rad) at full term (i.e.,
cculd begin within 5 min were implicitly assuming at birth) and 5 Gy (500 rad) for an adult.'5 Thus a trasel time equivalent to a wind speed the fetus is as much as five times as susceptible 296.5 km'h (260 mph). That any of the respon-as an adult to whole body exposure. If the fetus dents would actually expect wind speeds this ex-is assigned a susceptibility rating of 100, the rel-treme is improbable; so it is more reasonable to ative susceptibility of both the adult female and assume that this portion of the sample was un-male would be about 20.
aware that radioactive materials would be carried I
A basis for including preschool children in by the wind. Rather, the respondents seemed to the special target group for evacuation arises from believe that the radioactive release would be pro-the age dependence of the thyroid exposure to pelled either by an explosion (perhaps one that radioactive iodine. Table 3.6 of the Environmental breached the containment building and initiated Protection Agency Manual of Protective Action the release) or by some energy of its own. In any Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear /nci-event, the data support the hypothesis by Lindell dents" (Appendix D) shows the inhalation dose and Perry' that at least some members of the l
per unit activity exposure to different isotopes of public believe that a radioactive release would radioactive iodine as a function of age. This table travel instantaneously in all directions.
indicates that, for a given concentration, a ten-The most plaus.ble estimates of radioactive i
sear-old child would receive only 70 to 90Q of
'he exposure receised by a newborn child, and p ume trad dme wouW be M mb to 4 h W t
speeds between 1.6.and 16 km/h (about I and an adult, only 50 to 64Q. By this criterion the 10 mph)). Only about 25b of the sample made e
judged susceptibilities were approximately correct judgments within this range. Also of some sig-I for a ten vear-old child but were overestimated nificance is the fact that respondents made dif-bv 20 to 30 percentage points for an adult.
rem judgmems akut radadon ad hn. U I
' The " correct" estimate of the effectiveness of wind speed were recognized to be the only rele-sheltering in reducing radiation exposure depends vant physical factor, any differences between the on the size and construction of the building in cumulative frequency curves would be statistically which shelter is taken. Shielding factors may n significant. The significance of the differences range from 0.90 for a wood-frame dwelling with-in the distribution functions for the two hazards out a basement to 0.40 for a masonry dwelling with a basement." These shielding factors (the Supports the interpretation that some respondents beheved that radioactive material can somehow ratio of the dose incurred with sheltering to that travel under,ts own power.
i without sheltering) must be subtracted from unity and multiplied by 100 to place them in the same The appropriate comparison data for judg-units as the data shown in Fig.1. When this trans-ments of the respondents of the minimum distance l
formation has been accomplished, the correspond.
to a safe location depends in substantial measure ing levels of protection are 10 (for wood frame, on one's. definition of safe. Judgments of respon-I no basement) and 60 (for masonry, with base-dents can be compared with data from Burke et ment). About 30c/c of the respondents in this sam-al.," which indicate that the average risk of early pie underestimated the minimum level of protec-fatality in the area between 20 and 25 miles (32 tion afforded by sheltering, whereas about 15Fe and 40 km) from a reactor in a worst-case core-overestimated the maximum ievelin the range.
melt (PWR 1 A) release would be 5 X 10-5. Thus l
The physical parameters that determine the one could consider distances between 25 and 40 amount of time between a radioactive release at miles (40 and 64 km) to offer a high degree of a plant and its arrival at a location 5 miles (8 km) safety. Only about 15Fe of the sample made dis-
)
away are wind speed and direction. Respondents tance judgments in this range, Approximately who were aware that radioactive materials would 65% of the sample would choose to evacuate more-j be driven by the wind could reasonably ignore than 40 miles (64 km).
j j
NUCLEAR SMETY, Vc4 27. No. 4. Octoter-Decomter 1986
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r GENERAL SAFETY CON'SIDERATIONS 466 perceptions may diverge. The moderate level of CONCLUSIONS predictability of evacuation intention calls for ad-j The data reported here contribute to a growing ditional research to better understand the cogni-literature that suggests that the overresponse at tive factors governing the decision to evacuate.
TMI resulted as much from prior public percep-tions of the risks of a nuclear power-plant acci-dent as it did from.the confusing and conflicting REFERENCES information disseminated during the TMI-2 crisis.
Thus the establishment of measures to ensure con-I. M. K. Lindell and R. W. Perry. Nuclear Plant Emergency sistency in the information released about an ac-warning: How would the Public Respond? Nucl. News.
cident addresses only a part of the problem.
26(2): 49-53 (February 1983).
Moreover, these data indicate that the problem
- 2. S. Cutter ard K. Barnes, Evacuation Behasior and 'i'hree Mile Island. Duassers. 6(2): 116-124 (1982) of overresponse is not peculiar to radiation hazard J. P. S. Houts and M. K. Goldhaber, Psychological and but may be exhibited in regard to hazardous mate.
Social Effects on the Population Surrounding Three Mile rials accidents as well.
Island After the Nuclear Accident on March 28,1979, pp.
The divergence between public perceptions and 151-164 in S. K. Majumdar (Ed.), Enerry. Environment i
reactor accident consequence analyses is partic*
and rht Economy. Pennsylvania Academy of Science, ularly significant because the perceived risk char-Easton. Pa. 1981, acteristics were correlated with reported intention
- 4. D. J. Zeigler S. D. Brunn, and J. H. Johnson, Jr., Evac-untion from'a Nuclear Technological Disaster. Geogr.
to evacuate rather than shelter. All these factors 8"" 7un: M6(January W80 Suggest reasons why the governor's evacuation
- 5. R. A. Stallings. Evacuation Behavior at Three Mile Island, advisory at TM1 prompted an overresponse. First, Int. J. Mass Emergeneses and Daasters. 2(l): Il-26 TM1 area residents may have felt that only small (March 1984).
differences exhted between the target group (preg-
- 6. Nuclear Regulatory Commission / Federal Emergency Man-nant women and preschool children) and the re-agement Agenes. Cruirrafor Preparaison and Evaluation mainder of the population with respect to their of Radiological. mergency Response 1"ans and Prepared-
" 'n SufPorr of Nuclear Power Plants. NRC Report susceptibility to radiation hazard. This consider-REM 4 MM A REP-0 W. January W81 ation would have been compounded by the per-d'
" #'"## ^#""'"#
ception of the rapid speed of onset and the high piagio canyon Suciaa,"poner piang, y,,t e r.s Thesis.
likelihood of serious consequences. Second, those California Polytechnic State Unnersity, San Luts Obispo, who were advised to seek shelter may well have 1982.
8 Se**on*ein A85ociates. Ind'an Point Emergency Plannsng thought it an ineffective means of protection. Fi-2""e DP:nion Poll. New Rocheile. N.Y.,1983, nally, the data on the perceived distance to a safe
- 9. D. J. Zeigler and J. H. J hns n, Jr., Evacuation Behavior location suggest that those outside the target area in Response to Nuclear Power Plant Accidents. Prof.
[5-m.le (8-ktn) radius] believed themselves to be c,ogr. 36(2): 207-215 (May 1984).
i i
at risk.
- 10. J. H, Johnson. Jr., Planning for Spontaneous Evacuation These results suggest that local residents might During a Radiological Emergency, Nuct. Saf. 25(2): 186-l be less likely to deviate from the protective action 194 (March-April 1984).
j
- 11. P. Slovic, B. Fischhoff, and S. Liechtenstein, Facts and l
recommendations of authorities if they could be Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, pp. 181-216 in R. C.
j provided with accurate information about the haz-Schwing and W. A. Aiben, Jr. (Eds.), Societal Ruk As-trd and e. bout alternative protective actions. The sessment: How Soft Is Safe Enough' Plenum Press, New
}
gap between accurate mformation and the achieve-yorg,gggo, I
l ment of compliance with recommended actions
- 12. G. T. Gardner. A. R. Tiemann, L. C. Gould. D. R.
should be recognized as a large one. Persons must DeLuca, L. w. Doob, and J. A. J. Stolwijt. Risk and attend to, comprehend, yield to, and retain in-Benefit Perceptions. Acceptability Judgments and Self-l Reported Actions Toward Nuclear Power J. Soc. Psy-l l
formation before they can act on it. The yielding
'^ #" H6: %W7 ( Apra W82L is likely to occur only if the sour:e of the infor-
- 13. M. K. Lindell and T. C. Earle How Close is Close mation is considered credible.21 Enough: Public Perceptions of the Risks of industnal Even if the public does not accept the results p,c,i, ties. Rak And. 3ML 35-253 tDecember 1983t of RACAs, those respon:.ble for recommending
- 14. C. vlek and P. J. Stailen. Judging Riskt knd Benefits in protective actions would benefit by understanding the Small and in the Large. Organs assonal Behavior and I
the ways in which their assessments and public Human Performance. 28(2). 235-271 (October 1981).
I NUCLEAR SAFETY, Vol. 27, No. 4. October-December 1986 l
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GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 467 15 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Reactor Sa/etr Study:
- 18. A. W. M Hay. Tetrachlorodibenro-p Dioxin Release at An A ssessment of Accsdent Rusks m C. S.
Com.
Seveso. Dusasters. \\(e). 289 308 (l977).
mercoal Nuclear poner Plants. NRC Report W AS H.
- 19. Ennronmental Protection Agency, Manuolo/ Protectsve Ac-l400 (NU R EG 15 0141. NTIS. October l915.
non Gundes and Prosecuve Acnons for Nuclear incsdents.
- 16. R. P. Burke C. D. Heising, and D C. Aldnch, in Plant Report EPA 520/ l-75-001. September 1975.
ConsJderanons for Opomal Offsne Response to Reactor 20 D. C. Aidnch. D. M. Encson. Jr., and J. D. Johnson Pubhc Accidents. NRC Report NUREG:CR 2925 (S AND Hourcnon Stranegiesfor PotennalNucnear Reacsor Accsdents:
2004), Sandia National Laboratones, NTIS. November Shehermg Concepts wnh Essumt Pubhc and Pnvase Struc.
1982.
tures. Report S A ND-771725, Sandia National Laboratones,
- 17. P. S. H outs. M. K. Lindell. T. W. H u. P. D. Cir ary, NTIS. February 1978.
G. Tokuhata, and C. B. Flynn, The Protective Action
- 21. W. J. McGuire, The Nature of Attaudes and Attitude Change.
Decision Model Applied to Evacuation Dunng the Three in The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2d ed., G. Lindsey Mile ?slanr' Cnsis. Int. J. Mass Emergencies and Duasters.
and E. Aronson (Eds.), Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass.,
2(11. '.7 39 (March 1984).
1968.
\\
l Safety-Related Topics from the Nuclear Power Options Viability Study By D B. Trauger" and J. D. White 6 Abstract: The Nuclear Power Options Viability Study mation derived from an extensive bibliography and (NPOVS) evaluated mnovatsve reactor comepn. and this ar.
ncle revsews NPOVS [mdmgs, wnh emphasis on safety and from visits, meetings, and personal Communica-hcensmg. The reactors studard were of hght m ater hqusd. metal, tions. Reactor systems vendors, architect lengi-and hehum cooled concepts. and most w ere of modular design.
neers, utility companies and utility organizations, Prehcensed standard plants offer an emportant step toward regulatory bodies, universities, and consultants regulatory stabninv and early hcensmg approvals with pubhc were contacted. The University of Tennessee and pornespanon before major expenduures. Advanced reactors thC TCnnCsset VallCy Authority participated as wnh passeve sa/etyfeatures offer she posssbihty ofperformance-based regulanon. The concepts studsed appear to be potennally partners with Dak Ridge National Laboratory in vsable, but more complete designs wdl be required before eco.
much of the work. This article emphasizes features nomic evaluanons can be de/smuve.
of the study that pertained to safety and regula-tion.
(
The Nuclear Power Options Viability Study BACKGROUND (NPOVS)"' reports on the description and as-sessment of innovative reactor concepts selected The NPOVS sought to explore options that in accordance with criteria established in the study.
might improve the position of nuclear power as l
It represents an evaluative compilation of infor-
" James D'. White is manager of the Air Force Worldwide l
' Donald B. Trauger is senior staff assistant to the Director Military Command and Control information System Program of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). He received the in the Martin Marietta Energy Systems. Inc., Data Systems A.B. degree m physics in 1942 from Nebraska Wesleyan Uni-Research and Development Programs. White received the versity, and he first worked in uramum ennchment at Co.
M.S. degree in nuclear engineering from The University of lumbia University and in Oak Ridge. Trauger has been the Tennessee in 1968. He managed a program that assessed the l
Associate Director for Nuclear and Engineenns Technologies, probability of pressurized thermal shock events in nuclear Director of the ORNL Gas-Cooled Reactor Program, and
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power i. ants and then led the Nuclear Power Options Viabihty head of Irradiation Engineenng. Trauger is a fellow of the Study at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) from its Amencan Nuclear Society. Current address: ORNL, P.O. Box inception in 1984. Current address: ORNL, P.O. Boa X Oak X, Oak Ridge, TN 3783 L.
Ridge, TN 37831.
NUCLEAR SAFETY Vol. 27, No 4, October-December 1986