ML20235A551

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Insp Rept 50-482/87-21 on 870731-0904.No Violations or Deviations Noted.One Deficiency Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Licensee Performance & Capabilities During Annual Exercise of Emergency Plan & Procedures
ML20235A551
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 09/21/1987
From: Fisher W, Hackney C
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235A525 List:
References
50-482-87-21, NUDOCS 8709230335
Download: ML20235A551 (8)


See also: IR 05000482/1987021

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APPENDIX

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSION-

REGION'IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/87-21 Licens'e: NPF-42.

Docket: . - 50-4'82

Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation 1

P.O. Box'411

Burlington,1 Kansas 66839.

Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station

Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Burlington, Kansas-

Inspection Conducted: . August 31 through September 4, 1987

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Inspector: t (Lim c A .. 7/

s C. A. Hackney,. Emergency Preparedness-Analyst. Dats

Accompanying

Personnel: R. Vickrey, Region'IV, NRC

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E. Podolak,iNRR,'NRC Headquarters

D. Schultz, Comex Corporation

Approved: t hw

W. L. Fisher, Chief, Nuclear Materials and

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Date '

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Emergency Preparedness Branch

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted August 31 through September 4, 1987 (Report 50-482/87-21)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance

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and capabilities. during an annual exercise of the, emergency plan and

procedures.

Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were

identified. One deficiency was identified by NRC inspector (paragraph 4).

8709230335 870921

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Personnel

  • B. Withers, President and Chief Executive Officer I

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  • F. Rhodes, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
  • J. Bailey, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services
  • G. Boyer, Plant Manager
  • R. Hagan, Manager, Nuclear Services
  • K. Moles, Manager, Emergency Planning
  • 0. Maynard, Manager, Licensing
  • R. Andrews, Emergency Planning Administrator
  • M. Nichols, Superintendent, Plant Support
  • J. Zell, Manager, Nuclear Training
  • J. Goode, Licensing Engineer
  • J. Dagenette, Instructor Coordinator

NRC

  • J. Cummins, Senior Resident Inspector
  • B. Bartlett, Resident Inspector

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

R. Leonard, Program Manager

R. Bissell, Technological Hazards Specialist

The NRC inspector also held discussions with other station and corporate

personnel in the areas of security, health physics, operations, training,

and emergency response organization.

  • Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Followup on Previously Identified Items

(Closed) Deficiency (482/8704-01): The primary offsite dose calculation

method used by the licensee was essentially a manual method, involving

data entry into a matrix and operating in it with a handheld calculator.

Although the method was reasonably timely, it had a high potential for

error (due to numerous arithmetic operations) and only addressed simple, .

straight-line Gaussian dispersion conditions.

The NRC inspector observed dose assessment personnel performing dose ,

calculations utilizing the dose assessment computer. i

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(Closed) Deficiency (482/8704-03): The access code number for placing 1

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telephone calls to state and local agencies was not initially available to

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the Technical Support Center (TSC) communicator, thus causing confusion

and a slight delay in making the required initial notification from the

TSC.

The licensee had established a facility telephone directory. The ,

telephone directory contained access codes for each facility and other

appropriate information.

(Closed) Deficiency (482/8704-04): The Duty Emergency Manager (DEM)

delayed making protective action recommendations after plant conditions

(e.g., clad failure and core uncovering at 9:59 a.m.; 3.5 percent

concentration of hydrogen in the containment at 10:30 a.m.; continuous

pressure buildup in.the containment building; large LOCA and loss of

coolant inventory) warranted it. The DEM postponed making protective

action recommendations for the public at risk, even after the NRC

emergency response team informed him that in their opinion general

emergency conditions were present (10:23 a.m.). The decision for

sheltering personnel within the center zone was not recommended by the DEM

until 11:10 a.m. At that time, the county decided for evacuation of human

populations at the center zone.

The DEM made a timely classification at the general emergency. The

accompanying protective action recommendations to the state and county

were timely.

(Closed) Deficiency (482/8704-05): During the exercise, the EOF

experienced a temporary loss of the telephone system. Communicators in

the EOF had not received hands-on training in the use of the radio. That

lack of hands-on radio training prevented the communicators from using the

backup radio communications for making offsite notifications to the state.

The telephone service was restored in a matter of minutes and the offsite

notifications were made within the 15-minute requirement. If the event

had been a lasting telephone system failure, notifications could have been

substantially delayed.

The NRC inspector observed during the exercise that E0F communicators did

establish radio contact with the county. The communicators demonstrated

the capability to properly use the radio communication system. A review

of training records revealed that personnel were given hands-on training

in the use of the radios.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Program Areas Inspected

The following program areas were inspected. Unless otherwise noted, the

inspection was completed and revealed no violations, deviations,

deficiencies, unresolved items, or open items. The inspection included

interviews with cognizant individuals, observations of activities, and

, record reviews. The depth and scope of these activities were consistent

l with past findings and with the current status of the facility. Notations

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after a specific inspection item are used to identify the following:

I = item not inspected or only partially inspected; V = violation;

D = deviation; H = deficiency; U = unresolved item; O = open item.

Procedure Program Area and Inspection Requirements

82201 Emergency Detection and Classification

021 - Adequacy of EALs in site emergency plan and

procedures. (I)

022 - Initial offsite notification procedures based on EALs.

Procedures for recommending protective actions for

onsite nonessential personnel.

023 - State and local agency agreement with EALs. (I)

024 - Emergency event classification.

025 - Use of post-TMI indicators for core and containment

status. (I)

026 - One individual onsite at all times understands

authority and responsibility to classify events and

initiate emergency actions.

027 - Emergency Operating, Alarm, or Abnormal Occurrence

Procedures direct the user to classify emergencies.

(I)

028 - EALs consistent with appropriate control room

instrumentation.

Decisional aids readily available and consistent with

EALs.

029 - Shift supervisors and other responsible personnel

promptly and correctly classify events. (I)

02202 Protection Action and Decision Making

021 - Authority and responsibility clearly and unambiguously

assigned.

02i Authority and responsibility for making protective

action decisions are in procedures and understood by

licensee personnel.

023 - Emergency response facilities can implement onsite and

offsite protective measures.

024 - Understanding of relationships between plant

conditions, offsite consequences, and effectiveness of

protective measures.

025 - Offsite officials have the capability to make prompt

public notifications and protective action decisions

in 15 minutes. (I)

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l 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors

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(1) Control Room (D)

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, (2) Technical Support Center

! (3) Emergency Operations Facility

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(4) Operational Support Center

(5) Corporate Command Center (H0EC) (I)

(6) Offsite Monitoring Team (I)

(7) Corrective Action / Rescue Team

(8) Security / Accountability Team

(9) Press Center (I)

(10) Medical Team (1)

(11) Postaccident Sampling (I) .j

4. Control Room (Emergency Classification) 82301 (1)

The NRC inspector noted that several EALs relating to fuel breach were

exceeded, but the control room staff classified the event as an unusual

event. EALs exceeded included:

CVCS letdown radiation monitor off scale high,

containment air monitor (s) increased significantly,

l area radiation monitors increased significantly, and

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sampling data verified existence of failed fuel (five times Technical

Specification limits).

Based on the observation above, the following is considered to be an

emergency preparedness deficiency:

Classification of the emergency was incorrect, considering the plant

parameters and radiological conditions given to the operators.

(482/8721-01)

5. Exercise Critique

The NRC inspector attended the post-exercise critique by the licensee

staff on September 3, 1987, to evaluate the licensee's identification of

deficiencies and weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q),

10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F.5.

The licensee staff identified the deficiencies listed below.

No violations or deviations were identified.

Licensee Identified Deficiencies

Reliability of dose assessment computer needs to be increased. '

Media representatives need additional training.

l Review news release information flow from Wichita to Topeka,

especially for fast occurring events.

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Review core damage methodology, need additional method.

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Correct cause of'telecopier. problems.in Wichita and the plant.

Corrective action for identified deficiencies-and-weaknesses will be

examined during a futu're NRC inspection.

No violations or. deviations were identified.

6. Exit Interview

=The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted,in

paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the in'spection'on September.4,'1987.

o The. inspectors summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and

the findings. The NRC team' leader. reviewed the' deficiency with

Mr. B. D. Withers and staff and stated that the findings.would be' reviewed

by NRC Region-IV management. Any substantive changes to the findings

would be brought to the attention of appropriate licensee representatives..

The licensee's actions during the' exercise were found to be acceptable to

protect the health and safety of the public.

No' violations or deviations were identified.

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ATTACHMENT 2

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