ML20217P272
| ML20217P272 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1998 |
| From: | Collins S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Katz D, Mangiagli S CITIZENS AWARENESS NETWORK |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217P277 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9804100051 | |
| Download: ML20217P272 (12) | |
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March 31, 1998 IDENTICAL LETTER SENT T0:
Sal Mangiagli Deborah Katz, President Citizens Awareness Network P.O. Box 83 Shelburne Falls, MA 03170
Dear Ms. Katz:
I am responding to your letter dated February 2,1998, which contains the three questions submitted i
for Chairman Shirley Ann Jackson, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to address during her public meeting at Waterford, Connecticut, on February 2,1998, as well as 11 additional questions for the NRC to address. All 14 questions and responses are included in the enclosure for completeness.
I trust that this reply responds to your concems.
Sincerely driginal81pledby SamuelJ.Cetis Samuel Jc Collins, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated Distribution:
Docket File (w/originalincoming)
(PGBUC; EDO G980074 NRR Mailroom (w/ copy of incoming)
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March 31, 1998 Sal Mangiagli, Board Member i
Citizens Awareness Network 54 Old Tumpike Road Haddam, CT 06438 i
Dear Mr. Mangiagh:
i I am responding to your letter dated February 2,1998, which contains the three questions submitted for Chairman Shirley Ann Jackson, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to address during her public meeting at Waterford, Connecticut, on February 2,1998, as well as 11 additional questions for the NRC to address. The questions and responses are included in the enclosure for completeness.
I trust that this reply responds to your concerns.
Sincerely, am r
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated j
I.
Response to Questions 1.
A reactor has suffered a partial melt down and a licensee lied to the NRC without l
NRC revoking their licenses to operate a nuclear reactor. At Millstone, gross and systemic mismanagement threatens the health and safety of workers and the public without license revocation by the NRC. What will it take for the NRC to revoke a license to operate a nuclear reactor?
The NRC would revoke a nuclear power plant license, if, in the opinion of the Commission, continued possession of the license would be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. In other words, the Commission would have to conclude l
that the licensee is not capable of protecting the public, in any plant condition, before a nuclear reactor license would be revoked. Normally, public health and safety can be adequately protected by ensuring a licensee maintains its facility in a shutdown condition until the significant problems are corrected (along with increased NRC oversight of the facility). Thus far, the Commission has not found it necessary to revoke the' operating license of a commercial l
nuclear reactor.
2.
Little Harbor Consultants established 14 attributes associated with an effective Safety Consc!ous Work Environment. LHC believes that " requiring management action" is acceptable for the restart of the Millstone reactors even though NU has t
a decade long history of harassment and retaliation. A) Will you reject LHC's
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recommendation and hold Millstone accountable to meaningful requirements such as " meeting expectation?" B) If you refuse to hold Millstone accountable to meaningful requirements, will you impose, so as to protect the health and safety l'
of workers and the public, a 6 month dry-run period prior to start up for NU to demonstrate that they will not harass and/or fire workers who raise safety concerns?
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The NRC believes the recommendations presented by LHC are meaningful. Therefore, they will be an important element in the Commission's decision regarding restart of any Millstone facility. When the NRC's October 24,1996, order was issued, the NRC recognized that it would take a long time for employees to develop trust in a developing and evolving safety-conscious l
work environment (SCWE) and it takes time for management to avoid the occasional errors and j
eliminate actions which may lead to a chilling effect. As specified in NRC's October 24,1996, l
order, the Independent Third-Party Oversight Program (ITPOP) will continue to be l
implemented until the licensee demonstrates, by its performance, that the conditions that led to the requirements of the oversight have been corrected. Factors for determining when ITPOP l
can be discontinued will essentially be the same as those required for restart of a Millstone unit except that sustained performance, without intervention, will need to be demonstrated.
l Demonstration of sustained performance will be assessed using the continued findings of the ITPOP, licensee self-assessments, performance indicators, and NRC evaluations. It is anticipated that the ITPOP will need to be in place at least six months following the restart of a Millstone Unit to provide a sufficient period to assess sustained performance related to an SCWE and a capability to handle safety concems raised by employees and contractors.
Enclosure i
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- Following this initial assessment period, there may be a need for periodic evaluations by the ITPOP or other third-party organization to assure that programs are maintained and that they are
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being effectively implemented. The licensee's current extended outage provides for an i
adequate initial assessment period regarding implementation of SCWE and ECP. Therefore, the NRC does not believe an additional six month dry-run period is necessary to provide adequate protection of public health and safety, i
3.
Given both the gross number of discrepancies and the two very serious discrepancies found when only 5 of the 88 reactor systems were inspected at Millstone Unit 3, will NRC increase the scope of the independent Corrective Action Verification Program and inspect additional systems?.
The third-party contractor has actually carried out a detailed review on 15 of the 88 risk 3
significant or safety-related systems as categorized by the Maintenance Rule. Critical design aspects of an additional 22 systems were also reviewed.
The large number of DRs are preliminary in that they have not been reviewed by NU. NU may provide additional information to the contractor that may demonstrate that the discrepancy was (a) previously discovered during CMP or (b) that the plant is in conformance with its licensing and design bases. In these two cases, the DRs are categorized respectively as "previously Identified" and "nondiscrepant." NU may also agree with the contractor that the DR is a true i
nonconformance. These are called " confirmed" DRs and these are what are reported by the i
staff and trended. The number of confirmed DRs, as of February 27,1998, is 184 for Unit 3. Of 937 DRs issued as preliminary, as of February 27,1998, 301 have been " closed." (" Closed DRs are those that are either " confirmed," "nondiscrepant," or "previously identified.") Thus far, the contractor review has confirmed six findings which involve a nonconformance with the licensing bases (Level 3). With such a small percentage of DRs closed, it is premature to draw j
meaningful conclusions. The attachment provides information which describes the NRC staff process by which the staff will assess the results of the ICAVP.
4.
What actions will NRC take given the continued harassment and intimidation of workers by senior management which is demonstrated in the Focus 98 Nuclear Oversight list dated January 1,19987 The licensee's treatment of workers who raise safety issues is an important element in NRC's Millstone oversight program. A number of alleged instances of retaliation and discrimination remain under review by the NRC and, as such, it is inappropriate to comment on them at this time. However, potential enforcement action against individuals, as in all wrongdoing matters, will be considered if the developed facts support such action.
5, Since senior management continues to use harassing and intimidating tactics to censure employees at Millstone, will NRC revoke NU's license?
The issue of license revocation is addressed in the response to question 1.
' 6.
Given the level of radioactive contamination at Haddam Neck's site, the release.of contaminated blocks and soll from Haddam Neck to the surrounding community and the recent shipment of contaminated sediment from Millstone's intake pipe to the Waterford landfill, what guarantee do we have that the NU management did a better job. with radioactive controls at Millstone Units I,11 and lit than at Haddam Neck? And, what investigations has NRC carried out regarding site contamination at Millstone and off site locations that received materials from Millstone? -
The Millstone Restart Assessment Panel will weigh many factors prior to making a restart recommendation to the Commissioners. These factors will include data provided by the resident inspection staff, the ICAVP, the NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 40500, " Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems," an upcoming operational safety team inspection, and Little Harbor Consultants. The Commissioners will then decide if the facts demonstrate that NU is ready to safely restart any of the Millstone units.
A sampling program for fields and facilities around Millstone Station was undertaken by Northeast Utilities beginning in December 1996. The results of this sampling were provided to the NRC. The NRC's review of this data indicates that radioactivity measurements are below natural background levels. The locations sampled included: Rolf Baseball Field; Rotary Baseball Field; Patterson Baseball Field; Babe Ruth Baseball Field; Spera Soccer Field; Greco Football Field and dirt mound north of field; and the Equestrian Riding Center - Camp Harkness Park.
NRC regulations require licensees to maintain procedures and processes to preclude an unrestricted release of licensed material. Nonetheless, the trace concentrations that have been identified in this instance cannot be reliably detected using state-of-the-art portable survey instrumentation, typically used for such purposes. While the detection of these very low levels of contamination can be achieved by laboratory analysis, such trace levels do not represent a health and safety hazard.
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The NRC has reviewed the Radiation Protection Program at Millstone and has determined it to comply with all regulatory requirements. Routine inspections of Millstone continue by the i
resident staff and regional radiation specialists. In addition, the staffis examining the way Haddam Neck handled radioactive material and will determine if the inspection program at Millstone needs to be modified.
7.
Will NRC approve Millstone Unit 111 entering into mode 4 in the near future and if so, how can this be justified given the fact that the reactor is still not meeting NRC regulations? Recall that Haddam Neck was in cold shutdown when a nitrogen bubble, unbeknownst to workers, forced water out of the reactor core and nearly caused core boiling.
The licensee is required to satisfy the requirements of the facility's Technical Specifications (TS)
- before changing modes of operation. As such, before the licensee can heat up into Mode 4, all of the Mode 4 required TS conditions must be satisfied. Included within the determination of whether all required TS conditions are satisfied is an evaluation by the licensee of the impact of 4
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any identified conditions, including those identified during the ICAVP, that have the potential to impact a required TS condition.- When the licensee determines that all of the required TS conditions have been satisfied, it will make the determination to heat up and enter Mode 4. NRC staff at the Millstone site are closely monitoring licensee activities related to possible entry into Mode 4.
Each of the Millstone units is included on NRC's problem plant "Watchlist"in Category 3, and must receive approval by the NRC Commissioners prior to restart. Prior to Commission approval, the reactor core must be maintained suberitical (Mode 2 = criticality).
8.
The 't.1 million-dollar civil fine NRC imposed on NU was for violations in the period -
October 24,1996 through December 31,1996. What actions does the NRC intend to take for the violations which occurred in the past 13 months?
The recent civil penalty was the culmination of many inspections over a lengthy period. The enforcement action was designed to focus on the very broad deficiencies apparent from these inspections rather than on all the known individual examples of the deficiencies. Sufficient numbers of examples were included to justify the conclusions. Govemment agencies at all levels routinely make decisions on enforcement actions using prosecutorial discretion in order to i
arrive at an appropriate conclusion considering, on balance, the available evidence and the rese'arcos necessary to support the action. In the letter to the Millstone licensee accompanying the asociated Notice of Violation, the NRC stated:
Finally, the violations described in the Notice are not the sum total of all apparont
- violations present or identified during the various inspections, but serve to ropesent the systemic nature of the significant regulatory problems existing at the Millstone facility.
Other apparent violations described in the inspection reports referenced in the Notice are not being addressed in this enforcement action. Nevertheless, they need to be considered as part of your corrective Jctions.
The December 31,1996, endpoint was an intenhnal decision made in order to permit the enforcement process to proceed. This did not me.On that no further enforcement actions would be considered, in fact, a $55,000 civil penalty regaMing physical security violations was issued on June 11,1997, for inspections conducted February 3-7,1997. Also, on March 9,1998, the NRC issued a $55,000 civil penalty related to potential D binding of the Unit 3 charging system that was discovered during the NRC's Tier 1 out-of-scope, ufety system functional inspection.
The NRC is reviewing a number of violations that have been reported in inspection reports over i4 the past year to determine what enforcement action, if any, it warranted.
9.
What progress has been made in NRC's inveF$gation to ascertain whether NU intentionally made falso statements of fact ander oath?
l in accordance with agency policy regarding investigation of such matters, it is inappropriate to comment on cases under review by the NRC at this time.
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- 10.
Is NRC currently investigating the alleged resignation of the Supervisor of Operator Training at Millstone Unit lli for making false stctements in documents to the NRC? If accusations of falso statements by NU prove true, will NRC revoke NU's license?
See responses to questions 9 and 1.
11.
Will NRC keep Millstone 11 and 111 on the " watch list" if they restart?
Following any positive Commission vote for restart, the units will remain on NRC's watchlist, in.
Category 2, and will continue to be subject to a relatively high level of NRC oversight. The units will remain Category 2 watchlist plants and will only be removed when the NRC determines that the licensee's performance warrants a normal level of NRC oversight.
12.
What is the cost incurred for the enhanced NRC oversight at Millstone?
The costs incurred for the enhanced NRC oversight at Millstone are not available as a separate entity. The NRC does not differentiate costs incurred as part of routine inspections and oversight from those costs incurred as a result of enhanced oversight. In a relative sense, the NRC is spending approximately 50 percent more effort on a per unit bases as compared to the median hours of effort per unit for the industry. Additionally, the NRC will expend approximately
$4 million for NRC contractual support for the Millstone oversight reviews.
13.
Under the Reagan administration the cost to regulate nuclear reactors is paid for by individual licensees. If NU is paying for the increased NRC costs to regulate Millstone, are the ratepayers of CT forced to cover the expense of NRC oversight?
The licensee, in accordance with the agency's full-cost recovery policy, is paying for the NRC costs incurred at Millstone. The method which the licensee is using to cover these expenses, whether by ratepayers or stockholders, is outside the purview of the NRC. Costs recovery from ratepayers is a matter for consideration and determination by the state public utility commission.
14.
What maintenance and operational costs have ratepayers incurred during the two-year operational hiatus at Millstone station?
See response to question 13.
DISCUSSION OF NRC ACTIONS RELATED TO ICAVP FINDINGS A further discussion of corresponding NRC actions related to the ICAVP findings, as follows, is intended to better explain and document the process being used by the NRC staff.
Level 1:
System does not meet licensing and design bases and cannot perform its intended function.
NRC Action: Would likely result in selection of additional system (s) for ICAVP review -
Additional Discussion.
If either the ICAVP contractor review or the NRC staff review confirms a Level 1 finding, the NRC staff anticipates that, as a' minimum,'an additional' system or systems will be added to the ' ~
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current scope of the ICAVP review. Following confirmation of a Level 1 finding, the Special Projects ONice (SPO) sta# will immediately present the finding and recomtriendations for ICAVP scope expansion to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), and the Executive Director for Operations (EDO). Expansion of ICAVP scope will involve an additional system or systems review by the ICAVP contractor, the NRC sts#, or both. Absent a negative determination by the EDO, the SPO staW will require the acansion of the ICAVP scope.' The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope exp&asion w?l be communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.
LavaL2-Single train of redundant system does not meet licensing and design bases and cannot perform its intended function.
NRC Action: Would likely result in expansion of ICAVP scope to evaluate for similar nonconformance issues in other systems Additional Discussion:
if either the ICAVP contractor review or the NRC staff review confirms a Level 2 finding, the NRC staff anticipates that ine accpe of the ICAVP would be expanded to, as a minimum, require the evaluation of similar operational, procedural, or design attributes in other safety-related or risk-signifirnt systems for potential nonconformances. Following confirmation of a Leve! 2 finding, the
' SPO staff will immediately present the finding and recommendations for ICAVP scope expansion to i
the Director, NRR. The extent of reviews required under any expansion of the ICAVP will be based on (1) an NRC staff assessment of the licensee's root cause of the Level 2 finding, and (2) an NRC staff assessment of the corrective actions taken by the licensee to address both the staffs specific finding and any broader programmatic implications. ' Absent a negative determination by the Director, NRR, the SPO staff will require the appropriate expansion of the ICAVP scope. The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope expansion will be communicated to the licensee by j
wntten correspondence.
Level 3 :
System does not meet licensing and design bases but able to perform its intended 3
function.
NRC Acthn: Could result in expansion of ICAVP scope to evaluate for similar nonconformance issues in other systems Attachment j
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h,
Additional Discussion:
if either the ICAVP contractor review or the NRC sta# review confirms a Level 3 finding, the NRC staff will consider expanding the scope of the ICAVP to require the evaluation of similar operational, procedural, or design attributes in other safety-related or risk-significant systems for potential rcEn;eiJennances. The SPO staff will present confirmed Level 3 findings and recommendations regarding ICAVP expansion to the Millstone Restart Assessment Panel (RAP). The staff recommendation on possible ICAVP expansion for individual findings will consider the specific finding, and the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions. The effectiveness of corrective actions will be independently verified by the NRC sta#, or the ICAVP contractor, and will consider the requirements of Appendix B, Critorion XVI, and the guidance of GL-gi-18. The staff expects that, for
' an individual Level 3 finding, effective licensee corrective action to address both the specific " defect,"
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as well as any broader implication for other systems, would lead to an NRC staff determination that the ICAVP need not be expanded. Conversely, a negative determination on effective licensee corrective action would be expected to result in a decision to expand the ICAVP The RAP decision on ICAVP expansion will be documented in the RAP meeting minutes, and the Director, NRR, will l
approve any expansion of ICAVP scope. The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope j
expansion will be communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.
In addition to evaluating individual Level 3 findings, the NRC staff (Chief, ICAVP Branch, SPO, NRR),
i will periodically, at least biweekly, consider the collective group of confirmed Level 3 findings identified during the conduct of the ICAVP reviews. Negative trends established by these Level 3 findings, which raise a question about licensing and design bases conformance in other systems, i
would, in the' absence of effective corrective actions by the licensee, be expected to result in i
expansion of the ICAVP to address possible similar nonconformances in other systems. In its i
l evaluation of possible trends, the NRC staff will consider whether or not (1) the findings represent a l
large fraction of items reviewed; (2) the findings are implementation errors (e.g., program or procedural requirements were not properly performed; (3) the findings are concentrated in a particular discipline (e.g., mechanical, electrical, instrument and controls, or structural); and (4) the findings are i
l concentrated in a particular type of document (e.g., operating procedure, calculation, drawing, FSAR, maintenance procedure). Any decision to expand the scope, based on negative trends associated with Level 3 findings, will be approved by the Director, NRR. The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope expansion will be communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.
Level 4:
System meets licensing and design bases but contains minor calculational errors or inconsistencies of an editorial nature.
NRC Action: Multiple examples could result in expansion of ICAVP scope to evaluate for similar errors / inconsistencies in other systems i
Additional Discussion 1
Although they do not result in the plant being outside its licensing and design bases (i.e., the ICAVP regulatory standard /soceptance criteria), Level 4 findings will be assessed by the NRC staff. Level 4 findings will be assessed to determine whethat trends exist which could raise a question regarding the plant's licensing and d6aign bases Confamed Level 4 findings are being assessed initially by the contractors to determine if licensee correctivo actions are appropriate. The NRC staff, on an ongoing basis, is also revbwing these findings for identification of multiple examples of specific findings and l
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3-1 corresponding trends. In its avaiustion of possible trends, the NRC staff will consider whether or not (1) the findings represent a large fraction of items reviewed; (2) the findings are implementation errors (e.g., program or procedural requirements were property performed); (3) the findings are i
concentrated in a particular discipline (e.g., mechanical, electrical, instrument and controls, or structural); and (4) the findings are concentrated in a particular type of document (e.g., operating procedure, calculation, drawing, FSAR, maintenance procedure). The staff anticipates that if licensee corrective adions are determined to be effective, and trends which raise questions about the licensing and design bases are not identified, the scope of the ICAVP would not be expanded. The status of Level 4 findings are periodically presented to the RAP. Any expansion of ICAVP scope j
resulting from Level 4 findinge will be approved by the EDO. The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope expansion will be communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.
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EDO Principal Correspondence Control
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- FROMs DUE
- 02/19/99-EDO CONTROL: G980074 DOC DT 02/02/98 FINAL REPLY:
' D;bby Katiz Sal Mangingli Citizcns Awareness Network (CAN)
TO:
Chairman Jackson i-FOR SIGNATURE OF :
.DESC:
ROUTING:
MIIpSTONE Ca11an Thadani Thompson Norry Blaha' l
-Burns
! DATES 02/06/98 Miller, RI ASSIGNED TO:
CONTACT:
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_ RR Collins SPECIAI ~ INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:
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Chat'rean di.g4chn's foifice1 to resiewi:responsei prior:- to DUE TO NRR D: RECTOR 1
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L ll OFFICE OF'THE SECRETARY-CORRESPONDENCE--' CONTROL TICKET
- PkPERNUMBER:
CRC-98-0099 LOGGING.DATE: Feb
'S 98 l -,
. ACTION OFFICE:
EDO AUTHOR:
' DEBBIE"KATZ-
' AFFILIATION::
CONNECTICUT ADDRESSEE:
' CHAIRMAN-JACKSON LETTER:DATE:
Feb-: :L 98 FILE CODE: 'IDR 5 MILLSTONE
SUBJECT:
MILLSTONE L
. ACTION:
Direct Peply
-DISTRIBUTION:
CHAIRMAN, COMRS SPECIAL HANDLING: SECYtTO ACK
. CONSTITUENT:
NOTES:
.OCM #11851 (CHAIRMAN SHOULD REVIEW RESPONSE PRIOR l
.TO' DISPATCH)
' DATE DUE:
Feb 20 98
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SIGNATURE:
,DATE SIGNED:
AFFILIATION:
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