ML20217K348
ML20217K348 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | 07003089 |
Issue date: | 08/13/1997 |
From: | Horn M NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
To: | Pierson R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
References | |
NUDOCS 9708150204 | |
Download: ML20217K348 (53) | |
Text
i August 13, 1997 MEMORANDUM TO: Robert Pl:rson, Chl:f Sp;ci:1 Proj: cts Brcnch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards FROM:
Morti Horn, Project Manager Enrichment Section g
Special Projects Branch nAnD4 Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
FOR AVLis MEETINGS WITH USEC On July 29, and 30,1997, staff from the Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards met with the United States Enrichment Corporation to discuss technical aspects of the AVLIS prograi. USEC informed the staff that they expect to submit a license application for AVLIS in December 1998. USEC presented a brief os erview of the AVLIS program, and outlined the nuclear criticality safety (NCS) approach for the AVLIS enrichment facility.
Specific topics included the design criteria and approach, the NCS evaluations, the NCS limits for process controls, NCS controls, NCS organization, configuration management, and administrative practices. USEC discussed their approach to establish analysis benchmarks and code validation for the higher enrichment levels (up to 10 percent) needed for AVLIS. On July 30,1997, USEC presented information on the integrated safety analysis (ISA) being conducted for the AVLis enrichment f acility, and discussed the major safety hazards being considered. The agendas, list of attendees, and USEC handouts are attached.
Docket 70 3089 Attachments:
- 1. Agenda for NCS
- 2. List of Attendees for NCS k
/
- 4. Agenda for ISA g
- 5. List of Attendees for ISA f
Docket 70-3089 !NRC File Center 9 PUBLIC SPB r/f NMSS r/f FCSS r/f n:\\mtgsumav.wpd OFC S,PB k
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/ /97 DATE
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i NPC/USEC Meeting Agenda July 29,1997 Review of AVLIS Uranium Processes Nuclear Criticality Safety Approach for AVLIS-e Development of NCS Design Criteria and Approach
- NCS Limits for Process Controls e NCS Controls e NCS Administrative Practice Validation of NCS Codes for AVLIS Material e Approach e Benchmark Data e Results Including Blas and Applicability 1
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O Agenda NRC/USEC Meeting July 29,1997 1:00 p.m.
i on AVLIS Nuclear Criticality Safety J
Introduction to AVLIS 15 min.
Toelle Review of AVLIS uranium processes 30 min.
Koopman (as needed for new participants)
Nuclear Criticality Safety approach for AVLIS 1.5 hr.
Koopman/Kidd (Draft Chapter 6 of license application)
Development of NCS Design Criteria and Approach e
NCS Evaluations e
NCS Limits for Process Controls e
NCS Controls NCS Organization e
Configuration Management Administrative Practices e
Validation of SCALE 4.3 for AVLIS 1.5 hr.
Wetzel Purpose of Validation e
issues in the 5-10 w/o "U range 2
e Benchmark Critical Experiment Data e
Validation Approach
.- Range of Applicability Results (Blas and Recommendations)
Conclusions Wrap up and Action items Toelle l
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Approach for the AVLIS Enrichment Facility i
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Presented to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission I
July 29,1997 f
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Overview l
l Development of NCS design criteria & approach I
NCS evaluations i
NCS limits for process controls 4
1 NCS controls I
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NCS organization
- Configuration management
- Administrative practices
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i Development of NCS Design Criteria and j
Approach i
Based on current methodology & guidance j
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Reg Guides (e.g.,3.52, Rev. 2 draft)
NUREG's (e.g., draft 1513, draft 1520)
ANSI /ANS 8 standards (e.g., 8.1,8.3,8.19, j
8.20, 8.21)
-10CFR70 (including preliminary draft revision) & 10CFR40 l
recognized handbooks (e.g., LA-12808, TID-l 7016, LA-10860, LA-3366(Rev), Knief's l
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NCS Design Criteria and Approach (continued) t
- Based on experience of a licensed & operating j
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30+ years experience in criticality safety i
l recent license renewal j
continuously improving program
- Based on the Double Contingency Principle i
process analysis from the ISA l
NCS evaluations i
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i NCS Evaluations 9
Formal NCS Analysis Procedure ES-0001 l
- adopted by AVLIS Program i
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- will be used through plant implementation i
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- content of an NCS evaluation i
statement of analysis request l
i system description l
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description of calculational methodology description of assumptions
-parameters affecting reactivity i
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controlled parameters l
limits M4 c.- - c.
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NCS Evaluations (continued) i
- content (continued)
.redible contingencies / accident pathways
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double contingency / defense-in-depth i
list of engineered controls, equipment, maintenance j
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inspections, tests, surveillance and frequency t
independent review documentation 4
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NCS Limits (continued) i
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observe "on-the-floor" NCS conditions Operations supervisors
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Training general employee training 1
special.ized. instruction cvaluation 3
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- Inspections, Audits, Assessments, investigations l
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engineered limits and controls in operating and maintenance procedures as necessary
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NRC/USEC Meeting Agenda July 30,1997
- Basis for the AVLIS ISA Process Structure for the AVLIS ISA Process Conduct of the ISA Tasks Major.lSA Components -
Development of AVLIS License Application Sections Schedule of ISA Milestones t
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i MEETING OF U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f
AND UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORPORATION.
i July 30, 1997 TOPIC:
AVLIS ISA Meeting r
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The ISA is "an analysis to identify hazards and their potential for initiating event sequences, the potential event sequences and their consequences, and the site structures, systems, equipment, l
components and activities of personnel that are relied on for safety" (NUREG-1513).
The ISA will:
- Assess the hazards associated with AVLIS operations
- Develop graded requirements for safe design and operations
- Provide input for NRC license application
- Evaluate AVLIS facility structures, systems and components (SSCs) for safety significance N9JS -
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Basis for the AVLIS ISA Process Approach is based on the guidance provided in draft NUREG-1513, " Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document" Developed to comply with the guidance provided by draft NUREG-1520, " Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility" Incorporates safety analysis guidance from NRC, DOE, OSHA, and the chemical process industry t
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Conduct of ISA Tasks Establishment of criteria for safety evaluation Utilization of AVLIS pilot facility operating experience at LLNL-Inclusion of nuclear and chemical industry experience Conduct of investigations and interviews Development of integrated, multidisciplinary teams
'"Mation of peer, independent, and management reviews.
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Development of a Safety information Data Base s
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Criteria for ISA Team Selection Team Leader (s) trained and knowledgeable in selected methodology and evaluative processes Member (s) knowledgeable in the process under analysis Team consists of members that have relevant engineering, process and operations expertise Team members have specific safety expertise (e.g., radiological safety, fire protection, nuclear criticality safety, chemical safety, l
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9 ISA Core Team Health physics modeling/ analysis Occupational safety / industrial hygiene Nuclear criticality safety 1
Fire protection / prevention 1
Systems / design analysis Other specialists for speci'ic applications i
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ISA Team Engineering / Design Participants Separator system engineering Laser engineering Uranium process engineering Facility design engineering AVLIS Demonstration Facility [ full-scale: operations Nuclear criticality safety analysis l
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Major ISA Components Hazards identification Document
-Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Hazards and Operability Study Preliminary Hazards Analysis Accident Analysis Integrated Safety Analysis Report nGisc:
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Hazards identification Document Completed July 1996 Based on "What-If" and Checklist analysis techniques Utilized previous AVLIS program hazards analyses and early design information Provided a summary of potential hazards based on type, form, location, and potential interactions 1
Received programmatic review and concurrence Developed the basis for subsequent hazard evaluations i
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Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 1 Currently in progress 1
Evaluates failures of SSCs and the effects of these failures Identifies failures requiring further safety analysis (based on severity of effects)
Presents prelirninary identification of safety-significant SSCs Provides feedback for design development 1
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Compositiori of the FMEAs AVLis facility divided into 24 systems Defined boundaries and interfaces between systems Effects of failures with safety significance were graded based on l
qualitative analysis of severity Systems with safety significance will be addressed in subsequent analyses i
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AVLIS Systems (Basis for FMEAs)
Separator Uranium Recovery Feed Handling Analytical Laboratory Canister Withdrawal Non-Destructive Analysis Product Handling Interstage Processing Tails Handling Pod Refurbishment Product Blending / Shipping HVAC Systems RCZ Support Areas Process Lasers Non-Process Lasers Fire Protection Systems Buildings & Structures Plant Services & Utilities Electrical Power Systems Pod Changeout & Transport Centralized Waste Mgmt.
Control Features for Natural Phenomena Control & Data Acquisition Systems Monitoring Systems for Radiation, Criticality and Industrial Hygiene
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t Hazards and Operability Study Analyzes systems identified in the FMEA. as having safety significance Evaluates hazards associated with operations Inciudes human factors analysis Focuses on man-machine interfaces Defines specific hazards that result from equipment, process or human failures twC UnitedStates Enrichment Corporation t
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Preliminary Hazards Analysis Utilizes information from previous analyses of equipment, systems, processes and human factors failures / hazards Addresses hazards from process deviations, internal initiators, and credible external events 1
Eliminates hazards of little or no significance by screening criteria Identifies hazards that will be subjected to rigorous safety analysis Includes consideration ofinteraction of hazards and controls to l
define preliminary risks Produces a ranking of the hazards associated with AVLIS operations 5.N !S nW UnitedStates Enrichment Corporation 16
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Acddent Analysis l
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discipline-specific analyses Develops accident sequences and scenarios l
Utilizes detailed event trees and fault trees includes detailed consequence analysis l
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t ISA Report Integrates criticality, radiological, fire, chemical, and l
occupational / industrial safety Discusses all modes of operation, including startup, operation, shutdown, and maintenance Presents the salient points of the PHA and the accident analysis i
Addresses final definition of safety-significant SSCs 1
Provides the basis for license application i
Provides input for plant programs AOI E
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Schedule of ISA Mi!estones Milestone / Activity Est. Completion Date llazard Identification Document completed 07/96 Failure Modes and Effects Analyses due 07-08/97 i
Preliminary Hazards Analysis 12/97 Fire Protection Hazards Analysis 07/98 Chemical Hazards Safety Analysis 07/98 Nuclear Critier ty Safety Analysis 0S/98 Accident Analysis 09/98 Radiation Protection Program Plan 09/98 1
Integrated Safety Analysis Report 10/98 NRC License Application 12/98 6
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