ML20217F665
| ML20217F665 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/08/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217F652 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9910210037 | |
| Download: ML20217F665 (7) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 Shipper:
U. S. Department of Energy Locations:
Aiken, South Carolina Marietta, Georgia East Ridge Tennessee Paducah, Kentucky Metropolis, Illinois Ogden, Utah Idaho Falls, Idaho Date:
August 24-28,1999.
Inspectors:
Orysia M. Bailey, Radiation Specialist, Region ll Thomas Dexter, Security inspector, Region IV Gail Good, Chief, Plant Support Branch, Region IV James Kniceley, Security inspector, Region 111 Larry Ricketson, Radiation Specialist, Region IV William Tobin, Senior Safeguards inspector, Region 11 Approved:
Edward J. McAlpine, Chief Fuels Facilities Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety l
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Enc!osure 9910210037 991008 PDR ORG EUSDOE PDR L
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
. On June 4,1999, NAC International (NAC) notified NRC by letter that they were acting as a general licensee for an irradiated fuel shipment for the Department of Energy (DOE) moving from several sites in Europe. In the June 4 letter, NAC requested NRC to approve the spent fuel route for highway movement between the Savannah River Site (SRS) and the Idaho National Engineef.ng and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). By letter dated June 18,1999, the DOE provided additional information on the proposed route. The Tri-State Motor Company wds designated as the carrier. NRC conducted a survey of the proposed route in nine states, coordinating with representatives of appropriate State Governors, officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), State law enforcement representatives, and local response authorities along the route. On August 11,1999, NRC Informed the DOE that the route was approved.
On August 13,1999, the DOE informed the NRC and the appropriate state govemment points of contact of the ar,-ival at the Naval Weapons Station Charleston of ;:e five containers of irradiated fuel and of the scheduled dates and times for transport. The shipping schedule specified that the tansport would occur in two segments. The first segment involved a three transport vehicle convoy with a single container on each vehicle. The second segment involved a two transport vehicle convoy with a single container on each vehicle. The second convoy was scheduled to depart from SRS after the first convoy arrived at INEEL.
Prior to departure of the first convoy from SRS, the NRC inspected the three transport vehicles and verified compliance with security and health physics requirements. The DOE and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmentai Control also verified adherence to radiation control standards. On August 25,1999, at 6:00 p.m. the first convoy left the SRS and was inspected in Tennessee, Illinois and Idaho by state radiation protection specialists. The first convoy arrived at INEEL on August 28,1999, at 9:15 a.m. (EST). Upon arrival, the convoy was inspected by NRC and DOE radiation specialists. Radiation readings were well within regulatory limits and agreed with tho various states inspections results.
The second convoy departed the SRS at 6:00 p.m. (EST) on August 28,1999, and arrived at 6:45 a.m. (EST) on August 31,1999. The NRC monitored the progress of the second convoy by telephone, but the vehicles were not physically inspected by NRC. Several states conducted safety and radiation inspections. The DOE also conducted departure and arrival radiation inspections.
Inspection conducted by the NRC confirmed that the contamination and radiation levels, placarding, and shipping papers associated with the first segment were in accordance with NRC and the Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements. Vehicle safety inspections conducted by state inspectors at various locations along the route revealed vehicle safety deficiencies. South Carolina, Tennessee and Illinois vehicle safety inspectors identified problems such as defective trailer brakes, a tire needing replacement, chaffed airbrake lines, loose airbrake lines, an exhaust line leak under a cab, unsecured lumber in the trailer, an oil leak under an engine and a reflector and a mud guard needing replacement. While none of these deficiencies caused the cancellation of the shipment, they did delay the convoy several hours while mechanics repaired / replaced the faulty equipment. These unexpected delays placed additienal strains on the armed police escorts sheltering the trucks on public highways.
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Security and Safeguards (81310) a.
Inspection Scope The NRC requirements for the physica! protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit are specified in 10 CFR 73.37. The Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a document titled " Cross-Country Authorized Stops and Alternate Safe Parking Areas" which furnished the crews with emergency telephone numbers for local, state and federal authorities, as well as timetables and shelters, b.
Observations and Findings The route traversed portions of ten states. NRC conducted a route survey in advance of the shipment. The survey covered portions of six states (South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Illinois, Utah and Idaho) for which route surveys had either not been previously conducted or for which the previous route survey was out of date. This survey involved 406 miles out of a total of 2,400 miles. The State, federal and local authorities including appropriate tribal representatives were contacted and are identified in the Attachment. NRC approved the route on August 11,1999.
Prior to the departure of the first convoy, on August 24 and 25, the NRC randomly verified the presence of an immobilization device and the functionality of radio / telephone capabilities on selected vehic!es. Driver understanding of these devices was also f
verified. Emergency procedures and associated driver knowledge were verified. The NRC inspectors discussed the responsibilities of the armed escorts for South Carol;na, l
Georgia, Tennessee, Illinois, Utah and Idaho with those police officers and verified their knowledge of their duties. The first convoy departed at 6:00 p.m. on August 25 and was accompanied by the NRC inspectors verifying communications capabilities, telephone logs, emergency procedures and the presence of armed escorts in South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Illinois, Utah and Idaho. Upon arrival of the first convoy at INEEL, the second convoy departed SRS at 6:00 p.m. on August 28 and was telephonically monitored by the NRC until its arrival at 6:45 a.m. on August 31.
During these shipmeats numerous vehicle safety deficiencies were identified by state inspectors. Prior to departure, the South Carolina authorities conducted a Commercial Vehicle Safety Assessment and declared the condition of one trailer as unfit for interstate highway movement due to brake failures. In Georgia, there was a two hour delay for additional trailer brake problems. Most common of the deficiencies were faulty brakes on the trailert and associated airbrake line failures, also cited were frayed and loose airbrake lines, un exhaust leak under the cab, an engine oil leak, unsecured lum,ber lying on top of a battery, and the need to r.eplace a mud flap and a reflector. At the Georgia / Tennessee state line, the NRC bpectors were informed by State of Tennessee officials that the vehicles did not meet enteria specewd in a " Point of Departure" inspection due to the condition of a trailer's brakes. The problems were corrected and the vehicles passed an "Enroute Shipment" inspection which is less restrictive. The convoy was allowed passage, but not before the senior driver indicated that a mechanic k
2 would be alerted to meet the convoy at the Illinois state line where the next vehicle inspection was scheduled. A three hour delay occurred at the Illincis state line where state inspectors identified several of the previously mentioned deficiencies. These delays posed additional strains on armed escorts staging along the route, as well as on the armed escorts needing to shelter the vehicles while repairs were made.
c.
Conclusion The shipment met NRC security and radiation protection requirements, but did not meet state vehicle safety standards and was delayed several times while repairs were made.
2.
Inspection of Transportation Activities (86740) a.
Inspection Scope The radiation protection requirements for the shipment of irradiated fuel are found in 49 CFR Part 172 (placarding) and Part 173 (dose rates and contamination levels).
Inspection Procedure No. 86740, " Transportation Activities" details NRC and DOT shipping regulations.
b.
Observations and Findings The licensee transported three casks containing spent fuel from overseas research reactors from the DOE's Savannah River Site to the INEEL. The activity in the casks ranged from 33.7 Tbg to 507 Tbq. The casks were place in an international standards organizations (ISO) container in each originating country, locked, and had a seal affixed to the container. The casks remained in the containers until they arrived at INEEL. The containers were transported by tractor trailer, one container to each flat bed truck, for exclusive use transport to INEEL.
The inspectors reviewed the shipment to determine the licensee's compliance with the NRC transportation requirements contained in 10 CFR Part 71 and the DOT requirements in 49 CFR 170 through 189. The inspectors reviewed the shipping papers the licensee had prepared for the shipment. The shipping papers contained the information required by 49 CFR 172.200 through 205. Emergency response information and exclusive use instructions were included with the shipping papers as required by 49 CFR 172.600 through 606.
After the freight containers were loaded on the trailers, the inspectors examined the shipment for compliance with the placarding requirements of 49 CFR 172.500 through 519. Each container was clearly placarded on all four sides with the required radioactive placard.
The inspectors also conducted surveys of each freight cc.ntainer to determine if the shipment complied with the radiation level limits in 49 CFR 173.441 and the contamination limits in 49 CFR 173.443. The casks were transported by exclusive use trucks and each cask was contained in individual, sealed ISO containers that served to i
make the conveyance a closed transport vehicle. Since the casks were in sealed f
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3 containers and were in a " transit" mode from the origination countries to the final destination, the inspectors did not have access to the cas (s. The inspectors were not able to survey the package surfaces or to review the package markings and labels.
The inspectors used an Eberline RO-2 lon Chamber (No. 5713, calibrated August 22, 1999) to survey the surface of each container and to obtain measurements at two meters from the edge of the trailer and inside the truck's passenger compartment. The background radiation level was less than or equal to.5 millirem per hour. The measured dose rates, taken at the surface of the containers and at two meters from the edge of the trailers, ranged from 0 to 2.5 millirem per hour. The measured dose rate within the i
passenger compartments were 0 millirem per hour. Based upon the survey, the inspectors determined that the shipment did not exceed the vehicle outer surface radiation level limits of 200 millirem per hour, the 10 millirem per hour limit at two meters from the trailer edge. and the two millirem per hour limits in the occupied spaces of the vehicle passenger compartments.
Since :he inspectors did not have access to the radioactive material packages, the inspectors could not determine the level of removable radioactive contamination on the external surfaces of each package. However, the inspector did obtain six wipes from the exterior surfaces of each container near any openings (doors, hatches, louvers) into the containers. The 100 cm contamination wipes were counted for one minute with an 2
Eberline ESP-2 instrument (No. 794, calibrated August 23,1999) in the scaler mode with an Eberline HP-260 " pancake" detector. None of the results exceeded twice background, that being 43 cpm.
At the termination of the brst convoy NRC and DOE radiation specialists independently surveyed the casks and found no contamination leakage and that readings were well below limits allowable by NRC regulations.
c.
Conclusion The dose rates a..d contamination levels of the three containers inspected by the NRC were confirmed to be below the allowable limits of 49 CFR Part 173. The three containers were not damaged and were placarded correctly.
3.
Exit Meeting On October 8,1999, the NRC concems relate to the transport vehicles not meeting safety standards and the request to perform an investigation to identify the cause and proposed corrective actions was discussed in a telephone conversation between Edward J. McAlpine of i
the NRC Region ll staff and Blake R. Williams of NAC International (the licensee). The licensee acknowledged the NRC concerns and agreed io perform the requested investigation to identify the cause and provide corrective actions.
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o ATTACHMENT 1.
Persons Contacted Route Survey (July and Auoust.1999)
V. Alvarez, Chief of Police, Shoshone-Bannock Tribe, Idaho V. Autry, South Carolina, Governor's Representative C. Davis, Special Agent, FBI, Washington, D.C.
S. Gerard, Wyoming, Governor's Representative E. Gordon, Iowa, Governor's Representative A. Hatcher, Georgia, Governor's Representative S. Jones, Idaho State Police R. Kolko, Special Agent, FBI, Atlanta, Georgia M. Millett, Utah Highway Patrol D. Rich, Idaho, Govemor's Representative T. Runyan, Illinois Department of Radiation Safety W. Sinclair, Utah, Guvernor's Representative R. Thorpe, Public Safety, Sheshone-Bannack Tribe, Idaho B. Tuma, Nebraska, Governor's Represer,tative E. Ursery, Tennessee Emergency Management Agency J. Volpe, Kentucky, Govemor's Represer<tative J. White, Tennessee, Governor's Representative Shioment inspection R. Arenez, DOE-INEEL A. Blackman, DOE-SRS M. Bosher, Tennessee Department of Safety B. Bugg, Georgia Public Service Commission R. Cayler, Tennessee Emergency Management Agency W. Clark, DOE-SRS, Project Manager D. Cupp, TRISM R. Garidy, South Carolina Department of Health L. Goden, TRISM R. Huskin, DOE-SRS K. Mc Alhany, DOE-SRS s
R. Mc Lean, DOE-SRS T. Mustin, DOE-Headquarters, Project Manager R. Perry, Tennessee Division of Radiological Health G. Phillips, Nuclear Assurance Corporation D. Rhodes, South Carolina Department of Public Mety J. Wade, DOE-INEEL D. Walker, Idaho Oversight Program B. Williams, Nuclear Assurance Corporation
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2 NRC Personnel O. Masnyk Bailey, Radiation Specialist, Region 11 T. Dexter, Security inspector, Region IV G. Good, Branch Chief, Region IV J. Kniceley, Security inspector, Region lli L. Ricketson, Radiation $pecialist, Region IV W. Tobin, Senior Safeguards inspector, Region 11 2.
Insoection i)rocedures Used 81310-Physical Protection of Shipments of irradiated Fuel 86740-Transportation Activities
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Acronyms Used CFR Code of Federal Regulations em Centimeter cpm Counts Per Minute DOE Department of Energy DOT Department of Transportation FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory ISO International Standards Orgc.nizations SR3 Savannah River Site Tbg Terabecquerel TRISM Tri State Motor Company i
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