ML20217B650

Amends 108 & 86 to Licenses NPF-68 & NPF-81,respectively, Updating Limiting Condition for Operation (Loc) 3.0.4 & SR 3.0.4 in Existing VEGP TS to Be Consistent with Versions of Loc 3.0.4 & SR 3.0.4

ML20217B650
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	09/30/1999
From:	Emch R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	City of Dalton, GA, Georgia Power Co, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, Oglethorpe Power Corp, Southern Nuclear Operating Co
Shared Package
ML20217B657	List: ML20217B650 ML20217B662
References
NPF-68-A-108, NPF-81-A-086 NUDOCS 9910130005
Download: ML20217B650 (46)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:t t t# Ef 4 g" UNITED STATES g ,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 't WASHINGTON. D.C. 20556-0001 o 49.....,o SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY. INC. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON. GEORGIA VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 108 License No. NPF-68

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Comrnission) has found that:

j A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 filed by the Southem Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licenseos), dated April 13,1999, as supplemented by letter dated August 26,1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act or 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and te0ulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The faciiity will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 9910130005 990930 PDR ADOCK 05000424-p PDR

l-t- 1 4

2. 'Accordingly, the license is hereby arnended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 is hereby amended to reaa as follows:

Technical Soecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.108 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shull be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r Richard L. Emch, Jr., Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate ll Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance: September 30, 1999 l h I 4 l

1 4 4 44 NO y* u UNITED STATES g j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 206t50001 .....,d 4 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY. INC. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON. GEORGIA VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 86 License No. NPF-81

1. The Nuclear Ragulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 filed by the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), acting for itself, Georgia Power Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated April 13,1999, as supplemented by letter dated August 26,1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility wll operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; j l D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and J security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. ) I

4 % l

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Soecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 86 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. 1

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Richard L. Emch, Jr., Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate ll Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes Date of issuance: September 30, 1999 l i I

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 108 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-68 i DOCKET NO. 50-424 AND TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 86 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF,f r, j i DOCKET NO. 50-425 i Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached - revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal j lines indicating the areas of change. Overleaf pages are provided.' Remove Insert l 1 3.0-1 3.0-1

• 3.0-2 3.0-2 3.0-5 3.0-5 l

3.1.1 -1 3.1.1 -1 3.3.1 -1 3.3.1 -1 3.3.1-2 3.3.1 -2* 3.3.8-1 3.3.8-1 3.3.8-2 3.3.8-2* 3.4.8-1 3.4.8-1 3.4.8-2 3.4.8-2 3.4.12-1 3.4.12-1* 3.4.12-2 3.4.12-2 3.9.1 -1 3.9.1-1 3.9.6-1 3.9.6-1 3.9.6-2 3.9.6-2* D 3.0-6 B 3.0-5 B 3.0-6 B 3.0-6 B 3.0-7 B 3.0-7 8 3.0-8 8 3.0-8* B 3.0-13 B 3.0-13* B 3.0-14 B 3.0-14 8 3.0-15 B 3.0-15 B 3.1.1-3 B 3.1.1-3* B 3.1.1-4 B 3.1.1-4 B 3.3.1-41 B 3.3.1 -41

• B 3.3.1-42 B 3.3.1-42 B 3.3.8-1 B 3.3.8-1
• l-B 3.3.8 2 B 3.3.8-2

.4 2 Remove insert - B 3.3.8-3 8 3.3.8-3 B 3.4.8-3 8 3.4.8-3 B 3.4.8-4 B 3.4.8-4* B 3.4.12 9 B 3.4.12-9. ) - B 3.4.12-10 B 3.4.12-10 j B 3.4.1211 B 3.4.12-11 B 3.4.12-12 B 3.4.12-12 . B 3.4.12-13 B 3.4.12-13 8 3.4.12-14 B 3.4.12-14 B 3.9.1-3 B 3.9.1-3 B 3.9.1-4 B 3.9.1-4* B 3.9.6-1 B 3.9.6-1

• B 3.9.6-2 B 3.9.6-2 I

I l l

m ) 4', i LCO Applicability f 3.0 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the ~ Applicability, except as provided in LCO 3.0.2. LCO 3.0.2 ' Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.6. If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time (s), completion of the Required Action (s)is not required unless otherwise stated. LCO 3.0.3-When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an .{ associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated i ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour 1 to place the unit, as applicable,in: a. MODE 3 within 7 hours; b. MODE 4 within 13 hours; and i c. MODE 5 within 37 hours. Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications. I Where corrective measures are comptsted that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required. LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1,2,3, and 4. LCO 3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued 1-(continubd) Vogtie Units 1 and 2 - 3.0-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1) Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2) i

y LCO Applicability 3.0 f I - 3.0 LCO APPLICABILITY. i LCO 3.0.4. operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the (continued) ' Applicability for an unlimited period of time. This Specification shall not - prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the . Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.- Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications. These exceptions allow entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered allow unit operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability only ifor a limited period of time. ~, LCO 3.0.4 la only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified Condition in the Applicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4. LCO 3.0.5 - ' Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the u testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. LCO 3.0.6. When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCO not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the support system LCO ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the supported system. In this event, additional evaluations and limitations may be required in accordance with Specification 5.5.15, " Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)." If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in whi:h the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. When a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to L be declared inoperabl(or directs entry into Conditions and Required s ' Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2. 1 (continued) Vogtle' Units 1 and 2 3.0-2 Amendment No.108 (Unit 1) Amendment No. 86 (Unit 2) L,

y SR Applicability 3.0 3.0 SR APPLICABILITY - l-1 SR 3.0.3 - - When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period. l ' (continued) and the Surveillance is not met,91e LCO must immediately be declared ~ not met, and the applicable Condition (s) must be entered.- SR 3.0.4 Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability c. an i LCO shall not be made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met i within their specified Frequency. This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are ( required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a snutdown of the j unit. SR 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified ~ .. condition in the Applicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4. t J l .Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.0-5 Amendment No.108 (Unit 1) Amendment No. 86 (Unit 2) j.:

r:, 4 SDM 3.1.1 3.1. REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ^ 3.1.1.. SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) ' LCO 3.1.1 SDM 'shall be 2 the limit specified in the COLR. t ' APPLICABILITY: MODES 3,4, and 5. ACTIONS. NOTE While this LCO is not met, transition to a lower MODE within the Applicability, and entry into MODE 5 from MODE 6 is not permitted. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 'l . A. SDM not within limit. A.1 Initiate boration to restore 15 minutes SDM to within limit. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l l l ' SR 3.1.1.1 Verify SDM is 2 the limit specified in the COLR. 24 hours l t - Vogtle Units 1 'and 2 3.1.1-1 Amendment No.108(Unit 1) Amendment No. 86(Unit 2) L

F ' i, RTS Instrum:ntation 3.3.1 j 3.3 lNSTRUMENTATION.

.3.3.1. ' Reactor Trip System (RTS) instrumentation

. LCO' 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE. -{ -APPLICABILITYr According to Table 3.3.1-1. ] I ACTIONS-NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions - A.1 Enter the Condition - Immediately with one or more referenced in required channels Table 3.3.1-1 for the - ) inoperable. channel (s). B. : One Manual Reactor Trip - B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours 1 channelinoperable. OPERABLE status. ) 2 B.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours C. NOTE C.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours While this LCO is not met to OPERABLE status. i for Functions 1,17,18,. or 19 in MODE 5, closing M . the reactor trip breakers- ' is not permitted.' C.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours l' ' One channel or train inoperable. (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and ~2 = 3.3.1-1 Amendment No.108(Unit 1) Amendment No. 86(Unit 2) I L

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued) . CONDITION REQUIRED AC :ON COMPLETION TIME D.- One Power Range NOTE Neutron Flux-High A channel may be bypassed for up channelinoperable. to 4 hours for surveillance testing and setpoint adjustment. D.1.1 Flace channelin trip. 6 hours AND D.1.2 Reduce THEkMAL 12 hours POWER to s 75% RTP. D.2.1 Place channel i.1 trip. 6 hours AND NOTE Only required to be performed when the Power Range Neutron Flux input to QPTR is inoperable and THERMAL POWER 2 75% RTP. D.2.2 Perform SR 3.2.4.2. Once per 12 hours D.3 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours (pangued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-2 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1) Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)

fi; p~ '. High Flux at Shutdown Alarm l- .3.3.8 e i 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION - - 3.3.8"H_igh Flux at ShutdoEn Alarm (HFASA) -LCO 3.3.8 Two channels of HFASA shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 3,'4, and 5 NOTE The HFASA may be blocked in MODE 3 during reactor startup. ACTIONS T i COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. 'One channel of HFASA 'A.1 NOTE Inoperable. Exception to LCO 3.0.4: MODE changes are only permitted when Required-4 Actions B.1.and B.2 are met.- Restore channel to 48 hours OPERABLE status. / B. - Required Action and B.1 Perform SR 3.1.1.'1 (verify 1 hour associated Completion _ SDM). -Time of Condition A not AND met. Once per 12 hours thereafter

QR

.Two channels of AND HFASA inoperable. B.2 Perform SR 3.9.2.1 (verify 4 hours unborated water source isolated). AND Once per 14 days thereafter Vogtle Units 1 and 2 - 3.3.8-1 Amendment No.108(Unit 1) Amendment No. 86(Unit 2) x.

e High Flux at Shutdown Alarm 3.3.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY NOTE Not required to be performed prior to entering _ MODE 3 from MODE 2 until 4 hours after entry - into MODE 3.- . SR 3.3.8.1 Perform COT. 92 days SR 3.3.8.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.- 18 months J Vogtie Units 1 and 2 3.3.8-2 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1) Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)

P;u RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled 3.4.8 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMIR0S) 3.4.8 ' RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled LCO 3.4.8 Two residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE and one RHR loop shall be in operation. Each valve used to isolate unborated water sources shall be secured in the closed position. ....................... NOT ES-..-.--.- 1. All RHR pumps may be de-energized for s 15 minutes when switching from one loop to another provided: a. The core outlet temperature is maintained > 10'F below saturation temperature, b. No operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of the RCS boron concentration; and c. No draining operations to further reduce the RCS water volume are permitted. 2. One RHR loop may be inoperable for s 2 hours for surveillance testing j provided that the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation. 3. Valves in the flowpath from the RMWST, through the chemical mixing tank, to the suction of the charging pumps may be open under administrative control provided the RCS is in compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of LCO 3.1.1 and the high flux at shutdown alarm is OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with RCS loops not filled. I (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.8 1 Amendment No.108 (Unit 1) Amendment No. 86 (Unit 2)

4 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled 3.4.8 ACTIONS (continued) NOTE--.------------- While this LCO is not met, entry into MODE 5 with RCS loops not filled is not permitted. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR loop inoperable. A.1 Initiate action to restore immediately RHR loop to OPERABLE status. I B. Required RHR loops B.1 Suspend vil operations immediately ) inoperable, involving i duction in RCS borori concentration. QB AND No RHR loop in operation. B.2 Initiate action to restore immediately one RHR loop to OPERABLE status and to operation. C. One or more valves used C.1 Initiate action to secure immediately to isolate unborated water valve (s)in closed sources riot secured in

position, closed position.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.8.1 Verify one RHR loop is in operation. 12 hours SR 3.4.8.2' Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power 7 days are available to the required RHR pump that is not in operation. SR 3.4.8.3 Verify each valve that isolates unborated water 31 days sources is secured in the closed position. Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.8-2 Amendment No.108 (Unit 1) Amendment No. 86 (Unit 2)

r7 - COPS l 3.4.12 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Protection Systems (COPS) LCO 3.4.12 A COPS shall be OPERABLE with all safety injection pumps incapable of injecting into the RCS and the accumulators isolated and either a or b

below, a.

Two RCS relief valves, as follows: 1. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift settings within the limits specified in the PTLR, or 2. Two residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves with setpoints 2 440 psig and s 460 psig, or 3. One PORV with a lift setting within the limits specified in the PTLR and one RHR suction relief valve with a setpoint within specified limits. i b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent of 2 2.14 square inches (based on an equivalent length of 10 feet of pipe). APPLICABILITY: MODE 4, MODE 5, MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on. NOTE 1. Accumulator isolation is only required when accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the P/T llmit curves provided in the PTLR. 2. The safety injection pumps are not required to be incapable of injecting into the RCS until 4 hours after entering MODE 4 from MODE 3 provided the temperature of one or more RCS cold legs has not decreased below 325'F. Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.12-1 Amendment No. 96 (Uniti ) Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)

r_ d COPS 3.4.12 ACTIONS .................... NOTE-1. While this LCO is not met, entry into MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on from MODE 6, and entry into MODE 5 from MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on is not permitted. 2. With one required PORV inoperable for the p,urpose of cold overpressure protection, entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3 is permitted provided that RCS temperature is maintained above 275 F, and, within 36 hours, either: the PORV is restored to OPERABLE status; or, an RHR suction relief valve is placed in service so that the requirements of LCO 3.4.12 are met. Otherwise, the reactor vessel must be depressurized and vented in accordance with Required Action F.1. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more safety A.1 Render all safety injection 4 hours injection pumps capable pumps incapable of injecting of injecting into the RCS. into the RCS. B. An accumulator not B.1 Isolate affected accumulator. 1 hour isolated when the accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR. C. Required Action and C.1 Increase RCS cold leg 12 hours associated Completion temperature to > 350 F. Time of Condition B not met. QR C.2 Depressurize affected 12 hours accumulator to less than the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR. D. One required RCS relief D.1 Restore required RCS relief 7 days valve inoperable in valve to OPERABLE status. l MODE 4. (continued) I f Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.12-2 Amendment No.108 (Unit 1) Amendment No. 86 (Unit 2) l L

p i: Boron Concentration 3.9.1 3.9 REFUELIF G OPERATIONS l 3.9.1 Boron (,oncentration - LCO 3.9.1 Boron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant System, the refueling canal, and the refueling cavity shall be maintained within the limit specified in the - COLR. APPLICABILITY: - MODE 6. ACTIONS J NOTE With the RCS boron concentration specified in the COLR for MODE 6 not met, entry into . MODE 6 is not permitted. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Boron concentration not A.1 Suspend CORE immediately within limit. ALTERATIONS. AND A.2 Suspend positive immediately reactivity additions. AND i A.3 Initiate action to restore immediately boron concentration to within limit. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR ' 3.9.1.1 .. Verify boron concentration is within the limit 72 hours specified in the COLR. 1 Vogtle' Units 1 and 2 3.9.1-1 Amendment No.108(Unit 1) Amendment No. 86(Unit 2)

RHR cnd Coolint Circulation - Low Wat:r Leval 3.9.6 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS '3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level LCO 3.9.6 Two RHR loops shall be OPERABLE, and one RHR loop shall be in operation.. APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 with the water level < 23 ft above the top of reactor vessel flange. ACTIONS -NOTE While this LCO is not met, entry into MODE 6 with water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange is not permitted. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.' Less than the required A.1 Initiate action to restore immediately number of RHR loops required RHR loops to OPERABLE. OPERABLE status. 08 A.2 initiate action to immediately establish 2 23 ft of water above the top of reactor vessel flange. B. No RHR loop in operation. B.1 Suspend operations immediately involving a reduction in reactor coolant boron concentration. AND (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.9.6-1 Amendment No.108(Unit 1) Amendment No. 86(Unit 2)

RHR a,d Coolant Circu!ation-Low Water Leve! 3.9.6 ACTIONS CONDITIDN REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2 initiate action to restore immediately one RHR loop to operation. AND B.3 Close all containment 4 hours penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.6.1 Verify one RHR loop is in operation and circulating 12 hours reactor coolant at a flow rate of 2 3000gpm. l i Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.9.6-2 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1) Amendment No.' 74 (Unit 2)

v d LCO Applicability l_ B 3.0 l BASES I l LCO 3.0.3 an Applicability of 'During movement of irradiated fuel (continued) assemblies in the fuel storage pool." Therefore, this LCO can be applicable in any or all MODES. If the LCO and the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.15 are not met while in MODE 1,2, or 3, there is no safety . benefit to be gained by placing the unit in a shutdown condition. The Required Action of LCO 3.7.15 of " Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool" in the appropriate Required Action to complete in lieu of the actions of LCO 3.0.3. These exceptions are addressed in the individual Specifications. LCO 3.0.4 LCO 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met. It precludes placing the unit in a MODE or other specified condition stated in that Applicability (e.g., Applicability desired to be entered) when the following exist: a. Unit conditions are such that the requirements of the LCO would not be met in the Applicability desired to be entered; and b. Continued noncompliance with the LCO requirements,if the Applicability were entered, would result in the unit being required to exit the Applicability desired to be entered to comply with the i Required Actions. Compliance with Required Actions that permit continued operation of the unit for an unlimited period of time in a MODE or other specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is without regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE change. Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or j other specified condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with the provisions of the Required Actions. The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated i MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability. f l (continued) i Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-5 Rev. 1 - 9/99 l

LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.4 The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in (continued) MODES or othei specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. l Exceptions to LCO 3.0.4 are stated in the individual Specifications. Exceptions may apply to all the ACTIONS or to a specific Required Action of a Specification. LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable for MODE changes when entering MODE 4 from MODE 5, MODE 3 from MODE 4, MODE 2 from MODE 3, or MODE 1 from MODE 2. Furthermore, LCO 3.0.4 is applicable when entering any other specified condition in the Applicability only while operating in MODES 1,2,3, or 4. The requirements of LCO 3.0.4 do not apply in MODES 5 and 6, or in other specfified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODES 1,2,3, or 4) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measures to be taken. In some cases (e.g., LCO 3.1.1) these ACTIONS provide a Note that states "While this LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability is not permitted, unless required to comply with ACTIONS." This Note is a requirement explicitly precluding entry into a MODE or other specified condition of the Applicability. Surveillances do not have to be performed on the associated inoperable equipment (or on variables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. Therefore, changing MODES or other specified conditions while in an ACTIONS Condition, in compliance with LCO 3.0.4 or where an exception to LCO 3.0.4 is stated, is not a violation of SR 3.0.1 or SR 3.0.4 for those Surveillances that do not have to be performed due to the associated inoperable equipment. However, SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILITY prior to declaring the associated equipment OPERABLE (or variable within limits) and restoring compliance with the affected LCO. LCO 3.0.5 LCO 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable Required Action (s)) to allow the performance of SRs to demonstrate: a. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service; or (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-6 Rev. 1 - 9/99

y l LCO Applicability 4 l B 3.0 1 BASES LCO 3.0.5

b. The OPERABILITY of other equipment.

(continued) 1 The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the allowed SRs. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance. An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service is reopening a containment isolation valve that has been closed to comply with Required Actions and must be reopened to perform the SRs. An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of an SR on another channelin the other trip system. A similar example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of an SR on another channel in the same trip system. i LCO 3.0.6 LCO 3.0.6 establishes an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for support systems that have an LCO specified in the Technical Specifications (TS). This exception is provided because LCO 3.0.2 would require that the Conditions and Required Actions of the associated inoperable supported system LCO be entered solely due to the inoperability of the support system. This exceptioe is justified because the actions that are required to ensure the unit is maintained in a safe condition are specified in the support system LCO's Required Actions. These Required Actions may include entering the supported system's Conditions and Required Actions or may specify other Required Actions. When a support system is inoperable and there is an LCO specified for it in the TS, the supported system (s) are required to be declared inoperable if determined to be inoperable as a result of the support system inoperability. However, it is not necessary to enter into the supported systems' Conditions and Required Actions unless directed to do so by the support system's Required Actions. The potential confusion and inconsistency of requirements related to the entry into multiple support and supported systems' LCOs' Conditions and Required Actions are eliminated by providing all the actions that are necessary to ensure the unit is maintained in a safe condition in the support system's Required AcJons. (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-7 Rev.1 - 9/99

~ LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.6.. However, there are instances where a support system's (continued) - Required Action may either direct a supported system to be declared inoperable or direct entry into Conditions and Required Actions for the supported system. This may occur immediately or after some specified delay to perform some other Required Action. Regardless of whether it is immediate or after some delay, when a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2. Specification 5.5.15, " Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)," ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other limitations, remedial actions, or compensatory actions may be identified as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Conditions and Required Actions. The SFDP implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6. Cross train checks to identify a loss of safety function for those i support systems that support multiple and redundant safety systems { are required. The cross train check verifies that the supported systems of the redundant OPERABLE support system are OPERABLE, thereby ensuring safety function is retained. If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. LCO 3.0.7 There are certain special tests and operations required to be pedormed at various times over the life of the unit. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions. Test Exception LCO 3.1.8 allows specified Technical Specification requirements to be changed to permit performance of these special tests and operations, (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-8 Revision No. O i

9. i SR Applicability ) B 3.0 i BASES ' SR 3.0.3 ' personnel, the time required to perform the Surveillance, (continued)' the safety significance of the delay in completing the seguired Surveillance, and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements. When a Surveillance witn a. Frequency based not on time intervals, but upon specified unit conditions or operational situations, is discovered not to have been performed when specified, SR 3.0.3 allows the full delay period of 24 hours to perform the Surveillance. SR 3.0.3 also provides a time limit for completion of Surveillances that become applicable as a consequence of MODE changes imposed by Required Actions. Failure to comply with specified Frequencies for SRs is expected to be an infrequent occurrence. Use of the delay period established by SR 3.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals. If a Surveillance is not completed within the allowed delay period, then the equipment is considered inoperable or the variable is considered outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required i Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon i expiration of the delay penod. If a Surveillance is failed within the delay period, then the equipment is inoperable, or the variable is outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon the failure of the Surveillancs. Completion of the Surveillance within the delay period allowed by this Specification, or within the Completion Time of the ACTIONS, restores compliance with SR 3.0.1. SR ' 3.0.4 - SR 3.0.4 establishes the requirement that all applicable SRs must be met before entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability. This Specification ensures that system and component OPERABILITY requirements and variable limits are met before entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the (continued) Vogtle Units _1 'and 2 B 3.0-13 Revision No. O e

SR Applicability ' B 3.0 BASES SR 3.0.4 Applicability for which these systems and components ensure (continued) safe operation of the unit. The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endosing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability. However, in certain circumstances, failing to meet an SR will not result in SR 3.0.4 restricting a MODE change or other specified condition change. When a system, subsystem, division, component, device, or variable is inoperable or outside its specified limits, the associated SR(s)is not required to be performed, per SR 3.0.1, which states that surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment. When equipment is inoperable, SR 3.0.4 does not apply to the associated SR(s), since the requirement for the SR(s) to be performed is removed. Therefore, failing to perform the Surveillance (s) within the specified Frequ ency does not result in an SR 3.0.4 restriction to changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability. However, since the LCO is not met in this instance, LCO 3.0.4 will govern any restrictions that may (or may not) apply to MODE or other specified condition changes. The provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. The precise requirements for performance of SRs are specified such that exceptions to SR 3.0.4 are not necessary. The specific time frames and conditions necessary for meeting the SRs are specified in the Frequency, in the Surveillance, or both. This allows performance of Surveillances when the prerequisite condition (s) specified in a Surveillance procedure require entry into the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the associated LCO prior to the performance or completion of a Surveillance. A Surveillance that could not be performed until after entering the LCO Applicability, would have its Frequency specified such that it is not "due" until the specific conditions needed are met. Altemately, the Surveillance may be stated in the form of a Note as not required (to be met or performed) until a particular event, condition, or time has been, reached. Further discussion of the specific formats of SRs annotation is found in Section 1.4, Frequency. (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-14 Rev. 1 - 9/99

SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES SR 3.0.4 SR 3.0.4 is only applicable for MODE changes when entering MODE 4 (continued) from MODE 5, MODE 3 from MODE 4, MODE 2 from MODE 3, or MODE 1 from MODE 2. Furthermore, SR 3.0.4 is applicable when entering any other specified condition in the Applicability only while operating MODES 1,2,3, or 4. The requirements of SR 3.0.4 do not apply in MODES 5 and 6, or in other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODES 1,2,3, or 4) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measures to be taken. Vogtle Units 1 and 2 8 3.0-15 Rev.1 - 9/99 i

~ SDM B 3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE terminating RCS heat removal and cooldown. Following the SAFETY ANALYSES MSLB, a post trip retum to power may occur; however, the ' (continued)

MSLB analysis bounds the post trip retum to power, and therefore, there is adequate protection to ensure that the specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded for this transient.

The most limiting event in MODES 3,4, and 5 is a boron dilution at BOL, when critical boron concentration is highest. In the bcron dilution analysis, the required SDM defines the reactivity difference between an initial subcritical boron concentration and the corresponding critical boron concentration. These values, in conjunction with the configuration of the RCS and the assumed dilution flow rate, directly affect the results of the analysis, in the analysis of this accident, the minimum SDM specified in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)is required to allow the operator 15 minutes from the initiation of the Source Range High Flux at Shutdown Alarm to totalloss of SDM. In addition to the limiting MSLB and boron dilution transients, the SDM requirement must also protect agairast: a. An uncontrolled rod withdrawal from subcritical or low power condition; and i b. Rod ejection. l Each of these events is discussed below. Depending on the system initial conditions and reactivity insertion rate, the uncontrolled rod withdrawal transient is terminated by either a high power level trip or a high pressurizer pressure trip. In all cases, power level, RCS pressure, linear heat rate, and the DNBR do not exceed allowable limits. The ejechon of a control rod rapidly adds reactivity to the reactor core, causing both the core power level and heat flux to increase with corresponding increases in reactor coolant temperatures and pressure. The ejection of a rod also produces a time dependent redistribution of core power. (continued) i ~ Vogtle' Units 1 and 2 B 3.1.1-3 Revision No. O

SDM ' B 3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SDM satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement. Even SAFETY ANALYSES though it is not directly observed from the control room, (continued) SDM is considered an initial condition process variable because it is periodically monitored to ensure that the unit is operating within the bounds of accident analysis assumptions. LCO SDM is a core ciesign condition that can be ensured during operation through control rod positioning (control and shutdown banks) and through the soluble boron concentration. The MSLB (Ref. 2) and the boron dilution (Ref. 3) accidents are the most limiting analyses that establish the SDM value of the LCO. For MSLB accidents,if the LCO is violated, there is a potential to exceed the DNBR limit and to exceed 10 CFR 100," Reactor Site Criteria," limits (Ref. 4) For the boron dilution accident, if the LCO is violated, the minimum required time assumed for operator action to terminate dilution may no longer be applicable. The required SDM is specified in the COLR. APPLICABILITY In MODES 3,4, and 5, the SDM requirements are applicable to provide sufficient negative reactivity to meet the assumptions of the safety analyses discussed above. In MODE 6, the shutdown reactivity requirements are given in LCO 3.9.1, Boron Concentration." In MODES 1 and 2, SDM is ensured by complying with LCO 3.1.5, " Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits," and LCO 3.1.6," Control Bank Insertion Limits." ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note prohibiting transition to a lower MODE within the Applicability and entry into MODE 5 from MODE 6. LCO 3.0.4 already prohibits entry into MODE 4 from MODE 5 and into MODE 3 from MODE 4 when SDM requirements are not met, j A:.1 If the SDM requirements are not met, boration must be initiated promptly. A Completion Time of 15 minutes is adequate for an operator to correctly align and start the required systems and components. It is assumed that (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.1.1-4 Rev. 1 - 9/99 3

n O RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 ' BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)' 7 Condition A applies to all RTS protection functions. Condition A 1 addresses the situation where one or more required channels for j one or more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The ' Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.1-1 and to take the Required Actions for the protection functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions. B.1 and B.2 Condition B applies to the Manual Reactor Trip in MODE 1 or 2. This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS for this Function. With one channelinoperable', the inoperable channel i must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to ) perform the safety function. i The Completion Time of 48 hours is reasonable considering that there are two automatic actuation channels end another manual initiation channel OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. j If the Manual Reactor Trip Function cannot be restored to - OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour Completion Time, i the unit must be brought to a MODE in which Condition B is ilo longer applicable. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought i . to at least MODE 3 within 6 additional hours (54 hours total time). The 6 additional hours to reach MODE 3 is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power operation in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. With the unit in MODE 3, Condition C applies to this trip function. C.1 and C.2 - Condition C applies to the following reactor trip Functions in MODE 3,4, or 5 with the RTBs closed and the CRD System capable of rod withdrawal: (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-41 Revision No. O L_

RTS Instrum:ntation ' B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) Manual Reactor Trip; RTBs; e RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms; and l e 1 Automatic Trip Logic. This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS for these Functions. With one channel or train inoperable, the inoperable channel or train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours. If the affected Function (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the RTBs must be opened within the next hour. The additional hour provides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderly manner. With the RTBs open, these Functions are no longer required. This -Condition is modified by a Note that prohibits closing the RTBs in MODE 5 if any of the above Functions (Function 1,17,18, or 19 of Table 3.3.1-1) are not met. Closing the RTBs in MODES 3 or 4 with any of these Functions not met is prohibited by LCO 3.0.4. The Completion Time is reasonable considering that in this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the safety function, and given the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. D.1.1. D.1.2. D.2.1. D.2.2, and D.3 Condition D applies to the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Function. The NIS power range detectors provide input to the CRD System and the SG Water Level Control System and, therefore, have a two-out-of-four trip logic. A known inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition. This results in a partial trip condition requiring only one-out-of-three logic for actuation. The 6 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition is justified in WCAP-10271-P-A (Ref. 7). In addition to placing the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to s 75% RTP within 12 hours. Reducing the power level prevents operation of (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 8 3.3.1-42 Rev. 1 - 9/99

A HFASA Instrumentation B 3.3.8 L B 3.3 INS TRUMENTATION, B 3.3.8 lHigh Flux at Shutdown Alarm (HFASA) ~ , BASES ~' r BACKGROUND.' 1The primary purpose of the HFASA is to warn the operator of an ' unplanned boron dilution event in sufficient time (15 minutes prior to loss of shutdown margin)'to allow manual action to terminate the event. The HFASA is used for this purpose in MODES 3 and

4, and MODE 5 with the loops filled.

. The HFASA consists of two channels of alarms, with each channel receiving input from one source range channel. An i ' alarm setpoint of 52.3 times background provides at least 15 I minutes from the time the HFASA occurs to the total loss of ' shutdown margin due to an unplanned dilution event. This meets the Standard Review Plan criteria for mitigating the consequences of an unplanned dilution event by relying on operator action. ' APPLICABLE The anal'ysis presented in Reference 1 identifies credible . SAFETY ANALYSES boron dilution initiators. Time intervals from the HFASA until loss of shutdown margin were calculated. The results demonstrate that sufficient time for operator response is available to terminate ~ an inadvertent dilution event taking credit for one HFASA with a l setpoint of $2.3 times background. The HFASA satisfied Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. ' LCO ' ' The LCO requires two channels of HFASA to be OPERABLE with input from two source range channels to provide protection-against single failure. APPLICABILITY The HFASA must be OPERABLE in MODES 3,4, and 5. The Applicability is modified by a Note which allows the HFASA to be blocked in MODE 3 during reactor startup so that spurious alarms are not generated. (continued) -Vogtle Units 1 and 2 - B 3.3.8-1 Rev.1-3/99

HFASA Instrumentation B 3.3.8 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, operators are alerted to an unplanned (continued) dilution event by a reactor trip on overtemperature delta-T or power range neutron flux high, low setpoint, respectively. As a protective measure in addition to HFASA, in MODE 5 with the loops not filled, unplanned dilution events are precluded by requiring the unborated water source (reactor makeup water storage tank (RMWST)) to be isolated. ACTIONS A.1 With one channel of HFASA inoperable, Required Action A.1 requires the inoperable channel to be restored within 48 hours. in this condition, one channel of HFASA remains available to provide protection. The 48 hour Completion Time is consistent with that required for an inoperable source range channel. Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note providing an exception to LCO 3.0.4. When Condition A (and Required Action A.1) are applicable, the Note permits MODE changes provided that Required Action B.1 and B.2 are met. LCO 3.0.4 allows MODE changes when the associated ACTIONS to be entered provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time, or to comply with ACTIONS, or to facilitate a shutdown of the unit. The associated ACTIONS of LCO 3.3.8 provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time. Therefore, with one channel of HFASA inoperable, LCO 3.0.4 would permit entry into the Applicability of LCO 3.3.8 and MODE changes within the 48 hour Completion Time allowed by Required Action A.1, before Condition B and Required Actions B.1 and B.2 would become applicable. In particular, when transitioning down through MODES 3,4, and 5, the shutdown margin requirements become more restrictive to compensate for a postulated boron dilution event. Required Action B.1 is a periodic verification of shutdown margin, and Required Action B.2 ensures that the unborated water source isolation valves are shut, precluding a boron dilution event. With one channel of HFASA inoperable, it is prudent to take the compensatory actions of Required Actions B.1 and B.2 if MODE changes are desired or required. B.1 and 8.2 With the Required Action A.1 and associated Completion Time not met, or with both channels of HFASA inoperable, the appropriate ACTIONS are to verify that the required SDM is present and isolate the unborated water source by performing (continued) I Vogtle Units 1 and 2-B 3.3.8-2 Rev. 2 - 9/99

~ HFASA Instrumentation c B 3.3.8 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) SR 3.9.2.1. This places the unit in a condition that precludes an unplanned dilution event. The Completion Times of 1 hour and once per 12 hours thereafter for verifying SDM provide timely assurance that no unintended dilution occurred while the HFASA was inoperable and that SDM is maintained. The Completion Times of 4 hours and once per 14 days thereafter for verifying that the unborated source is isolated provide timely assurance that an unplanned dilution event cannot occur while the HFASA is inoperable and that this protection is maintained until the HFASA is restored. SURVEILLANCE The HFASA channels are subject to a COT and a CHANNEL REQUIREMENTS CALIBRATION. SR 3.3.8.1 SR 3.3.8.1 requires the performance of a COT every 92 days to ensure that each channel of the HFASA and its setpoint are OPERABLE. This test shallinclude verification that the HFASA setpoint is less than or equal to 2.3 times background. The frequency of 92 days is consistent with the requirements for the source range channels. This Surveillance Requirement is modified by a Note that provides a 4-hour delay in the requirement to perform this surveillance for the HFASA instrumentation upon entering MODE 3 from MODE 2. This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without delay for the performance of the surveillance to meet the applicability requirements in MODE 3. 1 SR 3.3.8.2 SR 3.3.8.2 requires the performance of a CHANNEL j CAllBRATION every 18 months. This test verifies that each i channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary j range and accuracy. It encompasses the HFASA portion of the instrument loop. The frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle. L l REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Subsection 15.4.6. I l Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.8-3 Rev. 1 - 9/99 l l t. )

f..

RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 m BASES l-LCO Note 3 allows valves in the flowpath from the RMWST, through (continued) the chemical mixing tank, to the suction of the charging pumps to be open under administrative control provided the SDM requirements of l ' LCO 3.1.1 are met and the high flux at shutdown alarm is l-OPERABLE. (OPERABILITY of the high flux at shutdown alarm is defined by LCO 3.3.8.) This permits the addition of chemicals to the i RCS as necessary in this MODE of operation while minimizing the risk of an uncontrolled boron dilution transient. An OPERABLE RHR loop is comprised of an OPERABLE RHR pump capable of providing forced flow to an OPERABLE RHR heat l exchanger. RHR pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required.

APPLICABILITY-In MODE 5 with loops not filled, this LCO requires core heat removal and coolant circulation by the RHR System.

Operation in other MODES is covered by: LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2"; LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 3"; l LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4"; LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled"; LCO 3.9.5, " Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level" (MODE 6); and - LCO 3.9.6, " Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant . Circulation-Low Water Level" (MODE 6). ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note prohibiting entry into MODE 5 with the loops not filled while the LCO is not met. b:1 ) If only one RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation, redundancy for ^ RHR is lost. Action must be initiated to restore a second loop to OPERABLE status. The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining the availability of two paths for heat removal. (continued) l Vogtie Units 1 and 2 ' . B 3.4.8 Rev. 1 - 9/99 fL

RCS Loops-MODE 5. Loops Not Filled ' 'B 3.4.8 L BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 - (continued) If no required RHR loops are OPERABLE or in operation, except during conditions permitted by. Note 1, all operations involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration must be suspended and action must be initiated immediately to restore an RHR loop to OPERABLE status and operation. The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal. The action to . restore must continue until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation. 9.d if the valve (s) required to be closed are discovered to be open (except as provided by Note 3 to the LCO), action mest be initiated immediately to secure the open valve (s)in the closed position in order to preclude an uncontrolled boron dilution transient. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification every 12 hours that one loop is in operation. Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room to monitor RHR loop performance. SR 3.4.8.2 Verification that the required number of pumps are OPERAALE ensures that additional pumps can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Venfication is perfomwxi by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required pumps. The Frequency of 7 days is ' considered reasonaNe in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.- (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.8 4 Revision No. O

r COPS B 3.4.12 BASES APPLICABILITY OPERAPlLITY of the pressurizer safety valves that provide (continued) overpressure protection during MODES 1,2, and 3. Low temperature overpressure prevention is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid, and a mass or heat input transient can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure when little or no time allows operator action to mitigate the event. The Applicability is modified by a Note stating that accumulator isolation is only required when the accumulator pressure is more than or at the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature, as allowed by the P/T limit curves. This Note permits the accumulator discharge isolation valve Surveillance to be performed only under these pressure and temperature conditions. ACTIONS Two Notes modify the ACTIONS table. Note 1 prohibits entry into MODE 6 with the vessel head on from MODE 6 and MODE 5 from MODE 6 with the vessel head on. Entry into MODE 4 from MODE 5 is already prohibited by LCO 3.0.4. Note 2 permits entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3 with a PORV that is inoperable for the purpose of cold overpressure protection provided that RCS temperature is maintained i above 275'F, and, within 36 hours, either: the PORV is restored to OPERABLE status; or. an RHR suction relief valve is placed in service so that the requirements of LCO 3.4.12 are met. Otherwise, the reactor vessel must be depressurized and vented in accordance with Required Action F.1. With only one PORV OPERABLE, the COPS remains capable of mitigating a design basis cold overpressurization event. However, the system cannot withstand a single failure of the remaining PORV. The current COPS enable temperature is established very conservatively at 350*F. However, the application of ASME Code Case N-514 would allow the enable temperature to be lowered to less than 275'F. Therefore, when entering this LCO from MODE 3 with one required PORV inoperable, maintaining RCS temperature above 275'F minimizes actual exposure to a cold overpressure event. Furthermore, requiring action within 36 hours minimizes the exposure to a single failure while allowing sufficient time to either restore the inoperable PORV or to place RHR in service. Note 2 is only applicable to the condition of entering MODE 4 from MODE 3 with one required PORV inoperable for the purpose of cold overpressure protection. If operating in MODE 4 and a failure of a required RCS relief valve occurs, Condition D applies. l (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.12-9 Rev.1 - 9/99 i

COPS' B 3.4.12 1 BASES ACTIONS A1 (continued) With one or more safety injection pumps capable of injecting into the RCS, RCS overpressurization is possible. Rendering the safety injection pumps incapable of injecting into the RCS within 4 hours to restore restricted coolant input capability to the RCS reflects the urgency of removing the RCS from this condition. B.1. C.1. and C.2 An unisolated accumulator requ'res isolation within 1 hour. This is only required when the accumulator pressure is at or more than the ) maximum RCS prr^ sure for the existing temperature allowed by the P/T limit curves. If isolation is needed and cannot be accomplished in i hour, Required Action C.1 and Required Action C.2 provide two options, either of which must be performt.M r the next 12 hours. By increasing the RCS temperature to > 350+, A pecumulator pressure of 678 psig cannot exceed the COPS limits if the accumulators are fully injected. Depressurizing the accumulators below the COPS limit from the PTLR also gives this protection. The Completion Times are based on operating experience that these activities can be accomplished in these time periods and that the likelihood that an event requiring COPS during this time is small. _D_J. In MODE 4, with one required RCS relief \\alve inoperable, the RCS relief valve must be restored to OPERABLE status within a 1 Completion Time of 7 days. Two RCS relief valves in any combination of the PORVS and the RHR suction relief valves are required to provide low temperature overpressure mitigation while withstanding a single failure of an active component. The Completion Time considers the facts that only one of the RCS relief valves is required to mitigate an overpressure transient and that the likolihood of an active failure of the rernaining valve path during l this time period is very low. 1 (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.12-10 Rev. 1 - 9/99 l

r COPS B 3.4.12 i BASES ACTIONS M (continued) The consequences of operational events that will overpressurize the RCS are more severe at lower temperature (Ref. 7). Thus, with one of the two RCS relief valves inoperable in MODE 5 orin MODE 6 with the head on, the Completion Time to restore two valves to ' OPERABLE status is 24 hours. The Completion Time represents a reasonable time to investigate and repair several types'of relief valve failures without exposure to a lengthy period with only one OPERABLE PCS relief valve to protect against overpressure events. E:1 The RCS must be depressurized and a vent must be established within 12 hours when: a. Both required RCS relief valves are inoperable; or b.- A Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, D, or E is not met; or-c. The COPS is inoperable for any reason other than Condition A, B, C, D, or E. The vent must be sized ;t2.14 square inches (based on an equivalent length of 10 feet of pipe) to ensure that the flow capacity is greater than that required for the worst case mass input transient reasonable during the applicable MODES. This action is needed to protect the RCPB from a low temperature overpressure event and a possible brittle failure of the reactor vessel. - The Completion Time considers the time required to place the plant in this Condition and the relatively low probability of an overpressure event during this time period due to increased operator awareness of administrative control requirements. (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.12-11 Rev. 1 - 9/99 l

4 COPS B 3.4.12 _ BASES ' SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.1 and SR 3.4.12.2 ' REQUlHEMENTS - To minimize the potential for a low temperature overpressure event by limiting the mass input capability, both safety injection pumps are verified incapable of injecting into the RCS, and the accumulator discharge isolation valves are verified closed and locked out. The safety injection pumps are rendered incapable of injecting into the RCS through at least two independent means such that a single - failure or single action will not result in an injection into the RCS. The Frequency of within 4 hours after initial entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3 and prior to RCS cold leg temperature decreasing below 325*F (for the safety injection pumps) and 12 hours thereafter (for the safety injection pumps and accumulators) is sufficient, considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room, to verify the required status of the equipment. SR 3.4.12.3 Each required RHR suction relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying its RHR suction isolation valves are open and by testing it in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This Surveillance is only required to be performed if the RHR suction relief valve is being used to meet this LCO.- For Train A, the RHR suction relief valve is PSV-8708A and the suction isolation valves are HV-8701 A and B. For Train B, the RHR suction relief valve is PSV-L 8708B and the suction isolation valves are HV-8702A and B. The RHR suction valves are verified to be opened every 12 hours. The Frequency is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls such as valve status indications available to the operator in the control room that verify the RHR suction isolation valves remain open. The ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 8), test per Inservice Testing Program verifies OPERABILITY by proving proper relief valve

mechanical motion and by measuring and, if required, adjusting the lift setpoint.

SR 3.4.12.4 - The RCS ven+ of 2 2.14 square inches (based on r 5quivalent length of 10 feet of pipe) is proven OPERABLE by verifylog its open - condition either: (continued) Vogtle Units'1 and 2 ' B 3.4.12-12 Rev. 2 - 9/99 l

p a f COPS B 3.4.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE . SR 3.4.12.4 -(continued) REQUIREMENTS a.J Once every 12 hours for a valve that cannot be locked.

b. Once every 31 days for a valve that is locked, sealed, or secured in position. A removed pressurizer safety valve fits this category.

The passive vent arrangement must only be open to be OPERABLE. This Surveillance is required to be performed if the vent is being used to satisfy the pressure relief requirements of the LCO 3.4.12b. 'SR 3.4.12.5 The PORV block valve must be verified open every 72 hours to provide the flow path for each required PORV to perform its function when actuated. The valve must be remotely verified open in the main control room. This Surveillance is performed if the PORV satisfies the LCO. The block valve is a remotely controlled, motor operated valve. The power to the valve operator is not required removed, and the manual operator is not required locked in the inactive position. Thus, the block valve can be closed in the event the PORV develops excessive leakage or does not close (sticks open) after relieving an 1 overpressure situation. The 72 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls available to the operator in the control room, I such as valve position indication, that verify that the PORV block valve remains open. i SR 3.4.12.6 Performance of a COT is required within 12 hours after decreasing - RCS temperature to s 350*F and every 31 days on each required PORV to verify and, as necessary, adjust its lift setpoint.. The COT will verify the setpoint is within the PTLR allowed maximum limits in the PTLR. PORV actuation could depressurize the RCS and is not required. A Note has been added indicatino that this SP is required to be performed 12 hours after decreasing HCS cold leg temperature to s 350 F. The 12 hours considers the unlikelihood of a low temperature overpressure event during this time. (continued) ' Vogtle Units 1 and 2. B 3.4.12-13 Rev. 1 - 9/99 1 ti

COPS c B 3.4.12 BASES i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) ' Performance of a CHANNEL CAllBRATION on each required PORV actuation channel is required every 18 months to adjust the whole channel so that it responds and the valve opens within the required range and accuracy to known input. REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G. 2. Generic Letter 88-11. 3. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Ill. 4. FSAR, Chapter 15 5. 10 CFR 50, Section 50.46. 6. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K. 7. Generic Letter 90-06. 8. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI. 9. Westinghouse Letter GP-13419, RHR Open Permissive Setpoint. l l l I Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.12-14 Rev.1 - 9/99 l

Boron Concentration B 3.9.1 BASES APPLICABLE The RCS boron concentration satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC SAFETY ANALYSES Policy Statement. (continued) LCO The LCO requires that a minimum boron concentration be maintained in all filled portions of the RCS, the refueling canal, and the refueling cavity while in MODE 6. The boron concentration limit specified in the COLR ensures that a core k., of s 0.95 is maintained during fuel handling operations. Violation of the LCO could lead to an inadvertent criticality during MODE 6. APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable in MODE 6 to ensure that the fuel in the reactor vessel will remain subcritical. The required boron concentration ensures a kw s 0.95. In MODES 1 and 2, LCO 3.1.4, " Rod Group Alignment Limits," LCO 3.1.5, " Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits," and LCO 3.1.6, " Control Bank Insertion Limits," ensure an adequate amount of negative reactivity is available to shut down the reactor, in MODES 3,4, and 5, LCO 3.1.1, " SHUTDOWN MARGIN" ensures an adequate amount of negative reactivity is available to shut down the reactor. ACTIONS - The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note prohibiting entry into MODE 6 if the RCS boron concentration specified in the COLR is not met. A.1 and A.2 - Continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions (including actions to reduce boron concentration) is contingent upon maintaining the unit in compliance with the LCO. If the boron concentration of any coolant volume in the filled portions of the RCS, the refueling canal, or the refueling cavity is less than its limit, all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions must be suspended immediately. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position or normal cooldown of the coolant volume for the purpose of system temperature control. (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 8 3.9.1-3 Rev. 1 - 9/99 l

Boron Concentration B 3.9.1 B/.SES ACTIONS A.3 .'~ . (continued) In addition to immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions, boration to restore the concentration must be initiated immediately. There are no safety analysis assumptions of boration flow rate and concentration that must be satisfied. The only requirement is to restore the boron concentration to its required value as soon as possible. In order to raise the boron concentration as soon as possible, the operator should begin boration with the best source available for unit conditions. Once actions ha!e been initiated, they must be continued until the boron concentration is restored. The restoration time depends on the amount of boron that must be injected to reach the required concentration. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the coolant boron concentration in all filled portions of the RCS, the refueling canal, and the refueling cavity is within the COLR limits. The boron concentration of the coolant in each volume is determined periodically by chernical analysis. A Frequency of once every 72 hours is a reasonable amount of time to verify the boron concentration of representative samples. The Frequency is based on operating experience, which has shown 72 hours to be adequate. REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26. ,,s 2. FSAR, Subsechon 15.4.6. Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9.1-4 Revision No. O

~ RHR t.nd Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level B 3.9.6 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS I 'B 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level BASES BACKGROUND- ' The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 6 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), as required by GDC 34, to provide mixing of borated coolant, and to prevent boron stratification. Heat is removed from the RCS by circulating reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchangers where the heat is transferred to the Component Cooling Water System. The coolant is then returned to the RCS via the RCS cold leg (s). Operation of the RHR System for normal cooldown decay heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room. The heat . removal rate is adjusted by controlling the flow of reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger (s) and the bypass lines. Mixing of the reactor coolant is maintained by this continuous circulation of reactor coolant through the RHR System. APPLICABLE'- While there is no explicit analysis assumption for the decay SAFETYANALYSES heat removal function of the RHR.systern in MODE 6, if the reactor coolant temperature is not maintained below 200'F, boiling of the j reactor coolant could result. This could lead to a loss of refueling i cavity water level. In addition, boiling of the reactor coolant could lead to a reduction in boron concentration in the coolant due to the boron I plating out on components near the areas of the boiling activity. The loss of reactor coolant and the reduction of boron concentration in the reactor coolant will eventually challenge the integrity of the fuel { cladding, which is a fission product barrier. Two trains of the RHR System are required to be OPERABLE, and one train in operation, in . order to prevent this challenge. RHR and coolant circulation - Low Water Level satisfies Criterion 4 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO in MODE 6, with'the water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, both RHR loops must be OPERABLE. i (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 - B 3.9.6-1 Revision No. O I

E RHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Lev:l B 3.9.6 BASES-Additionsily,- one loop of RHR must be in operation in order - LCO

to provide

. (continued) : a. Removal of decay heat; b. Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of criticality; and c. Indication of reactor coolant temperature.' An OPERABLE RHR loop consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path and to determine the low end temperature. The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs. . APPLICABILITY Two RHR loops are required to be OPERABLE, and one RHR loop must be in operation in MODE 6, with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to provide decay heat removal and mixing of the borated coolant. Requirements for the RHR System in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). RHR loop requirements in MODE 6 with the water level 2 23 ft are located in LCO 3.9.5, " Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level." ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note that prohibits entry into the Applicability while this LCO is not met. A.1 and A.2 ' If less than the required number of RHR loops are OPERABLE, action shall be immediately initiated and continued until the RHR loop is restored to OPERABLE status and to operation or until 2 23 ft of water level is established above the reactor vessel flange. When the water level is 2 23 ft above the reactor vessel flange, the Applicability . changes to that of LCO 3.9.5,~ and only one RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE and in operation. An immediate Completion Time is necessary for an operator to initiate corrective actions. (continued) Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9.6-2 Rev.1 - 9/99 --.4.. ,}}