ML20216J174
| ML20216J174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1997 |
| From: | Allen D UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GDP-97-2019, NUDOCS 9709170183 | |
| Download: ML20216J174 (6) | |
Text
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United St:tes Enrichment Corporstron 2 Democracy Center 6903 Rockledge Drsve j
[lethesda. MD ?0811 Tel (301) % 4 3?00 liniltsl Halem l$tilit liefictit (htlolalicial September 11,1997 I
GDP 97 2019 i
l United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) - Docket No. 70 7002 - Event Report 97-14 Pursuant to 10 CFR 95.25 (h), Enclosure 1 provides the required 30 day written Event Report (ER) for an event involving an unattended security container having classified matter found unlocked. Enclosure 2 is a list of commitments made in the report.
Should you require additional information regarding this event, please contact Scott Scholl at (614) 897-2373.
Sincerely, hoLef Dale Allen General Manager Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant D!A:SScholl:cw 3 'E M $ 2 Ib
/
cc:
NRC Region 111 C. Cox/D. Ilartland, NRC Resident inspectors, PORTS NRC Division of Security DhKO007002 PDR Offices in Paducah, Kentucky Portsmouth. Ohio Washington.DC
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 11,1997 Page Two Distributinn NRAP Reader File bec:
J. Adkins, liq i
J. Anzeltao, PORTS L
M. Boren, PGDP i
S. Brawner, PGDP l
S.- Casto, IORTS L. Calvert, PORTS R. Coriell, IORTS -
D. Davidson, PORTS -
J. Dietrich, LMUS L. Fink, PORTS S. Fout, PORTS R. Gaston, PORTS -
M. Hasty, ICRTS J. Henricks, PORTS J, liutsebaut, PORTS M. Kelly, PORTS J. Labarraque, PGDP B. Lantz, PORTS R. Lipfert, PORTS R. McDermott, PORTS W. McLaughlin, PORTS
' J. Miller, llQ
~ J. Mize, PGDP J. Morgan, PORTS J. Oppy, PORTS J. Parker, PORTS
. S. Polston, PGDP
' G. Price, PORTS
_11. Pulley, PGDP
- A. Rebuck-Main, HQ S. Routh, HQ _
S. Scholl, PORTS-B. Sykes, PGDP K. Tomko, PORTS R. Wells, HQ -
Plant Shift Superintendents PORTS Record Management -
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Docket No. 70 7002 Page 1 of 3 Event Iteport 9714 Description of Event Saturday, August 16,1997, at 1625 hours0.0188 days <br />0.451 hours <br />0.00269 weeks <br />6.183125e-4 months <br />, while conducting routine security checks in the X 344 Facility, Guard Force personnel discovered classified container 50010 unsecured in the office area. Upon finding the unsecured container, Guard Force personnel completed an "Open Safe Report," and attached the report to the container and secured the container. After securing the container the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) called off site and notified the X-344 Section hianager of the discovery. The Section hianager reported to plantsite and along with the X-344 Front Line hianager (FLht) conducted a preliminary inspection of the container and determined nothing was missing.
At PORTS an unk>cked security container found unattended constitutes a security infraction.
Security containers are used to protect classified information. This subject container was located within the plantsite controlled access area. Personnel having access to the controlled area must have the appropriate access authorization level for entry or be under positive escort of a cleared employce. Due to these facts it is believed that no unauthorized access was gained to the e mtainer and no classl0ed information or material was compromised. An unattended security c antainer having classified matter found unlocked is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 95.25 (h).
Monday, August 18,1997, at approximately 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br />, the Security Section was notified of the incident. A Security Investigator responded to the X 344 Facility and conducted interviews with the Section hianager and an X-344 Clerical Support Employee. The clerical employee reported verifying and documenting the container was secured before leaving plantsite August 15, at approximately 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />. The clerical employee then conducted a thorough inspection of the container confirming that no classified matter was missing, On August 18,1997, the X-344 Section hianager conducted interviews with custodians having access to the security container. An FLM, one of the authorized custodians of the container, acknowledged unlocking the container on August 16,1997, and falling to document opening or closing on standard form SF-702 " Security Container Check Sheet." The FLh1 also did not remember securing the container after opening.
Cause of Event The root cause for the event was the FLhi failure to follow procedure XP2-SS-SS1039 " Handling and Control of Classi0ed Documents." The procedure adequately details the custodians responsibilities in section 6.16 " Repository Storage of ClassiGed Documents." The procedure specines that upon opening a classified repository, the custodian shall initial the SF-702 assigned to the repository and record the date and time of access in the "Open by" portion of the SF-702.
Docket No. 70 7002 Enclosure i page 2 0f 3 Event Report 97-14 The procedure further states that when securing a classined repository, close all drawers, spin the combination dial at least four times in either a clockwise or counterclockwise manner, test each drawer to assure that the locking mechanism is operable and initial and 011 in the time that the repository was secured in the " closed by" portion of the SF-702. Following the securing of the repository the procedure reyJires the custodian to ask a fellow employee, where practical, to check the repository by spinning the combination dial at least four times in either a clockwise or counterclockwise manner and then test each drawer to assure the locking mechanism is operable.
The FLh1 understood the opening and closing requirements contained in the procedure but became distracted, deviated from the procedural requirements and neglected to secure the container following entry.
A contributing cause of the event was an ineffective corrective action. Examples of falling to follow procedure XF2-SS SS1039, as it applied to the opening and securing of classified containers, had been identined in the past. An rssessment of 40 of 165 security containers, performed by the Security Section, April 1997, revealed deficiencies associated with 36 security containers on plantsite. One of the containers found deficient in the assessment was container 50010 The deficiencies ranged from forms SF-702 being outdated, inconsistent checks by custodians and no second party checks. All Facility Managers and container custodians affected by the assessment were issued a copy of the assessment and the responsible managers were directed to document in writing their corrective actions.
On May 12,1997, X-344 htanagement responded that their corrective action was to emphasize to the container custodians the expectations of properly completing SF-702 Open/Close entries.
The hiay 12, 1997, corrective action was ineffective because it only emphasized procedural requirements but did not ensure that the procedural requirements were being carried out. A review of security container practices following the hiay 12,1997, corrective actions would have revealed that form SF-702 custodian checks and second party checks were still inconsistent and that form SF-700 " Security Container Information Form," (form containing the authorized list of container custodians) was not properly attached inside the container 50010 as required. The form SF-700 was actually located on the secretary's desk.
Corrective Actions 1.
On August 18,1997, classified material was removed from the classified container and the container was declassified.
2.
On August 20,1997, the FLht was issued a security infraction. The FLh1 also reviewed and signed a " Security Repositories" check sheet that details the proper securing of a security container.
Docket No. 70 7002 linclosure 1 Page 3 of 3 Event Heport 9714 3.
Ily October 30, 1997 Organizational hianagers having jurisdiction over security containers will review this event with the container custodians within their organization.
4 11y October 30, 1997, Organizational hinnagers having jurisdiction over security containers, will provide evidence to the Security Section that they have walked down and verified the requirements contalaed in procedure XP2 SS-SS1039 (section 6.16), as it applies to the opening an! securing of classified containers are being met.
l Extent of Exposure of Individuals to Radiation or Radioactive hlaterials l
l There were no exposures to individuals from this incident to radiation or radioactive materials.
Irssons Learned hianagement's emphasis of procedural requirements did not by itself ensure that the procedure was being followed correctly, hianagement must verify by reviewing available evidence that personnel are meeting management's expectations for procedural adherence.
- Docket No. 70 7002 Page1of1 Event Report 9714 List of Commitments
- 1.
By October 30,1997 Organizational. Managers having-Jurisdiction-over security containers will review this event with the container custodians within their organization.
2.
By October 30, 1997.- Organizational Managers having jurisdiction over security containers, will provide evidence to the Security Section that they have walked down and l-verified the requirements contained in procedure XP2-SS-SS1039 (section 6.16), as it applies to the opening and securing of classified containers are being met.
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