ML20216G763
| ML20216G763 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/24/1987 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1597, NUDOCS 8707010174 | |
| Download: ML20216G763 (164) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, i;e - .g y OMG o) UN11ED STATES u NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER Of: DOCKET NO: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS (3 V LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D. C. PAGES: 1 - 99 DATE: WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1987 f@VC. [$$pyefrcm CkS09te 4 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. OfficialReporters 7g374 444 North Capitol Street 4 870701C!1 Washington, D.C. 2000.1 PDfj ff H9 PDR (202) 347-3700 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE
r- - i. ) PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONERS' ADVISORY-COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24,'1987 ) The contents of this stenographic transcript of the proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of } the discussions recorded at the meeting held on the above q date. No member of the ACRS: Staff:and no participant at '(~) ^~ > this. meeting; accepts any responsibility for errors or inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this 1 i transcript. ) ) i a O
} CR31465.0 1 lCOX/sjg NUCL P REGU TORY C ISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 3 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS 5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6 Room 1046 1717 H Street, N.W. 7 Washington, D. C. 8 Wednesday, June 24, 1987 9 The subcommittee meeting convened at 8:30 a.m. 10 ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT: 11 12 DR. FORREST J. REMICK 'j 13 DR. WILLIAM KERR 14 MR. JESSE C. EBERSOLE DR. DAVID A. WARD 15 MR. GLENN A. REED 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 23 24 + 25 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Cmerage 800-336-6646
g 31465.0 cox 2 -s 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 DR. REMICK: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 3 The meeting will come to order. This is a meeting of the 4 ACRS subcommittee on human factors. I am Forrest Remick, 5 chairman of the subcommittee. Other ACRS members in 6 attendance this morning are Messrs. Ebersole, Ward, Kerr and 7 Reed. 8 The purpose of this meeting is to be briefed and 9 to discuss SECY-87-101, issues and proposed options '10 concerning degree requirement for senior operators. Herm 11 Alderman is the cognizant I.CRS Staff member for today's 12 meeting. The rules for participation in this meeting have 13 been announced in the notice of this meeting.as published in 14 the Federal Register on June 9, 1987. It is requested that 15 the speaker identify himself or herself and speak with 16 sufficient clarity and volume so he or she could be readily 17 heard. We have had a request from one member of the public 18 to make a statement, Mr. John Gallagher from Westinghouse. 19 He is scheduled for later this morning. 20 Just to bring us up to speed, there was an answer 1 21 notice of rulemaking that was issued in the Federal Register 22 on May 30, 1986 that was entitled " Degree Requirements for 23 Senior Operators at Nuclear Power Plants." I emphasize that ( }j f 24 this was an advance notice rather than a proposed rule. 25 Advance notice is generally used to notify the public of /\\CEJFEDERAL IlEPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage Mn.336-6646 {
31465.0 Cox 1 something that the Commission has in mind and to get early V,. 2 comments that they might be utilized in a proposed rule that-3 may or may not be issued later. 4 That advance notice allowed comments up until July 5 29, 1986, and I think that was then extended upon request for 6 an additional two months until the end of September, 1986. 7-In that Federal Register notice, it was the 8 purpose of the contemplated rulemaking is to upgrade the 9 operating, engineering and accident management expertise 10 provided on shift by combining both engineering expertise and-11 operating experience in the senior operator function. This 12 is being done to further insure the protection of the health. 13 and safety of the public by having personnel on shift with-14 enhanced qualifications. 15 I had intended to just summarize what was in that 16 advance notice, but I see in Mr. West's handout that he is 17 going to cover that, so I will skip that part. 18 I would mention that what we have before -- by the 19 way, when we considered it at the subcommittee meeting last 20 July, we came to the conclusion that we would not make any 21 response at that time, we anticipated that there would be a 22 lot of public comment, and we would await the benefit of some 1 23 of that public comment and take up the matter again. That's ( 24 the purpose of the subcommittee today. 1 25 Also, in that advance notice and in the SECY ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coserage MXh336416
- 31465.0
.j 4~ cox 1 document that' passes.on to the Commission, the public >Oz 2 comments and a' request from Staff for guidance,=there is a 3 mention in there of severe accident training,-which is a-4 matter that I suggest is somewhat of an independent matter 5 from the one we have before us today, and I would suggest we 6 might want to'take that up at a future human factors 7 subcommittee to. explore what really is being done in severe 8 accident training. 9 My own' personal view is that there are perhaps 10 some misunderstandings in that SECY document. .I don't want 11 oto get into' them, but I think it's a subject for a future 12 human factors subcommittee meeting when we have a chance, O 13 perhaps, to get.the Staff, INPO and industry to tell uslsome i 14 of the things that they are'doing, plan to do or perhaps;what 15 they are not'doing in severe accidents. So I would suggest 16 that.we, in general, restrict.our attention today primarily 17 on the subject of degrees for senior reactor operators. 18 Now, it's my personal impression, and-I might be 19 wrong on this, that the Staff is before us defending 20 something that is not necessarily a Staff initiative. I have-21 a feeling that this was a Commission-directed effort. I 22 think we should keep this in mind as we called the Staff, 23 perhaps, with our own impressions and biases on this (f 24 subject. 25 Do any other members of the subcommittee have a ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33MM6
c. 31465.0 cox 5 1 comment before we turn to the Staff? Yes, Bill. 7-~ -V '2 DR. KERR: In reading the material, with which I 3 am well acquainted now, I see on several occasions the 4 recommendation that one separate the training from the 5 education requirements. I am puzzled by this recommendation 6 since I would have thought that if the degree requirement had 7 a purpose, the purpose would be that one would be able to ? 8 deal with the material that would be made available with the 9 training. So I will be interested, if it im appropriate in 10 this meeting, that we infer how one separates a' person's 11 capabilities and background from the material that he is 12 presumably to learn and on which -- on the basis of which one ' ~ ' 13 is apparently choosing his background on degree requirements 14 or whatever. 15 MR. WEST: I will try to give some attention, at 16 least, to that particular point in my presentation. 17 DR. REMICK: Is that your comment, Bill, based on 18 something in the advance notice or something in the comments 19 received or both? 20 MR. WEST: This came up. 21 DR. KERR: I repeatedly saw the Staff recommend we 22 separate the question of training from degree requirements. 23 I was puzzled by the recommendation. l r^x (,) 24 DR. REMICK: It was in the SECY document. I 25 MR. WEST: It was, in fact, part of the Commission /\\CE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Cmerage 800-334 6646 1
31465.0 cox' 6 .1 paper that precedes the Staff comments that precedes this .2 -SECY paper today. That was, in fact, our recommendation. 3 DR'. REMICK: Any other' comments from members'of: 4 the subcommittee?. If not -- yes, go ahead. D 5 MR. EBERSOLE: I was interested.in Commissioner 6 'Asselstine's recommendation that they could wait a. year _or 7 .two before the last date and lock in.some people.. That could 8 'be some continuity on the way of getting a-degree toward the 9_ last year, a program plan.that'would be a positive step '10 'toward a degree or equivalent of one, and no escape in that-11' mode that he-suggested. 12 DR. REMICK: Jesse, you remind me of the fact that in the' advance ~ notice there were 20Lquestions raised'by the. '13 14 Commission, people encouraged to make: comment. In addition, '15 'there were separate comments by two Commissioners,. Roberts 16 -- 'and'Asselst'ine and each of-'them had questions'that they: 17 elicited a response from. So I assume those are some of the 1 ~ 18 ' things that we.will hear about today. 19 Let me turn the' meeting over then -- yes, excuse i 20 me, David. .) i l21 MR. WARD: ~I have one comment. I understand, did { l 22 the Commissioners vote on this -- on the issue of issuing-the j 23 rule? 24 DR. REMICK: That was a question I called Herm on 25 on Monday I was going to ask. I heard a rumor last week that ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. .l 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 i
31465.0 7 cox 1 at least three of the Commissioners have decided to proceed, ,, s Q) -2 ask the Staff to proceed with proposed rulemaking. I have 3 not been able to confirm it because I forgot to ask Herm when 4 I talked to him on the phone on Monday or Tuesday. Maybe the 5 Staff can address that. 6 MR. WEST: We have not received responses from all f 7 of the Commissioners. We have received responses from two of 8 the Commissioners and we are awaiting responses from the 9 remaining ones. 10 MR. WARD: You have received responses from two, 11 you say? 12' MR. WEST: Yes. r's - t I 13 DR. REMICK: If there are no further questions, I 14 would turn the meeting over to.a presentation by Garmon West 15 from the Staff, and Garmon, will you tell us where you are 16 from. I can see that you are human factors assessment 17 branch, Division of Licensee Performance and Quality 18 Evaluation. Would you introduce the other Staff members here i 19 at the table. 20 MR. WEST: Yes, again, I am Garmon West. I am i 21 with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Also we have 22 here Mr. J. Persensky and Dr. Dan Jones also from the Office i 23 of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. i ) 24 As has been pointed out, just about a year ago, ( 25 the Staff presented a report to this question regarding at /\\CE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. f 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
ry J3'1465.0 8' cox-1 'that: time the advance notice of proposed rulemaking that ,0 1 2 would_ require, by the year 1991, that_ licensed operators,- '3 senior operators, that is, would be requiredoto have a degree 14
- in engineering or physical science.
It's my purpose today to 5 provide this_ committee with an update of the_various 6 activities that have'taken place since that time. In 7 particular, I would like.to' bring you up to date'with regard 8 to the most recent action, namely issuance of SECY-87-101, 9 issues-and proposed requirements for senior operators. My 10 _ presentation will follow 1 the format that you have in front _of-11 you. If there is anyone here that doesn't have one, there 12 are certainly enough copies available that.you could.get LO 13 one.- 14 If you will turn to the.second page, you will.see 15 I have an outline of the broad areas I intend to cover' 16- .today. I will start with a background presentation;on the 17-unfolding since the time that the Staff received.the Staff 18' requirements memo, up to the present day in the SECY-87-101. 19 I will touch briefly on the particulars, the major points 20 that were included in the advance notice of proposed 21 rulemaking, and then I would opt to get right into the 22 SECY-87-101 and provide not so much a detailed discussion and 23 treatment of each and every one of-the questions that we () 24 asked in the advance notice, but I have selected out what I l 25 thought would be the more important ones to present and ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 - Nationwide Covmge 800-336-6646
e 31465.0 cox 9 1 discuss here. jsL] 2 Then I will shift to some consideration of the 3 advantages and disadvantages of the notion of a degree rule 4 for senior operators. I might mention, too, that, in 5 passing, I will touch on some of the knowledge that we have 6 acquired related to this issue in terms of the technical 7 justification for such a rule. We have some response from 8 the industry by way of a study that they conducted and 9 provided to us as part of the. comments. I will deal with 10 that. I will also present the findings of a panel and.the 11 findings of two studies that NRC contracted out.
- Then, 12 finally, I will end with certain options that we feel might
() ~ 13 be appropriate in this context. 14 You will notice on the next page that action in 15 this area began with the Staff requirements memo that the 16 Staff received in January of 1986, and based on that, the l 17 Staff wrote a Commission paper that included as an enclosure 18 the advance notice of proposed rulemaking. The Staff paper, 19 as well as the enclosed notice of advanced rulemaking was ) 20 issued as SECY-87-70 entitled " Proposed Rulemaking, Degree 21 Requirements for Senior Operators at Nuclear Power Plants." i 22 This was done February, 1986. j 23 After that, the actual advance notice of proposed p) 24 rulemaking itself was issued May of 1986. There was an t 25 extension of a comment period that was approved, July 1986 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 8043364646
=31465.O 10 cox' 'l .that extended the comment period until September. You have .O 2 on yodr handout, '87. Actually it was '86. I 3 Finally, this brings us up.to date with the most i 4 recent SECY-87-101, which was issued April of 1987. ] 5 On the next page you will see the highlights of 6. the advance. notice of proposed rulemaking. l; 7 It would presumably come-into effect that thel f 1 8 ' thinking was-there it would be January of 1991. The I 9 particulars would have to do with requiring senior. operators: 10 to have a baccalaureate degree in engineering or physical 7 11 science. Other degrees in other areas would be accepted on a i 12 case-by-case basis, and clearly.it would be the intent not to-q L' O. v 13 allow degree equivalency criteria. ~ 14 'MR. EBERSOLE: Are you goingcto take. questions as 15 you go along, or do you want to wait? 16 MR. WEST: I think that would be appropriate. j I 17 MR. EBERSOLE: On that particular topic, I would f 18 think the industry would, in fact, freeze in place a lot of l 19 SROs in 1990, to get them locked in and avoid all of this. 1 20 That's tactics that I have seen all too often. What can you I 1 21 offer to guarantee a continuity of approach for those people 22 already in place so they don't have an arbitrary freeze in at 23 some less than satisfactory training or educational level? h 24 Isn't there a way to avoid that? 25 MR. WEST: I don't know of a particular'way of ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 8(Xb336 6646
(? J31465.0 l11
- cox 1
' avoiding that.'.I think it is'an' issue that would have'to be-3 2 -covered and: addressed. I night' add to that related.to this 3 - you alsolhave the issue of grandfathering,'that at the- / 4 'particular time,-January of 1991, that any individual.that 5 would be an SRO at that time would"be grandfathered from an 6 interim point of view, 7 MR. EBERSOLE: Like keeping up medical ~ proficiency 8 in the doctors' world. I think we'have to-keep the heat on. 9 MR'. WEST: I think one, perhaps, positive aspect 10 of having_those~ individuals' grandfathered'and even to some 11 extent to lock them in that you are referring to, is the fact 12 that it would help to address another area of seriousness .O-13 that comes out of the comments, the.whole. business of how do 14-you. maintain the experience'1evel on' shift while at the same 15 time you are going'to require that individuals after January 16-of 1991 would have to have a degree requirement. 17 DR. KERR: There is, however, a requalification 18 program which operators and, I presume, senior operators are 19 continuously involved. I don't think that is a static 20 thing. Presumably, as new information is developed or new 21 needs are perceived, that a requalification program would 22 change. 23 MR. REED: Just to clarify that, in the workplace, h 24 from 10 to 20 percent of the time of all licensed personnel 25 is spent in the training billet, shall we call it. In other ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 m
31465.0 cox 12 1 Lwords, they:are retraining all the time and most' plants now ~ ~ '2 have-six shifts and the six shifts in training. It gets, 3 repetitious to infinity. 4-DR. REMICK: A comment I might. add to that, of 5 course, the. comments you made are for licensed personnel with 6 .the accreditation proces's, there are now 10 positions.that 7 have retraining requirements, some of which'are not as 8 extensivo as licensed personnel, because some of.those-9 personnel only have six shifts. It's not only retraining of 10 licensed people but other positions also. 11 MR. REED: Forrest, I didn't make an opening. 12 statement or plea. Maybe it's'a good time to make it now so 13 everyone will know where.I am coming.from. 14 DR. REMICK: Is it relat'ed to what Garmon has said 15 so far? You will have an opportunity later, but go ahead now 16 if you wish. 17 MR. REED: I don't know how I will put this in,' 18 but Jesse's comments which seemed to right away favor the 19 degree requirement and how do you get it even more so, lead 20 me to want to make an expression of where I am coming from. l 21 As you know, I am a person who-spent 30 years in 22 the trenches and bilges and sewers of nuclear at the 23 operating level and never left the sites. As you know, I am 24 a person who held a reactor operator's license, one of the 25 first,'probably early ones, and senior reactor operator's ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 i
31465.0 cox 13 1 1 license. I have mixed it up and been in close association () '^ 2 with degreed personnel and nondegreed personnel. I think 4 1 3 back over my lifetime, among the worst people in charge as 4 SROs or ROs were degreed personnel. Yankee Rowe made an 5 attempt to have a pertain number of degreed personnel in the 6 first wave. I say, among the worst were the degreed 7 personnel. 8 The issue, gentlemen, and the thing you have to 9 consider, is go back in your own life process, because I 10 assume you are all degreed personnel, and ask~yourself, how 11 much did you know -- 12 MR. WARD: You have to have a degree when you get ( 13 out of ACRS. 14 MR. REED: I didn't pick that up. 15 DR. REMICK: That's part of our aptitude testing. 16 MR. REED: How much did you really know when you 17 left engineering school or other technical school. In fact, 18 the professor, when I left, called us in and told us how 19 stupid we were. I thought that was a wonderful lecture. He 20 was right. I went out and served time in GE test, 21 Westinghouse, and I found out I never learned anything until 22 I went into that highly technical industry. That is true of 23 people who go into nuclear industry and nuclear plants. They () 24 never really learned anything until they got there. 25 DR. REMICK: I think when I graduated from college ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 4 47-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 4 46 M
~ 31465.0. cox 14 1 I knew more than when I graduated from high school. At least 7-s Q,) 2 I think I did. U 3 MR. REED: I am glad to hear an admission like 4 that. I think that's important to our judgment. Because we 5 all sit here as college people judging, from what. I am 6 ' judging from the fact of how dumb I was. So I think that in l 7 technical life, complex operating life, the important thing i 8 is, and I have to say this, the aptitude of the person, the 9 trail and the experience that he follows in his performance 10 in that activity. End of opening speech. This is where I am i 11 coming from. l 12 MR. EBERSOLE: Glenn, I want to say I agree with 13 you to some extent. But the degree requirement puts a lot of l 14 building blocks in place, even if you don't know what they 15 are for. I can recall many of those. I didn't know what the .{ 4 16 hell I was going to do, I was an electrical engineer and took l 17 a number of peripheral courses, but they were valuable, q l 18 MR. REED: Watch out for the danger there, Jesse. 19 I assume you were there on an athletic scholarship. 20 DR. REMICK: Gentlemen, we are going to have ample 21 time for a discussion. I suggest we let Garmon go through 22 this and we can ask him questions if there is anything we 23 don't understand or want him to elaborate. () 24 MR. WEST: The next subject had to do with 25 contemplating that one or two years of nuclear power ) /\\CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 ) J
31465.0 cox 15 l 1 experience would be at greater than 20 percent power. As I b 7s ( 1 %) 1 2 mentioned earlier, senior operator's license, prior to q s 3 January 1, 1991, would be grandfathered. It was proposed j l 4 also that one reexamination for senior operator applicants 5 who apply just prior to January of 1991 would be allowed. I 6 MR. REED: On your one to two years, you realize 7 that is a degradation from the present policies and 8 requirements? What you are saying is, only two years are 9 required -- of experience are required, to sit for an SRO 10 license or be an SRO; right? 11 MR. WEST: Yes. 12 MR. REED: I don't think that is satisfactory at I~) 13 all. The experience requirement has been too diminishing. '1 14 MR. PERSENSKY: If I may, J. Persensky. There is 15 no change with regard to degreed personnel. Therefore, the 16 SROs'can sit without four years of experience. Current 17 regulations allow a degreed person to get their SRO in three 18 years. 19 MR. REED: That's not sufficient. I wouldn't want i 20 an SRO with only two years of experience. 21 DR. REMICK: This indicates an SRO must be greater t 22 than two years. It's defining part of the two years has to 1 23 be above 20 percent. () 24 MR, WEST: Fine. Trying to enhance it to one i 25 year. ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 80(L336446
t, c',31465.0 cox 16 a 1 DR. KERR I must confess it puzzles me. I would ,_x i ) \\.[~' 2 think, since we are responsible individuals in situations, 3 .one would more likely experience unusual situations at less 4 than 20 percent power than full power. Typically, more 5 unusual events happen at less than 20 percent power than full o 6 power. 7 MR. REED: I think what this says is one of the 8 years could be following construction of a nuclear plant or 9 design of nuclear plant, isn't that correct? Only one year 10 has to be at power levels greater than 20 percent. So he is 11 saying that greater than 20 percent isn't really the best. 12 MR. WEST: I would certainly echo the fact that a O 13 certain number of comments also spoke to your particular 14 point, Mr. Kerr, that it would also be some advantage to have i 15 certain experience at startup and so on with the other l l 16 individuals, power level. 17 Note, too, that there was proposed, within the 18 advance notice, the possibility of having a concurrent policy 19 statement, issued statement that the contemplated degree rule 20 would be issued. 21 The notion of the concurrent policy statement had 22 to do with trying to encourage the industry through that j 23 particular policy statement to do certain things that would c(j 24 help to foster individuals who wanted to acquire degrees to 25 actually do that. ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, }NC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33MM6
'31465.0 17 cox 1 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask the question about this ,s , ') 2 greater than 20 percent power. The plants aspired to getting 3 on line and holding full power for a year like the Japanese 4 do, or better. My goodness, you just sit on your hands and 5-do nothing for the full year except watch the steady board in 6 front of you. I would think a much more meaningful l 7 requirement would be to participate in a number of transients 8 of certain operator types because then the operator has to do ] i 9 things. Otherwise, he just sits on his seat and watches the 10 panel in front of him. I think we are trying to find 11 operators who at least sit and get retrained before those 12 cases, instead of sleep, like Peach Bottom. ( ') 13 MR. WEST: I think you raise a very excellent 14 point. 15 DR. REMICK: Don't forget, Jesse, most plants, not 16 all, have simulators, those are integrated into both initial 17 and team training. That's where they really have a chance. 18 MR. EBERSOLE: How do you get into this power 19 business? 20 DR. REMICK: I don't want to defend the Staff in 21 their position, but their existing regulations on how much 22 experience, I thought this was an attempt to say that part of 23 that must be at power of something above 20 percent, rather ( ) 24 than just being at the plant and the plant has never l 25 participated. Ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33 4 6646
L 31465,0 cox1 18 P-c 1 MR. EBERSOLE: Operation in active cases is 2 better. 3 DR. REMICK: That's why there are simulators. 4 MR. EBERSOLE Doesn't have anything to do with 5 the state of the plant. 6 DR. REMICK:' There are not too many. transients 7 -they can perform on the plant itself.- 8 MR. EBERSOLE: I know. Most of their training 7 9 comes.from transients, on a power plant that is running. 10 well. 11 -MR. WEST: Lastly, the advance notice does make 12 the point that prior to moving forward with the next step, ,_Q 13 if, in fact, that is deemed appropriate by the Commission, 14 the next' step would be from the advance notice of proposed 15 rulemaking stage to an actual proposed rulemaking stage.- 16 Prior to that proposed rulemaking, it would be appropriate to 17 have the appropriate regulatory and backfit analysis 18 completed. 19 MR. REED: In other words, this would have to go 20 via the backfit rule; is that correct? 21 MR. WEST: That's right. 22 MR. REED: Would you, that will slow it down 23. maybe. () 24 MR. EBERSOLE: I can see them putting this in 25 numerical terms. That's going to be an interesting ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
31465.0-cox 19 1 exercise. Highly theoretical. c) X,) 2 MR. WEST: I would be the first to admit that the 3 theoretical analyses and the backfit analyses would be quite 4 a challenge. 5 MR. EBERSOLE: Less like the numeralized 6 equivalency of quality assurance. 7 MR. WEST: On the next page, we attempt to;give 8 you some notion of the categories and numbers of particular 9 commenters that provided responses to the advance notice. 10 The first category includes utility operators and some other 11 plant personnel that were not necessarily licensed 12 operators. By and large, this category reflects mostly b,_, 13 utility operators, about 86 of those individuals are, in 14 fact, operators. 15 The next it is line, 52, utility management; 16 citizens, 17; unions, seven; utility, consultants, six; 17 university, six; six Senators provided comments; one 18 Congressperson; and one department from a state level agency 19 provided comments. We received two letters from the 20 Professional Reactor Operator Society, one from the American 21 Nuclear Society, one from NUMARC and one from the American 22 Nuclear Insurers and one from the Atomic Energy Forum. .23 DR. REMICK: In the case of PROS, that was a (~)% (_ 24 number of their comments, right. 25 MR. WEST: That's correct. ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coserage 800-336-6646
31465.0 cox 20 1 DR. REMICK: And KMC letter would be counted as V 2 one? 3 MR. WEST: That's right. Therefore, we had a 4 bottom line of 200 commenters. 5 Next page points out, as was nentioned earlier, of 6 those commenters, clearly 195 opposed the degree rule and 7 five favored it. 8 On the next page, I thought it was important to 9 point out to what seemed to be a consensus among the 10 commenters. You will notice that half of the licensed 11 operators, nearly half, 86 total licensed operators, 41 of 12 them, as well as roughly half of the remaining respondents of ( ) 13 the remaining 114, 55 of those individuals, showed a 14 preference, indicated a preference for additional training in 15 the area of severe accident training, and indicated, too, 16 that they felt this would improve the ability of licensed 17 operators to prevent and manage a severe accident. 18 DR. REMICK: Am I correct that that response was 19 to a specific question to the operators; and, if so, do you 20 remember what that was, or maybe you are going to cover it. 21 MR. WEST: I don't plan to treat each of the 22 specific questions. Actually, it was a mixture of the two. 1 l 23 We did ask at least two different questions that were focused i /'N ( ) 24 on severe accident training. As you pointed out as well, we ] l 25 asked a variety of other type of questions that were not ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
31465.0 l cox 21 j 1 specific to training. t 6 c) 2 What we found was that independent of the 3 questions that we asked, you would also get a certain amount j 4 of comments related to particular areas, including this area 1 5 that. deals with training. ] ) 6 MR. EBERSOLE: The wording of this statement.here ] 7 bothers me a little bit. Additional training on severe i 8 accidents. One of the implications is that a severe accident 9 has happened, and you are trying to control or mitigate 10 that. I think it would be wise to spread this and say 11 something about the approach to severe accident conditions. 12 Then, if there is a severe accident, the mitigations are 13 there. Certainly what he is trying to do is put 90 percent 14 of his effort in preventing. 15 DR. REMICK: Jesse, they are only characterizing 16 comments. This is not something they are writing. They are 17 saying the number of comments in this area is this, am I 18 correct'? 19 MR. WEST: That's correct. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Presumably you have time to prevent 21 a severe accident. That's when to save the day. 22 MR. WEST: All right. The next page, you get a 23 much clearer idea, with regard to the five commenters who G(g 24 favored the degree rule, the type of commenter as well as the 25 reason for favoring the rule. We had, as you can see, an ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-3364M6
31465.0 cox 22 1 individual in each of the categories and correspondingly the 73 ~L) 2 reason that they gave. One senior operator who noted 3 potential safety benefit as a reactor operator also noted a 4 similar reason. 5 An individual from an affiliation with the 6 university indicated that it might indeed enhance the public 7 confidence in nuclear power. A utility consultant pointed 8 out that the reason for favoring the rule had to do with the 9 desirability of having a mixed operating staff, specifically 10 there this commenter is referring to the mixture of having 11 both the degreed as well as nondegreed individuals on shift. 12 Certainly that would be the case in the short term. ,_^') ( 13 DR. REMICK: Did you determine whether the senior 14 operator, reactor operator, who opted for the safety benefit, 15 were college graduates? 16 MR. WEST: I believe certainly in the first case, 17 with the senior operator, that individual was, in fact, a 18 college graduate, in the second case. 19 MR. REED: I am thinking back to years and years 20 ago when I held up a college graduate from promotion for 20 21 years -- college degree doesn't really mean that much. I 22 would think that this is a biased -- of course, all of them 23 are biased, but this one is really biased. (_h ~ / 24 DR. REMICK: Some of us do have biases. j 1 25 MR. WEST: Finally, the comment that we received 14CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC. l 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33M646
31465.0 cox 23 .f~( 1 from a state _ government agency also indicated potential o t.g 2 safety benefit from a degree requirement. 3 DR. REMICK: I think, in your previous comment, 4 .you said there'were six university comments.- Was there any 5 more than one that was in favor? 6 MR.. WEST: I didn't go down and-pick those out, 7; but it was surprising.- I thought in general, universitiesc '8 might support it, but I found it was the opposite.. 9 DR. REMICK: That's right. It was only one of the 11 0 six, exactly. 11 MR. REED: That's very interesting. 12 MR..EBERSOLE: Glenn,.you would~ require high' .i 13 school graduate, wouldn't you? 14 MR. REED: I think you have to do that. 15 MR. EBERSOLE: You begin to wonder, as you go up 16 scale,-you certainly wouldn't allow a Ph.D._to operate a ~17 reactor, would-you? 18 MR. REED: If they had proper mechanical aptitude, 19 yes. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: You would for theoretical? -21 MR. REED: If they had all the requirements, no. 22 DR. KERR: Let me point out that Fermi was a 23 Ph.D. '( ). 24 MR. WARD: I guess I am a little puzzled by some 25 of the comments. I read the proposed rule. There doesn't ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6M6
131465.0 = cox-24 1 seem to be anything in it that requires the NRC to grant a 7y (/ 2 license to anyone who has a degree nor to require the utility 3 to grant a-senior operator job to anyone who has a degree. I-4 .didn't see anything of that nature in the rule. 5 MR. WEST: That would have a degree. 6 MR. WARD: That would have a degree prior to 7 January 1991? I am being a little bit facetious. There are-8- requirements other than the degree that-would remain,-I 9 believe; is that right? 10 MR. REED: You have to take the test and all these I 11L things, you have to go through training and be able.to' absorb 12. -training, you have to operate valves, systems, all sorts of j,U 13 pumps. Sure, sua understand-that. I don't catch the meaning 14. of what you are saying, Dave. 15 DR. KERR: That's.because you have a degree. 16-MR. REED: Now you are saying if a person has a 17 degree, he has a right to get a lawyer, get a court, and 18 insist that he be seeded. I suppose that's a possibility 19 that might arise on the horizon, some guy that shouldn't be 20 an operator because he is a flake with a college degree, I 21 suppose now it opens up a new opportunity for lawsuit. 22 DR. KERR: I am going to agree, for the next five 23 minutes, to listen to Mr. West. () 24 DR. REMICK: I am glad you will do that, 25 Mr. Kerr. ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
r-a 31465.0 cox 25 1 MR. WEST: On that note. If we could turn .y O 2 attention to the reasons that were given for opposing the 3 rule. What we decided to do here were to take the responses, 4 in many cases, an individual might have provided or did, 5 indeed, provide, more than one reason to oppose the rule. We 6 took those reasons and rank ordered them. As you will see in 7 front of you, the most salient reason to do with the feeling 8 that it would not be a necessary type requirement. This 9 particular category of reason given captures such responses 10 as there is no technical justification for the rule, there is 11 no relationship between an individual having a degree and 12 operator performance and the like. ( ') i 13 MR. WARD: You said you rank ordered these. Was '~ 14 this in the order of the number of comments made? 15 MR. WEST: Yes, frequency of comments. 16 Secondly, the next most important reason given had 17 to do with the notion that experience was more important than 18 requiring an individual to have a degree in engineering or i 19 physical science. 20 Thirdly, potential negative impact on safety. To { 21 some extent that is clearly fleshed out, as it is explained 22 in the comments, with respect to the general notion of the 23 aggregate level of experience, perhaps being reduced, some j ( 24 concern about that. I 25 The fourth reason having to do with potential j ( ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 l
m i 31465.0 26 l cox 1 turnover. ,.m I '~' 2 Fifth reason dealing with the clear preference for 3 training rather than a degree requirement. 4 Six, the possibility of blocking the career path 5 and then in this instance, a concern is with regard to 6 blocking the career path of the reactor operators. 7 Then, finally, the reason that concerns are cost. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: What about the ingredient of 9 experience. It's been said that experience can be -- a small 10 bit of experience repeated 20 years instead of a broad-based 11 experience of many kinds of challenges. I don't know what 12 " experience" means in the context you-use it, but I think it 13 certainly has to mean something more than sitting steady in 14 your seat for X years. 15 MR. WEST: I think you are certainly right. 16 Clearly, the comments, it comes out in the forms of concern 17 that senior operators are, in fact, individuals, that have 18 hands-on type of experience at a particular plant. They 19 understand how the plant operates. They have been in their l 20 job successfully for any number of years, contrasted -- l 21 MR. EBERSOLE: They have experienced transients, 1 l 22 they have -- 23 MR. WEST: That's right, whole gamut versus a r-() 24 person that might have the engineering knowledge but not 25 necessarily coupled with experience at a particular plant. /\\CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
= 31465.0 cox 27 1 DR. REMICK: At the same time,-I hope they haven't' 2 had experience in. mitigating core damage or handling 3 containment failure or things like that. So experience,is 4 relative, I think, how much experience a person has. 5 MR. WEST:- What I would_like to do at.this point -6 is to shift now into the information-that we do.have 7 available that gets at the whole concern sbout'what extent' 8 could a degree rule be justified from an empirical point of 9 view or from a technical point of view. 10 On the next page, this is the particular study. 11_ that we alluded to a little bit earlier,'that'KMC-provided by 12-way of the public comment period. (), 13 KMC is a consulting firm. On behalf of-the group 14-that is referred to as the Qualification of Reactor Operators 15 Group, KMC conveyed the findings or the actual study that we 16 will present here. The Qualification of Reactor Operators 17 Group is a conglomerate of roughly about 22 utilities. The 18 firm that actually did the work for this study was the Delian 19_ Corporation. 20' You will note that one of the findings of the 21 study, I might. add, too, that the study was from the point of 22 view of looking at this whole. issue from a PRA perspective, 23 probabilistic. risk analysis perspective. p) 24 Note that the first conclusion of the study -- g, 25 DR. KEhR: Excuse me. You mean an effort was made ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-(M6
31465.0 cox 28 1 to include in the study a consideration of whether or not the 7- ' (_) 2 person had a degree? 3 MR. WEST: Yes. Not in a traditional sense in 4 terms of how PRAs are used, and it wasn't in an attempt to do 5 it in a quantitative type of way, roughly, I would be the s 6 first to admit this is not an area I have the greatest amount 7 of expertise in, but I did provide the entire study to an 8 individual on our staff who does have expertise in'this 9 area. He felt the methodology they used was a reasonable 10. one. Basically, and as a thumbnail sketch, what they did, 11 they first tried to identify the various attributes that you 12 would expect an operator to have, as this individual would be Q# 13 expected to either try to prevent or manage accidents. So 14 that was the first phase of the work. 15 Then from there there was an attempt to enumerate 16 the kinds of severe accidents that have been experienced or 17 postulated. 18 The third stage of the methodology then looked at i 19 the various scenarios, accident scenarios, with respect to if 20 the individual who had had a degree, would it enhance the 21 operator's capability to either mitigate, prevent or manage ) I 22 the accident. 1 23 Lastly, the methodology included a look at what f s () 24 would be some alternatives to, perhaps, a degree rule. 25 DR. KERR: Are you going to comment on whether you /\\CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ) 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 8(& 336-6646 1
r 31465.0 cox 29 1 think the study was meaningful or not? f-(_)3 2 MR. WEST: No more than I have already done by 3 simply passing along to you what I have gathered in a rather 4 summary kind of way from an individual that is knowledgeable 5 in this area, and his opinion was that the methodology was a 6 reasonable one. 7 DR. KERR: Thank you. 8 MR. WEST: Note that the first conclusion of the 9-study indicates that a college degree was not considered to 10 be more effective than other alternatives. The specific 11 alternative that this particular study looked at was focus 12 training. (L 13 The first stage of the methodology that I 14 mentioned that was employed in the study enumerated these 15 attributes that would be of value to an operator. 16 DR. KERR: Was it assumed that both a college 17 trained and noncollege trained operator had to focus 18 training. So it wasn't a question of focused training versus 19 degree, but rather focused training with and without a 20 degree? 21 MR. WEST: Yes, I think you are right; the 22 attributes that would be of value to a licensed operator, in 23 the context of severe accidents, either anticipating them or () 24 actually managing a severe accident. l 25 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask you this. The personal ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
l31465.0 cox 30 1
- characteristics and attributes of an individual, I think, are 2:.
more important than the fact he has gotten a degree, in any 3 ' case, absolutely. 4 MR. REED: Scorefl,' Jesse. 5, EMR. EBERSOLE: Right. On_the other hand, I.think-6- that individual, if he had those, would' aspire to a degree of 7 his own volition rather than-being hammered through it'by his~ 8 parents or'anybody, and come out to be:a dud'anyway. So I' 9 consider a degree, in this context, to be an attribute. 10 MR. REED: I have got to say_that that is maybe 11 true sometimes, but not very much of the time. I would-like. 12 to tell you another story at this point. 13 DR. REMICK:. Is it necessary at this point, 14 Glenn? I would like to give Garmon a chance to go through ~ 15 his presentation. We will have ample time. 16 MR. REED: For sea stories? 17 DR. REMICK: For sea stories. 18 MR. REED:' All right. 19 MR. WEST: As you see here these attributes would 20 have enhanced engineering knowledge, improved problem-solving 21 capability and integrated plant perspective and enhanced 22 communication skills. Clearly, this study favored focused j 23 training as being a better alternative. That's the point of L() 24 the third bullet in front of you. Focused training was 1 25 viewed as being superior to having the problem-solving skills { /\\CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
l 31465.0-cox 31 1 and the engineering knowledge that one might attribute to an j~3 V 2 individual that has a degree as a better way, the focused 3 training, that is, as a better way of enhancing operator 4 performance. 5 The study -- 6 DR. KERR: That conclusion would seem to imply 7 that it was a contrast between focused training and the 8 degree, rather than focused training for both and one with 9 and one without a degree. But perhaps I am misinterpreting 10 the comment. 11 MR. WEST: I am not sure that you are. I think 12 the main point here, though, is that the study came to the k' 13 ultimate conclusion, that focused training would be more 14 appropriate than an individual actually having degree as a 15 means of enhancing operator performance. The particular of 16 whether they looked at it from the point of view of 17 considering individuals that had degrees versus individuals 18 that didn't have degrees, I'm not quite clear on that 19 particular point. 20 DR. KERR: It would seem to me, inevitably in 21 preparing someone to be an operator, there will be focused 22 training. It would look to me that on the basis that you 23 have the same focused training for both, would the person (~s (,) 24 with or without a degree be better prepared afterward? 25 MR WEST: I think the import of the notion of ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
31465.0 cox 32 1 focused training with respect to this study has to do with C/ 2 the consideration that the attributes that would be desirable 3 for an operator to have, could just as easily be acquired 4 through focused training and more directly than getting those 5 attributes by way of a degree program. 6 DR. KERR: It isn't focused training -- 7 necessarily focused on operation of the plant. 8 MR. WEST: That's right. 9 DR. KERR: Thermodynamics, strength of material. 10 MR. WEST: That's right. Above and beyond the 11 traditional training that an operator is likely to receive. 12 MR. WARD: This is something beyond what the INPO / 1 \\'-'# 13 accreditation program would insist on? j 14 MR. WEST: I would certainly think it would 15 perhaps embrace some of that, but it would seem to me that 16 you are right, it would be above and beyond that. 17 MR. WARD: Is there some place where " focused 18 training" is defined in some sort of terms? 19 MR. WEST: I defined it only a cursory definition 20 of " enhanced training," the particular attributes in this 21 case that would be particularly desirable for a senior 22 operator or licensed operator to have. 23 MR. PERSENSKY: Garmon, do we actually have a copy () 24 of the study or did we just get the conclusions? 25 MR. WEST: We do have a copy. I don't have it ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 80(k336-6646
~ 1 j 31465.0 j cox 33 i 1 available with me. ) f--s ) 2 MR. PERSENSKY: Could we make it available to 3 them? 4 MR. WEST: Certainly. 5 MR. PERSENSKY: It was not done for us. It was 6 submitted to us as a way of -- by way of comment and it would 7 be more appropriate for you to look at that report. Is there 8 anyone here from KMC? 9 .DR. REMICK: Yes, there is, Pete. Do you care to 10 make any kind of comment on behalf of KMC on this? I realize 11 you are here as an observer. 12 FROM THE FLOOR: Yes, I am just an observer. I 13 don't have anything to say. 14 MR. WEST: The study does at least consider that, 15 which is no surprise, to assure that the degree, a degreed l 16 senior operator would be an alternative, at least, to the 17 notion of focused training; but, clearly, the study favored 18 the outcome. The conclusion was that focused training would q 19 be favored over having a degreed individual. } 20 Another conclusion of the study was that putting 21 aside the whole issue of formal education, and for the reason 22 of properly coping with accidents, senior operators should 23 receive additional education on plant response to accidents n(j 24 and should be very familiar with -- have experience with how 25 the plant operates. ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
i31'65.0-i j 4 34 c o x -. 1 The bottom line on this. study was that the p fq. kJ - '2 conclusion was that the degree rule would not -- was to -) 3 oppose the degree rule for the primary reason that it might 4' potentially have some negative impact on safety. A" 5 concluding comment of the study also had to do with the fact j 6-that a degree rule might be potentially beneficial, but'it 7 'was not necessarily an important issue with respect to public' 8 health and safety. 9 I think that was more.of a summary-type comment t 10 rather than a-finding that flowed directly from the study. 11 itself. 12 MR. EBERSOLE: Senior operator should receive O 13 additional education on plant response to accidents..Well, 14 management has got to give them the information. -It's 15 shocking to me, for instance, on the total failure case, 16 there is no knowledge, universally, at'least, present, as to. 17 how the plant degrades.in a variety of areas, that would 18 prolong the loss of AC power. There is nothing in the book 19 that says'the. plant operators, the engineers, or the managers 20 have to know. Now, a progressive aspect, that affects the 21 loss of AC power, right this minute. Yet that's one of the 22 most outstanding potentials we have for core melt. 23 MR. REED: I agree with what Forrest made as an O 24 evenine remerk, whet 1e the etetes ef the egereter treinine2 25 That's a whole subject. That would take half a day itself. Ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
31'4'65.0. cox 35 Whylwe are where we are, or haven't moved as far as.you think 'l ..g 2 we should have,-that's very interesting, too. 3-DR. REMICK: Dave. e. .4 'MR. WARD: Garmon,.I am not sure what you said 5. right at the end. Apparently KMC expressed the. opinion.that 6- .there is'a potential negative impact, there.could be 7 potential negative impact on safety of a degreetrequirement. 8 But that opinion didn't flow out'of the study necessarily? 9 .MR. WEST: It didn.'t flow necessarily out of'the 10 study. That came sort of obliquely through the package they. ~11 presented by way of the comments. The QR0 group had also ' included comments of,their own, and they were actually,.IL 12 13 think, referencing that to.the points that were made there, -14' particularly in the area of this aggregate level of 15 experience, one shift and concern about that.and its impact 16 on safety. 17 -MR. REED: I agree very much with the comment, I 18 don't know how they arrived at it,.'but I know how~I arrived 19 at it. Overall safety in a nuclear power plant is very much l 20 related to cooperation and the fellowship between all the j 4 l 21 parties involved in safety activities. Once you tend'to l i 22 create, I will call it chaos, which this does, create a ] 23 chaos, you begin to destroy corporation fellowship. You .O 24 des 1= to 8 11a aiere rect, vertic=1er1r 11 twet co11eee 1 25 graduate over there is not as good as the rank and file ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
31465.0 cox 36 1 field, a certain noncollege graduate is, yet he is holding a 7. ) x_/ 2 position. There are all kinds of potential negative 1 3 impacts. 4 DR. REMICK: Some of the ones that I think were 5 brought out in the comments is the fact that because there 6 would no longer be a career path, that people would opt.out, l l 7 they could not see a promotion. Therefore, you would lose 8 reactor operators, for example, because they could not aspire 9 to SRO after 1991, because of lack of career path,.you might 10 non get as good a type of person in the reactor operator. I 11 think those were some of the comments I remember also along 12 this line. !,,) 13 MR. WEST: Yes. In a similar vein, I also 14 expressed concern about the fact that you might get degreed 15 individuals that would assume the role of a senior operator 16 and would not particularly care for shift work; and, they, in 17 turn, might have a high rate of turnover. 18 Next I would like to present the global findings l 19 of a panel that was initiated by the NRC back in 1982, what l l i I 20 is the final results of that panel that were presented at 21 that time. l 22 The major finding of that panel, one of the major j 23 recommendations, had to do with the fact that the panel () 24 didn't think that a baccalaureate degree requirement would be l 25 appropriate.for reactor operators, senior operators or shift f /\\CE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. I 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
u I 31465.0 cox 37 1 supervisors, due to a variety of disadvantages. The first ') 'w 2 one, poor performance, is what I was alluding to a moment 3 ago, poor performance that could perhaps come about as a i 4 result of having a degreed individual that doesn't 5 particularly care for shift work and ultimately this might 6 result in the individual performing poorly. 7 MR. EBERSOLE: Can you characterize the peer 8 advisory panel in the context of frequent bias? l 9 MR. WEST: I can characterize them in general and 10 specific terms. Generally speaking, these were individuals 11 from other-federal agencies that were presumably 12 knowledgeable in this area. I could circulate also the list '~' 13 of the actual individuals. 14 DR. REMICK: I renember the time when that peer 15 panel was appointed. My experience initially was tnere was 16 nobody with any kind of nuclear power plant experience. I i 17 think they finally got somebody from the national lab, or 18 somebody with reactor experience, one person. I initially f 19 was concerned the other way. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: It was completely detached, i 21 DR. REMICK: J. 22 MR. PERSENSKY: The panel was comprised of 23 training and backgrounds from other federal agencies, like n 24 the FAA, Coast Guard, Office of Personnel Management. We did u 25 have one panel member from TVA. { ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
31465.0 38 cox 1 There were also a number of consultants who were, 8.j 2 in fact, much more knowledgeable in the industry, and there 3 were a number of presentations made to this panel with regard 4 to the whole situation. The panel met several times. This 4 5 was one of their findings. Another finding that is not shown 6 on here, a degreed individual should be on shift, the degreed j 7 and licensed person should be on shift. 8 MR. WEST: I might add to the comment about the 9 panel recommending a shift engineer. The notion was also 10 that this particular individual would replace the current 11 STA, the shift technical advisor. One difference between the 12 two would be that the shift engineer as conceived would, in n t 13 fact, have an RO license, reactor. operator license, whereas 14 the current shift technical advisor would not necessarily 15 have an operator's license. L 16 MR. EBERSOLE: Does the Chernobyl -- has the 17 Chernobyl incident led to any particular change in views 18 about the necessity of having diversity of supervision over j 19 and above the performing group, in that particular reactor, 1 20 driving it to destruction, a particular need for parties 21 standing by with the command authority to say stop this 22 stuff, people who are outside of the operating organization. 23 MR. WEST: That's a good question. I don't know ( )/ 24 the answer to it. 25 MR. EBERSOLE: It's analogous, you know, to a ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
i t . 31465.0-f . cox 39 L1 flight engineer on an airplane, of which we have few and' 2 getting fewer. I invite you to' consider the 14th Street 3 bridge case, which is a strong case in point, where the loss l ] 4 .of diversity'of opinion and information led, in effect, to 5 the crash. 6 MR.' REED: If we.are going to pack.this. jury, 7-Jesse, let.me.-say that EBR-1 was driven to destruction by the-H 8 college professors who were directing the activity.- I not-
- 9 sure about-Chernobyl..
.I suspect there were asfew personnel-10 there driving the' testing, but I am not sure. 11' DR. REMICK: Electrical engineer.- One thing'I 12 would like'to.say, I appreciate that the-Staff made clear:in 0 13 this presentation and in the SECY document what the peer 14 ' panel recommended on degrees,-because I-was a little incensed 15 that the advance notice _gave the impression to me,: as I read 16 it, that perhaps that. peer panel favored what was proposed. 17 It mentioned the peer panel as if this was. support for a ~ 18 Commission action, and I think we should have the-SECY d 19 document, what they recommended and what was presented here l 20 as one of their recommendations. I applaud you for that. 1 21 MR. WEST: You are exactly right. There was a j 22 need for us to do a better job in that area. 23 MR. WARD: Of course, what you have got here sort O 24 of dends in the other direction, I think. It doesn't mention i 1 25 the shift engineer recommendation. ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
31465.0 cox 40 1 MR. WEST: You are right. That was-pointed out to ,s 2 me. I had planned to mention it verbally. 3 DR. REMICK: Commonwealth does have that system. 4 They do have a shift engineer. They did it independently 5 about the time this was all taking place, called it SCRE, 6 shift control room engineer. ) I 7 They do have a recommendation similar to what this 8 panel recommended, j 9 MR. WARD: He is an SRO. He functions as sort of i 10 the -- what I would usually call the -- 11 MR. WEST: STA? i 12 MR. WARD: No, control room supervisor, as I see ,_). ( 13 it, rather than shift supervisor. 14 MR. EBERSOLE: He is a nonparticipant, isn't he? 15 MR. WARD: No, I don't think so. 16 MR. PERSENSKY: I think he is an additional 17 person. He is an add-on to the -- as I understand it. 18 DR. REMICK: I think so. 19 MR. EBERSOLE: That is somebody should stand back I 20 and obtain a perspective. 21 MR. WARD: I would like the record to show it's 22 factual. 23 MR. EBERSOLE: I would like the record to show I ('O, 24 certainly endorse somebody standing behind and maintaining a 25 broad perspective of what is going on while the other crew is ACEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. { 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-f6:6
L31465.0-cox' 41 ) a l 1 churning through'the details. ' ?% J - 2 DR. REMICK: The STA is put there for that L 1 3 purpose? 4 MR. EBERSOLE: No, that is the STA. 5 DR.'REMICK: Everybody has an STA. 6 MR. REED: That has been part of the push going 7 on, Jesse. Not all of the people are doing it. I agree with 8 you we ought to be back where the ACRS recommended in the '83 9 report. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: There was a controversy in the 11 ACRS. A lot of them wanted them compounded in the' shift. 12 MR. REED: I know it was -- 13 DR. REMICK: Our previous people recommended 14 that. 15 MR. REED: But the STA is still hanging in there. 16 DR. REMICK:- Some of them believe it's a good 17 idea. I 18 MR. WARD: The comment about Chernobyl, and the 19 fact that there was an electrical engineer. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: That didn't send me anyplace. 21 MR. WARD: In fact, I think it becomes pretty 22 clear in all of the reports on the Chernobyl accident, is 23 that the electrical engineer in this case was not a i 24 reactor-oriented -- l () 25 MR. EBERSOLE: It was driving toward a test on a ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 q
4 l 31465.0 { cox 42 f-1 generator system. v)- 2 DR. REMICK: I thought Jesse was saying it was a 3 degreed person that was instrumental. I agree it was an 4 electrical engineer that made some of the decisions. 5 MR. EBERSOLE: In fact, that's the inverse of what 6 I meant. He was exactly the kind that I wouldn't'let drive 7 the show. 8 DR. REMICK: I agree. I was pointing out there-9 was-an engineer involved in it. He had a degree. I. don't 10 know if the others had degrees or not. 11 MR. EBERSOLE: He had a particular line degree. 12 He didn't know what was going on in the larger world. ) ~' 13 DR. REMICK: It's tough to agree with you, Jesse, i' 14 I see. 15 DR. KERR: Mr. West, do you see what happens when 16 you pause? 17 MR. WARD: I think if someone is going to somehow 18 take the Chernobyl experience and stick it somewhere in the 19 bac,k of their mind and let that influence where they come 20 down on an issue like this in some sort of implicit way, I 21 think we ought to understand what the Chernobyl experience 22 was. In fact, as I understood, the electrical engineer was 23 not making the decisions about what was going to be done with (a_) 24 the reactor, he was driven to run his electrical test and 25 ask, apparently ask for certain things to be done with the ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
31465.0. e cox 43 1 reactor, and the reactor operators, whether they -- whether 3 O 2 degreed or not degreed, I don't know -- went along 3 improperly, really went along with the request is what it '4 amounted to. ] l 5 MR. EBERSCLE: They might have been driven by the ,] 6 fact that he had a degree and they didn't. 7 MR. WARD: That's a possibility. 8 MR. REED: David, what is in the back of my mind f 9 on Chernobyl -- and I have read it -- clearly, the design was 10 flawed and that the Institute didn't make available to the 11 operating personnel the flaws that existed. They didn't know i 12 about it. That was in the back of my mind. O\\) 13 MR. EBERSOLE: That was'truly experimental. 14 DR. REMICK: Moving right ahead, Garmon. 15 MR. WEST: Just to wrup this particular point.up. 1 16 The other disadvantages that the panel saw, with respect to 17 requiring licensed operators to have a degree, included the d I 18 possibility of inexperienced operators. I think, clearly 19 here, you have the notion of the instant senior operator or ] 1 20 licensed operator coming right out of college and serving in 21 that role. 1 22 MR. REED: World War II we had a name for those i 23 people. 90-day wonders. I am not so sure that that was a { I rx (_) 24 good plan either. 25 MR. WEST: Also the consideration of high 1 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 8(Kk336-6W ~
31465.0 44 cox 1 turnover, the possibility of driving out capable operators, \\_j. 2 concern about the curtailment of selection pool, misplaced 3 emphasis and little scientific basis for a degree 4 requirement. 5' Certainly, as my colleague pointed out, and 6 rightly so, the panel also recommended that a shift engineer 7 be placed on shift, opted for that. 8 Next I would like to turn attention to 9 NUREG/CR-4051. Th.s NUREG was initiated, contracted out, by 10 the NRC. The NUREG itself was issued in 1985, entitled 11 " Assessment of Job-Related Educational Qualifications for 12 Nuclear Power Plant Operators." Here the attempt was to look 13 at the match comparison, if you will, between what an 14 individual is likely to get by way of education at various 15 levels, and what you would expect this individual to know 16 that would be desirable, on the job, functioning as an 17 operator, as a licensed operator. Here, again, it was l 18 looking between the match at the two, what the person has l 19 received in his or her education, and what the individual 1 f 20 should know on the job. '21 This study found that 10 percent would be l I - 22 acquired, 10 percent of what an individual should know on the 23 job, as an operator, could be acquired through high school. <>s i j~,.) 24 Another 65 percent could potentially come from college, i 25 another 20 percent could come from elsewhere, and the /\\CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC. ) 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 8tKF336-6646 g
31465.0 45 cox l' elsewhere in this case would be that which you couldn't ,m ~) 2 attribute to high school nor college, in particular, it's t 3' referring to plant-specific type of training, or plant 4 training that an individual might receive with a plant I 5 training program. l i 6 The residual of 5 percent refers to the area where l 7 the subject matter experts could not come to any consensus of 8 agreement. 9 DR. REMICK: When you say " knowledge," " academic j 10 . knowledge" here, that's in the context of the knowledge,, i 11 skills and abilities. It's.the knowledge portion of that, 12 not the skills. \\ 13 MR. PERSENSKY: In fact, this came from using the 14 INPO job test analysis data base for just the academic 15 knowledge. If you look at the data base, there are three L '16 . types of knowledge: systems, components and academic. This 17 study prepares engineering or educational curricula to just l l 1.8 the academic part of that data base. 19 DR. REMICK2 You might learn exponentials, maybe l 20 some basic chemistry, things like that, it's that type of 21 thing. 22 MR. PERSENSKY: Correct, the math, chemistry, 23 physics. n ( ) 24 MR. WEST: Clearly, the cont.ribution for high 25 school, the 10 percent, had largely to do uith math courses, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage MX)-336-6646
l i I 31465.0 J cox 46 1-more so than anything else. 7-Q)3 2 MR REED: In other.words, it's a basic tool kit 3 and its availability, where it can be gotten for a person to 4 be. hired to aspire to licensed position. It's a basic tool 5 kit of fundamentals. It has nothing to do with the 6 experience aspect. 7 DR. REMICK: Skills don't. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: I am surprised at 65 percent being 9 as large as it is. I would just assume it's near 40. 10 MR. REED: Phenomenal 65 percent. 11 MR. WEST: Here again, 65 percent reflects to a 12 great extent engineering courses that individuals might 13 have. 14 MR. PERSENSKY: With knowledge coming from the 15 upper level nuclear courses as opposed to other engineering 16 courses, they had a smaller percentage. 17 MR. EBERSOLE: They teach in universities, core 18 physics and core design, purely. How much of that is -- 19 DR. REMICK: How long have you been there? 20 DR. KERR: You have not looked at nuclear 21 engineering curricula lately. 22 MR. EBERSOLE: They even have valves now? 23 DR. KERR: Abeolutely, n() 24 MR. WEST: You will note on the next page a study 25 that was a follow on of the one we just considered. In this ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Cmerace 8(0 3364446
~ r s 31465.0-47 cox 1 study, the attempt was to look at degree perhaps, A.S. degree j ,s ) 1 R~ 2 programs and course work programs, grouping of courses would 3 be taken, B.S. also, grouping of courses would be taken 4 rather than structure. There was a wide range of 15 percent 5 up to 65 percent of variation among problems. 6 MR. REED: There was a suggestion of Jesse's point 7 it goes from 15 to 65, the average is about 40 there. 8 MR. WEST: The average was about 35 to 40 percent 9 of programs. 10 Note, too, the second major conclusion, was that 11 there was no significant difference between the different 12 kinds of programs with respect to what you would expect an i , ~' 13 individual to know on the job or be prepared to do on the 4 14 job. 15 Finally, the study took a look at the traditional 16 bachelor of science degree in nuclear engineering and the 17 finding there was that this particular type of program would 18 contribute to roughly about 50 percent of what you would 1 19 expect an individual to know as a licensed operator. 20 That ends what we currently have available to us 21 as far as what we would look at in terms of a technical 22 empirical justification for degree rule. In either case, 23 whether it could be justified or not from a technical or es( ) 24 empirical point of view, what I would attempt to do at this 25 point would be to shift to some of the pros and cons and have ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, }NC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33MM6
1 31465.0 cox 48 l 1 a degree rule. -j
- S d/
m 2 MR. EBERSOLE: Is there anything in here, when you j 3-are talking about degrees, you stopped at the B.S. Was there 4 anything that you looked at in the context of what advantage 5 it is to have an M.S. or Ph.D.? ) 6 MR. WEST: I have not encountered anything as 7 yet. The rule would be drawn, written in the preliminaries 8 here, to say that any person from any school who has a B.S. 9 in engineering or science would meet the qualification 10 requirement. 11 DR. REMICK: And accredited school. 12 MR. REED: I will add that. Yet the numbers on '(7,) 13 the last page say the contribution of the college education 14 varies anywhere from 15 percent to 65 percent. 15 MR. PERSENSKY: Excuse me, that finding relates to 16 all of the programs. Some of the programs are not B.S. 17 programs. In fact, most of those programs are A.S. programs 18 and there are some programs that were specifically tailored 19 by a combination of a utility and a local college to get some 20 of the academic knowledges that they thought were necessary 21 so that they wouldn't even lead to a degree. So what this t 22 finding is that amongst that wide range of academic programs 23 that are out there, that the utilities are working with, that /~T 24 it's,15 to 65 percent. The previous study, the one that (. j 25 talked in the 50 to 65 range, talked about the accredited ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
r 31465.0 cox-49 1 -B.S., programs, primarily. ,m(_/ 2 MR. REED: I am just amazed at accredited B.S. 3 schools, without any tampering, without any reorientation or 4 focusing, would deliver at the 50 percent level. 5 DR. REMICK: Remember, Glenn, this is academic 6 knowledge required of a reactor operator. It's not the 7 experience, it's not the skills, those types of things. It's 8 what chemistry, math, things like that that you need. 9 MR. WARD: It's not even all knowledge. I think 10 J. said there are classes of knowledge. 11 MR. REED: Try me on this. I would expect, based 12 on my years in the business, for the science in this b,_. 13 business, the most important is heat transfer and 114 thermodynamics. I don't think many B.S. people, except 15 engineering, come out with much training or school education 16 on heat cransfer and thermodynamics; am I correct? 17 DR. REMICK: That's probably true. 18 MR. REED: That's my point. 19 DR. REMICK: If you are considering another 20 physical science, that's probably true. 21 MR. REED: Yet they qualify. 22 MR. EBERSOLE: I agree with you, Glenn, that's i 23 wrong. ('~j% 24 DR. KERR: In spite of the use of the word i 25 " findings" by these gentlemen, what they are reporting are ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage IKK)-336-6646 )
31465.0 cox 50 1 conclusions. ,~) %J 2 MR. EBERSOLE: In the matter of getting into the 3 degree area, you mentioned B.S. as a nominal level. I would 4 like to pitch out a warning. If you march on up the 5 educational level, you are going to get into trouble. I had 6 some experience just like Glenn, except it was in the hiring 7 of design people. 8 If you go on up into a person who has a highly 9 specialized degree, Ph.D. in science, materials, whatever, 10 which is inconsistent with the job on hand you want him to 11 do, he will be unhappy, he won't do his job right, he will 12 look down on everybody. He becomes a nut in the whole i'-) 13 process. 14 There is some kind of optimum, as you come up in 15 this educational level, probably at the B.S., I would argue 16 probably at the M.S. level. Beyond that, you can get in big 17 trouble unless you have a particular individual who realizes 18 he is operating below the level of educational prowess that 19 he has and he agrees to let that be his career. They have 20 unhappy people, well, George Wallace characterized them as 21 those opinionated Ph.D.s that can't park their bicycle 22 straight in Washington. You can get into that category of 23 people which is certainly no good at all. () 24 MR. WEST: I think this is certainly one of the 25 points that the peer review panel pointed out and had in ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 8(KF336-6646
q 31465.0. - cox-51 1 mind. (_4 )- 2. RDR.-REMICK: I don't think we should misinterpret 3 what is being proposed. I am not-surprised that they find 4 that people.with a B.S. degree'have'certain of the academic-5 'knowledges. I have been involved years ago -- I must admit 6 -- not in recent years, in training power plant personnel, 7 some of which were degreed and some'of which were 8 nondegreed. There is no question about it that, fin general, 9 the people who have been through an engineering' degree, it's 10 easier to teach them the academics necessary'for reactor 11 _ operator. No question about it. They have had that 12 additional education. That does not say.they are going to be ~ ^- 13 the best operator by any chance, but this is'looking at what' 14 knowledge.do these people need, it's not surprising'to me 15 that a certain percentage of those, whatever it.is, they are 16 going to get in an engineering program or' specially tailored; 17 program. '18 MR. REED: Is it time now for-me to tell my sea 19 story. Mr. West. 20 MR. WEST: Could we wait until the end of my ? 21 presentation. I don't have much more to go here. 22 Now I would like to turn my attention to some of 23 the advantages that might come from a degree rule. The first () 24 concerns the establishment of a career path to upper 25 management positions. I would be the first to also mention ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, }NC. 202-347 4 700 Nationwide Coverage 800-3364M6
31465.0 cox 52 1 that I heard this particular point argued even from the point L.J i 2 of view of perhaps being a disadvantage. But I opted to list ~ 3 it here as an advantage, at least for the purpose of my t 4 presentation. 5 Secondly, the enhancement of professionalism of a 6 senior operator position. 7 Thirdly, the enhancements of engineering' expertise 8 an shift. I might add, just in passing, it seemed to me, in-9 looking over the comments we received, there was generally 10 less agreement that a degree requirement could, in fact, 11 enhance engineering expertise. The argument came more with 12 regard to the area of -- enhanced area of accident management !'~ 13 expertise on a shift. l l 14 DR. REMICK: Garmon, if I remember enhanced 15 professionalism was not mentioned in the advance notice; is 16 that correct? I understand those first two are what are 17 driving some of the Commissioners. 18 MR. WEST: That's right. Professionalism was i 19 mentioned from the point of view that it comes up by way of 20 questions in that area, of those 20 questions. One does 21 present this. 22 MR. REED: I would like to point out that 23 post-Three Mile Island 2 incident, when the STA thing was p) 24 established, and a person with an engineering degree was made (_ 25 available on shift, I felt a great deal of relief that we had ACE FEDERAL R.EPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
r-31465.0' cox: 53 O s. 1- ' covered that career path, that mobility, a person who had-f r1 i 2 served in the trenches rising to top management. If you are 3 going to say that this new option of degreeing SROs 4 ' establishes a path, I think path was already established in 5 equally well or better. i 6 DR. REMICK: I know you know those STAS not to be 7 licensed. Therefore, I would argue that those people haven't 8 had operating experience. I interpret what is driving some 9 of the Commissioners here, they want people in management who ~ 10 have had actual operating experience. 11 MR. REED: As a. rule, I thought they should be 12 licensed. Do you know what is happening out there? They are O 13 being licensed. Many go on and trade,with the team they 14 worked on in the shift, so on and so forth. I think it 15 happens. 16 MR. WEST: Certainly the shift technical advisors 17 that are in that position, through the option of combining 18 the roles of the senior operator.and the shift technical 19 advisor, would, in fact, have a license. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Has the reputation of the STA 21 improved in the last five-odd years? Of course, the industry -l 22 stuck these wet-eared individuals behind us because they'had 23 a degree. I could see them standing there behind a veteran '( ) 24 operator in the nature of a sophomore behind a veteran. 25 DR. REMICK: Jesse, I would say, in general, the ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage M4336-6646
o 31465.0'- L .cox 54 1-answer is yes,'for the reason Glennl pointed.out and the O 2 reason Garmon pointed out, is that utilities are' licensing 3 more of these people, in addition to STA, they are licensing 4 -more SROs progressively, they are.using them in combined-5 _ positions so.they are getting respect. In the place I think' l. 6 that respect is somewhat weak, not in all cases,:is'the case-7 where it's a separate STA, not licensed, they are still using-h 8 that engineering kid. Now, there are some' exceptions.to. 9 that,'but it's how the management uses that STA. 10 MR..EBERSOLE: I think he,should be licensed. -On 11 the other hand, I think he should~ stand back and keep 12 perspective. h 'O 13' 'MR. REED: In fact, there was'anLaccident, rather 14 serious one, about two years ago,'when the STA'fingere'd the 4 q 15' problem. LI.can't remember the exact one. j
- l 16.
'DR. REMICK ' But'what.did he do, I. don't~ recall?- l l l ~ 17 - MR. EBERSOLE: He fingered the problem and said 18 from his standback. l 1 l l' 19 MR. REED: Yes, from the standback position. q 20 MR. WEST: It was my opinion on the results of the-g 21 STA on shift that we presented here about a year.ago, the 22-information we received from doing that study seemed to 23 indicate to me that there were, in fact, numerous STAS that 24 were serving in the dedicated STA role that did, in fact, 25- .even have senior operator licenses. l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ) 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4 646
i 31465.0 cox 55 j 1 DR. REMICK: I think that is more a subjective 7- \\) I 2 judgment on my part, but through the accreditation process, 3 it's a question I get to ask of many utilities. In general, 4 that's the trend, I think. 5 MR. EBERSOLE: I think the STAS and the use of the 6 STAS, in part, of course, I don't think he cannot be in 7 command, he is an advisor. 8 But, on the other hand, he should be able to issue -9 advice which is documented, perhaps on tape, to the party in 10 charge, and say you can go ahead and we will operate with the 11 following reservations, you are undertaking this and-that 12 level of hazard. I personally endorse you to not do this, ^,,b 13 but that's your prerogative. 14 MR. REED: I would like to just point out on this 15 STA thing, and a previous remark I made, the fact that STAS 16 arrived, they were met with hostility or something imposed, 17 just like resident inspectors arrived, they.were met with 18 hostility. It takes a while to earn your credits and become 19 accepted. Unfortunately, there is still a residual of 20 noncollege people throwing rocks at STAS. If you go out and 21 conduct another poll and you plot these polls, I think you 22 will find the hostility coming down and down and down. If 23 you go through this proposed rule, why you demand degreed /% (_) 24 personnel, you create a chaos and create hostility. That's 25 why I am opposed to this'now. I think the STAS have won ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-37(X) Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6(46
31465.0 cox 56 1 their wings. ,-s %J 2-Garmon, do you want to tell us about the 3 disadvantages? 4 MR. WEST: Certainly. You will note one i 5 disadvantage concerns the possibility of high turnover that-1 6 might lead to this loss of experience level on shift.
- Again, 7
the disadvantage of no known or demonstrated empirical l 8 justification for a degree rule. Turnover due to l 9 undesirability of shift work. Here again, that an individual 10 with a degree in engineering, physical science, would not 11 initially and certainly, perhaps not in the long term, desire 12 to work on shift. .s ) ( 13 MR. WARD: How is that different from the first 14 one? 15 MR. WEST: You are right. They are related. 16 MR. PERSENSKY: The first one relates to the 17 nondegreed ROs, because their career path leaving, whereas 18 the third one reflects the fact that the degreed person isn't 19 going to want to work on shift very long, so he or she will 20 move up quicker. 21 MR. WEST: Again the notion of an instant senior 22 reactor operator person coming directly out of college and 23 becoming a senior operator. O) 24 MR. EBERSOLE: Caretr path, doesn't it affect the (_ 25 path, there is a pretty clear path there right on up from ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
p -l 31465.0 cox 57 A-l 1-auxiliary operator right into the presidency of a utility,. .-( t g 2 with'.a degree? 3 MR. WEST: That's not my u derstanding,-no. 4 MR. EBERSOLE: Utilities'are old line companies, a l .5-compliant person can manage to climb his way right on 6 through. 7 MR. REED: I have'got to be humorous here. 8 Particularly if he marries the chairman of the. board's' i 9 daughter. .10 DR. REMICK: Parti'cularly, if'there are a' number l 11 of ROs, where the opportunities or-in' general or corporate 12 positions, so there is a limited amount of upward movement, q .13 Hypothetical, that is possible, and-it does happen, because 14 some of.the other places where they might move might require '15 an engineering degree to go'there. 16 MR. PERSENSKY: Most of the management positions 17 in the ANS standards do require, by guidance, ANS standard, a 18 degree. 19 MR. WEST: Then, finally, the disadvantage of 20 harming operators' morale. That was clearly expressed in the 21 comments we received. 22 The last point that I would address here concerns 23 potential options.to the first bullet; namely, the whole O 4 netie ei the deeree r=1e thet is exere sed te the edve ce 25 notice of proposed rulemaking, and there should be a slash ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
31465.0 cox 58 1 there, along with the notion of degree rule, you would also (]L 2 have a concurrent policy statement that I alluded to 3 earlier. One option to a degree rule concerns a rule on 4 degreed' senior managers.- I am sure many of you are certainly 5 familiar with that from previous years. It was presented 6' back in 1984. 7 I am also aware that there are certainly other 8 ' variations of.that same theme of having a senior manager on. 9: Eshift. I know one'of my colleagues has pointed out a point 10 of view of the possibility of-requiring,ilet's say, one 11 individual on shift, to be degreed, and'let the utility 12 decide who, in. fact, that individual should_be. So that's 13 another variation of that same thing. 14 DR. REMICK: On that' variation, could.that be the' 15 .STA? There is one person now with a degree, that's the~STA. 16 MR. WEST: Potentially. 17 MR. PERSENSKY: Degree and license, I.think,-is 18 the important point. 19 MR. WEST: Yes. 20 DR. REMICK: I see. 21 MR. WEST: Some STAS, particularly if they serve 22 in the capacity of a dedicated STA, might have degree 23 equivalency criteria, not a degree, in fact, by way of that. (^)- 24 MR. REED: I am opposed to that degree senior V 25 manager on shift proposed rule. Is that still a proposed ace. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l 202 347-3700 - Nationwide Coverage 8(Xb336-6646
r i -31465.0. cox 59 j ~1 rule? What is it'now,^ policy statement? f-~ (-)' 'l 2' MR. WEST: I don't think anything is happening in ~ 3 that area.at the present time. q l 4 'MR. PERSENSKY: That was never' approved' 5 . publication, the advance notice for replacement. 6 MR.: WEST: Then, finally, I would be the first to 17' admit that the final option is a rather weak one, the motion 8 would be to amend the policy statement on engineering 9 expertise on shift that would try to further encourage the 10 use of the combined STA/SRO on: shift. In its present form, 11 it's clearly the preference of the-Commission'that the-12-utilities go in that direction and the. intent with regard to 5 13 this option would be to further encourage that. 14 DR. REMICK: Thank you, Garmon. I would like to 15 ask the subcommittee if you'have questions of.Garmon. Sea' 16 stories can come after that. Let's now address if you have 17 any questions on what Garmon has said or not said. 18 MR. WEST: Let me provide a partial response,.at~ 19 least, to the early mentioning of the whole rationale for 20 recommending that the issue of training and education be 21 separated. It was our thought, as we drafted the particular 22 Commission paper that conveyed, particular SECY that we have 23 been discussing here, that it was important to do that given () 24 certain things that were happening at the time. 25 Particularly, we had in mind the fact that the moratorium, if ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 c
E31465.0 cox 60 s 3 -q -1 you will, in the area of training,.was about to come to an Aw,) . 2 end and certainly the Staff would have to turn their 3 attention to take a look at the current. policy statement in 4 that area, that, in effect, has put a moratorium on 5 regulations in the area of training for a two-year period. 6 That two-year _ period has ended. It ended in March, so we 7 were conscious of that particular happening. 8 The thought was that there would be some attention-9 by us to look at what had occurred up to this date over that 10 two-year period in terms of what the industry had done, in 11-terms of the area of training and perhaps make some 12 recommendations for an extension of that policy statement, or { 13 whatever would be deemed appropriate, to figure what needed-14 to be'done in the' area of training could be done in-the 15 context of the current policy statement, whatever 16 modifications that would take place in that area after the 17 two-year moratorium. 18 DR. REMICK: Bill. 19 DR. KERR: Again, I am not sure I understood the 20 context or the' meaning, but it seems we will decide on j 21 whether a person should have a degree and what he should l 22 understand or know separately. You train people to respond ] 23 to certain incidents, I think at least in the historical 1 24 context, I think a weakness was identified at TMI-2, if it 25 was a weakness, understanding unexpected, unusual, low ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
31465.0 cox 61 1 probabilities and serious accidents. )' 2 MR. EBERSOLE: Was it really? 'I thought it was 3 lack of informed people because the engineers didn't inform 4 .the. operators. 5 DR. KERR - Let me work through my hypothesis, then 6 you can go through yours. Whatever it was that was 7 identified, it seems to me, in trying to determine the ~ 8 background of the person who is going to' deal with this, one' 9 needs to know or have some fairly good idea what it is one i 10 wants the individual to be able to deal with..Therefore, 11 does.not --.if my hypothesis is correct, I don't see how'one 12 can separate whether the degree requirement makes sense or . ~) { (l' 13 not unless one has some idea of what.it is one wants people-1 J 14 to be able to deal with. That was the problem I had if I. 1 15 understood'what was being said correctly. I am not sure I l 16 did. 1 1 17 MR. : WEST: I can understand your concern. I wouldL 18 certainly concede the fact that if, indeed, the degree rule j 19 becomes a reality, some attention will certainly have to be i 20 given to what you would expect an individual to know, if no 21 more than that, by way of the justification for it in and of 22 itself. 23 DR. KERR: It would seem to me on whether or not a i () 24 degree was hired could hinge on what it was you want the 25 degreed person to be able to do. I don't see how you can ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 8(4336446
0 l 31465.0 cox 62 1 separate the two. Yet this seemed to me to be the 7_ 2 recommendation that was being made. We are going to decide + 3 what people know and we are going to decide on the 4 qualification of the people who need to know this, but we are 5 not going to relate to two. It seems to me to be so 6 illogical, I have to be missing something. 7 MR. PERSENSKY: I think the separation here is 8 much simpler than that'in the sense that we are separated out 9 and how we do things from a, regulatory standpoint. Training 10 is covered by a policy statement which endorses the INPO 11 accreditation program and is continuing.to do that in terms 12 of some of the day-to-day skill level, as well as knowledge (D k> 13 level abilities that are going into training through the 14 systematic approach. The idea of the degree rule, which is 15 education, was simply to say this is the minimum requirement 16 to get into this training program. This is a new screening 17 tool. 18 DR. KERR: If you don't know what the training i 19 program is training people to do, how can you make a good 20 judgment on what sort of background they need to get into 21 it? 22 MR. PERSENSKY: Part of that judgment is up to the 23 utility. The screen right now is a high school diploma or 24 GED. 25 DR. KERR: Wait a minute. To say it's the ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. I 202-347-3700 Nationwide Cmerage 800-336-6646
31465.0 cox 63 g-s. 1 responsibility of the utility sort of says we don't need any A,, 2 NRC regulations, the utility makes that judgment. Yet what 3 is being proposed here as a rule, which he does or does not 4 require a degree. 5 MR. PERSENSKY: As far as the specific knowledge, 6 this rule proposes a new screening device that advances it 7 from a high school to a -- I agree that we are not saying 8 here what knowledge the person-is supposed to have. I don't 9 think we know that. 10 DR. KERR Sort of like saying I am going to train 11 a doctor, but I don't know what disease to train him to deal 12 with. I am going to make him a specialist, but I. don't know 3 / T 13 what I am going to do after he becomes a specialist. 14 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me make a comment. t 15 DR. KERR: I am just missing something. Tell me 16 what I am missing. 17 DR. REMICK: I can't help you, because I think the 18 thing that you are coming to, the proposed decision to 19 require a degree is arbitrary. It's not based on knowledge i 20 of what that person needs to be trained for. It's an 21 independent arbitrary suggestion or decision. I 22 DR. KERR: I thought that was a separate issue. I 23 thought they were saying, in fact, maybe it's the consensus ) i () 24 of the Staff that it is so arbitrary, that you can separate 25 them because they don't have much relationship one or the e ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
1 31465.0 l cox 64 j 1 other. If that's the case, it was not clearly stated to me. ,.I') ~2 MR. PERSENSKY: To the extent we are talking about ) l 3 a degree in engineering or physical science as opposed to a f 4 . degree in education, there is some discretion that we are 5 trying to be getting. But the extent of the knowledge -- we j 6 are not trying to say, this is the specific education course 7 you have to take. Here are all the courses that have to be 8 taken. It's simply a screening tool. One of the 9 justifications here for not doing it or the disadvantages -- 10 DR. KERR: But you see, my question would be 11 screening for what? ,/-, 12 MR. PERSENSKY: To prepare them to become a senior \\~> 13 reactor operator. 14 DR. KERR: That's rather too vague..Again, let me 15 go back. I would have thought that the interest here was not 16 in routine reactor operation, but, rather, a situation in 17 which one is faced with perhaps an incident that has never 18 been seen before in any operating reactor. Now the question i 19 is, what sort of background preparation is most likely to 20 equip an individual faced with such a crisis to respond 21 properly? 22 MR. WEST: Certainly that notion ties into the 23 whole intent of the advance notice of proposed rulemaking in () 24 that the broad intent would be to provide an individual that 25 would be well equipped in the area of having a strong ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-3364M6
q i i 31465.0 cox 65 q 1 engineering background and presumably, I am sure with more ) ,_s f ) N^/ 2 argument, also would have acquired some expertise in terms of 3 accident management. That would be the global intent of it. i 4 DR. REMICK: Jesse. j u 5 MR. EBERSOLE: I agree with what you say, Bill. 6 But if you consider the evolution of actions taken to, say, 7 produce an emergency operating procedure, it comes from paper 8 generated by design people, engineers, who put the plant 9 together, and then tried to communicate to the operating 10 sector the characteristics of the plant, its peculiarities, 11 its weak points and so forth. I think the advantage of the 12 degreed operator senior that he can be perspicacious in 13 looking at what he has been told and hasn't been told. 14 I can take a meltdown case in point, don't get 15 into short periods. He has a perspective. -He can say to the 16 source of his information, you didn't tell me everything you 17 should have about TMI-2. You didn't tell me that I really 18 was going to have a void in my vessel and my dam pressurizer 19 level was no reliability indicator of core recovery. I was 20 never told that. If they had a degreed and perspicacious and 21 operating staff, they would have long asked the question. 22 Are there circumstances with which I can have a dry core, and 23 with this particular profile of that design, have a wet (). 24 pressurizer that tells me I have got a wet core. I think it 25 gives, Glenn, the operating sector the perspective to be ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-37(X) Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
31465'.0 66 cox 1. suspicious and properly so if they have been told the true gQ ~ 2 characteristics.of the machine they are going'to run. 3 MR. REED: Don't forget experience. I have gained 4 that from 40 years of persons that dense water doesn't.run 5 uphill.' 6 MR. EBERSOLE: You'also'had technical experience. 7 MR. REED: Yes, to recognize the importance. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: You might have got that without a-9 degree. 10 DR. REMICK: Do you want to pursue your point any j l l-11 .further? 12 DR. KERR: In a slightly different direction, h. 13 DR. REMICK: Okay. 14 DR..KERR: As I sit here thinking about analogies 15 as to whether one should or should not require a degree. It l L 16' -occurs,to me, from what little I know about design of power 17 plants, which is not a great deal, I believe it is the~ case 18 that most people going into a design organization probably 19 have degrees and degrees in engineering. 20 From what I have seen of what they do, at least 21 when they start out, I do not think the engineering degree is 22 at all required from laying out piping, for laying out 23 wiring, for doing a lot of routine stuff that designers O tra ce111 do-vet 1 de t think enrhedy wo=1d emestion, 1 am s 24 25 not sure why, but I don t think anybody would question the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
r -
- p
- 31465.0-
-cox 67 I requirement that such people have engineering-degrees. In [') ' i k 2 ' fact, it is state law in some cases, about responsibilities., 3 Yet, we'are talking about a position that:has, I_would say, i 1 ~4 'moreiresponsibilities and could require more technical 5-capability, particularly in an emergency, than these people I 6 ever have. That does not say to-me that.the right decision 7 is or is not.being made. I am trying to think of an analogy 8 that puzzles me a little bit. We don't seem to raise the 9 issue for the design engineer, so-called, who I think has 10 much less responsibility than the-SRO. -11 DR.'REMICK: He made a suggestion that doctors, 12. earlier used that analogy. We accept the fact'that a person ) 13 going.to medical school should have a' bachelor's degree 14 'somewhere, an undergraduate degree. We accept.that in that 15 case. We do with lawyers.- I would hesitate to raise that 16 one. 17 MR. REED: I think my sea story is due. 18 DR. REMICK: Let's make sure'there are further l 19 questions. It will come, I promise you. I 20 MR. WARD: Before you can get an MBA, you have to 21 have a bachelor's degree. .22 DR. REMICK: I almost said that. There goes the 23 meeting if I said that.
- {}
24 MR. EBERSOLE: In this long list of comments, a L 25 question to you, I don't see INPO particularly represented as ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
/ 31465.0 cox 68 fy l' a batch of people supposedly representing the-consolidated ~ L/ 2 opinion of the utility operators. 3 MR. WEST: You are right. We didn't get an actual i 4 . official response. 1 5 'MR. EBERSOLE: Seems to me that would be very J 6 important to get it or not to get it. 7 DR. REMICK: They have NUMARC. NUMARC represents 1 8 some of the same people. l 9 MR. EBERSOLE: Can I call that INPO? 10 DR. REMICK: No, they are separate. 1 11 MR. PERSENSKY: May I address that?' I believe by 12 policy, INPO does not comment on our rulemakings. That's O 13 their policy, that's established when they were established. 14 NUMARC has a separate entity. 15 MR. EBERSOLE: NUMARC does that for them?- 16 MR. PERSENSKY: No. NUMARC is a separate entity. 17 They did it on their own. 18-DR. REMICK: Any other specific question of Garmon-19 before we go to Glenn's sea story? If not, my understanding 20 is the SECY document is up, you are asking the Commission for l 21 further guidance for the Staff and you have received two 22 Commission comments and that's where our status is now. 23 MR. WEST: That's correct. j (). 24 DR. KERR: My impression is that you are really 25 not making a recommendation to the Commission? /\\CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646 1 i
F 31465.0 cox 69 j 1 MR. WEST: You are right. We are enumerating the ~ 2 options and asking for guidance.. 3 DR. KERR: Did the Commission ask you to make a 4 recommendation, but you don't want to make a recommendation? 5 MR. WEST: We didn't feel strongly about any 6 particular option and therefore opted not to make a 7 recommendation. 8 DR. KERR I had thought you would say that if 9 that was the case. It looked to us as if it was a clear-cut 10 reason to or not to. Is that implicit in your view? 11 MR. WEST: That's what we had in mind. Maybe it 12 didn't come out as clearly as we would have liked. 13 DR. REMICK: I did want to say, Garmon, I thought 14 your presentation was excellent and very valid. I 15 MR. EBERSOLE: I thought it was, too. The best I 16 have heard, i 17 DR. REMICK: Glenn, your sea story. 18 DR. KERR: Glenn was very patient. 19 MR. REED: I thought we had reached, a few years 20 back, a fairly nice situation with respect to development of 21 personnel and the qualifications needed for them in the 22 workplace to be licensed personnel, except for one void, 23 which you have heard me talk about many times, called t( ) 24 " aptitude testing." j 25 Now, the interesting thing about this sea story ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 & 46
31465.0 cox 70 1 is, I am surprised that now, with two people on the ,gx'/ 2 ' Commission who are ex-Navy, high level Navy people, that this 3 thing has surfaced. There it becomes a sea story. I, 4 throughout my years, have hired many ex-Navy nuclear people, 5 The best anywhere that we have hired have been what we call 6 the old chiefs, that really ran the boats, the submarines. I 7 have hired some of those people and really, I am thinking of 8 one in particular, but I have hired half a dozen, at least, 9 SROs, outstanding at anything they might do in a plant. 10 I am thinking of one in particular, it goes back 11 to Jesse's comment because this particular person came from a 12 very large family in Macon, Georgia, and never -- well, I a t'~'y 13 think he went to high school for a year. And so illegally 14 joined the Navy at age 15 or 16 and worked his way up to 15 senior chief. When you hire a person, you sometimes ask 16 other people, even other engineers -- 17 DR. KERR: The suspense is killing me. 18 MR. REED: -- you ask other engineering officers 19 how good they are. They say they would really admit the deck 20 officers. The man who really knew the submarine was chief 21 so-and-so. He knew how to keep it right side up. All the 22 things to do with the reactor. We would tell him the orders 23 from the bridge, maybe, but he was the person. This happened () 24 in almost all cases of these real good old seamen chiefs who i 25 knew their stuff. ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
e
- M L>
31465.0
- cox 71 l'
In-all cases, they were not. Some of them,were } 2 equivalency people, they got GEDs while in'the' Navy. I would. f I 3 hate to see their careers blocked because they are the real 4 safety people in the operation of nuclear power plants. I.am. 5 disappointed to see the Commissioners, now, two, ex-Navy-from highlevels,areapparentlynotrecognizingwhatthechiffs 6 7 were doing, or I am misinformed by many other people in 8 engineering offices. 9 DR. REMICK: Anybody else have a; sea story before 10 we break? If there are none, I suggest we'take a break and 11 then we will hear from Mr. Gallagher and then we will open up Ji, 12 for discussion on what the subcommittee wants to do, whether-Q, .q 13 it wants to suggest a letter for'the sub.- 14 We will take a 15-minute break till 25 of.. 15 (Recess.) 16 DR. REMICK: Let's reconvene the' meeting, please. 4 17 The next item on the agenda is a discussion by a member of-18 the public, Mr. John Gallagher,'is that right? 19 MR. GALLAGHER: Yes. 20 DR. REMICK: Mr. John Gallagher from Westinghouse 21 on the alternatives to a degreed operator. 1 22 Mr. Gallagher, you may sit at the table or use.the l 23 podium. 24 MR. GALLAGHER: I would like to use the podium if 25 I may. ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-?36-6646 \\
u;nyw r i; 31465.0 cox 72 ,g, 1 DR. REMICK: All right. ) q 2 MR. GALLAGHER: I want to thank you for this 3 opportunity to give you maybe a slightly different view than 4 you have heard so far, but I think it deals with a lot of the i 5 issues that you have brought up. First of all, let me say i 6 that while I am here as an employee of Westinghouse, I am 7 also here as a person who has a concern about the human 8 performance problems in the operation of nuclear power 9 plants. We have been doing a lot of work in this area.
- But, 10 maybe, first of all, I should tell you who I am.
11 I work for the Westinghouse nuclear technology s, 12 systems division. I work in the general area of electrical -( ) a 13 and electronic technologies for nuclear power plants since 14. 1954, started out at the dynamic analysis and control 15 laboratory at MIT for two years, looking at some early 16 reactor concepts, and then spent 30 years at Westinghouse in 17 this general area. I have also been active in the IEEE i 18 nuclear standards area, the I&C nuclear standards area, and I 19 am the chairman now of one of the I&C subcommittees that 20 writes standard on I&C nuclear plants. 21 I am a member of the Ginna station nuclear audit, 22 safety and review job. I have held that job since 1970 which 23 has given me an opportunity to look into details in the ,i. ) 24 . operation of at least one plant. I also served for three 25 years on the Saxton experimental reactor, spearheading ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-37(X) Nationwide Coverage MG 3364M6
F ~31465.0 cox 73 1 reviewing testings that were brought up on that reactor. y (m) 2 Recently I have been working in the area of the 3 . Westel sonar group reactor group, reduction in assessment 4 program, to come up with ways of dealing with the frequency 5 of reactor trips. I have also been involved in the 6-Westinghouse emergency response center for both the Prairie 7 Island and Ginna 2 rupture events. 8 What I want to show you -- Mr. Reed has a. 9 question. 10 MR. REED: Mr. Gallagher, do you consider yourself 11 more of a fast track MBA person or a trench walker type of 12 person?' c.a 't \\. 13 MR. GALLAGHER: I spent most of my life in the 14 trenches. 15 DR. REMICK: One has to be cautious. You spend 16 too much time in the trenches, you sometimes get trench 17 foot. 18 MR. GALLAGHER: That's true. I think you all have 19 a passout. The purpose of my presentation is to share with 20 you an approach that I feel can significantly improve the 21 . control room crew's ability to prevent, terminate and 22 mitigate accident conditions. This is an outline. I will go 23 through the statement alternative, get into the accident l f^\\ (_) 24 response characterization that we have been working on as 25 part of a research program for the NRC, talk about the SROs Ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. h 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6 l l
31465.0 cox 74 x 1 system manager role and ways it may provide information to { U 2 support that role in ways of validating the effectiveness of 3 that information. 4 First of all, if we look at the alternatives, the 5 essence of the talk is to develop the factors that are 1 6 important to providing the SRO with the knowledge that is 7 necessary to respond quickly and correctly to accidents. I 8 think these are all things that you recognize that virtually 9 all incidents have included situations that went beyond the 10 rote execution of the preplanned guidance. We see that 11 during these accidents there is a need for a gradual 12 unfolding of more and more background knowledge, that is what jq 'i 13 was the -- what is behind the procedures, what was the basis 14 for the design of the systems, what was assumed for the 15 action studies that were done to justify that these systems 16 were the proper ones to deal with the accidents. 17 I think if one looks down, presently the knowledge 18 to deal with accident responses is provided in training 19 procedures, things like the SPDS that was introduced'after 20 the Three Mile Island as well as the STA. 21 Most of what I am going to talk about is things 22 that will help guide the operator during the first hour, that 23 is prior to the activation of the technical support center, ( }j /~ 24 at which time a very large number of experts are brought into i 25 the event. So, as we talked about as one method is the ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 804 336-6646 m_. I
31465.0 cox 75 1 formal degree, and this alternative method is to provide s ( ) s-2 information at the engineering level to the SRO by means of a 3 supervisory center. 4 As envisioned, this center is a collection of 5 computerized decision aids that would allow the operator to 6 access information to deal with the accident in a way that is 7 -- that supports the SRO's system manager role. I will get, 8 in a little while, into more details into what the system 9 manager role is. 10 DR. REMICK: Mr. Gallagher, as a suggestion to 11 conserve time, just assume we can read your vugraphs, just 12 summarize what you think are the important points on them. 2 13 Since we have copies, we can readily read the details. 14 MR. GALLAGHER: Okay. 15 MR. EBERSOLE: Are you talking about an SRO with 16 or without the STA? i 17 MR. GALLAGHER: I am talking about an SRO without i 18 the STA. 19 MR. EBERSOLE: In your previous slide, you had an ) 20 STA down there. 1 21' MR. GALLAGHER: I said that's what is presently j 22 there. I am looking at the operating crew, which consists of 23 the standard people who are licensed to operate. ( 24 MR. EBERSOLE: Are you going to tell us how your 25 system would work and I will pick two incidents, the Browns ace. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 8(K)-336446
l 31465.0 cox 76 -y 1 Ferry fire and the TMI-2 case. G 2 DR. KERR You can always say no. 3 MR. GALLAGHER: I think it's nice to have specific 4 instances. 5 I had not planned to go into detail-on those two. 6 One of the things I wanted to show you is the design process 7 by which one would evolve a supervisory center, and I believe 8 that the design process for developing the design basis and 9 the functional requirements will -- shows that one is forced 10 to deal with the information needs in the questions that you. 11 were asking about. First of all, one has to start with 12 understanding what the situation is during an accident that O 13 brings about the need for a more in-depth understanding of 14 what is going on, what normally would be provided by the 15 standards. 16 The accident is a dynamic, event-driven world 17 where things are changing. There is uncertainty in the data 18 collection and evaluation, things like there's a very low and 19 constantly changing signal-to-noise ratio with respect to the 20 information that is important, it's ambiguous and incomplete 21 data. We are asking the man to be able to tie together data 22 that is important, where some of it is delayed by a long time 23 and others coming up by fairly rapidly.
- R(,)
24 The systems have a large number of highly 25 interactive parts that result in a many-to-many mapping ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4 46 1 I
n -l .31465'.0 cox 77 1 between the physical systems and the_ process functions._ This 0*- -2 has been one of the problems of being able to understand what 3 the -- 4-DR. KERR: Is the purpose of these slides to 5.' convince us that the-operator:is faced with a' difficult-6 task? If that's the; purpose, I am convinced ~. 7 MR. GALLAGHER: No, but it's also to categorize 8 the task in a way that.you understand what his problems are 9 so_you can deal with them, as opposed to.just saying it's a 10 tough job. This allows you, by' putting them into these 11 categories, you can think of the things you can do -- 12 DR' KERR Those are' pretty general categories. r 13 It's a long list. 14 MR. GALLAGHER: As you see later on, there are 15 ways of dealing with these. issues. 16 DR. KERR: Okay. 17 MR. GALLAGHER: Finally, we have asked him to 18 perform a supervisory function where he thinks about things 19 at a very low level of things popping up with resper:t to the 20 accident. i 21 Following all of this, you can take the attributes 22 of these difficulties and identify them with respect to the 23 cognitive aspects of his activities he has to perform to deal O 24 with these events. This is a listing of these. I will come ) 25 back to this later on, some of the key ones, multiple goals, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coserage 800-336-6646
31465.0 .CoX 78 1 condtraints, side effects, problem formulation and strategic gy V 2 focus. I think we all recognize what these are. 3 The question now is how may one deal with these? ~4 .First of all, _ I would like to review with you-the idea of the 5 . system manager role. If we think back on the study that was 6 done after Three Mile Island, they said one of the major 7 . problems they saw,.the control room was laid out.primarily'to 8 support the' equipment operator role,.to be at the board and 9 ~ operator valves,' turn motors on and off. In other words, he 10 has focused in at a particular component or very narrow part 11 of the system. They said, what was missing was the idea of a 12 system manager role, the functions he has to play in this jy 13 system manager role. In other words, the idea of being able 14 to monitor the overall health and safety of the plant, to be 15 able to control the resources that are needed, to deal with. 16 the incident, and in those cases, where the incident goes 17 beyond the planning to be'able.to work out alternative .18 courses of action. On Browns Ferry, nowhere did he know how 19 much water he needed to flow through the core. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: He just needed to know he had to 21 keep it covered. q 22 MR. GALLAGHER: But he didn't know how much water 23 that was and he didn't have abstracts that tell him whether j i(_j 24 it was covered or not. 25 MR. EBERSOLE: You say he lost his level ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coserage 800-3364M6 l
1 31465.0 cox 79 1 instrumentation? I thought he lost his ability to make up? 7s 1 ~ 2 MR. GALLAGHER: I think he lost both. As I 3 understand it, he picked a way that he knew was available to 4 him and turned that on. 5 MR. EBERSOLE: But that didn't put the fire out. 6 MR. GALLAGHER: In order to address the system 7 manager role, there is a need for tools, first of all, to 8 identify manageable categories of information processing 9 that's done by the people in the control room. We have found 10 that the model that is based on the idea of skill, rule, 11 knowledge-based behaviors, is a very valuable one in giving 12 ~ guidance as to what type of information support is needed for ,y 13 these processing functions. This work was done as part'of an 14 EPRI project in the early '80s. From this we are able to 15 delineate these skill-based, rule-based, knowledge-based 16 behaviors, with respect to the kinds of resources that were 17 talked about in the Three Mile Island action plan. 18 The improvement in the control board layout, 19 paint, label and tape, training, specific to his reaction to 20 signals, where in this area the SPDS seemed to cover a fairly 21 narrow band here. As you moved up into things like the 22 disturbance analysis systems that were being studied and the 23 STA and the TSC, you were moving more up into the (f]-), 24 knowledge-based behavior area where he was faced with the 25 issue of being able to establish goals and do the planning on /\\CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ) 202-347-3700 Nationwide Cmerage 800-336 6646 ) li
31465.0 80 cox 1 the actions to be taken with the multiple events that were f^y i v 2 not covered by procedures. 3 We also looked into the aspect of his need for 4 feedback on these actions. Here, after he executes actions, 5 he needs the feedback, first of all, to verify that when he 6 moved the handle to open the valve, that the light went from 7 red to green, that there was indeed water flowing, getting 8 the water from point A to point B, moving the situation with 9 respect to the level of water in the tank; and then, finally, 10 he was achieving the goal he was after, which was to cover 11 the core. 12 So this is also the same model, where in this area -sI 'i 13 this is rule-based actions -- I mean, this is skill-based 14 actions, rule-based actions, and then knowledge-based 15 actions. 16 MR. EBERSOLE: Where is there in that diagram a 17 statement of his knowledge level wherein he took the 18 information that pressurizer level indicated to him that he 19 had cover on the core, which was wrong? 20 MR. GALLAGHER: That would be here. He was 21 working from information that was given to him -- 22 MR. EBERSOLE: -- by the engineers. He was 23 malinformed. rN ( ), 24 MR. GALLAGHER: That's right. The proce:dures he I 25 was working from did not cover the situation he was dealing ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-66 4
31465.0 cox 81 1 with. "~ 2 MR. EBERSOLE: So it was an engineering, 3 translational or identification void within which he had not 4 been informad and he did what he was supposed to do. 5 MR. GALLAGHER: What I am talking about here is 6 not another set of procedures that would follow that same 7 way, but providing him the background so that he can ask the 8 questions with respect to what the purposes of systems are, 9 .what assumphions were made, so he can judge -- 10 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you think a degree would assist 11 him in being able to ask those questions? 12 MR. GALLAGHER: I think a degree would assist him, n 13 but would not make up for the need for him to be trained to 14 understand the functions of each aspect of the plan and to 15 also understand and how to properly use this tool. 16 MR. EBERSOLE: But in an operator category, where 17 he is dependent upon translation of design information, he 18 would still miss the boat if he hadn't been told. He would 19 not -- without a degree, he might not have inferred or have 20 imagined that he was ill-informed. [ 21 MR. GALLAGHER: What we talk about providing the 22 engineering knowledge to him is not the engineering knowledge 23 that is specific to a scenario that was worked out. It's ( 24 much more deep than that. 25 DR. REMICK: Mr. Gallagher, we have run 20 minutes ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
31465.0 cox 82 1 into your presentation, and you have had a couple of: 7 2 interruptions, I must admit, but I think we can only go to- ~ bout 11:15 on this. So you might want to think ahead as to 3 a 4 the message.you_want to get to us. l 5 MR. GALLAGHER. I will. The other aspect here-is l l 6' that one has to figure out how to make a decomposition of the 1 7 plant with respect to both the level of abstraction and the~ j 8 detail provided to the operator with respect to systems, and 9 in a simplified view, the equipment operator is down in this' i 'l 10_ area where he is dealing with a very particular function 11. that's trying to do, the system manager is working up at a f 12 much broader view at a higher level of abstraction. 13 This has been categorized again by people at Riso 14 Laboratory all the way from where the piece of equipment is 15 in the plant all the way up to general and abstract functions. 16 with respect to being able to provide core cooling or the 17 other things that are needed for meeting the general goal of 18 limiting the release of radioactivity. This allows one to 19 then categorize. In this area, it would be the equipment 20 operator's needs. In this area it would be the system 21 manager's needs. 22-The handout that goes into detail on this, I just i 23 want to show you the general view of the hierarchy with r. I'/"% (_j 24 respect to all the way from the top level goals down through 25 the systems, loads of operations, systems, components. One l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 80()-336-6646
-31465.0 cox 83 a 11 -can use this as-a very structured way'to decompose the plant, ~ p L )L 2 people talk aboutethis as a-goal Means way of representing -3 the plant. We use this methodology to come up with our SPDS, 4 we work with the NRC, they form an evaluation on this. 5 From.their safety evaluation I-think they made two 6-very important conclusions. I 7 One is with' respect to knowledge-based behaviorf 8 and the need for feedbacks and to come up with.a 9 theoretically sound basis for.the development of the 10' displays. From the decomposition I showed.you, it gave a way. 11' to develop the functional requirements that the system had to 12-meet. So it was a very systematic approach that has a^ strong .,- g - 13 assurance of completeness. 1 14 Now, what we view then as the.needs of a 15 supervisory center in order to provide the information to the 16 SRO, first of all, he has to have a display of the overall 1 17 plant status, which means he has to be able to collect and 18 integrate low level information to depict the overall plant 19 status. There are -- all these things I am going to talk '20 about are either in existing systems where people have worked 21 out the prototypes here, Haddam has worked in this area, they 22 have a prototype system in operation that does this. 23 Next, he needs a way of understanding how to deal i 24 with alarms from the point of view that the abnormality may 25 be there, provide a means to evaluate what it is, provide a j ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6M6
'31465.0-cox. 84 ,f - - 1 means for.the corrective action, people in the working area ,1 ~ 2 where they can prioritize alarms based upon a' top level 1 view 3 of;what is going on and where the'propagations are, starting ,4 from and where the impacts are on.the operation of the l 5' ' plant. That's work that is going on. There is a need for 6 computerized procedures that provide guidance in the 7 selection.of procedures based upon the plant data and also'in 8 the execution of them and people who have been working in 9 these areas that help guide the operator through the l 10 procedures. 11 There is the need -- now we get into the engineering areas -- a need for understanding the. design .12 13 bases for the systems and the role that these systems play in 14 the accident. This is the view of the engineer who built the 15 system. This is the view of the analyst who looked at the 16 performance of this system during certain accidents, and one 17 ~can categorize these. The way for us is to do what we have, 18 -worked out an accident analysis profile, where he can call up i 19 an action, what the function of the action is, and help give i 20 him guidance on how to prioritize his actions. i 21 Finally, there is a need for computerized 22 technical specifications that allow him to assess the impact 23 of changes in component operability or plant modes. Much of
- (,,).
24 this is aimed in making sure he stays as much as possible in i 25 a condition that he needs for dealing with events should they ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
31465.0 cox 85 1 occur. V 2 As I said, we have been working on a cognitive 3 model that can tie these problem areas with the implication 4 for the cognitive activities and then from this identify the 5 characteristics that have to be in the model. This cognitive 6 model then provides a basis for doing validation testing on 7 these various aids. So it's not just a guess that they could 8 help out, but you can actually do testing to validate their 9 value. 10 So, in conclusion, we believe that such a 11 supervisory center, when cor.tbined with proper training on its 12 use, can provide a trained SRO with the knowledge that he I5M) 13 needs to help him work his way through accidents,. multiple 14 failure events that are not completely dealt with by 15 procedures. 16 I would like to go back, in my last minute or so, 17 to'one overhead. There was a question asked about the 18 trained -- we believe that a very important part of the 19 training of an SRO is to learn the plant from the bottom up. 20 In this area, these would be his training, as a reactor 21 operator, so when he moves up into this level, he has a 22 complete understanding of the plant, he knows where the 23 valves are, he knows where the pumps are, he knows what r-(,) 24 actions are reasonable that can be asked for. 25 So there is training both learning the plant from ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
q 31465.0 cox 86 J I 1 the bottom up as well as training with respect to the i / 2 nuclear, thermal hydraulic conditions that have to be dealt ) 3 with so he can properly execute an abstract view in the form 4 of getting water from point A to point B, and this 5 supervisory center, we believe, would allow one to focus in 6 on the training that is important to deal with the situations 7 that had not previously been worked out in the detail of a 8 procedure. 9 DR. REMICK: Thank you. 10 Mr. Reed has a question. 11 MR. REED: It's not a question but a statement and 12 perhaps a series of observations. I hate to disagree with (~J s k-13 Mr. Gallagher because I have known him for many years and 14 respect him as a trench walker and an expert in the field of 15 instrumentation and control and his other aspects of his 16 field. 17 Here is a concept, an idea. I reflect that this 18 add-on supervisory center, it's sort of too bad, in the last 19 10 years, that nuclear reactors weren't in airplanes. 20 Because then these add-ons and patches, as Jesse refers to, 21 would not spring up so easily and get accepted so easily 22 because they would ground the airplane from overweight. I 23 look upon this as an add-on. Og 24 I would like to reflect that we get to these 25 conditions because basics have been faulted. By that I mean ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coserage 800-336-6646
31465.0 87 Cox 1 that design basics have been faulted. Westinghouse as a r) vi 2 designer has not been as guilty, in my opinion, as other 3 designers. But just let me point out something about the 4 lack of return to basics and fundamental vulnerabilities 5 versus creating add-ons that make it very challenging for the 6 operator to try to operate this, unfortunately, not an 7 airplane, all right. 8 Diablo Canyon, I will use an example, recently had 9 an incident, called loss of shutdown cooling. Hey, that 10 could have led to a severe accident. It was not 11 proceduralized very well. The instrumentation, basics, the 12 instrumentation and control basics for control monitoring in ,g t ) ~# 13 the vessel for this early part of refueling was not good, 14 never has been good, and certainly someone could improve 15 those basics. 16 But the basic fault, root cause, that led into 17 this loss of shutdown cooling, was something rather 18 interesting. It won't probably show up in NRC work, but the 19 root cause that led into this Catch-22 situation, was the 20 fact that there are no vents on the water boxes of the steam generators, as was on Yankee Rowe and Point Beach. 21 l l 22 Therefore, the operators were pulling the water level down in 23 the core, in this early refueling situation, in order to , ( 24 gurgle air up into the steam generators to drop the water 25 out. They didn't want to have another Ginna incident where ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
31465.0~ cox 88 gN 1 the water dropped away from its capillary holding position-a l G; 2 and flood the people opening up the steam generator. 3 So, here, basics. 'Now even Westinghouse puts 4 vents on water boxes, which is the' precursor to why they have 5 got to a core melt. 6 To me, John, the problem is not pouring more 7 SPDSs, add-ons, in the control room and around the control 8 room and building little empires and conclaves, it's going to 9 basics. Because, in my opinion, the PWR isla very simple 10 thing.- It oughtn't to be loaded with'all this' garbage and 11 additions. We should correct the vulnerabilities and flawed 12 design. I won't name one designer's particularly flawed 13 design, we should collect the flaws and stop adding to the 14. garbage which makes for'the complicity of the operator, which 15 makes for degrees called for and makes this big empire pile. 16 I am sorry, I have to disagree with you. 17 MR. GALLAGHER: Let me answer that -- 18 DR. REMICK: That wasn't a question, that was a 19 comment. You need not answer if you don't wish to. 20 MR. GALLAGHER: I would like to.though. I think r 21 that points out exactly what we were trying to talk about. q i 22 First of all, we don't view this as an add-on, we view it as 1 23 a recognition that.the information that is needed by the SRO, 1 24 who is always in the control room, performing a job as the 25 assistant manager, his information needs are different than /\\CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6 q )
31465.0 i cox 89 1 the man who is working at the board. So what we are talking ,c, 2 about is providing him with standard information that is 3 brought forward to him, so the way he runs into a situation, 4 where the design is flawed and he gets himself into trouble, 5 he can at least recognize that that problem is going on and i 6 take action with it until somebody comes along and puts the l 7 vents on the water box. 8 MR. REED: I disagree again, fix the flawed 9 design, jack up the designers and let's get out of this 10 add-on situation. i 11 MR. GALLAGHER: But you like to keep the plant in 12 a state so when you go fix the flawed design cn something, '"y 8 13 they are worthwhile. 14 DR. REMICK: Mr. Kerr has a comment or question. 15 DR. KERR: Mr. Gallagher, I had anticipated that l 16 you were going to convince me that your system was a 17 replacement for the degree requirement. I am not convinced 18 by your presentation. Indeed, I would say that I still am in i 19 the same box of asking myself, would a person with a degree l 20 do better in this than a person without a degree? I don't l 21 hear anything in your presentation that would give me the 22 answer to that. 1 23 MR. GALLAGHER: We thought about this when we were () 24 working in this area. We thought it would be extremely 25 difficult to prove that a degree would not add to whether you ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
l 1 31465.0 cox 90 1 could do it. The issue we were dealing with, can one f3N] 2 identify the needs for engineering information and look at a 3 way of providing it without requiring a degree? 4 DR. KERR: Your presentation says "an alternative 5 to a degreed operator." 6 MR. GALLAGHER: The question I was asked, would a 7 degree help him? Sure. 8 DR. KERR: The position we are faced with, would a 9 power plant designed well operate well? 1 10 MR. REED: Strike that "well" from the record. l 11 DR. KERR: Should the operator have a degree? i 12 Your presentation does not give me the answer to that I,,) 13 question. 14 MR. GALLAGHER: If you were to ask me would a 15 degree be required, then I can say, no, I don't think so. 16 DR. KERR: I don't know what " required" means. I l1 17 am trying to give advice, insofar as I can, with information 18 available, to things that ought to be done to make reactors i 19 safe. It would seem to me if one had a strong argument that 20 could be used that a degree is going to make a reactor safer, 21 one would not hesitate to make that recommendation, whether 22 it's to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the utilities or 23 whatever. r~s () 24 MR. GALLAGHER: Let me answer it this way. I 25 think the information that the operator needs when he is in a i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202.147-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
31465.0 cox 91 1 situation he hasn't been in before, one where procedures were y () ' 2 not written for, he needs to know the bases for the design of 3 systems and the assumptions that were made for their function 4 during accidents. I don't think a college degree in general 5 physics provides him with that knowledge. I think that l 1 1 6 knowledge is very specific, and that was the type of 7 information we tried -- we viewed as being brought up in the 8 accident analysis profile, that he could ask the questions. 9 What is the role of this system, what are its capabilities, 10 what assumptions were made with respect to its performance 11 during this accident? 12 DR. KERR: Don't you think that in an unusual js) i'~' 13 accident situation that some wisdom and perspective are also 14 important? I don't know whether a degree provides that, I am 15 sure it doesn't by itself. But whether it enhances it 16 doesn't seem to me whether it enhances the question. I 17 haven't heard anything all morning that gives me very much l 18 insight in trying to answer that question. 19 DR. REMICK: Wait a minute, Dave comes next, then, 20 Glenn, excuse me, Bill, was that a question, are you going to f I 21 expect an answer on that? I i t 22 DR. KERR: I was going to ask another question. 23 It's not quite on this subject, so I will wait. () 24 MR. WARD: John, I guess when one designs a system 25 of the sort you are talking about, which is clearly a j i ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646 {
31465 0 cox 92 7> 1 man / machine interface, in order to design the physical .(s - 2 system, technical system, I guess, you have to have in mind 3 what: sort of.a man you are talking about on the other side of I 4-the interface. I think what you said is you specifically 5 have in' mind people with the sorts of people that we'have in 6 nuclear power plants today. trained, not necessarily degreed 7 but trained with a certain training they have. ~You'are 8 suggesting this. approach as'an alternative to' upgrading the 9 man side of the. machine interface. You are suggesting that 10 the instrument, the machine side of the interface, be 11 operated by this approach. Is that what you are getting.at? 12 MR. GALLAGHER: Yes. . f-13 MR. WARD: Do you think it would be unnecessary to 14 do anything.with selection, training requirements for the 15-operators if you went for this sort of a system? 16 MR. GALLAGHER: You would have to be trained in i 17 its'use. We did assume that we could bind'the information i 18-that this center would show to him, based on his 19 understanding that he had obtained in coming up through the 20 ranks of the physical structure of the plant, that he could 21 look over at an operator, for instance, an operator over in 22 the -- working on the feedwater system, and judge by his 23-actions whether he was having a problem or whether things (( ) 24 were going all right or not. 25 We have noticed, in doing testing, man / machine ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 80(L336-6646
31465 0-cox 93 cg 1 interface testing, that an SRO who has worked the board can O 2 tell, by the actions a man is taking, at a particular part of 3 the board, whether it's going smoothly or whether he has 4 problems. Didn't have to ask him verbally. I think I could i 5 answer that if I feel anywhere where a college degree adds to 6 what this does not add to, is his ability to communicate what 7 is going on. We have done testing of operators in feedwater 8 systems, how they run feedwater systems. The best feedwater 9 system. operators, English was not his strength. He could run 10 the feedwater system, but he had great difficulty 11 communicating with the nuclear operator what he needed. He 12 almost wanted to go over and take his actions, as oppesed to r, '-) l 13 telling him what he thought he should be doing to help him 14 out. That's the area I see, where, hopefully, a college 15 education improves one's abilities to verbalize thoughts. 16 But I think as far as his actions, that he can take, in 17 understanding what is going on, that this provides him the 18 information he needs without a -- l 19 MR. WARD: I guess what you are saying, if this l 20 sort of system were installed as a backfit or installed in 21 new plants as a backfit, you don't think it would be 22 necessary to upgrade, let's say, communication abilities in 23 the sense you are talking about, that the present level of 1 /^ (_)x 24 staffing would be adequate? f 25 MR. GALLAGHER: Present level of staffing would be I ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 i
i 31465.0-J 94 cox 1 adequate. You would have'to train people to.use this =fg Q' 2 properly, obviously. We have looked, there is already -- 3; there is a gradual and.somewhat' random migration in the 4. . industry to the realization that the system manager function 5_ tis a very key and important function. There's'been rules 6 written by the NRC about the SRO in.the control room at all 7 times, so you don't have somebody walking in and trying to 8 take over. But there hasn't been a' systematic development of' .9-the information he needs to support the: functions'you are 10 -asking him. b 11 MR. WARD: Is this sort of control room approach, 12 would that be incorporated in the advance Westinghouse-13 design? 14-MR. GALLAGHER: Yes. 15 DR.-REMICK: I am going to take the prerogative.of 16 the Chair and suggest we spend a few more minutes.
- Glenn, 17 did you have a question, then someone else.
18 MR. REED: I don't know. The Japanese seem to go 19 a lot for remote refueling and control centers and so forth, 20 I don't know, but let me ask the question, would you put in 21 water box vents on the steam generators, so that the lead in 22 to the procedure has fundamental design basics in it so that 23 it can be done without frailty? I find that we are building ( 24 our own house of cards. 25 MR. GALLAGHER: Suppose you put in the water box ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
31465.0 cox 95 gw 1 vents and they had manual valves on them. You found out an c) 2 operator had gone down and positioned the manual valves the 3 wrong way. You still have the situation to deal with. Even 4 -- I have heard people argue, let's go to more automation. 5 If you go to more automation, you elevate the supervisory 6 role that the operator has to play with respect to what is 7 going on, is he doing it right? Then how do you provide him 8 the information he needs to deal with the malfunctioning 9 automatic systems? The issue has not changed, maybe the 10 frequency of'it has changed. 11 MR. REED: I agree that the whole issue of 12 automation of equipment, manual, is very complex. Where do ex i 3 13 you cut it off, keep going, but I don't believe in the 14 add-ons which only add to complexity and. people, when basics 15 will take you out of a lot of issues. It's the basic 16 configuration of one reactor system is just so wrong that it 17 creates all the need for add-ons, patches and so on. Why 18 don't we reflect on basics first? 19 MR. GALLAGHER: I know with respect to reactor 20 trips we are. We have gone through the feedwater system all l 21 over again and ask the question why are trips where they are, 22 what can be done to improve the automatic control system to 23 reduce the frequency? But I think, if I hear you, it's Gs_j 24 almost looking at each case-by-case situation and figure out t 25 what you can do to fix it, and, sure, you will find the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Cmerage 80433MM6
'31465.0 cox 96 1 feedwater events, and you will fix those, but then~the next 2 situation will come along, one of the difficulties I have 3 seen, down to the evolution of the Ginna plant, and I think l 4 one of.the big changes that they made, was getting away.from~ 5 looking.at each incident as a particular case and starting to 6' ask the question, what was the root cause for this, where 7 else might this problem be, how might we deal with it? l 8 So use of the-INPO guidance with respect to 9 identification of root causes, has gone a long way to broaden 10 their thinking so that they ask the question, where else 11 might this problem be, is it.really'a common mode problem '12 with respect to root causes, or is it a particular case where- ,as. k 13 we have to go in and fix just that? I think what we are 14 talking about here is a' structure of thinking process.that 15 allows you to look at it in a generic basis, not asking that 16 you give the engineer--- that you give the operator a 17 scenario from the engineer, but giving him some of the basic 18 ideas back of the engineering. 19 DR. REMICK: Mr. Kerr. 20 DR.'KERR: Mr. Gallagher, I believe that one of 21 the things an additional formal education in the sciences and 22 engineering permits people to do is to conceptualize or think 23 abstractly. I think frequently this is a learned skill. I l !( ') 24 have been impressed recently, and we do some reactor operator 25 training in connection with our research reactor, that the /\\CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 j
~ -_--- m 31465.0' 97 cox 1 difference between a trainee's ability to think abstractly p V 2
- with a. limited amount of formal education, compared to the 3
ability to think abstractly, and by "think abstractly," I 4 mean to'really be able.to conceptualize, not just have'little ij 5 boxas hera that have numbers in them, but have some feeling l ~ 6-for what an abstr'act concept implies.- 1 7 Now, one does not necessarily learn.this well.by 8 _ going through four years of' engineering. But I think it does-9 add considerably to one's ability to make this a part of 10 ofte's makeup. I see your' system that you are proposing, 11 which,.by the.way, looks very good, as one which will not 12 attempt to predict exactly what is going on.in a difficult 13 situation or abnormal situation, but which will. provide 14 alternatives. One still has to choose among those 15 alternatives. 16 So indeed the alternatives presented by'this are 17 going to be, as one gets farther away from experience, 18 probably larger in number and more varied. I am not sure but 19 what you are facing an operator with more difficult choices 20' rather than simpler choices as one gets farther and farther 21 away from the usual. I 22' MR. GALLAGHER: If I might answer that, I didn't l 23 get into it, but on page 16 of the passout, we show -- we { I D 24 have gone through an abstract decomposition, for instance, w/ 25 maintaining inventory, all the way from get the flow water ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 i
~ 31465.0 cox 98 'l in, and the water is going out. We look at normal makeup, 2 emergency feed, you have the RWS, ST or the sump pump. We 3 have'related that in our alarm disturbance board to make him 4 sure that he understands the top level goal, he understands 5 the means for providing that goal, and he understands the 6 side effects that can result from the actions that he takes.- 7 We worked out a structured way of presenting information to 8 him that comes from the abstract view. 9 DR. KERR: But this can occur only if somebody .l 10 else has thought of the alternatives beforehand. I am 11 looking at a situation where somebody hasn't thought of the 12 alternatives beforehand because they haven't occurred yet. j, ( ! 13 MR. GALLAGHER: I think that's valid. I don't 14 know, and we have argued this, if we go through a 15 decomposition of the plant from its design functions, would 16 we have identified the hydraulic motors for operating the 17 drive system as a way of getting around it? 18 DR. KERR: I am not arguing against your system by 19 the way, I think your system is a good system and I would 20 encourage you to develop it. What I am trying to ask is, 21 given this system, a person with what sort of background is l 22 able to make use of it? That's the question I am trying to i 23 ask myself. Not is your system a good system, sounds like a n)- (_ 24 pretty good system to me. Indeed, I am surprised you didn't 25 use the term " artificial intelligence." I think that shows ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33M646
-} f j e.. 31465.0~ \\' r cox-99 ~ tl' ' q O .g ,1 great restraint on your part, considering.. ' d,) ' 2-MR. GALLAGHER:' That's a.whole'new subject..-By', u^ 3 'the way, this isn't our system. These ideas are ideas.that '4 are resident within certain parts of the nuclear.industrykf 5 but are'now being brought forward to deal with'this'issuei 6 -because frankly.we see that the end users of'thisTare driven 7 by.so many'other things that they don't have. time'for this. 8 MR.-REED: Are you saying that this' is not your' y 9 idea? 10 MR. GALLAGHER:.This is a' collection of man'y 11 people's. ideas. 12 MR. REED: I am much relieved, John. You are'back; -13 in graces. '14 DR. REMICK: With'that, gentlemen, I think we. 15 should bring this part of the discussion to a.close. We 16 thank you-very much,fMr. Gallagher for your presentation [in-17 answering questions. 18 Before we go off'the record and discuss'where we 19 are headed from here, are there any other formal matters.that 20 subcommittee members have of the Staff they wish.to ask,- 21 before we go off the record and discuss where we are headed. 22 Any further? If not, I guess we can go off the record at 23 this point. () 24 (Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the meeting was 25 concluded.) /\\CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. t j 202-347-3700 Natioiiwide Coverage 800 336-6646 l I
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER O This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of: NAME OF PROCEEDING: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS l DOCKET NO.: PLACE: WASHINGTON, D. C. DATE: WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1987 i were held as herein appears, and that this is the original I transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (sigt M (TYPED) [ WENDY S. COX Official Reporter ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Reporter's Affiliation 9 -.-_------------------------------------J
}.)O NRR STAFF PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS Nj c1 &a O l' C_ W
SUBJECT:
SECY-87-101 ISSUES AND PROPOSED OPTIONS CONCERNING DEGREE REQUIPIMENT FOR SENIOR OPERATORS DATE: JUNE 24, 1987 O PRESENTER: GARMON WEST, JR, PRESENTER'S TITLE / BRANCH /DW: ENGINEERING P3YCHOLOGIST HLFAN FACTORS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE AND QUALITY EVALUATION i ~ PRESENTER'S NRC TEL. NO : G01)492-4887 1 SUBCOMMITTEE: HtFAN FACTDRS 1
.g.
- +
C OUTI.1K
- BACKGROUND
- ADVANCE NOTIE OF PROPOSED RUL9% KING
- SECY-87-101:
ISSUES AND PROPOSED OFTIONS CONCERNING DEGREE PEQ FOR SENIOR OPERATORS - PUBLIC CO M NTS - ADVANTAGES O - DISADVANTAGES - OPT 10h5
- RECEIVE QUESTIONS 1
i
rs y;. I BACKGROUND
- STAFF REQUIREENTS MEMD JANUARY 23, 1986
- SECY-86-70: PROPOSED RULEMAKING: DEGREE FEBRUARY 28,1986 REQUIREENTS FOR SENIOR OPERATORS
.AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
- ADVANCE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (ANPRM)
MAY31,1986 oQ '" EXTENSION 0N ANPRM JULY 8, 1986 C0WENT RRIOD ON ANPRM ENDED SEPTEMBER 29,1987 ' SECY-87-101: ISSUES AND PROPOSED OPTIONS CONCERNING APRIL 16, 1987 DEGREE REQUIREMENT FOR SENIOR OPERATOR b
'rFO ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING )
- AFTER JANUARY 1, 1991
- S0s HOLD BACCALAUREATE DEGREE IN ENGINEERING / PHYSICAL SCIENCE - OTHER DEGREES ACCEPTED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS - DEGREE EQUIVALENCY UNACCEPTABLE O
- ONE OF TM0 YEARS OF NUCLEAR POWER EXPERIENCE MJST BE AT GREATER THAN TWENTY PERCENT POWER
- S0s LICENSED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1,1991 WOULD BE GRANDFATHERED
- ONE RE-EXAMINATION FOR S0 APPLICANTS WHO APPLY JUST PRIOR TO JANUARY 1,
'1991
- CONCURRENT POLICY STATEENT
- REGULATORY AND BACKFIT ANALYSES O
e
s (} ( C0ltENTERS NLEBER = UTILITY OKRATORS/ PERSONNEL '98 UTILITY MANAGEENT 52 CITIZENS' 17 LFIONS 7' liflLITY CONSULTAfffS. 6 LNIVERSilY 6 l/] SENATE 6 CONGRESS 1 STATE 1 PROS. 2i AtS-3 1 NtFARC 1. Afil 1 ~ AIF -1 200 .O
1 1 .O i 1 i i DEGREE RULE OPPOSE 195 FAVOR 5 200 i 'I i i I t \\ \\ l \\ O ( h
.4
- 't; '.
I .v CONSENSUS AMONG COWENTERS NEARLY HALF 0F THE LICENSED OPERATORS (41 0F 86) AND OTHER C0lT 0ffERS (55 0F 114) lNDICATE.THAT ADDITIONAL TRAINING ON SEVERE ACCIDENTS IS NEEDED AND - WOULD IIPROVE THE ABILITY OF LICENSED OPERATORS TO PREVENT AND FANAGE SEVERE iACCIDENTS 1 i ,LO
) J y C0ff0RER REASON FOR FAVORING RlLE SENIOR OPEPATOR SAFETY BENEFIT ~ REACTOROPERATOR SAFETY BENEFIT. UNIVERSITY PUBLIC CONFIDB4CE ?) - U-ifTILITY CONSULTANT MIXED OPERATING STAFF a STATE GOVEPWENT SAFETY BENEFIT 1 O 1
i./ . RANK. REASON FOR OPPOSING RULE ' k'.! .l 1. NOTNECESSARY-2 EXPERIENCE MDRE IWORTANT 3 NEGATIVELY IWACT SAFETY l 4 TURNOVER 5 TRAINING PREFERENCE 6 BLOCK CAREER PATH 7 QE -} i O
u
- o. -
(] CONCLUSIONS OF UTILITY STUDY *
- COLLEGE DEGREE NOT MORE EFECTIVE THAN OTHER ALTERNATIVES IN ASSURING ENHANCED OPERATOR PREPAREDNESS
- ATTRIBlffES OF VALUE IN ESPONDING TO SEVERE ACCIDENTS:
- ENHANCED ENGINEERING KNOWLEDGE -- IMPROVED PROI1LEM S0LVING CAPABILilY - INTEGPATED PLANT PEPSWCTIVE - ENHANCED C0FMUNICATION SKILLS
- FOCUSED TRAINING BETTER THAN APPLICATION OF PROBLEM SOLVING SKILLS / ENGINEERING KNOWLEDGE TO ENHANCE OPERATOR ESPONSE d+'
- AN ALTERNATIVE TO FOCUSED TRAINING WOULD BE TO HAVE B.S. DEGREED SENIOR OERATORS-
- EGARDLESS OF FORMAL EDUCATION AND TO PROPERLY COE WITH ACCIDENTS, SENIOR OPERATORS SHOULD ECEIVE:
- ADDITIONAL EDUCATION ON PLANT RESPONSE TO ACCIDENTS - PLANT O KRATING EX ERIENCE
- OPPOSE RULE
- POTENTIAL NEGATIVE IMPACT ON SAFEiY - POSSIBLY BENEFICIAL Blff NOT IMPORTANT ISSUE
- "0KRATOR RESPONSE TO INCIDENTS: A PROBABILISTIC RISK PERSKCTIVE "
PREPARED FOR WC, INC, AND QUALIFICATION OF REACTOR OEPATORS GROUP, PREPARED BY DELIAN CORPORATION, SEPTEMBER 1986. O
f
- f y xf CONCLllSION OF NRC-INITIATED PANEL
'SECY-82-162, 1982. PEPORT OF THE PEER ADVISORY PANEL AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATOPY C& MISSION ON OPERATOR QUALIFICATIONS. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COWllSSION, WASHINGTON,DC. THE ADVISORY PANEL REC 0 WENDED THAT A BACCALAUPEATE DEGREE PEQUIREfe,T SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED ON THE R0, SR0, OR SS DUE TO THESE DISADVAhTAGES: POOR . PERFORMANCE, INEXPERIENCED OPERATORS, HIGH TURNOVER, DRIVE OlfI CAPABLE i ORRATORS, INVAllD CURTAllferf 0F SELECTION POOL, MISPLACEED E?PHASIS, AND LITTLE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, .O i 4 i . V' V
I z. -fY . q ). CONCLllS10NS OF NRC-INITIATED STUDY NUREG/CR 14051, 1985. ASSESSMENT OF JOB-RELATED EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATORS, PNL-5303, PREPARED FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR-REGULATORY COWilSSION BY PACIFIC NORTHWEST LABORATORY, RICHLAND, WA, i CONCLUSIONS OF THE REPORT REGARDING ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE NEEDED BY R0s AND SR0s: PERCENTAGE HIGH SCHOOL 10 COLLEGE 65 pq. ELSEWHERE 20 V RESIDUAL 5 100 O
{} ' CONCLUSIONS OF NRC-INITIATED SRIDY .e. NUEG/CR-4411 _1986. ASSESSENT OF SPECIAllZED EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR LICENSEDylCLEAR EACTOR OPERATORS. PNL-5602. PEPARED FOR TiiE NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0WilSS10N BY PACIFIC NORE1 WEST LABORATORY, RICHLAND, WA. CONCLUSIONS: l
- 1. DiERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF VARIATION AMONG INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMS, P#1GING FROM COVERAGE OF 15% TO 65% OF EiE JOB-RELATED ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE. FOUR SCHOOLS COVER AT LEAST HALF, AND FOUR SCHOOLS COVER LESS DIAN ONE-THIRD OF THIS KNOWLEDGE CONTENT.
b
- 2. THERE IS NO SYSTEFATIC DIFFERENCE IN EiE JOB-RELATEDNESS OF BiE DIFFERENT TYPES OF SPECIALIZED EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS, A.S. DEGREE, B.S. DEGREE, AND COURSEWORK.
- 3. TRADITIONAL B.S. DEGEE PROGRAMS IN NUCLEAR ENGINEERING COVER AS MUCH JOB-RELATED KNOWLEDGE (ABOUT ONE-HALF 0F THIS KNOWLEDGE 4
CON H f) AS MOST OF THE SPECIALIZED EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM. O
c-i EO l 1 ~ ADVANTAGES OF DEGREE RLLE ESTABLISH CAREER PATH TO UPPER f%NAGEPENT POSITIONS V,A. ENHANCE PROFESSIONALISM 0F SR0 POSITION l l ENHANCE ENGINEERING EXPERTISE ON SHIFT ENHANCE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT EXPERTISE ON SHIFT .O
i 0~ o-q M i DISADVANTAGES OF DEGREE RULE HIGH TURNOVER LEADS TO LOSS OF EXPERIENCE
- NO EMPIRlCAL JUSTIFICATION l
- ~ TURNOVER DUE TO UNDESIRABILITY OF SHIFT WORK
- BLOCK CAREER PATH OF NON DEGREED R0's iQ
- INSTANT SR0s
- HARM MORALE I
o J. ( h-LO
} 1;. ) b- .\\ OPTIONS
- L DEGREE RULE OF ANPRM CONCURRENT POLICY STAT &ENT
- RULE ON DEGREED SENIOR MANAGER (S$CY-84-106)
AEND POLICY'STATEENT 0N ENGINEERING EXPERTISE ON SHIFT C i 1 i l i i a
?, i e
- O PRESENTATION TO ACRS HUMAN FACTORS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING 4
JUNE 24,1987 THE SUPERVISORY CENTER: AN ALTERNATIVE TO A DEGREED OPERATOR 1 i John M. Gallagher Westinghouse, Nuclear Technology Systems Division O
'O _ OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION STATEMENT OF ALTERNATIVE ACCIDENT RESPONSE CHARACTERIZATION 1-DESCRIPTION OF SRO's SYSTEM MANAGER ROLE k 1 COMPUTERIZED SYSTEMS TH AT SUPPORT SYSTEM MANAGER ROLE { O VALIDATION OF COMPUTERIZED SYSTEMS 1 CONCLUSIONS i O 1
~ Q ALTERNATIVE TO DEGREED OPERATOR THIS. PRESENTATION PRESENTS FACTORS THAT ARE. lM-PORTANT IN PROVIDING A SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR (SRO) WITH THE-KNOWLEDGE THAT IS NECESSARY TO q RESPOND QUICKLY AND CORRECTLY TO ACCIDENTS. l i o_ WHILE PRE-PLANNED GUIDANCE IS ESSENTIAL, VIRTUALLY ALL SIGNIFICANT REAL INCIDENTS HAVE INCLUDED SITUATIONS THAT DEMANDED MORE THAN ROTE EXECUTION OF THE PRE-PLANNED GUIDANCE. o ONE WAY TO CONCEPTUALIZE THIS IS THAT DURING g ACCIDENT. RESPONSE THERE lS A NEED FOR THE. GRADUAL UNFOLDING OF MORE AND MORE j BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE (1.E., KNOWLEDGE BEHIND i PROCEDURE STEPS, KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SYSTEM DESIGN, KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS). i o PRESENTLY THE KNOWLEDGE TO DEAL WITH ACCIDENT RESPONSE IS PROVIDED IN THE FORM OF OPERATOR TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE SUPPLEMENTED BY PROCEDURES, SPECIAL DISPLAY SYSTEMS (E.G., SPDS SYSTEMS), THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER, AND THE SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR. O 2
O' - ALTERNATIVE TO DEGREED OPERATOR (Continued) o ONE PROPOSED METHOD TO PROVIDE THE SRO WITH ADDITIONAL ENGINEERING KNOWLEDGE IS TO REQUIRE THAT THE SRO HAVE A FORMAL DEGREE. i o AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD TO PROVIDE.THIS INFOR-MATION IS THE SUPERVISORY CENTER. o AS ENVISIONED, THE SUPERVISORY CENTER IS A l COLLECTION OF COMPUTERIZED DECISION AIDS THAT j WOULD ALLOW THE OPERATOR TO ACCESS O INFORMATION TO DEAL WITH ACCIDENT RESPONSE IN A TIMELY'. AND EFFICIENT FASHION TO SUPPORT-THE SRO's SYSTEM MANAGER ROLE. l 0
O CHARACTERISTICS OF NPP WORLD THAT MAKES OPERATOR RESPONSE TO ~ ACCIDENTS A DIFFICULT TASK l o DYNAMIC. EVENT-DRIVEN WORLD 1 INCIDENTS DEVELOP OVER TIME-AND NEW -EVENTS i CAN OCCUR AT INDETERMINATE-TIMES THAT CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED - THESE CHANGES CAUSE THE CHALLENGES TO O OPERATOR PERFORMANCE. l O 4
l
- D l
o UNCERTAIN DATA: COLLECTION AND EVALUATION THE DATA THAT MUST BE COLLECTED AND INTEGRATED TO DRAW INFERENCES ABOUT THE STATE OF PROCESSES IS BOTH UNCERTAIN AND DELAYED J LOW AND CHANGING SIGNAL TO NOISE RATIO AMBIGUOUS AND INCOMPLETE DATA LONG TIME DELAYS IN SOME DATA THAT NEEDS TO BE INTEGRATED WITH OTHER DATA THAT HAS ONLY SHORT TIME DELAYS i i O o LARGE NUMBER OF HIGHLY INTERACTIVE PARTS THERE IS A MAN.Y-TO-MANY MAPPING BETWEEN PHYSICAL SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS AND PROCESS FUNCTIONS. FAULTS CAN HAVE MULTIPLE CAUSES, l MULTIPLE CONSEQUENCES, MULTIPLE PATHS TO SATISFACTORY OUTCOMES AND DIFFERENT KINDS OF i RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PARTS. 5
h .{ ~ O o LARGE AMOUNT 01-A'ITGMs TION FOR INDIVIDU AL COMPONEN TS: ALMOST NO AUTOMATIOP' FOR TOP LEVEL PROCES_S FUNCTIONS OPERATOR ROLE IN PERFORMING SUPERVISORY CONTROL TASKS FOR LOWER LEVEL (COMPONENT) CONTROLLERS CHARACTERIZED BY DISCRETE 3 INTERMITTENT CONTROL AND MONITORING ACTIVITIES AND BY EXPLICIT DECISION MAKING IN TRANSITION l BETWEEN ACTIVITIES O i ) . O-6
s IMPLICATIONS FOR COGNITIVE -g.- ACTIVITIES IN NPP WORLD o KNOWLEDGE INTENSIVE ACTIVITIES ' SITUATION - ASSESSMENT AND GOAL FOR-MULATION IN NON-ROUTINE MULTIPLE-FAULT EVENTS-MULTIPLE EFFECTS, EFFECTS AT A DISTANCE (BOTH SPACE AND TIME), S Y S T E M / C O M P O N E.N T A'N D COMPONENT / SYSTEM CAUSE AND EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS MULTIPLE GOALS, CONSTRAINTS AND SIDE j EFFECTS i O o EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND INTEGRATION j o. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND STRATEGIC FOCUS o LONG DECISION HORIZON o INCREMENTAL PROGRESS o SUBSTAINED MONITORING WITH MULTIPLE TIME FRAME RELATIONSHIPS o OPPORTUNISTIC REVISION o KNOWLEDGE OF HOW DATA TESTIFIES TO ISSUES o-CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND PERSONNEL RISK O-7
SYSTEM MANAGER ROLE - NUREG (CR-1270*) .o PROMPT RECOGNITION OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES "IN THE SYSTEMS MANAGER ROLE, THE OPERATOR CONSTANTLY MONITORS A SMALL NUMBER OF ~ CRITICAL SYSTEM OUTPUT' VARIABLES. IN THE CASE OF A NUCLEAR PLANT, THESE WOULD LARGELY' CORRESPOND TO THE VARIABLES CONTROLLED BY THE PLANT CONTROL SYSTEM. THESE WOULD BE GROUPED 'INTO A SINGLE STATION. NO ACTION WOULD BE REQUIRED AS LONG AS THE PLANT CONTROL SYSTEM PERFORMED-ACCEPTABLY. DURING ANY UNUSUAL-EVENT, THE MANAGER ROLE WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE OPERATOR BE ABLE TO OBSERVE THE BEHAVIOR-OF CRITICAL PARAMETERS AND COMMAND APPROPRIATE ACTION WHEN REQUIRED." O CONTROL AND MONITORING OF PLANT PROCESS o RESOURCES "THE.' SYSTEM MANAGER ROLE IMPLIES CONTROL OF AND 'IMMEDIATE FEEDBACK ON PLANT PROCESS RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO ACCOMPLISH THE AS-SIGNED TASK." j o EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION l "THE SYSTEM MANAGER ROLE REQUIRES THE ABILITY TO MAKE DECISIONS CONCERNING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE, AND THE COMMANDS NECESSARY TO OBTAIN IT. THIS GENERALLY REQUIRES SUPPORTING I AIDS FOR HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND EVALUATION OF j ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION." O
- Human Factors Evaluation of Control Room Design and Operator Performance at TMl-2, January 1980.
8 i
G N' O; IS N CS LN O EN BO I NO MI T ',D II ET C EE FT SC A LC EC SAY PI DA A L F - MT E FS O IC RF EOU SA PO V OD N R LSIE O 'SPS SE OEVT I ED EC VCEA T VYN VN NNRI 4 U LLA LE IEPC C OHM OU U O E VGM VQ YQTS S X NIO NE AEOS S E IHC IS MSNA E ) C K O R R A P M N E T T N E C U C O D N S PT E I E N NS GF S N D R IU RNF I S O NFE M NEIE C E FI OOT N OHS - E I OT P T EN TUE D R C SNA EO DR S O NA EOP WI EU,UR R T O RI TT SFGAE O A IH RTT EC A NCH T R TT OAU BA' BDI T A O AI CCP NVFO R B IW IN ND NALON E A C EFI OND O O A P L OM NI IAE IESE' O O SE OTD T N TC GE L SL NE ANR ANMDN T A AB OER IRA IEEEO N N - O 'TDI CEE CRLL A O R IU OTL OEBWH L I P E Q ST' SFOOT P T NOE SAE SNRNI A ONR APB AIPKW R N E L W p O S P I ) R .D G F E N O N IGE R VNG L N M A LID E E E YE OTE D S L LL SSL O S B TR EW M U O NE N~ MTO M R EV R E N L S P UO E LSK A A Q( T BI S U R F E T OSMP T O RD AN REEI P FES PO PHTH E J N CE I TSS C ( O NNI NT NOYN N I OET OI OPSO O T II N Y I C C DRV DG DHGT E EEI EO E NA T SPT SC SDIL E AXC AE ANSE D BEA BR BAUR O E D D L S E E E AR SR G R V BO AO D O E I BI E I L LV V LDV LA EA WEA IH LH OSH KE UE NAE SB RB KBB
y m w ~ 2' d SD P S E R g U G S N D MI D D E S E OlVRmI O C N N E S C\\ I AN S A A N DA AT R C R P T ,l NO N IT O UFI C OT C E A XE' 7 R S S - O N E D iO S G L S I g' K E N U S T N T n N RA A R C i I A s D T_ + M E i s N m y T T E R_ O T U c N A e RO T A P o O L OF U P T I P T T A i r S' U P C- / O A-a H t T a I W D M n E a L K m L B S u O H O A MSK R T P S f L F T A S I F A O A T _ L o / A OO Y N C E _ N: l I T e NG O O G d O S S A I I ST S o I M I T C AS A E s' IC D O 'n S e S s A ' sl s s u \\ m ~ s ^ a N \\ R O NO f IT o I A T I C N n o IF G i \\ T O T t I N C t N U as E P rd ED R EO N t e RI iI se N U T I O M T A Y uN I E l m T AM R l e CF L ER tO d I c B S EO FO r O N T F cu R E E t io P S D t s ae mR e hr D co ES St A a B r .e E D D 5p G E E O D R S R SR 2 O A O AO g E I BV V en L V I BI WA EA L A ri O L uw OH LH I H go NE UE KE ih KB RB SB FS m b '- wO
l E N 68 L 6 O 1 U s 0 R 1 T L N SS O KTN C CCO AEI BFT N DFC O EEA I &T A E A FNF NC DD DI IF ~ TI) ES G TN b ATN UO EE N CI T(, TN I ,N RD N ET N-O f_ - PIA XC R L EA I EKP s TS( E TA - ~ NA /TS \\ T IT TAN __~~~ N - CLO E ~ EUI Y M LM T FE ERC I L P,_ SOA - R F E M , VI T /\\ ~ H \\ A P T /,,- ,N T N N AS LS M - E PE ~ E C V - \\ C E T \\ U 1 LI - S s N - AH S DC ~ , gas O \\ U I g\\ /(g T \\ C L T A C 4I I' R 1 D E ~ O Il l I G L H / ,NT /, E S S q L S R A N - D C O TE I E - IT P I NA - K Y T T A OT C T A y MS ' A D T C s D R B E S IL Y /\\ E E F P F E T DN IE F S M I TT \\ \\ NA \\ ET gi DS I VIA 4C ESL M R TR E AO R S HN O N BDVB T O A A I R T E A TP G RD I E T LR S [v y AOE F g V DN EI EN ED n p.!' l l l l l \\ltjil\\(
.Q' tn n e o n o s i t t p u w c n n mt a [ a u ot l PF CS no i l t e c L vf a i j e or t L s D b L A L E E I FV E N LN t; E EDIO WNT ~ TAC E A N R B OT PI S T IHN B n SE A : f o oi NTF t d n OTO l e A et IT F i t AF A LO E \\ B U
r3 .j CONTENT OF MEANS-END REPRESENTATION OF TECHNICAL SYSTEMS
- MEANS-END LEVELS OF PROPERTIES OF THE SYSTEM SELECTED FOR REPRESENTATION ABSTRACTION PURPOSE PROPERTIES NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT FOR RELATING ThE PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM WITH THE REASONS FOR DI.Sl3N, WITH REQUIREMENTS OF ENVIRONMENT.
CONSTRAINTS l CATEGORIZATION IN TERMS REFERRING TO PROPERTIES OF THE ENVIRONMENT. ABSTRACT PROPERTIES NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIPS ACCORDING TO DESIGN OR INTENTION:
- ENERGY, VALUE, INFORMATION, TRUTH, ETC.
RELATIONSHIP TO UNDERLYING FUNCTION CAUSAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IS DEPENDING ON CONVENTION -AND DESIGN CH0 ICE. CATEGORIZATION IN ABSTRACT TERMS, REFERRING NEITHER T0 () SYSTEM NOR TO THE ENVIRONMENT. GENERAL! ZED PROPERTIES NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH " BLACK BOX" INPUT-0UTPUT MODELS OF FUNCTIONS IRRESPECTIVE OF UNDERLYING IMPLEMENTATION; THIS LEVEL IS NECESSARY FOR FUNCTION C0 ORDINATION OF DIFFERENT PHYSICAL PROCESSES TO SERVE JOINT HIGHER LEVEL PURPOSE. CATEGORIZATION ACCORDING TO RECURRENT, FAMILIAR INPUT-OUTPUT RELATIONSHIPS. PHYSICAL PROPERTIES NECCESSARY AND SUFFICIENT FOR USE OF OBJECT: FOR ADJUSTMENT OF OBJECT FOR USE, TO ADJUST TO LIMITS OF USE, TO PREDICT WHETHER OBJECTS WILL SERVE PARTICULAR USE ] FUNCTION TO SELECT PART TO MOVE FOR CONTROL OF PHYSICAL PROCESS. l CATEGORIZATION ACCORDING TO UNDERLYAING PHYSICAL PROCESS. J PHYSICAL PROPERTIES NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT FOR CLASSIFICATION AND RECOGNITION OF MATERIAL OBJECTS; FORM n
- J. RASMUSSEN - RISE NATIONAL LABORATORIES, DENMARK 13
O ll L S 'S R A E C D I E E R T TI S E E I F A RI M RS E R A C TI L E A R TA R B A AS T P HE Y C Y S TR T T U T! EA I Y V D EM RS T T O FI UT I C i R AL SN E i A P S N NE F S O N LI EM A I O A H ll ll TE D C T AR I I A S ITW HI S S U M M S R F RI T I Q E E T S E OS T T C N R N N E I N O TN S S Y SO Y Y INS y V A I TT H, MIT L B I T A S S AM t E e N T CE S TE E C A U R S N T f I N NF LS T N T I S a I P A UA PN S I S M A FS MO Y U D AY I S F V N MS d M OIT BD P A O A a L n \\ C C UE U C N SN E M DI y S T T A U FG K V t t t E t E TF t l OI A T i A D NE M S RF S l H E I O OD Y U ll i T N I T S D SG TH A Q S b E a F EI LE MI AS H O RTI i l S I AI E RL T F E S SV a Y CS T D UP S T MI v O S GM M N E T A I I T I C T N SA Y TT Y I O E E T C I R T ILS R A S F r T S o L BI C N C S O I E O A Y O Y T f AM T C S P S I C B LI A R A A L A B M y I Y F H U O h T Y IL A N TS S C c VI T r A AH E N a I L T V T R E r ll I I I B C A LI U M e AW A A S i T i t E C S N H IL P N R I A A TR E I A C l E TU I L a RT AQ n V E P A Z CE HE o N NM TR l i M A I A t I X T A R SY I c T NT n A N M A IN A OI u I P L I F A TIB M M CN A t L n UI e FA m V p i A u ll q E D N Y, Y N O d T A TI na T E YS A S IL F I A TT R s M m B S L N S E I N P E e A D BM O O T t I E S s L N AE TI F Y y IA A L V I R C O S S S S T N Y A U U M E R I A T VQ E D S T O S ( F 1 E AE T O M N P B LR D S V P E Y M E E 3 U IT A AY T N S N S M S C L C T I G L E Y O e O L r E I T E P J A F S A T S I B V RA E T S B M A u I T g Y U O O A CS D V S S C VI F i I wg
1 Goal: Provide X i G g Means: Functic,n A D Req / Goal: Needs Y Provide Y h I i Means: Function B l D Req / Goal: Needs Z Provide Z 'b Means: Function C Figure 4-3 (a):. Structure of the goal-means network: the goals to be accomplished, the relationships between goals and the means to achieve goals. I I Function A Function B Needs 01: P1 Needs 01: P2 Provide G1 { P1 P2} Function C 1 ..-Figure 4-3 (b): Different functions may place different requirements on a sin goal (G ; or from a different point of view function must sat fy multiple criteria on G1. J G1 G2 Function A unction B Process 1 Process 2 Process 3 Figure 4-3 (c): Given G1 as goal-of-interest, Process 2 provides G1 and affects G2 (G2 is a side effect of, or a constraint on Process 2 if G1 is the object of interest and visa versa if G2 is the object of interest. O G 1985 westinshouse niectric corn. 75 15
e f "y s vk i o t r r ao e os v et e mt ws ik w l s t r dn c e 'o e ao n o eo tM o c mw it l vr MnP A o t ee a yn r
- i t
P N r l A op r w o ro n C elF n ta t. o c i Wt i r u t t O a c ro e I l p E ro e ev C s is i t u ry s r PS s o c o i h a p r f t /\\ y P s c o gn c n e n t i nw a l r E o s e o d" e gl T it rF n W P e is d M u p 5 rw e a s o n eo mi U o l t laF E e S h m 89 Wn v e g o 1 it c n c t e I p c r r i la u A u o s d / me o e l rk S W ita oa T / NM S 4 ra y. W 8 pr 9 / R o 1 at j n k O de I nv / an i 0 / \\ er r e uta t e cw u / \\ diwh r m t ^ vot s a ol e y l rpP st or s s / \\ =e P n s r as r t l t y nt e H hb a n s oir a e t CPrP av my / pe r x wh a i lam o c l a i M eyr FA a oi l r v e gp d ra e ss A d vmaa iP e-i t =l v h e oiWM oA t n r r r o PP r f o C ,n P P ot i i M A c tr n ec> au lo pf dp s r r am s uv t a on a e nl n oCe C T M SI f o r o euan-er r t i W r ce eo P v r t l fp oWI ms r e PS as
- s xs
- s Ee ie e
c s it it
- o n
d i o o n d s 4r o o m p m i m x 4 b t it cn m c u t u o n m c es u o n r u ue F C F C F gh O itF 5 ill
'NRC SAFETY'EVALUATLON REPORT ON
- Q.
WESTINGHOUSE GENERIC SPDS .(FEBRUARY 2,1984) FROM A-HUMAN. FACTORS STANDPOINT, THE WESTIN-o GHOUSE DESIGN IS PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AN SPDS SHOULD AlD THE FOLLOWING OPERATOR TASKS: DETECTION OF ABNORMAL CONDITIONS REACTION TO A DETECTED " EVENT", l.E., " RAPID ASSESSMENT OF PLANT STATUS AND THE RESPONSE OF THE SAFETY SYSTEMS" DIAGNOSIS TERMINATION OR MITIGATION, 'l.E., TAKING COR-1 RECTIVE ' ACTIONS AND RECElVING FEEDBACK AS 'O TO -WHETHER THESE ACTIONS ARE HAVING THE i DESIRED EFFECT THIS METHOD OF CHARACTERIZING THE CRITICAL OPERATOR TASKS IS. A WIDELY ACCEPTED OPERATOR RESPONSE MODEL AND HAS ITS BASIS-IN BOTH OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND THEORETICAL FOR- ) MULATIONS SUCH AS THAT OF JENS RASMUSSEN (REFERENCE 13). WESTINGHOUSE STATED THE MODEL WAS VALIDATED BY OPERATOR-IN-THE-LOOP TESTING CONDUCTED WITH A PROTOTYPE OF THE DISPLAY i SYSTEM. UPON REVIEW OF THE TEST-RESULTS THE i -STAFF CONCURRED WITH THE USE OF THIS MODEL IN THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE DISPLAY. BASED ON OUR REVIEW RESULTS PRESENTED ABOVE, THE STAFF CONCLUDES THE HUMAN FACTORS DESIGN 'O BASIS OF THE GENERIC SPDS DISPLAY IS THEORETI-CALLY SOUND. ) 17 l j
) o-THE FUNCTIONAL REQUlf?EMENTS REPRESENT A i EC MP SITI N. F THE DESIGN BASIS AND REFLECT 'O THE USE OF A TOP-DOWN DESIGN APPROACH TO THE DISPLAY SYSTEM. THE DESIGN OF THE GENERIC SPDS IS PARTIALLY BASED ON THE RESULTS FROM RELATED WORK THAT WESTINGHOUSE HAD. UNDERWAY ON AN EPRl' RESEARCH PROJECT (RP891-3) " SCOPING AND FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR PLANT WIDE DISTURBANCE ANALYSIS AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (DASS)". THE STAFF CONCLUDED THAT THE USE. OF A TOP-- DOWN APPROACH ALONG WITH THE USE OF THE RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE DASS EFFORT, SHOULD LEAD WESTINGHOUSE TO ~ A REASONABLY COMPLETE SET OF FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. o BASED ON THE REVIEW AND AUDIT, WE CONCLUDE TH AT THE ESI N AND DESIGN VERIFICATION
- O' METHODS REVIEWED BY THE STAFF ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GENERIC WSPDS.
WE BELIEVE THAT THE ABILITY OF THE OPERATOR TO PERFORM APPROPRIATE TASKS DURING OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS IS ENHANCED BY THE IN-FORMATION DISPLAYED ON THE WSPDS. FURTHER, THE SECONDARY DISPLAY FORMATS CONTAIN DATA AND INFORMATION WHICH NOT ONLY AUGMENTS THE PRIME FUNCTION OF THE
- WSPDS, BUT SHOULD HELP OPERATORS FOR OTHER TASKS TO ANALYZE AND DIAGNOSE EVENTS.
l O 18
l COMPUTER BASED SYSTEMS' FOR SUPERVISORY CENTER EXISTING SYSTEMS OR PROTOTYPE SYSTEMS THAT FORM THE BUILDING BLOCKS FOR AN EFFECTIVE SUPERVISORY . CENTER o DISPLAY OF OVERALL PLANT STATUS. PURPOSE; COLLECT 'AND INTEGRATE LOW LEVEL INFORM ATION TO DEPICT OVERALL PL ANT STATUS - ASSIMULATE DATA INTO A SINGLE PER-CEPTUAL OBJECT THAT MAKES THE STATE OF A SYSTEM DISCERNIBLE AT A GLANCE EXAMPLES g HALDEN HALO ALARM. HANDLING SYSTEM: ICONIC DEPICTION OF SYSTEM AND SUBSYSTEM STATUS WESTINGHOUSE SPDS; TOP LEVEL ICONIC AND SYSTEM STATUS DISPLAYS { i O 19 i
i o ALARM HANDLING SYSTEMS PURPOSE: COLLECT AND INTEGRATE INFORMATION .. T O - ALERT OPERATOR THAT A PARTICULAR DIS-TURBANCE OR ABNORMALITY MAY EXIST PROVIDE A MEANS TO EVALUATE THE ABNORMALITY PROVIDE A MEANS TO DETERMINE CORREC-TlVE ACTION O EXAMPLES - HALDEN HALO ALARM HANDLING SYSTEM: REDUCES NUMBER OF ALARMS AND USES SPATIAL DISPLAY MEANS TO PRESENT' ALARM. INFORMATION WESTINGHOUSE DISTURBANCE BOARD; DISPLAYS OF GO AL-FUNCTION-SYSTEM TOPOLGIES WITH SEPARATION BETWEEN ALARM AND STATUS MESSAGES O 20
,7 O o COMPUTERlZED PROCEDURES PURPOSE; PROVIDE GUIDANCE IN SELECTION OF. PROCEDURE BASED ON PLANT DATA AND CAN I ALSO PROVIDE GUIDANCE IN EXECUTION OF PRO-1 CEDURES-EXAMPLES' { { EPRI AND HALDEN HAVE SUPPORTED DEVELOP-1 MENT OF APPROACHES USING DIAGNOSTIC AIDS ) AND SUCCESS PATH MONITORING O WESTINGHOUSE COMPUTERIZED EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SYSTEM PROVIDES DETAILED GUIDANCE THROUGH EOPs SUPPLEMENTED BY 'P A R A L L EL INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT CONDITIONS, SAFETY STATUS OF PLANT AND-TRACKING OF CRITICAL COMPONENT PARAMETERS AND STATUS. O 21
~ O o-DESIGN BASES INFORMATION PURPOSE; PROVIDE THE ENGINEERING INFORMA-TlON' WITH RESPECT TO THE FUNCTION AND ~ CAPABILITY OF EACH SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF THE SYSTEM IN A PARTICULAR ANALYZED EVENT TO ASSIST IN DECISIONS DURING MULTIPLE FAILURE SITUATIONS. EXAMPLE WESTINGHOUSE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS PROFILE - O-PROVIDES A
SUMMARY
OF THE PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS OF EACH ANALYZED ACCIDENT, THE ROLE OF SYSTEMS AND KEY COMPONENTS IN THE ACCIDENT AND THE RELATIVE TECHNICAL i SPECIFICATION INFORMATION FOR THE ACCIDENT. 'O 22
s8 O o COMPUTERIZED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PURPOSE; ASSIST IN DETERMINATION OF IMPACT OF CHANGES IN COMPONENT OPERABILITY OR PLANT MODE ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMPLIANCE PROVIDES EFFECTIVE MEANS TO IDENTIFY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERRELATION-SHIPS BETWEEN COMPONENTS, SYSTEMS O AND PROCESS PARAMETERS. PROVIDES BASES FOR CONSISTENT INTER-PRETATIONS EXAMPLES WESTINGHOUSE SPECAPPRAISAL SYSTEM IN-CLUDES ASSISTANCE IN TRACKING COMPLIANCE, DOCUMENTATION, REPORTING AND EQUIPMENT TAG-OUT' ALSO, WESTINGHOUSE BYPASS AND INOPERABLE STATUS INDICATION SYSTEM - MONITORS AVAILABILITY OF SAFETY SYSTEMS. O 1 23
~ sc i U t ts ir e c ) ) a s s n r c m e a v y h i e e i t rt rl r n C oi p s eps D s s i din a f r S g nl o uu l t t e c c r oo e d e a n Uui s t ta FF c o nc n p Mi t s i n M dn D oa o p g rf rU i r ni a nt o oo o e ( i .o t M l f t ic v uC c f r a a l n oa t s n e b l i t ch a u e SFt s o s a mi md C gt r s n nF - n ns si i t i i a l iU s s mlei u e v e t pl i a e s s S r t s n n e aR a ek D el ept r s. me l i a blt s oc .p@ D r h c s h d i i r I n pc c t r o p ed coR o ou o e a n eh f PMC O Ma MC& M 3R sn [, o b4 itac i e l v p t k m iid c s n i i i nl s g R o r t r l s i i s u t e e t e go e a n s t s a & a h oW i r F i t sc a e r g I C i v & t i r c t c t o S y et d em i e rP s t t r a n n n l c tnnip f e n P & n oP A ei t t I a f t o n a a i fN Es o d e mnu y-C f n z s g o D l t O n n_ o o i r l s v ,S i s n s e n r soM s i r e w c o o i i s i t s s t o r r v i s oi n et s n l l l a W H g o o u e a a e i e e t sl e a l c os d u o iR Hu U c t i s e s u n e n t t r n s e P t Gc o m n ai n A mi Fa'. r o P o c f s r l M P t e I t l oI e o ct. n ru es ef o s Mi d i N l t o oo i i e f s eo n C l is a l F l v l g i F R s. pD e pE a c t i i e n d n gt U e pi ~d n i i t t s t e al t t m. D t e e u ds e n n i mc au l l n t ee c uan e u a ud e e s mir l e n s IA wi oov MtaC mis Mbu l i t g e a o w i .c e e f l oSGNE r o on u p ne h v v i i t p ot o d t n oc n r s s i 1 i K' c PF I I S O K_T C E i tc A b% ev i t a i t n a g D o f s C .n c t r i s a a f t cd P r o l e ir g c y t s o n n r a i U .r W i tc m a m r tcP e u t s aP n c u S rN I i o r y m u h n a g 1 i a n b e C M y l D m b A a T O
T = y it nl ny y t t oi nil i aimb oti li iub b a ( c ca a e ul I t i i 2 i He Axe ene el l v R Rot d i ER i r f i a t etue o y. cn t n v t ei g y i eet i l n xGab o i gE ma c o o i i e Cnt t l f s e c o yE R o n ei t t i a ncli l i l n l m bAbaa e ar r ey mhi em d o vi oiel vu o t t CwROH m f ilti r i b e n a P gi g ol n e h n CR is a s m e u c H orp s lo c i c e l ov o t i bi ot s ri P n ms g y f o no n d oC yl t s a i e e s t n n r n e e. eA ta om se od St y at v is nd ie e mli h r t s oi t zi i t nm e ae s yt b y s in er nl s us t l s a git aEi oo b it s po tn o n e ni l ic O SA OC IF AtoR zb l i s io ct f i a e o ] l i i Dr l t e P u R n n i h a d c em f r a o a .n sr v u e e o )i d S loH t t (( i c ~ l r o C o a v e f t F no e n ns Fn i g l i t o oe o t n e n ns eg di n i s fi n o g d i pu st dio oe op et t s ot u .i a a e n s e et t s i s lwv&z Ma o sl a a e h e p .i c ee c awv&z l i m e i l e ot o t t n d nc i r izt i c eS si o KA UP ( SA A D B oi t l v io ie. ee t n c t r ticl KA UP nne M j gad hd t i omo v e. CrM f s o o v or ef e i d \\ it i s r aeh p A n B Pt n n n e s g e n oo g o r r o yt u i ei o rgt od g u n ei f t cR t e n d o gt C oda i e p y t da d l d i nl n e is e i t t w t of a e n t slen MRa c v e n ri i c i lwe eo r a o c s pn r r e awe e s si po e OK T P D Boe et Onr nr c R ~ Kp Da Kpen' e R 2 3 ,s s m e s t t n nr r u o e a u p i ml t r a n: ao g S I l u es tar s, i t F M ed ert y r a of e sna i pM n pi l b e a o p as r PtoMtoii vd s s n t n g l 2 3 n o s e nt E E E E n s t t i t o c yn nt in d t o e f e if r Aiod g. i ae c iv y ci t oe nn i t c t et ci n iE c plu t l io n A n eS oI at nd mC I I I e vf ec S&EoLA ym w
CONCLUSI'ON WE BELIEVE THAT A SUPERVISORY CENTER, WHEN COM-BINED WITH PROPER TRAINING ON ITS USE, CAN PROVIDE A TRAINED SRO WITH THE KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY FOR ' ACCIDENT. RESPONSE, REGARDLESS OF FORMAL. EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SRO. THE SUPERVISORY CENTER HAS A SOLID FOUNDATION AS A RESULT OF PREVIOUS i DEVELOPMENT WORK. SYSTEMS OR PROTOTYPES THAT FORM THE BUILDING BLOCKS TO CONSTRUCT AN EFFECTIVE SUPERVISORY CENTER. RESEARCH PRESENTLY UNDERWAY. TO DEVELOP MODELS OF COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR IN NPP PERSONNEL PROVIDES O THE BASIS F R THE VALI ATI N OF THE COMPUTERIZED SUPPORT SYSTEM. i O 26
1 a'l 4 eM ~ .j 14 Unrcstricted rV h R&D REPORT 87-1060-00 GIN-11 O-om;; nJ.Jn 7 o.t. The Supervisory Center: A Means to Deliver Knowledge to the Senior Reactor-Operator During Emergency
Response
i k K. B. Bennett, D. D. Woods Human Sciences and i J. M. Gallagher NBID March 12, 1987 ) O ipr 0vsD,
- 1. F. Innes, Manager Human Sciences APPROVED:
Q D. R. Muss, Manager Applied Sciences Division 8 Westinghouse R&D Center 1310 Beulah Road n.. e.. t msga_
5 4 g Table of Contents Abstract i
- 1. Introduction 1-
- 2. Roles of the SRO during accident conditions 2
- 3. Characteristics of the NPP world and implications for accident response 4
1 3.1 Dynamic, event-driven world 4' 1 3.2 Uncertain data: collection and evaluation 4 3.3 Large number of highly interactive, parts 5-k 3.4 Highly automated world 5 l l ~ 4. Accident response 5 l
- 5. Improving accident response 7
O
- 6. Summary 9
- 7. Computerized systems suitable for supervisory center 10 7.1' Display of overall plant status
.10 7.2 Alarm handling systems 11 7.3 Computerized procedures 12 7.4 Design bases 13 7.5 Computerized Technical Specifications 13
- 8. References 15 l
o. o
s.H k Abstract O This paper presents factors that are important in providing a senior reactor operator (SRO) with the knowledge that is necessary to respond quickly and correctly to accidents. i While pre-planned guidance is essential, virtually all significant real incidents have in-cluded situations that demanded more than rote execution of the pre-planned guidance. - One way to conceptualize this is that during accident response there is a need for the gradual unfolding of more and more background knowledge (i.e., knowledge behind pro-cedure steps, knowledge about system' design, knowledge about accident analysis). Pres-ently the knowledge to deal with accident response is provided in the form of operator training and experience supplemented by procedures, special display systems (e.g., SPDS systems), the technical suppon center, and the shift technical advisor. One proposed method to provide the SRO with additional engineering knowledge is to require that the SRO have a formal degree. An alternative method to provide this ' formation is the m supervisory center. As envisioned, the supervisory center is a collection of computerized decision aids that would allow the operator to access information to deal with accident response in a timely and efficient fashion. We believe that a supervisory center, when combined with proper training on its use, can provide a trained SRO with the knowledge necessary for accident response, regardless of formal education requirements for the SRO. The supervisory center has a solid foundation as a result of previous development work. Existing systems or prototypes that form the building blocks to construct an effec-g, tive supervisory center are described. 1 1 i 4 i _a. w
7... __ a f -Q
- 1. Introduction This paper presents factors that are important in providing a senior reactor operator (SRO) with the knowledge that is necessary to respond quickly and correctly to accidents. Accidents usually arise as.a result of equipment malfunction, operator error, or a combination of the two. Accidents occur along a continuum: at one end the potential for a fault or disturbance has been recognized, it has been analyzed,' and guidance for the SRO has been prepared (in the form of operational practice with the procedures and other operatcr j
aids). At the other end of the continuum the potential.for a fault or disturbance has not been foreseen (usually because it arises from multiple faults or other unforeseen events) and responses have not been prepared in advance. 4 While pre-planned guidance is essential, virtually all significant real incidents j have included situations that demanded more than rote execution of the pre-planned guidance. This includes ; situations where recovery cannot continue until an issue is resolved (Oyster Creek - Pew, Miller, and Feehrer, t 1981), situations that are outside the boundaries assumed in the guidance (NRC Information. Notice 83-30), situations in which the guidance was Q under-specified (Davis-Besse - NUREG 1154),Jand situations where more than one fault occurred simultaneously (Ginna - Brown and Wyrick,1982). For example: 9 An SRO sees two parameters conflict that have never conflicted before with no evidence of sensor failure (e.g., primary pressure decreasing, pressurizer level high - TMI; triple low-level alarm-while other reactor level instrument indicates normal - Oyster Creek, Pew et al.). How should the SRO resolve this conflict? How should it effect his monitoring strategy or actions to be carried out? 9 During the response to one failure, an SRO discovers that a second failure has occurred. Does the pre-planned response to the first failure still apply? (e.g., Ginna - Brown and Wyrick, 1982). The important point is that the possibility always exists for the accident to evolve beyond the pre-planned guidance that is being fonowed,.as a result of operator error, equipment malfunction, or multiple faults. One way to conceptualize this is that during accident response there is a need for the gradual unfolding of more and more background knowledge (i.e., knowledge behind procedure steps, knowledge about system design, knowledge 1-
o-I about accident analysis).' The SRO must bring more knowledge to bear in order to evaluate, modify, or develop the appropriate response. This can be h, knowledge he possesses, knowledge that other people possess (e.g., the i technical support center), or knowledge that is packaged electronically (in the form of operator aids). The question for the nuclear power industry is, "how should this knowledge be provided?" Presently the knowledge to deal with accident response is provided in the form of operator training and experience supplemented by procedures, special display systems (e.g., SPDS systems), the technical support center, and the shift technical advisor. Although there are several alternatives (NUREG 3785) one proposal that is being considered to provide the SRO with additional engineering knowledge is to require the SRO to have a formal degree. An alternative to this proposal is the " supervisory center".(see also Cain,1986). As envisioned, the supervisory center is a collection of computerized decision aids that would allow the operator to access information that is critical to accident recovery (e.g., background knowledge about the procedures, system design, and accident analysis) in a timely and efficient fashion. The supervisory center could assist the operator in accident recoven by providing a-single integrated source for this information, by pre-processing low-level data (in the form of integrated displays, boolean logic, or mathematical g calculations), by displaying information in a parallel (rather than' serial) fashion, by providing information about the underlying structure of the plant (a large number of highly interactive parts), and by reminding the SRO of actions that need to be taken or things that need to be considered. We believe that a supervisory center, when comb *med with proper training on its use, can provide a' trained SRO with the knowledge necessary for accident response, regardless of formal education requirements for the SRO. The remainder of this paper provides the basis for this belief.
- 2. Roles of the SRO during accident conditions During accident conditions the operating staff has two major roles: the system supervisory management role and the equipment operator role.
When an operator assumes the system supervisory management role he is concerned with the overall safety and availability processes in the plant; when assuming j the equipment operator role, an operator is more concerned with the status of individual components or subsystems. The resources required for the two problem solving roles are different, in that system supervisory management requires a broader field of attention and consequently a higher level of abstraction than the equipment operator. This paper concentrates on the role h of system supervisory management, and this role is discussed in both the 2
- 4 a
f O " '=*"d**" '**' " d*' ' Peration. The term "SRO" is used in this paper to refer to the individual who fulfills the role of system supervisory management. In this context the SRO must 1) maintain an overview of the plant processes so that abnormal events are detected early enough to decrease the probability that severe consequences will arise, and 2) focus the extra i training, experience, and knowledge (prerequisite for being the SRO) on handling the abnormal event (proposed revision to regulatory guide 1.114, Task HF 601-4). Even though the term is a licensing definition which often has little to do with behavioral roles this paper assumes that the SRO will, in fact, be the individual largely responsible for system supervisory management. For abnormal and accident conditions, the control room crew's actions are paced by the plant processes. During this mode of operation, they have to respond in real time to the system's behavior and perform the appropriate action to terminate or mitigate the anomalous event. During these conditions the SRO requires a broad field of attention and, therefore, a high level of abstraction for the determination of functional and/or cause-effect relationships between controlled and output critical process parameters. Control of the plant processes requires the detection and early interpretation of plant abnormalities and the initiation of corrective (control) actions utilizing available plant resources to terminate or mitigate the event. Rasmussen (1979,1986) describes three types of behavior that are exhibited by operators in emergency conditions: skill-based, rule-based, ~ and knowledge-based. Skill-based behavior, a key element in the equipment operator role, is not of major interest here, since this paper is concerned with the system supervisory management role. Rule-based behavior is implicitly goal oriented and requires conscious effort. In rule-based behavior the operator uses mental or physical procedures that have been derived from previous experience (including present. training programs). Accomplishing a goal requires that sets of these procedures be linked together. The operator must evaluate the relevant aspects of the environment and consciously determine the appropriate mental or physical procedure to invoke. The important point is that the operator has experienced the set of environmental cues and has practiced the set of potential responses. The operator will rely on past experience to choose between these alternatives, and will be able to i provide a rationale for his choice. Knowledge-based behavior is performed when the operator does not have Q mental or physical procedures (developed as a function of training and experience) to provide guidance about the situation. Knowledge-based behavior is problem solving in the truest sense. 'Ihe operator must determine 3
s-1 the present conditions of the plant, compare these conditions to goal state, formulate a' strategy for matching the goal and the present conditions, and h implement the strategy. An important aspect in forming a strategy is the use of mental' models of the components / systems involved and the causal relationships 'between these components / systems. The operator can either simulate alternative courses of action in his head, or test alternative courses or hypotheses with the actual system.
- 3. Characteristics of the NPP world and implications for accident response.
He roles and capabilities of the operator interact with the demands arising from the inherent ' nature of.the nuclear power plant environment. These 1 demands complicate operator response, as outlined in detail in Woods and Roth (1985, NUREG CR-4532). This section discusses the characteristics of the nuclear power plant that make accident response a difficult task. 3.1 Dynamic, event-driven world. The nuclear. power plant environment is { characterized by its slowly-responding and event-driven nature. Incidents develop over time and new events can occur at indeterminate times which changes the nature of the problem to be solved. It is at these times of change that challenges to performance occur. There is a need for continuous situation assessment or tracking of how the incident develops. The operator l must perform multiple small steps with repeated inspection of progress'and adjustment to problem response, rather than by the determination of a strategy followed by straight-through implementation of the plan. He dynamic and event-driven nature also results in the'need for high prospective memory requirements. That is, the' operator must remember to monitor a process or perform a control action in the future. As a result, SRO skill during accident recovery can be characterized as the ability to revise responses to changing circumstances and goals. 3.2 Uncertain data: coDeetion and evaluation. The data or evidence that the SRO must collect and integrate to draw inferences about the state of processes is both uncertain and delayed. De ability of the SRO to discriminate important information may be impaired by the low signal-to-noise ratio and/or changes in noise parameters over dme. He evidence that the SRO is asked to collect and integrate is often difficult to interpret. He data can be ambiguous or incomplete, and can be based on indirect measurements or calculated values / states. How this evidence should be utilized can also vary with the context. He result is that there is a high degree of uncertainty associated with h some pieces of evidence that the SRO must use. All these factors make the 4
- i
- s Q
SRO's task of interpretation of plant state and the formulation of strategies a difficult. task. 3.3 Large number of highly interactive parts. The nuclear power plant environment is complex and highly interactive in nature. There is a many-to-many mapping between the physical systems / components and the functions. Additionally, each part (object) is itself a complex entity. As a result the SRO has to diagnose causes and devise strategies in a very large search space. The SRO must select a goal and process to focus on. The fact that there are interactions among parts of the plant.has implications for recovery strategies. The SRO must choose an action to implement a response by adjusting or replacing processes related to a disturbance, prevent consequences of disturbances from propagating to other goals, and trace the causal chain associated with a disturbance to identify the underlying cause. 1 Faults can have multiple consequences, multiple causes, multiple paths to satisfactory outcomes, and different kinds of relationships between parts. 3.4 Highly. automated world. The high. level of automation' means that supervising lower level controllers is a major component of the SRO's role during accident recovery. Supervisory control tasks are characterized by O discrete, intermittent controi, and monitoring activities and by expiicit decision-making in the transition between activities. In addition, there are multiple levels of supervisory control. This implies the need for the SRO to 3 perform several activities. The SRO must monitor the control of a process as well as monitor the state of the process being controlled. This is an additional layer of monitoring and control tasks that has been imposed by the addition of sometimes unreliable automatic controllers. The SRO must distinguish disturbances due to improper control of the process from disturbances in the process itself, and decide if and when to intervene in the automatically controlled process. 1
- 4. Accident response Abnormal or accident conditions can be viewed as falling along a continuum.
At one end of the continuum are accidents that have been extensively analyzed and planned for, for example, a loss of coolant accident..The potential for disaster has long been recognized: safety systems and procedures have been ~ designed and the SRO has been trained to mitigate the effects of such an accident. In such a situation very little knowledge-based behavior on the part O of the SRO is required to respond. At the other end of the continuum is the situation where the SRO has no training and no procedures to help him. This type of accident could occur as a consequence of a multiplicity of operator and 5
a-o equipment malfunctions. Operator education, training, and aids should be aimed at supporting both ends of this continuum. h When the accident has been extensively analyzed the SRO is involved in rule-based behavior. The SRO must know the situations to be recognized, the evidence indicating that these situations have arisen, and the response that should follow. Procedures are a formalized version of rule-based behavior that are useful because they form a coordinated frame of reference for operator activities. It is a common misconception that procedures can be written to handle all possible scenarios; the contributing role that procedures frequently play in serious accidents attests to this fact. By their very nature procedures have limitations. A procedure is a static, sequential list of activities that assumes a particular set of preconditions and a particular set of potential scenarios. The inherent weakness in procedures is that deviations can develop that render a particular procedure inappropriate for a particular situation (e.g., multiple failures). Although some incidents or. parts of incidents are more susceptible than others, and the quality of the procedure effects the frequency with which these arise, research in a variety of situations has shown that these factors can never be completely eliminated by expanding and refining procedures (for both pragmatic and theoretical reasons) and that these factors g are ubiquitous in actual serious accidents. When procedures are rotely followed performance breakdowns occur in a variety of conditions (Woods, Roth, and Bennett, in press). This statement is true for both the optimal recovery guidelines and the functional maintenance procedures. First, it is a very difficult task to write procedures at an appropriate level of detail. Overspecification results in procedures that are cumbersome to understand, physically
- unwieldy, and inflexible.
Under-specification results in the potential for misinterpretation or ambiguities in the procedures and insufficient direction for the operator. i l Special conditions or contexts (boundary conditions such as in the incidents described in NRC Information Notice 83-80 or impasses where assumptions about the procedures are not true) may exist that preclude their use. For example, is a given procedure still relevant given the changes in plant state induced by the failure of another system? Similarly, what happens if there is an error in execution by the operator that changes plant state?, or if novel situations arise (incidents not planned for or multiple failur'es)? A related point is that the procedures are rigid and may not be able to be adapted to special conditions or contexts. Good operations requires more than rote rule h following; it requires the operator to " understand how the various steps of a 6
Li i f Q procedure work together to produce intended effects" (Brown, Moran, & Williams,1982). As the accident deviates from the scenarios that the procedures assume the SRO becomes involved in knowledge-based behavior. There is a need to access more and more of the background knowledge (i.e., the specialist ' knowledge) that the procedures were based on. This includes the background 3 information for procedure ' steps, specialist knowledge about system design, { specialist knowledge about accident analysis, etc. The SRO must determine j that additional knowledge is needed, locate the source of that knowledge, and apply this knowledge to the novel situation. One way to conceptualize this is that during knowledge-based behavior in accident response there is a need for the gradual unfolding of more and more of the background knowledge behind the procedures.
- 5. Improving accident response The SRO response to accident conditions can be improved through a variety of methods which includes education, training, improved operator aids, and additional personnel. The benefits gained by improvements in each method is orthogonal: each can make a unique contribution regardless of improvements O
in the others. Increased formal education attempts to make the SRO better able to handle accidents by providing a background that increases the SRO's general knowledge. However, it is not clear how much this general knowledge would assist the SRO in the operational aspects of accident response. Another approach is to provide additional personnel (such as the TSC) that can provide specialist knowledge to assist the SRO. This approach has the advantage of providing distinctly different knowledge and perspectives regarding accident response, but the disadvantage of time lags and communication problems between these individuals (located outside the control room) and the SRO (who has full view, both visual and auditory, of all activities in the control room). ] Training is another method to improve SRO response to accident conditions. [ The goal of training for accident response is to allow the SRO to be able to recognize when a particular procedure is relevant (Brown et al.,1982) and to be able to execute the responses that the procedure calls for, to be able to recognize instances where procedures have become irrelevant, and to be able i to use the knowledge sources that are available to help prompt and retrieve appropriate guidance (either paper, computer-based, or human knowledge j sources). Operator aids are another means to improve SRO response to accident conditions. One approach that combines many improved operator aids is the 7
l 2 I supervisory center. The supervisory center could support both rule-based and knowledge-based problem solving in accidents. To support rule-based behavior the supervisory center could provide expanded and computerized emergency response procedures; to support knowledge-based behavior it could provide computerized sources of knowledge on a variety of topics relevant to fault. management, including technical specifications, a safety parameter display system, an alarm handling system, and design bases. ' The supervisory center could provide information 'in an easily accessible form that would augment the SRO's knowledge about emergency response. The supervisory center's potential to assist the SRO during accident conditions stems from the provision of. the. various types of knowledge in a single, integrated system. The SRO must consult a large number of knowledge sources (people, procedures, and manuals) to access the myriad of data that is relevant to accident response. The supervisory center could provide a single integrated system for easy and efficient access to much of this data, thereby decreasing the. time required to obtain this information. In addition, the supervisory center could allow this information to be seen in parallel, rather than sequential fashion, thus providing the SRO.the right information at the right time to assist in the difficult decision-making process. The supervisory - center could also reduce prospective memory requirements (such as remembering to complete steps of a procedure at a future time) by providing reminders to that effect. The SRO must consider a large number of relatively low-level data points and integrate this information to arrive at conclusions about higher-level issues. The supervisory center could help aggregate this information by performing pre-processing of the low-level data contained in data bases. This could be either in the form'of improved grapidc displays (such as SPDS systems) or computations (boolean logic or mathematical calculations). In the nuclear power plant there is a topology of relationships between systems, functions and objectives (Rasmussen and Ilnd, 1981). For example, there is a many-to ~many mapping between systems and functions, and problems in a given function can be caused or countered through several means. This means that the SRO must consider side effects associated with actions and multiple ] constraints on process availability. The supervisory center could aid the SRO in this task by keeping track of these relationships through an appropriate representation such as the goal /means hierarchy. This representation also allows the improved understanding of disturbances. When the levels of i organization associated with the goal /means hierarchy are linked to a spatial g display mechanism the SRO can directly see the current set of disturbances, the evidence that indicates these disturbances, and the relationships between S
1 s, Q disturbances _ (causal, consequential). The-SRO also needs to analyze past j plant behavior and anticipate future plant response. The supervisory center could help perform these replay and predictive behaviors. ) 1 Essentially the supervisory center can reduce the. overhead workload, and ) provide critical information in an easily accessible form, thereby increasing the j SRO's ability to respond to accident conditions. It is important to stress that the supervisory center does not imply a new ' ontrol room or even~ a significant c modification. Rather, it is an addition to existing control rooms. The supervisory center.would also provide another function as well. Often the individual who is responsible for the supervisory management' role is drawn into the equipment operator role. The SRO would have a designated place to 1 be (at the supervisory center), which would lessen the probability that the control room crew would neglect the more important role of supervisory management for the role of equipment operator. It is also important to stress that many of the components necessary to construct the supervisory center. (i.e., the software systems) already exist. Some of the computerized systems that we are familiar with are discussed in Section 7 of this paper.
- 6. Summary As the previous discussion has indicated, the SRO has inherent limitations on i
the type and the amount of information that can be processed, the nuclear power plant environment has characteristics that provide challenges to these-capabilities, and pre-planned guidance is often *mcomplete in actual abnormal i situations. The result is that during accident recovery the SRO is often engaged in problem solving activities. The SRO must process evidence and build up an assessment of the accident condition, generate, update and modify explanations that account for that' condition, generate expectations about i future plant behavior and potential recovery strategies, change these strategies - as a result of changing plant conditions, detect and resolve-discrepancies j L between the accident condition (or expectations about that condition) and new I evidence, and prioritize data-gathering and recovery actions. l The SRO has an invaluable store of operational knowledge that is necessary ) for accident re;vai. This knowledge has been built up as a result of-i l education, training, and the experiences that arose in the process of becoming an SRO (progressing from auxiliary operator to reactor or control operator to j SRO). Although an individual may be an expert in one or two aspects of j accident recovery, no one could possibly be an expert in all aspects. There are q O simeir too many reievant operationai and technicai detaiis. newever. the SRO is ultimately responsible for accident recovery, and for the critical first hour of an accident the SRO can be without help. The SRO needs additional 1 9
1 " i i ( i gs h- ~ engineering'. knowledge-to augment operational knowledge. The additional . engineering knowledge can be delivered in the form of education, training, h1 improved operator aids, and other individuals (such as the TSC). We believe that the most effective way to deliver this knowledge is through the supervisory j center, as described in this paper. When coupled with training on its use, the ' supervisory center will provide a powerful form of operator assistance for accident recovery. .t
- 7. Computerized systems suitable for supervison center 1
This section describes existing systems or prototypes that form the building blocks to construct an effective supervisory center, as described in this paper. The important point is that these systems actually exist; the supervisory center has a solid foundation as a result of previous development work. Although , there is considerable work in integrating these systems, some key elements of 'a supervisory center are under development, exist in prututype form, or are actually in use at some utilities. 7.1 Display of overall plant status . One of the most important aspects of SRO accident response is to maintain an understanding of the carrent plant state. As has been previously stated, the SRO's actions.are paced by the plant processes. 'Ihe SRO must be able to ' revise goals on the basis of changing conditions; it is imperative that the SRO works on the appropriate problem. In the present configuration of control rooms (typically a one sensor-one display philosophy) the operator must collect and integrate low-level information to reach a decision about high-level j issues..One of the functions that the supervisory center can provide is to j collect and integrate low-level information to depict overall system status. j J ..A particularly effective approach is to assimilate that data into a single perceptual object which makes the state of the system discernible at a glance. For example, as part of its HAI.O alarm handling system the OECD Halden j Reactor Project provides an overview of the plant status through the use of icons which graphically depict systems and subsystems. ' As part of its safety parameter ' display l system and computerized procedures Westinghouse has Ldeveloped a polygon display which depicts the overall safety status of a nuclear power plant (Woods, Wise, & Hanes,1931). The different spokes are hl dynamically' scaled so that a regular polygon always represents normal conditions, while distortions in the display represent a developing abnormality. 10 bS
hp ,] i i Q' Overall system status ~ displays have many advantages' for iraproved SRO-j information extraction, especially for fault detection. This type of: display enhances the SRO's ability to extract information about the overall health of the?. system. because it produces a better ' match between human cognitive characteristics and the cognitive demands of the tasks to be performed. This claim is supported.by the NRC's findings in their review of the Westinghouse generic ~ SPDS as stated in: the letter of February. 12, 1984-from Dennis . Crutchfield to E.P.' Rahe (Westinghouse): "we believe that the ability of the operator to perform appropriate tasks during off-normal conditions 'is enhanced by the information displayed by the WSPDS." 7.2 Alarm handling systems Traditionally, alarm systems consist of messages about simple set-point or state (e.g., open-closed) violations displayed as one dedicated message per set-point. However, the history of incidents is full with cases where operators were unable to detect, identify and respond to abnormal plant conditions with ] this type of alarm system (Banks and Boone,1981; Laes,1983). Investigators { have.noted that one source of these difficulties is " alarm inflation", i.e., the large number of messages that can be active simultaneously. Alarm inflation j h' is associated with (a) cases where operators fail to detect a highly important j alarm' given the large number of simultaneously active but. less important I messages'(high ambient data noise), and with (b) cases'where operators fail k to integrate disparate low level alarm messages into accurate higher level assessments of process abnormalities. Another closely related source of difficulties is "nuisanos alarms", i.e., " alarm" messages that are - not l abnormal, at least for current plant conditions. A third source of alarm inflation is " alarms" that are really equipment or system status messages, e.g., a message on the status (on-off) of a pump. The result is that operators must sift through large numbers of alarm messages in order to f' d and identify m abnormal conditions. The present configuration of alarm systems does,not provide adequate support to the SRO. There is a need to aid the SRO in the identification of and - response to abnormal conditions by calling his attention to conditions that may { require corrective action. This objective means that a good alarm system should (a) alert the SRO that a particular disturbance or abnormality may exist, (b) provide a means to evaluate the abnormality, and (c) provide a means to determine corrective action. h In the nuclear power plant there is a topology of relationships between systems, functions and objectives (Rasmussen and Und,1981). For example, there is a many-to-many mapping between systems and functions, and 11
Je p-4 problems in a given function can be caused or countered through several means.- This topology of entities and relationships forms one method to . produce high level descriptions that can aid SRO fault management (Woods, Elm, and Easter,1986).. There is a need to better organize data on abnormal conditions to aid SRO -detection, interpretation and response to abnormal conditions. This includes L separating alarm and status messages,. better definition of what constitutes an alarm, improved organization and display of abnormal data, and displays of goal-function-system topologies. An alarm system has been developed at Westinghouse which is based on this topology: the disturbance board (Woods et al.,1986). It uses a knowledge representation to define an information space at two levels: a high level view of the abnormal status of a plant function in the context of the abnormal status 1 of other functions, and a view of the specific abnormal conditions within a function in the context of what the function should achieve and what it needs to work properly. When these levels of organization are linked to a spatial display mechanism, i.e., the disturbance board, the SRO can directly see the current set of disturbances, what evidence indicates these disturbances, and ~ the relationships between disturbances (causal, m=:uential). The OECD Halden Reactor Project has also developed an alarm handling g system that reduces the number of alarms and presents alarm information through a spatial display mechanism. 7.3 Computedzed procedums During accident response the initial concern of the SRO is to protect the three primary boundaries that prevent fission product release. There may - be considerable stress in these conditions and the consequences of operator error are great. There has been a movement to develop computerized procedures which support the operator by providing increased access to guidance. For t example, EPRI supported developmental work on a disturbance analysis and . surveillance system (Gaudio and Jamison,1985). 'Ihe OECD Halden reactor project has also developed computerized procedures. A computerized procedure syst2m has been developed at Westinghouse which aids the operator by providing access to additional guidance (Upner, Munday, Impink, and Meyer,1985). It guides the user step by step through the procedures by monitoring the appropriate plant data, by processing the data, and by. identifying the recommended course of action. It also provides the necessary parallel information which allows the SRO to assess other plant g conditions which may require attention. It allows the user to understand overall system or safety status by displaying a summary of those items that are I 12
s T i-h considered crucial while following the current set of procedures. It alleviates SRO memory burden by automatically keeping track of items which the user must remember, such as tank levels.and component states. If such an item requires attention, the system informs the user of this fact, along with a statement of the action necessary to solve the problems. 7.4 Design bases There is a need to provide the SRO with information about the design bases underlying a particular event (i.e., the engineering knowledge that is specific to a particular accident). During the first hour the SRO typically does not have access to this type of information, which includes an understanding of the important parameters and the role of individual safety features as they relate to the accident. The original or current vendor analyses of I.DCA, transients, containment integrity, radiological releases and associated studies performed as a part of the licensing basis of the plant are additional examples.. Provision of this information would allow the SRO to access information regarding specific accidents, how a particular system is used in the accident, how/what technical specifications are affected by a particular accident, or how a particular parameter is effected by an accident. Such a system, callM the Accident Analysis Profile (AAF) system, has been developed at Westinghouse. The AAP allows safety and engineering evaluations to be done rapidly and effectively because a structured format is provided to access and store the original or current vendor analyses of LOCA, transients, containment integrity, radiological releases and associated studies performed by Westinghouse as a part of the licensing basis of the plant. This enables the SRO to search for and access detailed data by querying an accident, a system, a parameter, or a technical specification. 7.5 Computarized Technical Specincations One of the most important aspects of accident response is operability. A computerized technical specification system would allow the SRO to determine the impact of changes in component operability or plant mode on technical specification compliance. Furthermore, such a system would provide an efficient means to identify the technical specification interrelationships between components, systems, and other plant information. Additional benefits include consistent interpretation, assistance in tracking compliance, documentation, reporting, and equipment tag-out. This information improves g the SRO's ability to understand and evaluate the technical specifications. The primary function of the system would be to ensure that the utility's plant is operating in compliance with the technical specifications, down to the J l m
- l 4
component level of detail. Such a system would allow the SRO to track the h operation of key components and the effect of component status on corresponding technical specifications. It would also identify and track the relationships between the tech specs, components, and other plant information required by the SRO (such as time outages allowed for components). Such a system, called the Specappraisal system, has been developed at Westinghouse. A related Westinghouse system monitors the availability of safety systems. i This system, called the BISI system, is operational and has been installed in one plant. 4 4 I e 14
J 't. 0:
- 8. m.rer.nces Banks,.W. W. and Boone, M. P. 1981. Nuclear control room annunciators:
Problems and recommendations. National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA, (NUREG-CR-2147). Brown, J. S., Moran, T. P., & Williams, M. D. 1982. The semantics of. procedures. Technical Report, Xerox Palo Alto Research Center; Brown,.W, and Wyrick, R. (eds.). 1982. Analysis of steam generator tube ) rupture events at Oconee and Ginna. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (82-030). - Cain, D. G. 1986. Review of trends in computerized systems for operator support. Nuclear Safety, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 488-498. Gaudio, P. and Jamison, D. 1985. Computerized diagnostic Aid / success path monitor. EPRI Research Project 2402-2. Final report, Combustion -{ 1 engineering, Inc. I.mes, F. P. - (1983). Process computer alarm and disturbance analysis: Review-of the state of the art. Computers and Chemical Engineering, 7(6), pp. 669-694.. Lipner, M. H., Mundy, R. A., Impink, A. J., Jr., and Meyer, C. E. 1985. A-I computerized emergency procedure system for a pressurized water reactor. ANS Topical Meeting on Computer Applications for Nuclear Power Plant Operation and Control, pp. 392-398. NRC Information Notice 83-30. 1983. Misapplication of generic ~ emergency i operating procedure guidelines. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Wash., D. C. NUREG-CR-1154. I.oss of main and auxillary feedwater at the Davis-Besse plant on June 9,1985. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, D.C. NUREG-CR-3785. Olson, J., Schreiber, R. E., and Melber, B. D. 1984. Alternative appr%s to providing~ engineering expertise on shift. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, D.C. NUREG-CR-4532. Woods, D. D., and Roth, E. M. 1986. Models of cognitive l behavior in nuclear power plant personnel: A feasibility study. Volume 2: Main report. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, D.C. Pew, R. W., Miller, D. C., and Feehrer, C. E. 1981. Evaluation of proposed control room inprovements through analysis of critical operator decisions. Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA. /
Rasmussen, J.1986. Information processing and human-machine intera An approach to cognitive engineering. New York: Elsevier Publishing Rasmussen, J.1979. On the structure of knowledge-A morphology of Roskilde, Denmark: Riso National models in a man-machine context. Laboratory, Report No. M-2192. Rasmussen J. & Lind, M. 1981. Coping with complexity. European An Also in Conference on Human Decision Making and Manual Control, Delft. Roskilde, Denmark: Riso National Laboratory, Report No. M-2293. Woods, D. D., Elm, W. C., and Easter, J. R. 1986. The disturbance concept for intelligent support of fault management tasks. In Pro i Nuclear the International Topical Meeting on Advances in Human Pactors n Power. American Nuclear Society. Woods, D.D., Roth, E.M., & Bennett, K.B. (in press). Explorations in l human-machine cognitive systems. In W. Zachary, S. Robertson, f Nonvood, N.J.: Ablex (Eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Cooperation. Publishing Corp. Woods, D. D., Wise, J. A., & Hanes, L. P. (1981). An evaluation of Palo Alto, California: Electric Power Research g, parameter display systems. Institute, Research Project 891-5. l i i 16 i}}