ML20216F960
| ML20216F960 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1998 |
| From: | Imbro E NRC |
| To: | Bowling M NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216F963 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-423-97-210, NUDOCS 9804170291 | |
| Download: ML20216F960 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000423/1997210
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 4 001
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April 3,1998
Mr. Martin L. Bowling -
Recovery Officer- Millstone Unit 2
c/o Mr. Harry Miller
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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company .
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P.O. Box 128
Waterford, CT 06385
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND INDEPENDENT CORRECTIVE ACTION
VERIFICATION PROGRAM FUNCTIONAL INSPECTION OF MILLST
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UNIT 3 (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-423/g7-210)
Dear Mr. Bowling:
During the periods from January 5 -16 and January 26 - February 6,1998, a team from the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Special Projects Office, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, in accordance with SECY-97-003 * Millstone Restart Review Process,"
performed a Tier 1 in-scope inspection of your Unit 3 facility. This inspection was one part of
ongoing, multifaceted, NRC effort to evaluate Sargent and Lundy's (S&L) conduct of the
independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) and the effectiveness of your
configuration management plan (CMP). The results of the ICAVP will provide insights that will
be used by the NRC in assessing the effectiveness of your CMP and to determine your
readiness for the restart of Unit 3. The inspection team assessed the capability of the quench
and recirculation spray systeims, the emergency diesel sequencer, and a portion of the plant -
emergency ventilation system to perform the safety functions required by their design bases.
Adherence of the systems to their design and licensing bases, the consistency of the as built
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configurations with the Final Safety Analysis Report, and the consistency of system operations
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with the plant technical specifications, were also evaluated.
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The NRC determined that S&L successfully implemented the Tier 1 review of the systems
selected for this inspection. Based on observations by the inspection team, S&L expanded
their review efforts in the following areas: evaluating single failure vulnerabilities of electrical
control circuits, temporary modifications and structural calculations.
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The inspection findings were presented to you and your staff during a public meeting on
February 24,1998. The issues identified by the team, both individually and in aggregate, were
considered minor and of low safety significance. However, when the team departed the site
there was still a significant amount of work and operator training outstanding on the
recirculation spray system (RSS). A number of modifications were stillin the review or
implementation processes. In accordance with the ICAVP scope, S&L will evaluate recently
completed RSS-related modifications that make substantial changes to the system.
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Although there were modifications ongoing in the RSS system, the team was able to review a
substantial portion of the RSS design including some of the modifications completed during this
outage. Based on the results of the team's independent design review, the team's assessment
of the S&L implementation of Tier 1, and the relatively small number of confirmed level 3
discrepancy reports identified to date by S&L, preliminary indications are that the NNECO's
configuration management plan (CMP) was generally effective in identifying and correcting
nonconformances with the plant's design and licensing bases. While the team identified issues
not discovered by your CMP or by S&L, the safety significance of these findings was low. This
provides confidence that other issues, should any be discovered, would likely be of low
significance.
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During the onsite inspection the team identified two inadequate procedures, two design
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discrepancies, and a failure to take adequate corrective actions. These findings have been
cited as violations in the enclosed Notice of Violation. Please note that you are required to
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respond to the Notice of Violation and should follow the instructions specified when preparing
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your response.
The violations contained in this report have been categorized as being equivalent to ICAVP
significance level 3 findings. ICAVP level 3 findings have been defined by the NRC to occur if a
system is outside its licensing and design bases but is still able to perform its intended function,
in a January 30,1998, letter to you from the Director of the Special Projects Office, the NRC's
criteria for determining whether to expand the scope of the ICAVP was described. An important
factor in making this determination is the NRC's assessment of the effectiveness of the
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corrective actions taken to address the findings. Your corrective actions taken in response to
these findings will be assessed by the NRC as part of our review of the implementation of
ICAVP-related corrective actions.
As noted earlier, this inspection was part of the NRC's ongoing assessment of the effectiveness
of your CMP and S&L's ICAVP. The findings of this inspection will be combined with the results
of other NRC inspections to make an overall determination of the restart readiness of Unit 3 and
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your configuration management practices.
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In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations, Section 2.790(a), a copy of this
letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions conceming the enclosed inspection report, please contact the
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project manager, Mr. J. Andersen at (301) 415-1437, or the inspection team leader,
Mr. J. Luehman, at (301) 415-3150.
Sincerely,
Eugene V. Imbro, Deputy Director
ICAVP Oversight
Special Projects Office
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Docket No. 50 423
Enclosures:
2. Inspection Report 50-423/97-210
cc w/ enclosures: See next page
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inspection Report 50-423/97-210
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cc w/ enclosures:
M. Brothers, Vice President - Operations -
J. Streeter, Vice President, Nuclear Oversight
D. Hicks, Unit Director - Millstone Unit 3
D. Amerine, Vice President for Engineering and Support Services
F. h. then, Vice President, Work Services
S. Sherman, Audits and Evaluation
R. Johannes, Director, Nuclear Training
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L. Cuoco, Esquire
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J. Egan, Esquire
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V. Juliano, Waterford Library ._
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J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control
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S. Comley, WE THE PEOPLE
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State of Connecticut SLO Designee
D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)
R. Bassilakis, CAN
J. Block, Esquire, CAN
S. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC)
Representative T. Concannon
E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, Nuclear Energy Advisory Council
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