ML20216F005
| ML20216F005 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1998 |
| From: | William Reckley Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216F009 | List: |
| References | |
| NPF-06-A-189 NUDOCS 9803180220 | |
| Download: ML20216F005 (18) | |
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kl UNITED STATES a
E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E
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1 ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC.
DOCKET NO. 50-368 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.189 License No. NPF-6 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Com nission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) dated September 23,1997, as supplemented on February 27 and Maith 4,1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance- (1) that the activities authorized b' this
/
amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
1 I
9803100220 980312 PDR ADOCK 05000368 P
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2-2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicaterf e the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating dcanse No. NPF-6 is hereby amended to read as follows:
2.
Tech.11 cal Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 189, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION G<
f-William Reckley, Project Manag r Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects lil/lV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: March 12, 1998 l
. ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.189 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-6 DOCKET NO. 50-368 l
Revise the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages.
The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the l
area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
REMOVE PAGES INSERT PAGES 2-5 2-5 3/4 3-1 3/4 3-1 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-6a 3/4 3-6b 3/4 34c 3/4 3-10 3/4 3-10 l
3/4 3-17 3/4 3-17 3/4 3-18 3/4 3-18 3/4 3-19 3/4 3-19 3/4 3-20 3/4 3-20 3/4 6-7 3/4 6-7 B 3/4 3-1 B 3/4 3-1
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3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
l APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.
)
ACTION:
As shown in Table 3.3-1.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPEPABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.
4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.
4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing.
Each test l
shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.
4.3.1.1.4 The Core Protection Calculator System shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that less than three auto restarts have occurred on each calculator during the past 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
4.3.1.1.5 The affected Core Protection Calculator Channel shall be subjected to a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST to verify CPERABILITY within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of receipt of a valid CPC Cabinet High Temperature alarm.
ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. M,4M,MS,l09
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ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-6 Amendment No.189 I
p,.LE 403-1 REACT 0X FROTECTION INSTRW.ENTATION StFRUEILLANCE REQUIRDGNTS
~
CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CRANNEL PUNCT20NAL SURVEILIANCE PUNCT20NAL UNIT CNECK CALIBRATION
' TESTS REQUIRED 1.
Manual Reacter Trip N.A.
N.A.
S/Ull)
N.A.
2.
Linear Power 2evel - Righ 3
D(2,4),
TA(10) 2, 2 j
M(3,4),
0(4) 3.
Logarithmie Power Level - Eigh 3
R(4)
TA(10),
2,2,3,4,5 S/U(1) and
- 4.
Pressuriser Pressure - Eigh 3
R TA(10) 2, 2 l
S.
Pressuriser Pressure - Low S
R TA(10) 2, 2,3*,4*,5*
l 6.
Containment Pressure - Eigh S
A TA(10) 1, 2 l
1.
Steam Generator Pressure - Low 5
R TA(10) 1, 2,3*,4*,5*
l S.
Steam Generator Level - Low 3
R TA(10) 2, 2 l
9.
Local Power Density - Nigh 3
D (2,4 ),
TA(10),
1, 2 R(4,5)
R(6)
I 10.
DNSR - Low S
S(7),
TA(10),
1, 2
}
D(2,4),
R(6)
M(8),
R(4,5) 11.
Steam Generator Level - Eigh 3
R TA(10) 2, 2 l
12.
Reactor Protection System Logic W.A.
W.A.
TA(10) 2, 2,3*,4*,5*
l 13.
Reactor Trip Breakers N.A.
N.A.
M 2, 2,3*,4*,5*
14.
core Protection Calculatt,rs S
D(2,4)
TA(9,10),
2, 2 R(4,5)
R(6)
~
15.
CEA calculators S
R TA(10),
2, 2 R(6)
}
\\
ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 2/4 3-7 Amendment No. 84,44,M,444,189 lb W 2 1 1997
Abive 104 cf SIATED TErJenL potrER, verify that th3 t tal RCS flew (7) rato as indicat:d by cach CPC is loss than sr cpel to th3 cetual RCs tstel ficw r:to datermin:d by cither using tho monttar eenient pmqp difforcatici pr:ssuro instrumentctita (conservatively compensate for measurunent uncertainties) er by
(
calorimetric calculations (conservatively seaponsated for measurament uncertainties) and if necessary, adjust the CPC addressable constant flow soefficients such that each CPC indicated flow is less than or opal to the actual flow rate.
The flow measurement uncertainty may be included in the SEIUt1 j
teza in the CPC and is opal to er greater than 44.
j Above 704 of RATED TEDOOLL EDIFER, verify that the total RCS flow (8) rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or egal to the actual RCs total flow rate determined by calorimetric calculations (conservatively sospensated for measurement macertainties).
The CPC CEANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include the verification that (9) the correct values of addressable constants are installed in each OPERABLE CPC.
en a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
l (10) t AnxANsAs - mrIT 2 3/4 3-9 Amendment No. 44,*e,w,444,186 13Y 21 n?7
INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGXNEERED SAFETY FFATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION PVR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and bypasses shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip setpoint column of Table 3.3-4.
l APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.
ACTION:
a.
With an ESTAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
b.
With an ESTAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.1.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL fvNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.
4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated CPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.
4.3.2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESTAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.
Each test shall include at leasr. one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels
...n sa specific ESFAS function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" Colums Jf Table 3.3-3.
l i
l ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-10 Amendment No.189
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ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-20 Amendment No. 49,44,189
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IIIiIIlllllIIIIIIIlllll'llIl REGION OF UNACCEPTABLE OPERATON 16.5 RELATIVE HUMIDITY f.,.
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y (125.1,13.2) 13 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 CONTAINMENT AVERAGE AIR TEMPERATURE (T)
CONTAINMENT INTERNAL PRESSURE vs.
AVERAGE AIR TEMPERATURE FIGURE 3.6-1 NOTE:
Instrument Error is not Included on curve ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 6-7 Amendment No. 4,34,u e,u s,189
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRftY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1.5 The structural integrity ef the containment shall be mintained at a level consistant with the actoptance criteria in Specification 4.5.1.5.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 51, 2, 3 and 4 ACTION:
With the structural integrity of the contairunent not conforming to tne above recuirements, restore the strvetural integrity to within the limits within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least NOT STAND 8Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD $NUTDOWN within the following 30 hoars.
$URVEILLANCEREQUIRE$ENTS i
- 4. 6.1. 5.1 Containment Tendons The contairenant tendons' structura" integrity snali ne amenstrated at the end of one, three and dive years il do11owing tne initial containment structural integrity test and at five
] year intervals thereafter. The tendons' structural integrity shall be demonstrated by a visual examination (to the extent practical and with.
out dismantling load bearing ccenponents of the anchorage) of a repre.
sentative sample' of at least 21 tendons (6 dame, 5 vertical, and 10 hocc) and verifying no abnormal degradation. Unless there is evidence of abnormal degradation of the contairunent tendons during the first three tests of the tendons, the nwnber of tendons examined during sub.
secuent testa may be reduced to a representative sample of at least 9 tencons (3 dome, 3 vertical and 3 hoop).
"For each inspection, the tendons shall be selected on a random but representative basis so that the sample grove will change somewhat for each inspection; however, to develop a history of tendon performance and to correlate the observed data, one tendon from each group (dome, verttcal, and hoop) may be kept unchanged after the initial selection.
I ARKANSAS. UNIT 2 3/4 $=8
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3f/,4. 3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (EST)
INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and EST instrumentation systems and I
bypasses ensure that 1) the associated Esr action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a chan -1 to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system l
functional capability is available for protective and Esr purposes from l
diverse parameters.
l The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systens is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. The triannual channel functional testing frequency is to be performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
The swasurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and Esr action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.
l The RPS and ESTAS response time tables have been relocated to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.
Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response l
time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsit' test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.
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ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. M,M,M6,189
g-8Lsts Plant prstective Systca (PPS) logic is designed for speratica os a 2 out of-3 logic although normally it d.s operated in a 2-out of 4
)
mose.
The RPS Logfc tonstats of everything downstream of the bistable relays and upstream of the Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers. The RPS Lorfe is divided into two parts. Matria Logic, and Initiation Logic.
Failures of individual b1 stables and their relays are sensidered esasurement thannel failures.
The E5FA5 Logic consists of everything downstream of the 61 stable relays and upstream of the subgroup relays. The ESFAS Logic is divided into three parts. Matrix Logic. Initiation Lepic. 'and Actuation Logic. Failures of individual bistables and their relays are considered sensurement thannel failures.
Matrix Logic refe,rs to the matriz power supplies. trip channel bypass sentacts, and interconnecting matrix wiring between bistable relay cards. up to, but not including the matrix relays. Matrix sontacts on the bistable relay cards are excluded from the Matrix Logic definition since they are addressed as part of the measurement channel.
Initiation Logic tensists of the trip path power source. matrix relays and their associated contacts, all interconnecting wiring, and the initiation relays (including contacts).
E5FAS Actuation Logic consists of all circuit'ry housed within the l
l Auxiliary Relay Cabinets (ARCS) used to house the ESF Functions 1
excluding the subgroup relays, and interconnecting wiring to the
' -inittstion relay zentacts mounted in.the PPS tabinet....... ---
.l For the purposes of this LCO. de energitation of arp to three estria power supplies due to a single failure. such as less of a vital instrument bus. is to be treated as a single matrix channel failure, providing the affected matrix relays de energize as designed to I
produce a half-trip. Although each of the sta matrices within en E5FAS Function (e.g.. SIAS. M5!$. CSAS. etc.) uses separate power supplies, the matrices for the different E5FA5 Functions share power supplies. Thus. failure of a matrix power supply may force entry into the Condition specified for each of the associated ESFA5 Functional Units.
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l ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3 3/4 3 la Amendment No.159 CMD.hki JBOL 6g 6&( $5 eas e e e