ML20216D710
| ML20216D710 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1999 |
| From: | Jonathan Brown UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 70-7002-99-05, GDP-99-2034, NUDOCS 9907300078 | |
| Download: ML20216D710 (6) | |
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USEC A Global Energy Company July 23,1999 GDP 99-2034 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS)
Docket No. 70-7002 Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Concern in Inspection Report (IR) 70-7002/99005 The subject IR contained two violations concerning failure to follow plant procedures. While the IR did not require the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to respond to these violations, the NRC requested USEC to respond to the " apparent generic weaknesses in your stafTs knowledge and rigor ofimplementation of plant procedures that the individual violations indicate."
A multi-disciplined team was assembled which performed an extensive review of this issue. The results of their review and the corrective actions that USEC is taking to address this issue are provided in Enclosure 1. Enclosure 2 lists the commitments contained in this submittal. Unless specifically noted, the corrective actions specified in the enclosures apply solely to PORTS.
Ifyou have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Peter J. Miner at (740) 897-2710.
Sincerely, W
. Morris Brown General Manager Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Oh
Enclosures:
As Stated cc.
NRC Regional Administrator - Region llI NRC Resident inspector - PORTS i
9907300078 990723 PDR ADOCK 07007002 C
PDR United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant P.O. Box 628, Piketon, OH 45661 L
GDP 99-2034 Page1of4 UNITED STATES ENRICllMENT CORPORATION (USEC)
RESPONSE TO NRC CONCERN IN INSPECTION REPORT (IR) 70-7002/99005 1.
Background Information in IR 99005, the NRC issued two violations concerning failure to follow plant procedures.
While the IR did not require the USEC to respond to lhese violations, the NRC requested
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USEC to respond to the " apparent generic weaknesses in your staff s knowledge and rigor ofimplementation of plant procedures that the individual violations indicate." In response, USEC assembled a multi-disciplined team to investigate the site procedure noncompliances, determine the root causes of the noncompliances, and develop corrective actions. This team consisted ofindividuals from Maintenance, Operations, Engineering, Production Support, Site and Facilities, Administrative Support, Environmental Safety and Health, Work Control, and Regulatory Affairs. Additionally, an individual from the Paducah Gaseous Difrusion Plant also assisted in the investigation.
The objectives of the team were to determine in each organization the extent of the condition, the root causes and contributing causes using the Taproot
- analysis methodology, and to i
develop a corrective action plan to improve performance in this area. To investigate the extent of this condition, trend reports were reviewed relating to failure to follow procedures and inadequate procedures. These trend reports, along with their raw data, were then i
analyzed by the team members. Based on their review and analysis, the team identified the following:
Over the past year (June 1,1998 to May 31,1999) there have been approximately 360 Problem Reports (prs) relating to failure to follow procedures. A review of the trends for this area revealed there has been an increase in failure to follow procedures over the past year on a per month basis.
Approximately 80% of procedure violations identified over the past year relate to noncompliance with administrative procedures (which are primarily Information Use procedures). The major categories of these procedure noncompliances were:
Radiation Protection / Radiological Control Lockout /Tagout Calibration In an earlier effort to address procedure noncompliances (i.e., those identified in IR 98005), site training was conducted at PORTS on June 17,1998 to emphasize the importance of procedure compliance.
During that training, management concentrated on adherence to work procedures (i.e., In-Hand and General Intent procedures) and what to do if deficiencies in these procedures were discovered. A
GDP 99-2034 Page 2 of4 review of trend reports and raw data revealed that the number of work procedure violations have been reduced and the number of problem reports identifying inadequate work procedures has increased. This indicates that the work force is aware of the importance of adhering to work procedures and identifying work procedure deficiencies.
Approximately 66% of the root cause investigations conducted on failure to follow administrative procedures have resulted in cause codes of either " accountability" or
" enforcement needs improvement," while an additional 25% have a cause code of
" communication of procedure change and/or new procedures needs improvement."
The nature of the procedure noncompliances is not limited to a few isolated procedures but is spread over numerous programs.
Many of the PORTS XP2 procedures (i.e., those procedures that apply to more than one site organization) do not have formal training modules and many that do are conducted only on an "as required" basis. There is a tendency to rely heavily on required reading to communicate procedure revisions, which has been ineffective, in many cases.
Less than 10% of prs relating to failure to follow procedures have personnel or nuclear safety significance. Rather, they relate to administrative requirements such as documentation or communication.
In order to gain additional insight into the problems associated with failure to follow procedures, a questionnaire was developed and interviews were conducted with over 80 personnel in a variety of organizations. This additional investigation identified a number of problems which were reviewed and categorized into problem statements. The problem statements were then analyzed using the Taproot
- analysis methodology.
II.
Causes of Procedure Noncompliance i
Based on the results of the reviews and the analysis described in Section 1, the following root causes were identified:
Administrative procedures are not properly communicated to the personnel esponsible for implementing them and the requirements are not reinforced on an ongoing basis. Personnel interviewed stated that they are not always familiar with these type procedures, and in some cases, there is little or no continuing training.
GDP 99-2034 Page 3 of 4 The procedure development process does not take skill-of-the-craft into consideration, which sometimes results in procedures containing excessive detail.
Additionally, the verification and validation process does not effectively utilize feedback from personnel who use the procedure.
III.
Corrective Actions In February 1999, PORTS conducted a site-wide stand down regarding an adverse trend in Human Performance. This stand down discussed recent human performance errors including procedure noncompliances. This stand down emphasized that personnel must clearly follow procedures and pay attention to detail.
Procedure Compliance at PORTS has been added to the " Adverse Trend" section of the PORTS Corrective Actions Program Report. This will first appear in the July 1999 report. This performance indicator will be reviewed monthly by PORTS Senior Management to determine if effective corrective actions are being taken.
Organization Managers will review with their employees the requirements of those administrative procedures that their organization have experienced the most noncompliances with and the employee's responsibilities for following these procedures. This action will be completed by August 21,1999.
The procedure change process will be revised to incorporate the first time use concept into the validation process to gain feedback from the individuals doing the work. This action will be completed by September 30,1999.
Administrative procedures will be evaluated to identify those which present a risk to personnel or nuclear safety when a single violation of the procedure occurs. This action will be completed by October 15,1999. Following this evaluation, actions will be developed to add or revise training on these procedures, as appropriate.
The process for issuing / revising procedures will be revised to strengthen the process of training on administrative procedures. Specifically, this revision will address continuing training for administrative procedures. This action will be completed by January 15,2000.
The procedure change process will be revised to require that a training summary be developed for procedure revisions. This training summary will highlight the procedure requirements and changes. This training summary will be utilized when conducting required reading or crew briefings for procedure training. This action will be completed by January 15,2000.
I GDP 99-2034 Page 4 of 4 l
A follow-up assessment will be initiated to evaluate the effectiveness of the above corrective actions to determine if the desired result is being achieved and to determine if additional actions are warranted. The PORTS Nuclear Regulatory AfTairs Manager I
l will advise the NRC Senior Resident Inspector of the results of this assessment. This action will be completed by June 23,2000.
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a GDP 99-2034 Page1 of2 List of Commitments
- Organization Managers will review with their employees the requirements of those administrative procedures that their organization have experienced the most noncompliances with and the employee's responsibilities for following these procedures. This action will be completed by August 21,1999.
The procedure change process will be revised to incorporate the first time use concept into the validation process to gain feedback from the individuals doing the work. This action will be completed by September 30,1999.
Administrative procedures will be evaluated to identify those which present a risk to personnel or nuclear safety when a single violation of the procedure occurs. This action will be completed by October 15,1999. Following this evaluation, actions will be developed to add or revise training on these procedures, as appropriate.
The process for issuing / revising procedures will be revised to strengthen the process of training on administrative procedures. Specifically, this revision will address continuing i
training for administrative procedures. This action will be completed by January 15,2000.
The procedure change process will be revised to require that a training summary be developed for procedure revisions. This training summary will highlight the procedure requirements and changes. This training summary will be utilized when conducting required reading or crew I
briefings for procedure training. This action will be completed by January 15,2000.
A follow-up assessment will be initiated to evaluate the effectiveness of the above corrective l
actions to determine if the desired result Is being achieved towards procedure compliance
. and determine if additional actions are warranted. The PORTS Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager will advise the NRC Senior Resident inspector of the results of this assessment.
This action will be completed by June 23,2000.
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- Regulatory commitments contained in this document are listed here. Other corrective actions listed in this submittal are not considered regulatory commitments in that they are either statements of actions completed, or they are considered enhancements to USEC's investigation, procedures, programs, or operations.
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