ML20216C295
| ML20216C295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1998 |
| From: | Curry D AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUM2-PPNR-1143, NUDOCS 9803130362 | |
| Download: ML20216C295 (20) | |
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PARSONS Daniel L. Curry, vce Prewoont. Nuclear servces l
Parsons EnerWy & Chemicals Group inc j
2675 Morgantown Road a Reading. Pennt.y!vania 19607 + (610) 855-2366
- Fax: (610) 855-2602 j
l Febmary 19,1998 Docket No. 50-336 Parsons NUM2-PPNR-Il43-L l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk l
Washington, D.C. 20555 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 2 Independent Corrective Action Verification Pronram (ICAVP)
Gentlemen:
This letter transmits summaries of telephone conferences between Parsons Power Group Inc., the U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NNECo and NEAC on January 22, January 27, January 29, February 3 and February 5,1998.
Please call me at (610) 855-2366 if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
_J Daniel L. Curry Parsons ICAVP Project Director DLC:djv Attachments 1.
Telephone Conference Notes from January 22,1998 2.
Telephone Conference Notes from January 27,1998 3.
Telephone Conference Notes from January 29,1998 l
4.
Telephone Conference Notes from February 3,1998 5.
Telephone Conference Notes from February 5,1998 cc:
E. Imbro (2) - USNRC J. Fougere - NNECo r
i H. Eichenholz - USNRC Rep. Terry Concannon - NEAC R. Laudenat - NNECo Project Files
.9 ll ll IlllllillllllNl1lll15l15111111 9003130362 980219 PDR ADOCK 05000336 i.m gim gIIII,lusi,lml[ LIE,lu ll,u p
PDR PPNR1143. doc l
4 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES January 22 1998 2
DATE:
JANUARY 22,1998 PURPOSE:
Administrative telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
. DR 0052 Specification SP-ME-224
=
MEPL Determination CD-3210M DCN DM2-S4878-95 e
IIPSI Flow Rertriction Orifices PDCR-2-7-90 Emergency Diesel Generators, Water Detection in Oil Storage Tanks RPS Reactor Coolant Low Flow j
4 LIST OF ATTENDEES:
l NNECo NRC NEAC Parsons Joe Fougere John Nakoski Bruce Deist Fred Mattioli Wayne Dobson Chris Cristallo Dan Wooddell Paul Collette Lou Mscichc,wski Roger Beal Wade Russell Bill Price Claude Didier Rich Ewing Richard Boyd Rick Bonner Candace segar John Bemis Torn Flemming Phil Higgins Jon Winterhalter Rich Glaviano 1.
Topic: DR-0052 (Dan Wooddell)
In reference to the 1-19-98 meeting between NNECo and Parsons, additional information is to be provided regarding DR-0052.
DR-0032 Items No.1, 4A, & 4B - NU is to pic nde a complete A WO to show that documentation exists for the DR concerns raised DR-0052 Item No. 3 - NU committed to revising the procedure to address this concern.
DR-0052 Item No. 4C - Use ofa templisticks is a common maintenance practice. NUhas no QA tracking.for templisticks.
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l ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES Janurry 22,1998 2.
Topic: Specification SP-ME-224 (Lou Mscichowski)
Background:
Tier 3 is reviewing specification revisions to determine if any configuration management deficiencies were caused by this change process. Specification SP-ME-224 was prepared in 1979-80 to purchase 1",1-1/2" and 2",600ll, socket weld gate and check valves. The valves are classified QA Category 1. The specification gives no indication as to why the valves were being purchased or where the valves were to be used. Since Tier 3 is only reviewing specification changes not associated with modifications we need to know why the specification was initiated and what caused the revisions.
Questions:
Were these valves purchased as ptrt of a modification?
The current revision is revision 2. What process initiated this revision?
e Generically, for specifications that are revised without DCN's, how de we determine what vehicle
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e initiated the change and the reason for the change?
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For specifications that are changed without DCN's how do we find the related 50.59 Safety Evaluation Screening?
A paper trail could not befound to determine why the specification was prepared or the intended use of the valves. Disc:tssions with personnel who have been at Afillstone since 1979-80 indicate the specification was associated with a PDCRfor modifications to the RBCCWsystem. The PDCR was canceled and the modification was never installed.
Revision 2 appears to be a result ofconforming the specification to the purchase order, although it is not clear as to whether the valves were everpurchased.
Currently specification revisions are initiatedin accordance with the DChi, Chapter 6. Prior to the effective date ofthe DCAfit is not always clear as to what initiated the specification change.
Currently 50.59 's are attached to the specification in accordance with the DCAf, Chapter 6. Prior to the effective date ofthe DCAf the 50.59 's were attached to the PDCR.
3.
Topic: MEPL Determination CD-3210M (Wade Russell)
Background:
MEPL Determination CD-3210 determined that numerous components in several systems requied a classification upgrade.Section XI.c of Figure 7.3 indicated that a CR/NCR had been written. We have been unable to locate a CR or UIR associated with this MEPL Determination?
Question:
Is there a CR/NCR associated with MEPL Determination CD-32107 If so, please provide an ID for this CR/NCR.
A CR andNCR were writtenfor AfEPL Determination CD-3210. The ID 's are NCR 297-455 and CR Af2-97-2572.
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ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES Janu:ry 22,1998 4.
Topic: P&lD revision due to DCN DM2-S-0878-95. (Claude Didier)
Background:
The RBCCW P&lD 25203-26022 has been updated per DCN DM2-S-0878-95. The change added three drain valves: 2-RB-405, 2-RB-406, and 2-RB-412. We are having difficult time determining if these valves are included ia related drawings.
Question: Are these valves depicted on other drawings such as small bore isometric's, stress iso's, etc?.
If so what are the drawing numbers?
These three valves are not on any related drawings at this time. The piping lines containing these valves are shown in thefollowing drawings:
Valve 2-RB-405 25203-20150 sht. 607 Valve 2-RB-406 25203-20150 sht. 926 Valve 2-RB-412 25203-20150 sht. 23 NNECo used a line list which cross references the iso's and P&lD in order tofind these iso's. Parsons will prepare an RAI to obtain a copy ofthis list.
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Topic: IIPSI (Richard Boyd)
Question: What manufacturer drawings are identified with the flow restriction orifices in the HPSI System; FO-3693 to -37007 Please identify the specifications used to purchase this equipment.
Several documents were identijled during the conference. 7hese documents will be requested via an RAI
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requesting " January 22 Conference Documents "
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6.
Topic: PDCR 2-7-90 (Candace Segar)
Question: The review of this PDCR cannot find information on applicable electrical drawings.
Please identify all applicable electrical drawings for this modification.
PA #84-063 in GRITS willlist all drawings. Parson will obtain the informationfrom GRITS 7.
Topic: Emergency Diesel Generators; (Tom Flemming, Jon Winterhalter)
Background:
Regarding pumps (P-47A and B), Diesel Oil Storage Tank (T47A), and Diesel Oil Transfer Tank T47A is monitored for inventory weekly, fuel quality monthly,10 gallons is pumped off the bottom e
quarterly, and volumetrically tested (frequency not found). LI-7004 has setpoint of 20%.
Pumps P-47A and B are automatically controlled by level in the Diesel Oil Supply Tanks (T48A and B).
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4 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES Jtnurry 22,1998 l
Questions:
is there any instrumentation to detect water in the Diesel Oil Storage Tank on a continuous basis?
e is there any procedure that describes the removal of the Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps from e
automatic operation? If so, under what conditions would that occur?
This question was deferred to the next conference, scheduledfor 1/27L98
- 8.. Topic: RPS Trip Setpoint for RC Low Flow (Rich Glaviano - Tier 2)
Background:
Tech Spec Table 2.2-1, item 3 lists the RPS Trip setpoint as 91.7% of total RC Flow. The allowable value is 90.9% of total flow.
Question:
1.
Drawing 25203-28500 Sh 72 shows the individual RC loop flows are summed to giw. nCS flow. The RC Low Flow trip setpoint is determined by multiplying 91.7% by the total RCS flow.
When actual flow drops below this value, a reactor trip signal is generated. Is Parsons understanding of the trip setpoint development correct?
The reactor trip signal is based on total RCSflow.
- 2. The Loss of Forced RC Flow event, initiated at full power, is stated in FSAR section 14.3.1 to represent the bounding condition for a complete or partial loss of RCS flow. Are the following events in the MP-2 licensing basis:
- a. Trip of 2 RC Pumps in the same loop?
- b. Trip of 3 RC Pumps?
- 3. With regard to the RC Pump Rotor Seizure event (14.3.3), the trip of a single RC pump is not directly modeled in the MP-2 analyses. Rather, the " cold leg" flows are combined and modeled as a " loop" flow reduction. For the affected loop, I core quadrant has forced flow, while the adjacent quadrant (with the tripped pump) does not. Is the accident analysis model conservative with regard to the power / flow distribution for the affected loop?
Parts 2 and 3 of this question were deferred to the next conference, scheduledfor 1/27/98 r-4 Of 4
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES January 27,1998 DATE:
JANUARY 27,1998 PURPOS2:
Administrative telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
RPS Trip Setpoint e
. DR 0133 Inservice Inspection FSARCRs LIST OF ATTENDEES:
l NNECo NRC NEAC Parsons Joe Fougere Steve Reynolds Wayne Dobson Gary Komosky John Nakoski Don Marks Mike Ahern Jon Winterhalter Norbert Carte Rich Olson Charles Dempsey Thomas Flemming Nabil Juraydini Roger Mauchline Robert Skwirz Rich Glaviano j
Dave Bajumpaa Larry B. Collier Ray L. Thomas John Hilbish Steve Fogelson 1.
Topic: Emergency Diesel Generators; Continued from 1/22/98 Conference (Tom Flemming, Jon Winterhalter)
Background:
Regarding pumps (P-47A and B), Diesel Oil Storage Tank (T47A), and Diesel Oil Transfer Tank T47A is monitored for inventory weekly, fuel quality monthly,10 gallons is pumped off the bottom quarterly, and volumetrically tested (frequency not found). LI-7004 has setpoint of 20%
Pumps P-47A and B are automatically controlled by level in the Diesel Oil Supply Tanks (T48A and B).
Questions:
Is there any instrumentation to detect water in the Diesel Oil Storage Tank on a continuous basis?
Is there any procedure that describes the removal of the Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps from e
automatic operation? If so, under what conditions would that occur?
Response to first part: There is no means to continuously monitorfor water in the tank.
Answer to secondpart: The only reason the pumps will be removedfrom automatic control is in response to high level alarms at windows B32 and B33. The pump supply breakers would be opened to prevent overflowing the tanks.
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t ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES l
Janu;ry 27c 1998 j
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Topic: RPS Trip Setpoint for RC Low Flow - Continued from 1/22/98 Conference -(Rich Glaviano)
Background:
Tech Spec Table 2.2-1, Jtem 3 lists the RPS Trip setpoint as 91.7% of total RC Flow. The allowable value is 90.9% of total flow.
Questions:
The Loss of Forced RC Flow event, initiated at full power, is stated in FSAR section 14.3.1 to represent the bounding condition for a complete or partial loss of RCS flow. Are the following events j
in the MP-1 licensing basis:
Trip of 2 RC Pumps in the same loop?
Trip of 3 RC Pumps?
e Respense: These scenarios require midtiplefailures andare not in the Millstone Unit 2 Licensing Basis j
l With regard to the RC Pump Rotor Seizure event (14.3.3), the trip of a single RC pump is not directly modeled in the MP-2 analyses. Rather, the " cold leg" flows are combined and modeled as a " loop" flow reduction. For the affected loop, I core quadrant has forced flow, while the adjacent quadrant (with the tripped pump) does not. Is the accident analysis model conservative with regard to the power / flow distribution for the affected loop?
Response: The reactor vessel distribution plenum is designed toprovide mixingprior to distribution ofcoolant to the,fuelassemblies.
3.
Topic: DR 0133 Response / Disposition (Roger L. Mauchline)
Background:
The DR stated that additional loads in anchorage elements due to possible eccentricities of attachment points with anchoring elements could cause the loads / stresses in some elements to exceed allowables. The Disposition response rejected the DR based on several factors including some statements that numerically defined the efTect of eccentricities (page 4 of 5). The bases for the statements about eccentricities are not cler.r and are the occasion for the specific questions that follow.
Questions:
For the anchor configuration used on Group 1 and Group 2 cabinets, how are the postulated (stud load / applied load) factors of 4/3 and 2.5/2 calculated?
For the anchor configuration used on Group 3 and Group 4 cabinets, please explain how possible e
eccentricities do not cause higher plate bending as compared to concentric loading (equal loading from both channel flanges).
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ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES Jrnu:ry 27,1998 Comment: Ihese questions have been rescheduledfor the next conference, January 29,1998 4.
Topic: Inservice Inspection (Larry Collier)
Regarding: Replacement snubber 12397 installed in 1994 using WO M2-94-06794 Questions:
Was a VT-4 type examination performed (under thejurisdiction of ASME Section XI Code 1981 Edition through the Winter 1981 Addenda) or, a functional test (as described in the technical specifications) performed for the subject replacement snt.bber?
Please provide the appropriate document identification for the examination or test performed.
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Comment: RAI written to obtainfunctional test datafor snubber.
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5.
Topic: FSARCRs (Rich Olson) t I
Discussion: He lowest numbered item in the " Final Safety Analysis Report Change (FSAR/ NOSE) Data Base" is 83-MP2-18, and several other FSARCR sequence numbers are not listed in the data base.
Questions:
Please explain what happened to the FSARCR sequence numbers below 83-MP2-18.
Please explain what happened to the following missing FSARCR sequence numbers:
84-MP2-12 85-MP2-1 thru -5 85-MP2-7 thru -12 85-MP2-14 thru -16 85-MP2-18 85-MP2-19 Response: Ihe FS4RCR data base was created relatively tecently, and NNECo went back to a certain point whenfilling in the data. Some FSARCRs were not captured. It was not intended to be an archive. A search ofnuclear records indicates that the FSARCRs mentionedin the question do exist in the system, butfor some reason, they do not appear in the data base.
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ADMIN'.STRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES Jrnurry 27,1998 Response continued: A printout ofchange records shows FSAR changes go back asfar as 1973.
Also, the FSAR update ride was June 1982, so there would have been a good six months ' worth of changes after the rule and before January J983.
NNECo willprovide an electronic copy ofthe FSARCR data base with the caveat that it is uncontrolled and not QA. It is understood that it is not possible to tell what 's in a given FSARCR just by the data base. Parsons recommends NNECo hold the IL410993 requestfor all FSARCR packages in abeyance pending Parsons ' receipt and review ofthe F5ARCR data base.
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-o ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES JIuary 29,1998
~ DATE:
1/30/98 [due to postponement of the 1/29/98 meeting}
PURPOSE:
Administrative telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
Setpoint And Accuracy Calculations Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance FSAR Code Clarifications and Reconciliations High Energy Line Break LIST OF A1TENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Parsons Joe Fougere Steve Reynolds Wayne Dobson Gary Komosky Rich Glaviano Steve Stadnick Daniel wooddell Nabil Juraydini Mike Akins Steve Wainio Gary Jackson Roy Terry Ken Gabel Dave Bajumpaa (New Britain)
Steve Fogelson Ben Stitt (New Britain)
Bruce Ikist 1.
Topic: Sctpoint And Accuracy Calculations (Steve Fogelson/ Ray Thomas)
Background:
ANF/Siemens Calculation E-5272-874-8 contain several references. Of these references, two are of interest at this time.
Reference 1: "XN-NF-507(P)(A). Supplements 1 & 2. ENC Setooint Methodolony for CE Reactors Statistical Setpoint !.lethodolocv". dated Scotember 1986 and Reference 5: E-5272-874-6. " Millstone Unit 2 Cycle 10 DNB LCO Setooint Verification-LOCF" by W. C. Arcieri dated August 1988 These references seem to provide a basis for the DNBR Calculation. Parsons requires these references in order to understand the basis for use as an input to the Safety Analysis, specifically the calculation of DNBR and possibly Linear Heat generation and they will be requested via an RAI following the conference. However, prior to requesting the documents, we request information regarding their use and application.
Questions:
How do Reference I and 5 apply to the Loss of Coolant Flow Event and Locked Rotor e
Events?
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e-ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES Jimarry 29,1998 f'
Responne: Ben Stitt ofSiemens responded to these questions. Reference 1 is ABB CE's Statistical Combination of Uncertainties (SCb) Afethodologyfor combining uncertainties. The DNB calculation of 0.93 was based on linear addition ofuncertainty terms. Linear Addition is the worst case method and could be used ifthe value calculatedhad enough margin to pass without anyfurther analyzing required. Smce this is not the casefor the Loss ofFlow case. 0.95 DNB, additional analyzing occurred. Reference I was applied to calculate a 959995% value in the workbook referred to as Reference 3. Reference 3 isfor Cycle 10 specylc core related values, but cycle 13 is the one ofrecordtoday. Ben suggestedthat we request both Cycle 10's and Cycle 13 's workbooksfor "Afillstone Unit 2 - LCO Setpoint Verification TOCF" because sometimes the new workbooks base their analysis on e, *ier workbooks.
The LockedRotor Event is non an Abnormal Operational Occurrence (AOO), therefore no SCU evaluations are applicable. The LockedRotor Event requires Linear Addition of:ermsfor DNB.
What is the basis for this Methodology ?
Response: The basisfor the Afethodology isfro n ABB CE.
2.
Topic: Emergency Diesci r nerator Mainisnace (C. Patton)
Background:
Parsons requires the id.atification of pro cdures used for some specific inspection and maintenance activities se that they can be requested via k AI.
Questions:
What procedures does Millstone use for inspection, repair, and overhaul of the following Emergency Diesel Generator equipment?:
Clean Oil Transfer Pumps (P-128A through P-128D).
Response: Millstone does not haveproceduresfor inspedion, repair, and overhaul ofthe Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) turbochargers or clean oiltransferpunps P-128A through P-12RD. Turbochargers are removed and reinstalled utiliting technical representative knowleke and support. The turbochargers would be sent to an entside shopfor repairs.
Response: Due to their small si:e, the clean oil transferpumps would be replaced rather than irspected or repaired.
i Does Millstona overhaul the Emergency Diescl Generator blow? If Yes, what procedure is e
used?
Responne: Afilistone does not overhaulEDG blowers. These components would be sent to an outside shopfor maintenance.
3.
Topic: FSAR Code Clarifications and Reconciliations (Ken Gabel)
Background:
Engineering Self-Assessment Report (ES AR)97-063, ' Pipe Stress And Support,
- recommendations include: 1) updating the FSAR to clarify desien Codes, 2) issaing a calculation to PAGE 2 I\\;..
1 AEMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES J;nu:ry 29,1998 document reconciliation between B31.7 and ASME Section 111 Codes, and 3) developing a piping project
, instruction.
Questions:
Is there an action plan for each of these three recommendations, and if so, what are the tracking documents established for each?
What is the schedule completion for each of these three actions?
e Which specific Code reconciliation (s) are planned?
e Response: AR 97-016619 issued against ESAR 97-063 recommendations. AR assignment 03 addresses Code reconciliation, action is completed with results documented in Engineering l
Record 97-331 AR assignment 08 addresses FSAR updas with action under FSAR CR 97-207 currently in review phase. AR assignment 09 coversproject mstruction development which is j
scheduledfor completion 3/31/98.
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Topic: 11igh Energy Line Break (Gar" Jackson)
Background:
Information Notice 89-55 (June 30,1989) was provided to alert utilities for the potential for a high-eneigy line ^oreak inside containment causing fr~ lure of piping in a closed system thereby negating one containment isolation barrier and leaving the plant with only single containment isolation valve to mitigate potential radiological releases. Parsons is currently rniewing the issue of High Energy Line Break inside containment and is attempting to identify available documentation on this issue.
Question-Although no response was necessary for this Notice, did NNECo review the infonnation l
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for applicability and consider any actions, as appropriate? [Please identify all documentation packages /walkdown packages which address these issues i.e., HELB in containment.]
I Response: Deferreduntil2/3/98.
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s ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES Febru ry 3,1998 DATE:
2/3/98 PURPOSE:
Administrative telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
Seismic Analysis Calculation # EMF.2657 Torque values for EDG cage yoke studs e
Torque values for Pressurizer Safety Valve 2-RC-201 e
e 95-ENG-1225 M2
- PDCR MP2-041-95 e IIVAC calculations Cahie Tray has Electrical leads in Disarray e
P&ID revision due to DCN DM2-S-087F-95 e
fligh Energy Line Break [11oldover item from 1/30/98 which was not on the e
original agenda l LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNEco NRC NEAC Parsons Joe Fougere John Na,lpski Wayne Dobson Jim Nicholson Don Marks Gary Komosky Rich Ewing Claude Didier Dom Ramos Nabil Juraydini Dan Wooddell Bill Price Ken Gabel Roy Terry Larry Collier Steve Stadnick Bill Collier liarvey Beeman Dave Lengel John Becker Gary Jackson Cli!TMarks 1.
Topic: Scisiaic Analysis Calculation # EMF-2657 (Ken Gabel)
Background:
Drawing 25203-28408, sheet 084 references calc # EMF-2657. Parsons RAl-996 was issued as s result of the t/13/98 phone conference to request this calc when found or the replacement calc (ref. UIR-2849) when generated. NNECo response to RAl-996 indicated cale was not found, referenced a 1976 Bechtel calc (1-20), and stated that the RAI is closed. He existing sheet 084 drawing does not show the current as-built tubing configuration. The 'I-20' cale analysis model is inadequate, especially with respect to ancharage selection and location.
Questions:
is scisminnalysis calculation # EMF-2657 going to be regenerated?
e Response: EAfF-2657 is a memo number, not a calc number. Seismic analysis calc number identified by this memo is Bechtel calc 7-20'.
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A[DMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES
. February 3 1998 0
2.
Yopic: Torque values for EDG cage yoke studs (Daniel Wooddell)
Background:
During a review of Procedure MP 271911, EDG Fuel Supply System Maintenance, it was noted that torque values for the fuel injector pump mounting nuts and for the "A" EDG cage yoke studs deviate from the torque values provided in the Fairbanks Morse engine nunual.
' Question:
1 Does Millstone have a record of vendor direction or concurrence for deviating from the j
e torque values provided in the engine manual?
Respense: Colt Letter No. 948-3059/88 authorized changing the sorque ofthe EDGfuel injector pump mounting studnuts. Colt Service Bu;letin, Vol. A. Issue 23, Dated 9-6-90 authorized changing
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the cageyoke stud torquefrom 60 - 80fl-Ib. TO 45 - 30fl-Ib.
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3.
Topic: Torque values for Pressurizer Safety Valve 2-RC-201 (Larry Collier)
Background:
In 1989 Pressurizer Safety Valve 2-RC-201 was replaced under WO M2-89-11585 with a replacement safety valve because the plant installed safety valve was suspected ofleaking. It is i
noted that the work order did not specify any torque values or reference any document that may have specified torque values.
Question:
Was, either, the inlet flange or outlet flange torqued to a specific value or values undet a e
separate working document?
Please provide the record or document number and name that recorded the tc>rque values?
i Respense: An RAIhas been written requesting torque values and calculations, 4.
Topic: 95-ENG-1225 M2 (William Clemenson)
Background:
This calculation determines the size of a relief port to be installed in the Containment Purge duct work.
Question:
Was this modification ever implemented and if so what PDOR installed this relief port?
e Response: NNECo stated that the PDCR was never implemented and that a Calculation Change Notice would be required. It was agreed that Parson willgenerate a DR on this issue.
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ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES Febncry 3,1998
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.5.
Topic: PDCR MP2-041-95 (William Clemenson)
Background:
Calculation 95-ENG-1222 M2 (Evaluation of the Purge Supply Fan (F-23) Performance with Gravity Damper)cvaluates, via " Graphical Analysis" the performance of the MP2 Encbsure Building 1-urge fan, F-n if a backdraft damper is installed in the CEBPS system and concludes that the capacity of F-23 w m decrease by 2% to 27,790 cfm and the horse power requirements will increase from 30 IIP to 36 IIP. This calculation also makes reference to how the system flow could be restored to the as-found condition of 28,379 by increasing the fan speed.
PDCR MP2-041-95 (Section 3D Detailed Design, Page B6 of 16) takes credit for Reference I and in 3
section 3D " Detailed Design", page B6 of 16, states that the fan RPM may be changed via standard sheeve changes to achieve desired flow. Section 3F " Test Plan", page B8 of 16, states tha: the post modification test will include a CEBPS Tut and Balancing to verify acceptable system / fan operation.
Question:
Was the fan RPM revised during implementation of PDCR MP2-041-957 What were the final operating characteristics of the fan / motor?
What was the scope of the post modification Test and Balancing of the CEBPS? Current j
documentation in the PDCR MP2-041-95 only includes a single page duct traverse data sheet which is neithe-signed nor dated?
Response: NNECo stated that thefan RPAf was not revised. Additionalinvestigation by NNECo 1
would be required to answer the questions concerning the results ofthe Post Modification Test i
Requirement to perform a CEBPS Test and Balance. This issue will be discussed at the next Telecon Conference.
6.
Topic: IIVAC calculations (William Clemenson) i
Background:
CR 96105 (Review Various Ventilation Calculations) and CR M2-97-0829 both reference CRs for upgrades to llVAC calculations.
Question:
What is the scope of this IIVAC calculation initiative?
e What is the status and forecast completion of this IIVAC initiative?
Has an ilVAC calculation list been developed and if so what is the document number?
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1 Response: The inMC Calculation Initiative is being trackedfor the most part by CR 96-101 This initiative has been divided into three phases, with phase I and11 complete andphase 111 work in progress. Phase 11has resultedin 16 revised calcsfor the Diesel Generator ventilation System and 28 calcsfor the EBFS system. Revisions to the flydrogen Purge inM C cales are in progress and are part ofPhase 111. A listing ofthe revisedInMC calculations is available and will be requested by Parson via an RAI.
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,6 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES Feimry 3,1998
,7.
Topic: Cable Tray has Electrical leads in Disarray (ClitTord R. Marks)
Background:
Whiie conducting plant walk-down, on 1/28/98, noticed several multi-conductor cables in Safety-l Related Cable Tray with individual conductors in disarray. The Facil!'y was indicated as 2.2 in the East Electrical Penetration Room, directly under Penetration, SEXD6.
Some of the conductor ends have taped leads, while others have bare Ring-Terminals laying in the Cable Tray. There is a moderate coating of dust indicating that the condition has existed for a period of time. The Cables seem to originate from the end of an Electrical Conduit directly beneath Penetration, SEXD6.
No Tagging indicating that Deficient Condition Exists, Work-in-Progress is evident, nor Winn3 is Spared per Modification or Temp Mod process.
References:
" Digital Pics 'have been Emailed for vore reference - P000541. ion. P000542. int and P000543 ing" These references indicate a material condition problem with spared or other condition adverse to quality Question:
What is the purpose of these conductors?
Response:NUgenerated CR M2-93-0294 as a result ofthis question. The conductors were improperly controlled and will be removed. NUgenerated CR M2-98-0294 as a result ofthis question. The conductors were DR-347 was written and submitted as a result ofthis conversation.
How is their use and configuration controlled?
Response: NUgenerated CR M2-98-0294 as a result ofthis question. The conductors were improperly controlled and will be removed. DR-347 was written and submitted as a result of this conversation.
8.
Topic: P&lD revision due to DCN DM2 S-0878-95 (Claude Didier)
Background:
The RBCCW P&ID 25203-26022 has been updated per the DCN DM2-S-0878-95 and 3 drain valves 2-RB-405, 2-RB-406, and 2-RB-412 have been added per a walkdown. In the telecon of 1/22/98 the question was asked if there were drawings, stress iso's, and scismic calc's for these valves.
The response was that the valves were shown on the following drawings:
Valve 2 RB-405 25203-20150 sht 607 Valve 2-RB-406 25203-20150 sht 926 Valvc 2-RB-412 25203-20150 sht 23 In resiewing these drawings the iso's show the fitting's and indicate a drain valve, however there is j
no reference either to a valve identification number nor reference to any drawing which depicts thesc valves.
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ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES Febrwiry 3,1998 i
Questions:
Are we to interpret from your response that there are no drawings which depict the valves, are used as stress iso's, or are the basis for the seismic calculations for these valves?
Respense: BillPrice responding. Curren:ty the valves were shown only on t e P&lD.
h Millstone need to look at the Bechtel spec MS-6 to see how vents and drains were handled including the seismic issue. Parsons referenced the Ibil-458 which requested iden'ifcation of plant drawings showing vents and drains. The NNECo response identified the 25203-20126 series ofdrawingsfor the 11 PSI andAMI'. systems where vents and drains were pt on drawings.
These howeverfailed to capture a majority of the installations. Because some ofthe vent and drain valves are depicted on Bechtelsmall borefieldsketches, the question wasposedif possibly the higher 400 series nwnbers are replacement valves installed after the original construction and operation. The response was indeterminate but they (Millstone) did not believe so, that the valve numbers were taken out in 1995for valves identified as the result ofwalk-downs.
The question was asked as to hun get to the drawing which shows the vah efrom the large-bore Iso whichjust indicates a drain. Millstone is researching the basis ofthis type ofpiping and design issue.
7his item is to be continuedin the Thursday teleconference.
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Topic: High Energy Line Break (Gary Jackson) l
Background:
Information Notice 89-55 (June 30,1989) was provided to alert utilities for the potential for a high-energy line br::ak inside containment causing failure of pipin3 n a closed system thereby negating i
one containment isolation barrier and leaving the plant with only single containment isolation valve to mitigate potential radiological releases. Parson.; is currently reviewing h % sue of High Energy Line Break inside containment and is attempting to identify available documeuSGon on this issue.
Questions:
Although no response was necessary for this Netbe, did NNECo review the information for applicability and considct any actions as appropriate?
l Response: There was no 89-SS reviewfor Unit 2 and CR (M2-97-0933) addresses the issue. No walkdown was performed. ERC #25203-ER-97-0406, Rev.0 was completed to verify the design adequacy ofHELB inside containment based on a limited sample.
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ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES Febru:ry 5,1998 DATE:
2/5/98 PURPOSE:
Administrative telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC and Parsons to discuss:
Specifications SP-ME-324 and SP-ME-753 Piping P A classification changes e PDCR MP2-041-95 P&lD revision due to DCN DM2-S-0878-95 LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Panons Joe Fougere Steve Reynolds T. Concannon Wayne Dobson Joe Fougere Donald Marks Fred Mattioli Louis Mscichowski Bill Price Claude Didier Ron Baldini William Clemenson Don Becker Jim Petrosky John Becker 1.
Topic: Specifications SP-ME-324 and SP-ME-753 (Louis Mscichowski)
Background:
Tier 3 is resiewing specification resisions not associated with modifications to determine if any design and configuration mr.nagement deficiencies were caused by the specification change process.
Specifications SP-ME-324 and SP-ME-753 appear to be related to PDCR's based on similarities to three other specifications that were found to be related to modifications..
Question:
Were specifications SP-ME-324 and SP-ME-753 related to a PDCR7 If so please identify the PDCR's.
Response: SP-ME 753 is not PDCR related, the work wasperformed under a work under. SP-ME-32.t it associated with PDCR 2-013-83.
Does Millstone have a cross refe:ence that relates PDCR's to specifications if the specification number is known? If so, Please identify that cross reference.
Respense: There is no cross reference that relates specifications. to PDCR 's.
- 2. Topic: Piping QA classification changes (Claude Didier)
Background:
P&lD 25203-26008 sheet 2 was resised by DCN's DM2-S-0225-96 and DM2-S-565-94 to show a pping specification change, and piping configuration changes including addition of orifices and PAGE 1
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V ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES F brmry 5,1998 valves. Generally when we see QA classification changes they are associated with piping specification changes. The classification change in this case is unclear.
4 Questions:
liow do you show QA classification changes on the P&lD?
e Response: QA classification is not shown on the P&lD's.
if not shown on the P&lD how and where are QA classification changes depicted?
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Response: The QA Classification is determined by looking the component up in PAL \\(S, and ifnot there then in the System MEPL. The QA classification ofthe piping would be determinedfrom its location between components.
3.
Topic: PDCR MP2-041-95 t/illiam Clemenson) [ Continued from 2/3/98)
Background:
Calculation 95-ENG-1222 M2 (Evaluation of the Purge Supply Fan (F-23) Performance with Gravity Damper) evaluates via "Gnghical Analysis" the performance of the MP2 Enclosure Building Purge fan, F-23, if a backdrif: damper is installed in the CEBPS sy stem and concludes that the capacity of F-23 will decrease by 2% to 27,790 cfm and the horse power requirements will increase from 30 HP to 36 HP. This calculation also makes reference to how the system flow could be restored to the as-found condition of 28,379 by increasing the fan speed.
PDCR MP2-041-95, (Section 3D Detailed Design, Page B6 of 16) takes credit for Reference I and in sec' ion 3D " Detailed Design", page B6 of 16, states that the fan RPM may be changed via standard sier changes to achieve desired flow. Section 3F " Test Plan", page B8 of 16, states that the post modification test will include a CEBPS Test and Balancing to verify acceptable system / fan operation.
Questions; l
Was the fan RPM revised during implementation of PDCR MP2-041-957 l
What were the final operating characteristics of the fan / motor?
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What was the scope of the post modification Test and Balancing of the CEBPS?
e Current documentation in the PDCR MP2-041-95 only includes a single page duct traverse data sheet which is neither signed nor dated?
Response: NNECo stated that they had been unable to locate additional Test and Balance data associated with the subject PDCR. It was agreed that a DR would be generated to track this issue.
4.
Topic: P&lD revision due to DCN DM2-S-0878-95 (Claude Didier) [ Continued form 2/3/98]
Background:
The RBCCW P&lD 25203-26022 has been updated per the DCN DM2-S-0878-95 and 3 drain valves 2-RB-405, 2-RB-406, and 2-Rn 412 have been added per a walkdown. In the telecon of 1/22/98 the question was asked if there were drawings, stress iso's, and seismic calc's for these valves.
The respo ise was that the valves were shown on the following drawings:
Valve 2-RB-405 25203-20150 sht 607 Valve 2-RB-406 25203-20150 sht 926 PAGE 2
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ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE NOTES Fcbns:ry 5,1998 Valve 2-RB-412 25203-20150 sht 23 In resiewing these drawings the iso's show the fitting's and indicate a drain valve, however there is no' reference either to a valve identification number nor reference to any drawing which depicts these valves.
Questions:
Are we to interpret from your response that there are no drawings which depict the valves, are used as stress iso's, or are the basis for the seismic calculations for these valves?
Response: Afillstone was not able to identify the drawings ofrecordfor the valves Bill Price stated that the governing procedure along with AIS-6 was the Bechtel Procedure 7604 s1-18 titled
" Office and Field Engineering Afanualfor Routing and Support of2 inch and under piping. "
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