ML20216A500
| ML20216A500 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109218, 07109279 |
| Issue date: | 07/07/2020 |
| From: | Moyant K Nuclear Waste Partnership |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216A493 | List: |
| References | |
| TS:20:03014, UFC:5822:00 CCO-CAL-0005 | |
| Download: ML20216A500 (5) | |
Text
Calculation Cover Sheet
- 1. Document
Title:
Evaluation of the Criticality Safety Analysis for Criticality Control Overpacks Containing Machine Compacted Waste
- 2. Document Number: 3. Document Revision: 4. Page:
CCO-CAL-0005 0 1 of 5
- 5. Summary Description This calculation provides an evaluation of the existing criticality safety analysis for the TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT packages with respect to the fissile gram equivalent (FGE) and associated waste constituent mass limits for Criticality Control Overpacks (CCOs). An allowance for machine compaction of waste in a CCO at a fissile limit of 380 FGE is applicable, and conservative, if the CCO contains less than or equal to 1% by weight quantities of special reflector materials and the amount of plastic within the CCO waste contents is limited to 2,000 grams.
- 6. Software Usage Software Name Version
- 1. N/A 2.
3.
4.
- 7. Preparer Name Signature Date Digitally signed by KYLE MOYANT (Affiliate)
Kyle Moyant KYLE MOYANT (Affiliate) Date: 2020.07.07 11:36:02 -06'00'
- 8. Independent Reviewer(s)
Name Signature Date BRAD DAY (Affiliate)
Brad Day 2020.07.07 12:02:21 -06'00' JENNIFER BIEDSCHEID Digitally signed by JENNIFER BIEDSCHEID (Affiliate)
Jennifer Biedscheid (Affiliate) Date: 2020.07.07 13:51:17 -06'00'
- 9. Project Representative Name Signature Date MURTHY DEVARAKONDA Digitally signed by MURTHY DEVARAKONDA (Affiliate)
Murthy Devarakonda (Affiliate) Date: 2020.07.07 16:02:42 -06'00'
- 10. QA Representative Name Signature Date Digitally signed by DAVID TANNER (Affiliate)
Steve Tanner DAVID TANNER (Affiliate) Date: 2020.07.08 16:33:05 -06'00'
Calculation Continuation Sheet
- 1. Document
Title:
Evaluation of the Criticality Safety Analysis for Criticality Control Overpacks Containing Machine Compacted Waste
- 2. Document Number: 3. Document Revision: 4. Page:
CCO-CAL-0005 0 2 of 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
................................................................................................................ 3 2.0 EVALUATION OF CCO FGE LIMITS ........................................................................... 3
3.0 CONCLUSION
.................................................................................................................... 5 LIST OF TABLES Table 2 Summary of CCO FGE Limits .....................................................................................4 TABLE OF REVISIONS Revision Pages Revision Description Number Affected 0 All New Issue
Calculation Continuation Sheet
- 1. Document
Title:
Evaluation of the Criticality Safety Analysis for Criticality Control Overpacks Containing Machine Compacted Waste
- 2. Document Number: 3. Document Revision: 4. Page:
CCO-CAL-0005 0 3 of 5
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This calculation provides an evaluation of the existing criticality safety analyses for the TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT packages, as contained in the TRUPACT-II SAR 1, HalfPACT SAR 2, and CH-TRU Payload Appendices 3, with respect to fissile gram equivalent (FGE) limits and associated waste constituent mass limits for Criticality Control Overpacks (CCOs). The manually compacted with less than 1% by weight quantities of special reflector materials analysis for CCOs is reassessed in order to additionally accommodate machine compacted waste within CCOs.
2.0 EVALUATION OF CCO FGE LIMITS CCOs were evaluated in Case I with manually compacted (i.e., not machine compacted) waste loadings as discussed in Section 4.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. A criticality evaluation was performed for 380 FGE in payload contents that are manually compacted and contain less than or equal to 1% by weight quantities of special reflector materials. In that analysis documented in calculation 01937.01.M009-01 4, the fissile material is moderated and reflected by a mixture of 25% polyethylene, 74% water and 1% beryllium by volume. Results of the most reactive configuration for a CCO payload are given in Table 7.2-1 of the supporting calculation, which shows that optimum moderation of the fissile material occurs at an H/Pu ratio of 650. The method for calculating the composition of the fissile mixture is outlined in Section 3.0 of the calculation and is performed in reverse here to determine the mass of polyethylene in the optimum mixture. The densities used in the calculation are 19.84 g/cm3 for Pu, 1 g/cm3 for water, 0.92 g/cm3 for polyethylene and 1.848 g/cm3 for Be.
At an H/Pu ratio of 650, the fissile mixture has a radius of 7.7026 cm and a height of 48.3293 cm from Table 3.0-2 of the reference. From this, a fissile mixture volume of 9008.1 cm3 is calculated. The Pu volume of 380 g / 19.84 g/cm3 = 19.1 cm3 is subtracted to obtain a moderator volume of 8989.0 cm3. The moderator is 25% by volume polyethylene, so the polyethylene volume is 8989.0 x 0.25 =2247.3 cm3 and the mass is 2247.3 cm3 x 0.92 g/cm3 = 2067.5 g.
Thus, if WKHILVVLOHPL[WXUHFRQWDLQVJRISRO\HWK\OHQHLWcannot be made critical. The 1
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), TRUPACT-II Shipping Package Safety Analysis Report, Revision 23, USNRC Certificate of Compliance 71-9218, U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, New Mexico, December 2012.
2 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), HalfPACT Shipping Package Safety Analysis Report, Revision 6, USNRC Certificate of Compliance 71-9279, U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, New Mexico, December 2012.
3 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), CH-TRU Payload Appendices, Revision 3, U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, New Mexico, December 2012.
4 R. J. Migliore, Criticality Control Overpack Criticality Analysis for TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT, 01937.01.M009-01, Rev. 0, AREVA Federal Services LLC, Federal Way, WA, February 2012.
Calculation Continuation Sheet
- 1. Document
Title:
Evaluation of the Criticality Safety Analysis for Criticality Control Overpacks Containing Machine Compacted Waste
- 2. Document Number: 3. Document Revision: 4. Page:
CCO-CAL-0005 0 4 of 5 criticality analyses for machine compacted waste have considered optimum moderation by 100%
polyethylene as the plastics in the waste could be compacted above the 25% used in the manually compacted analyses, leaving little room available for water. However, neglecting the water and limiting the amount of polyethylene in a CCO to the amount present in the manually compacted waste analysis will ensure an undermoderated condition exists for the same FGE in machine compacted waste. By neglecting the water, 6.7 liters of moderator is ignored, which results in an undermoderated system and a much smaller fissile region in each CCO; thus the interaction between the fissile material in the multiple CCOs in the TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT is also significantly reduced. For simplicity in the limit value, the amount of polyethylene in a CCO at the 380 FGE limit is rounded down to 2,000 g. Table 2-1 presents a summary of all CCO FGE limits with the applicable plastic limit for machine compacted waste contents.
Table 2 Summary of CCO FGE Limits Fissile Limit Plastic Limit Fissile Limit per Fissile Limit per CCO per CCO TRUPACT-II per HalfPACT (Pu-239 FGE) (grams) Package (Pu-239 Package Contents Case FGE) (Pu-239 FGE)
Not machine FRPSDFWHGZLWK 1% I 380 N/A 5,320 2,660 by weight Be/BeO Machine compacted ZLWKE\ZHLJKW I 380 2,000 5,320 2,660 Be/BeO
Calculation Continuation Sheet
- 1. Document
Title:
Evaluation of the Criticality Safety Analysis for Criticality Control Overpacks Containing Machine Compacted Waste
- 2. Document Number: 3. Document Revision: 4. Page:
CCO-CAL-0005 0 5 of 5
3.0 CONCLUSION
The existing criticality safety analysis for the TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT containing CCO payload configurations have been evaluated with respect to the quantity of polyethylene moderator within the fissile region as correlated to the degree of compaction of the waste contents with the CCO. Table 2-1 summarizes the plastic limit necessary to extend the existing manually compacted criticality analysis (Case I) to accommodate machine compacted waste with a limit of 2,000 g of plastics applicable to the CCO waste contents.