ML20215N240
| ML20215N240 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1986 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215N234 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-55354, TAC-55355, NUDOCS 8611050082 | |
| Download: ML20215N240 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
l WASHINGTON, D. C. 20065
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 67 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 AND AMENDMENT NO. 59 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364 INTRODUCTION By [[letter::05000364/LER-1985-013-01, :on 851113,discovered That Fire Watch Requirements Determined Incorrectly When Fire Detector on Both Sides of Inoperable Fire Barrier Made Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error|letter dated December 16, 1985]], supplemented August 1, 1986, Alabama Power Company proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) pertaining to the reactor trip system instrumentation and surveillance in response to Generic Letter (GL) 85-09. GL 85-09 was a followup to GL 83-28, " Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events." The NRC staff concluded in GL 85-09 that TS changes were needed although the licensee had not provided TS changes earlier per GL 83-28. The NRC staff concluded that TS changes should be proposed by all licensees to explicitly require independent testing of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the reactor trip breakers during power operation, testing of bypass breakers prior to use, and independent testing of the control room manual reactor trip switch contacts during each refuelino outage. Our evaluation follows.
EVALUATION We have compared the licensee's proposed TS changes with the GL 85-09 model TS which were provided to all licensees. We had some concerns with the licensee's December 16, 1985, proposal.- However, following discussions with the licensee's staff, a revised Table 3.3-1 was submitted by letter dated August 1,1986, to resolve our concerns. The August 1, 1986, submittal provided supplemental infonnation only and therefore did not change the determination of the initial Federal Register Notice.
A discussion of the proposed changes follows:
1)
Table 3.3-1 (Reactor Trip System Instrumentation) contains changes for the Manual Reactor Trip (Functional Unit 11, the Reactor Trip Breakers (Functional Unit 21) and the Automatic Trip Logic (Functional Unit 22).
Appropriate action statements are included for each limiting condition for operation. These changes conform to our guidance of GL 85-09 and are acceptable.
2)
Table 4.3-1 (Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements) contains modifications to require verification of operability of the manual reactor trip circuits of the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) and the reactor 8611050082 861024 PDR ADOCK 05000348 P
trip bypass breakers during refueling outages and prior to startup, including independent verification of the undervoltage and shunt trip l
circuitry. These changes conform to our guidance of GL 85-09 and are acceptable.
3)
Table 4.3-1 contains modifications to require on-line testing of the RTBs including independent testing of the undervoltage and shunt trip functions for each train, and on-line testing of the automatic reactor trip logic channels, at least every 62 days on a staggered test basis. These changes conform to our guidance of GL 85-09 and are acceptable.
4)
Table 4.3-1 requires testing of the reactor trip bypass breaker (including independent verification of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuitry and devices) prior to placing the breaker in service. This change conforms to our guidance of GL 85-09 and is acceptable.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Technical Specification changes as submitted by licensee [[letter::05000364/LER-1985-013-01, :on 851113,discovered That Fire Watch Requirements Determined Incorrectly When Fire Detector on Both Sides of Inoperable Fire Barrier Made Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error|letter dated December 16, 1985]], and supplemented by licensee letter dated August 1, 1986, have been reviewed for consistency with the~
NRC staff guidance of Generic Letter 85-09. We find the proposed changes are acceptable.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION These amendments involve a change in the installation or use of the facilities components located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR 20 and a surveillance requirement. The staff has detennined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in
'the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public connent on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: October 24, 1986 Principal Contributors:
A. Toalston E. Reeves
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