ML20215L942
| ML20215L942 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Westinghouse |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1987 |
| From: | Bidinger G NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Cline W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8706260222 | |
| Download: ML20215L942 (5) | |
Text
-
n a
v-V Mall o a p i
l MEMORANDUM FOR:
W. E. Cline, Chief Nuclear Material. Safety and Safeguards' Branch, RII j
FROM:
George H. Bidinger l
Uranium Process Licensing Section Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NMSS
SUBJECT:
FEEDER REPORT, TEAM ASSESSMENT, WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.,
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA (DOCKET 70-1113)
I Enclosed is a copy of my feeder report. While Region II issued the report
{
without any requested input and/or concurrence, my observations and findings
{
have been documented nonetheless. My preliminary findings included two potential items of noncompliance and two safety issues.
Region II should pursue these items.
1 On February 17, 1987, Ed McAlpine faxed to me.a portion of the report for my concurrence by Noon the same day.
Unfortunately, I was committed to a day _long meeting and was not aware of the facsimile until the report was issued.
Fortunately, the errors in the report do not affect the safety findings.
Oricinal Sirmed Bv t George H. Bidinger Uranium Process Licensing Section Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NMSS
Enclosure:
As stated 4
DISTRIBUTIONw/ enc 1.
1 Docket,.701151~3 NMSS R/F FCUP R/F VLTharpe ~ "~
GHBidinger(2)
GSjoblom,IE WTCrow POR UFC:FCUP
- FC
.....____,$M.dt......._[UF j
i NAME:GHBidinger:ht :VLTharpe DATE:03/>/87
- 03/A/87 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
)
8706260222 870302 PDR ADOCK 0700 3
C 1-I 2
pg j$
o o
r~.
v 3
MAR 0 21987 L
- g..
TI 2Q0 FEEDER REPORT
'WESTINGH0USE ELECTRIC COMPANY, COLUMBIA,. SOUTH CAROLINA-JANUARY 14-16, 1987 DOCKET NO.'70-1151 During the 3 days onsite, most of the uranium process areas were toured.
The report; presents; the adverse findings, several of. which are' preliminary and
< should be subject to further inspection effort..Many observations were made which show.that Westinghouse has a very good program but in need of improve-ment :in: limited specific ' areas..
Outside Areas-The outside' areas included the-transport staging area, the UF6' storage area, and the UNH tank' farm.
-Inlthe transport staging area, trailers loaded with fuel elements were being staged.
.No' observations of poor practice were made, and.no items of concern.
were.noted.
In' the'UF storage area, UF cylinders are stored in a cuboidal array.
Some g
g combustibTes are stored outside of, but against the fenced storage area.
No combustibles were: stored inside'the fenced area. The area around the concreted-storage pad'is graded ~ so' that any liquids spilled on the pad.would flow away from UF cylinders'..No observations of poor practice were made, and~no items of 6
concern were noted.
For the UNH storage tanks and piping systems to and from the process area, the areas were observed and P& ids were studied.
Controis were identified which are
' capable of assuring nuclear criticality safety by concentration control of the nonfavorable geometry storage tanks. The system for using the UNH in the o
aprocess area is being converted from a batch process to a continuous process.
'The continuous flow process was not reviewed.
It will be necessary to assure that the continuous process system does not allow inadvertent transfer of UNH into systems where concentration' of the UNH would lead to inadvertent criticality.
It is also necessary to ensure that precipitating chemicals cannot be inadvertently transferred into the UNH storage tanks.
With the batch system, no unsafe practices were observed, and no items of concern were noted.
~ Vaporization Area The steam chests 'for UF vaporization are located in a concreted trench.
Steam g
condensate from the chests drains into the trench and is then pumped to liquid
- waste. disposal. The condensate is discharged through a line with a conductivity probe... If high conductivity is detected as the result of a UF release, the
.liquiddischargeisterminatedandthecondensateispumpedthhoughafilter system back into the trench.
i
[h n
1 Q)
Q Westinghouse Electric Company 2
MAR 0 21987 Since the last site visit, a sprinkler system for fire suppression has been installed in the UF bay.
In the event of UF release and a simultaneous releaseoffiresuppressionwater,asignific$ntouantityofU0,,F could accumu-g 2
late in the steam trenches. The small filter system would not be effective in removing the uranium. Westinghouse representatives did not produce a safety evaluation showing that nuclear criticality was not credible in the trenches.
This should be evaluated promptly.
Housekeeping in this area, while improved over previous visits, was not good.
Waste combustibles were observed in plastic bags in several locations in the area. A facility addition under construction will be used for the collection and temporary storage of waste combustibles. This will permit improved housekeeping in the UF6 bay.
I Conversion, Powder Handling, and Pelletizing i
The ADU conversion process relies primarily on favorable geometry for nuclear i
criticality safety control. When the U0,, powder is certified for low moisture content,.it is transferred to the bulk p6wder handling area.
Bulk handling of uranium oxide is under moderation control for nuclear criticality. safety.
The IDR conversion process in the MAP area relies primarily on moderation control for nuclear criticality safety.
Process and safety interlocks ensure that high temperatures are maintained so that hydrogen is available only as steam or HF vapor. Other process interlocks ensure that uranium is not transported over into'the HF condensate system. After the uranium oxide powder is certified as being dry, it is transferred to bulk hoppers for blending and preparation for pelletizing.
Interlocks are used to limit the number of lubricant additions I
which can be made to the bulk blenders.
Pelletizing, sintering, grinding, and rod loading use favorable geometry for nuclear criticality control.
During the tour of the conversion, powder handling, and pelletizing areas, no unsafe practices were observed, and no items of concern were noted.
Fuel Assembly Area Sealed rods are assembled into fuel bundles. The bundles are washed, inspected, stored, and packaged for shipment.
Rods are handled primarily in favorable geometry configurations.
Fuel bundles are handled individually by overhead cranes which ensure spacing between bundles.
By design, fuel
- bundles are limited to k-effective of not more than 0.95.
No unsafe practices were observed, and no items of concern were noted.
Scrap Recovery Areas In the scrap recovery areas, clean scrap may be converted directly into usable U 0, powder. The thermal process uses a safe batch operation for nuclear 3
criYicality safety.
O A
V U
' Westinghouse Electric Company' 3
Dirty scrap may go through several processes which may include precipitation, drying, dissolution, solvent extraction, and UNH concentration.
Batch control is used primarily for initial stages of scrap recovery; favorable geometry is l
used for solvent extraction, and UNH concentration.
{
A new scrap dissolver had just been installed. The design did not employ favorable geometry although there appeared to be sufficient headroom for a favorable geometry dissolver. Section 2.3.10 of the license requires W to justify use of nonfavorable geometry equipment. Limited time onsite did not permit resolution of this point.
Liquids containing uranium were stored in 55-gallon drums in the scrap area.
On the other hand, some contaminated liquids from solvent extraction which previously were stored in 55-gallon drums had been eliminated. The elimination of some non-favorable geometry ~ containers is an improvement in the nuclear safety program.
1 Ash is stored in cans in floor-stacked arrays. The basis for safety was described as a modified solid angle analysis which took credit for low uranium concentration and low moderator concentration material in the array.
It is not evident that the analysis complies with conrnitments for moderation control or with k-effective values for the solid angle method. The array did not appear to be unsafe, but license conditions must be observed. Time did not' permit resolution of this issue.
Except for the items above, no unsafe practices were observed and no items of concern were noted.
Criticality Alarm System 3
There was confusion at the end of the assessment as to whether or not backup emergency power was available for the criticality alarm system.
Instructions had been provided to employees to evacuate part of the plant if power were lost. The evacuation instruction should be evaluated.
Based on the plant configuration, it appears that additional personnel should be evacuated from-the plant areas. Greater distances may be required to assure safety of plant personnel than that obtained by partial evacuation.
n o
V U
e i
NMSS/ Fuel Cycle Material
\\
fCUF-FCAF File-Dochet #--
7.9-JWI Project #
SS 396' t
I
)
.j