ML20215J746
| ML20215J746 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1986 |
| From: | Miosi A COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 2232K, NUDOCS 8610270168 | |
| Download: ML20215J746 (2) | |
Text
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__ \\ Commonwealth Edison E /
72 West Adams Street, Chicago, Illinois
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) Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
'd Chicago. Illinois 60690 0767 October 9, 1986 Mr. Harold R. Denton U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatory Washington, DC. 20555 Gubject:
Braidwood Station Unit 1 Interim Technical Specifications to 5% Power-Test Deferrals NRC Docket No. 50-456
References:
(a)
September 30, 1986 A.D. Miosi letter to H.R. Denton (b)
September 19, 1986 D.H.
Smith letter to H.R. Denton $,~1gy ;
(c)
August 26, 1986 A.D. Miosi letter to H.R. Denton
Dear Mr. Denton:
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with a technical basis to support our relief request from the provisions of Technical Specification 3/4.9.4 as identified in reference (a).
Granting it does not result in any negative impact upon the health or safety of either Commonwealth Edison personnel or the public.
Should an emergency occur within the containment in the course of fuel load, having the hatch open would enhance our ability to respond and mitigate the potential for personnel injury or equipment damage.
In reference (c) we submitted the interim operation plan for the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System.
This plan addresses the generation of fission products and offsite and control room radiological doses during the Braidwood Unit 1 startup.
If a fuel handling accident occurs inside containment or in the Fuel Handling Building, radioactive releases will not occur since the fuel has not been irradiated.
After fuel load, fission products will not be generated until reactor criticality.
Until that time, radiation levels inside the containment and auxiliary building will be at normal background levels and there will be essentially no risk of releasing radioactive contaminants to the environment.
Consequently, containment integrity will need to be established just prior to initial reactor criticality.
With containment integrity established, there is no need to maintain negative pressure inside the fuel handling building until the Unit 1 core is unloaded.
h04 8610270168 861009 PDR ADOCK 05000456 A
O 6 During the period between reactor fuel load and initial criticality, fission products will not be produced.
Also, a fuel handling accident will not produce fission products.
Radiation levels inside the Auxiliary Building and Fuel Handling Building will be at natural background levels and there will be essentially no risk of releasing radioactive contaminants to the environment.
In order to maximize the orderliness and efficiency of the fuel handling operation while minimizing the potential for errors, it will be necessary to allow the personnel hatch to remain open.
Commonwealth Edison has had experience in loading the core with the hatch closed and more recently, in the case of Byron Unit 1, with the hatch opened.
We have found the fuel loading process to be a much a smoother evolution when the hatch is open.
Should you have any questions about this matter, please contact this office.
l One signed original and fifteen copies of this letter are provided for your review.
Very truly yours, 1/. D. Mio Nuclear Licensing Administrator
/klj cc:
J.
Stevens L. Olshan 2232K L