ML20215J672
| ML20215J672 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/1986 |
| From: | Mcdonald R ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| IEIN-86-003, IEIN-86-3, NUDOCS 8610270145 | |
| Download: ML20215J672 (24) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. t I 's M:lling Addr4 ) Alabama Powew?any 600 North 18th Street Post Of fice Box 2641 Birr.ungham, Alabama 35291 f Telephone 205 783-6090 %vj i<oun-a^ M (h hj) h P 2
- 0 0 s4 n o V ce P sidert MMmema Fhntridge Budding
.VD August 26, 1986 y't? N Docket Nos. 50-348 b 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II, Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street N. W. Atlanta, GA 30323 Attention: Dr. J. N. Grace Gentlemen: On August 20, 1986, Alabama Power Company (APCo) was contacted by your staff concerning IE Notice 85-03. The staff's position was that Alabama Power Company should review environmental qualification of Limitorque operators as a result of IE Notice 86-03 and provide justification for continued operation (JCO) if required. The enclosed JC0 is being submitted since the specific concern of IE Notice 86-03 cannot be resolved without a complete visual inspection. There are 104 t10Vs in each unit of Farley Nuclear Plant that have environmental qualification requirements. Of the 104 MOVs, 32 are located inside the containment or main steam valve room. All others are located outside containment excluding the main steam valve room. Limitorque operators within the scope of ICFR50.49 and located inside containment or the main steam valve room are justified based on: (1) a physical inspection with replacement of wiring as required for selected operators, and (2) the results of an operability analysis that ir.cluded normal plant operation valve positions and the required accident mitigation and post accident positioning. Limitorque operators within the scope of 10CFR50.49 located in other areas are justified based on the results of analyzing the environmental effects on the operator internal wiring and the control wire failure modes assuming that all internal wiring is insulated with PVC. l MO l di 1 e RPh % 8610270145 860826 FlCJAL COPY4 PDR ADOCK 05000348 G PDR (
Dr. J. N. Grace August 25, 1986 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2-As a result of this evaluation, it has been determined that the valves which are required to operate during design basis events can be expected to perform their safety functions as required for both of the Farley Nuclear Plant units. All Limitorque operators (104 in each unit) will be inspected prior to or during the Unit 1 (presently scheduled for October 1986) and Unit 2 (presently scheduled for September 1987) refueling outages. Unqualified jumper wire associated with only the limit switches will be replaced with qualified wire during these outages. If unqualified wire is identified in the torque switch leads, a separate repair plan and schedule will be submitted to the NRC. If there are any questions, please advise. Respectfully
- itted, ll
/ }v p,l R. P. Mcdonald RPM /0HJ:kpc-D-T.S.6 cc: Mr. L. B. Long Mr. L. S. Rubenstein Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. W. H. Bradford
F~ m - Evaluation of Potential Deficiencies in Em/ironmenta'l Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring, NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-03, dated January 14, 1986 Justification for Continued Operation 1.0
== Introduction:== An evaluation has been performed to address the potential concern identified in NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-03 regarding the possible use of unqualified internal jumper wires on safety related valves. The evaluation was performed for all Motor Operated Valves (M0V's) contained in the FNP Environmental Qualification Program Equipment Lists (U-416797 and U-416798). In evaluating the potential problem, consideration was given to the required valve functions and the related accident environmental conditions the valves are expected to encounter for the design basis events, and to the possible physical arrangement and type of valve operator internal wiring. The evaluation methodology was divided into two parts based on the location of the valve operators and the resulting severity of the design basis accident environmental conditions. For valve operators located inside the Containment (CTMT) or Main Steam Valve Room (MSR), an operability analysis was performed by evaluating the normal plant operation position of each valve, and the required accident mitigation and post accident positioning. For valve operators located outside the CTMT and MSR, the design basis accident environmental conditions are less severe with the primary concern being only radiation degradation due to post LOCA recirculated fluids, as valve operator temperatures are expected to be within normal operating design considerations. Val ve operators outside the CTMT and MSR were evaluated by analyzing the environmental effects on the operator internal wiring and the control wire failure modes assuming that all internal control wiring is insulated with PVC. This insulation material is expected to be the worst type that is likely to be found in the Farley Nuclear Plant M0V operators. As a result of this evaluation, it has been determined that the valves which are required to operate during a design basis event can be expected to perform their safety functions as required for both of the Farley Nuclear Plant units. 2.0 CTMT and MSR Located Motor Operated Valve Operability Analysis: l l VALVE FUNCTION / POSITION REVI_Ej{ The normal operating position, required accident mitigation position, and post accident repositioning requirements for each valve were determined by reviewing the current FNP Operating Procedures and Emergency Response Procedures. Table 1 and Table 2 provide a tabulation of the MOV's contained in the FNP Environmental Qualification Program Master List of Environmental Qualified Equipment which are located in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 CTMT or MSR. The normal operating position (NORMAL POSITION), presence of a valve actuation signal for accident j mitigation positioning (SAFETY SIGNAL) and the need for post accident repositioning (LONG TERM P. A. OPERN) are indicated in Tables 1 l and 2. t
F f', ~) (3 Evaluation of L)tial Deficiencies in t n Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring, NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-03, dated January 14, 1986 Page 2 During the valve function / position review, several valves were identified for which post accident functions were described in the FSAR. These post accident functions are backup and are not required to mitigate the design basis accident. Justification for not requiring a post accident function is provided below. Instrument Air to Containment / Post Accident Containment Vent The post accident venting system consists of the instrument air supply to containment (MOV 3536) and the post accident vent from containment (MOV 3530). FSAR Section 6.2.5 identifies operation of the post accident venting system for combustible gas control in containment. Table 1 and 2 identifies MOV 3536 and MOV 3530 as being locked in the closed position with no long term post accident operation requirement. This is justified since the post accident venting system is a backup to the redundant post LOCA hydrogen recombiners. The recombiner system incorporates several design features intended to assure the capability of the system to be operable in-the event of an accident. Among these are: (1) seismic category I design, (2) protection from missile and jet impingement and (3) redundancy to the extent that no single component failure disables both recombiners. As stated in NUREG-0117 ~ Supplement 4 (Farley Nuclear Plant SER), " redundant... recombiners in the containment are the primary means of post-accident combustible gas control. In addition the post-accident venting system is provided as a backup system for the redundant hydrogen recombi ners." The Emergency Response Procedures (ERP's) instruct the operator to verify both post LOCA hydrogen recombiners are in service if containment hydrogen concentration is less than 4%. Since the post accident venting system is a backup system and the ERPs instruct the operator to place the post accident LOCA hydrogen recombiners in service, opening MOV 3536 and MOV 3530 is not required. RESULTS OF FUNCTION / POSITION REVIEW Table 1 and Table 2 each have a total of 32 Limitorque M0V's. Of the 32 MOV's per unit, only 9 M0V's are required to change position during the time adverse environmental conditions are expected to exist. The remaining 23 valves are either positioned by a Safety Injection (SIS), Containment Isolation (CIS) or Main Feedwater Pump Trip or else are already in the safety position. The 9 MOVs requi red to change positions for accident mitigation are listed below.
,j', g3 Evaluation of L3tial. Deficiencies in b Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring, NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-03, dated January 14, 1986 Page 3 M0V3660 CTMT Air Sample M0V3872A Reactor Cavity Dilution Fan Discharge MOV3872B Reactor Cavity Dilution Fan Discharge M0V3528A Sample Point 1 to H2 Analyzer MOV3528B Sample Point 2 to H2 Analyzer M0V3528C Sample Point 3 to H2 Analyzer M0V3528D Sample Point 4 to H2 Analyzer M0V3835A Post Accident Sample H2 Analyzer Return MOV3835B Post Accident Sample H2 Analyzer Return These 9 MOVs were evaluated by physical inspection and qualified wiring was installed as necessary. The post LOCA hydrogen analyzer sample flow path isolation valves (MOV 3528A, B, C and D, and M0V 3835 A and B) are normally locked in the closed position. Subsequent long term operations for the purpose of placing the hydrogen analyzers in service is addressed in the emergency response procedures. However, these long term operations are not essential to mitigate design bases events. Manual post accident containment atmosphere sampling capability is provided via a system which is not dependent on the post LOCA hydrogen analyzer flow path. Emergency response procedures provide for obtaining and analyzing grab samples if the post LOCA hydrogen analyzers are not functional. CONCLUSION OF OPERABILITY ANALYSIS It can be concluded that 23 of the 32 M0V's in each unit will be in or achieve their safety function position for accident mitigation prior to the occurrence of a significantly degraded environmental condition. The remaining 9 MOV's in each unit will require long term post accident repositioni ng. As a result, further evaluation by physical inspection was performed on these 9 M0V's and qualified wiring was installed as necessa ry.
e', Q,) Evaluation of Potential Deficiencies in Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring, NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-03, dated January 14, 1986 Page 4 Subsequent valve operator internal wiring failures if postulated to occur due to long term post accident environmental conditions will not result in spurious repositioning of the M0V's due to the presence of open control circuit interlock contacts located outside the harsh envi ronment. 3.0 Analysis of Environmental Effects on the Internal Control Wiring for Motor Operated Valves Located Outside the CTMT and MSR: Environmental Effects on PVC Insulation: Tables 3 and 4 provide tabulations of the MOV's contained in the FNP Environmental Qualification Program Master List of Environmental Qualified Equipment which are located outside the CTMT and MSR for Unit 1 and Unit 2. It is the intent of this discussion to demonstrate that the temperature and radiation conditions in the Auxiliary Building (outside the containment and main steam valve room) will not degrade the PVC insulation to an extent which could disable the operation of these valves. .The minimum size of conductor used on such applications is #14AWG, 600V grade wi re. Temperature: The normal maximum design ambient temperature outside the containment is 104F (40 C). The wires in the control circuit of the motor operated valve actuator are normally de-energized and carry no current. These wires are energized with 120VAC 60 Hz only when operating the valve and may carry less than 1 ampere for a duration of 1 minute or less. The self generated heat in such a short duration is not likely to cause any significant temperature rise. The only part of the circuit which could. be continuously energized is the indicating light circuit that uses 120V AC or 125V DC and will carry less than 0.2 amperes. A #14AWG conductor is capable of carrying more than 15 amperes at 600V and as such the indicating light circuit will have no significant temperature rise. 4
,,o', p p Evaluation of ntial Deficiencies in Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring, NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-03, dated January 14, 1986 Page 5 Radiation: The post accident radiation doses for the areas outside the containment are expected to be significantly lower than the inside containment dose of SOM rads. Although PVC insulation is susceptible to radiation degradation, it has only mild to moderate damage up to SE7 rads (see attached figure C-1 from EPRI Report NP1558). Attached Page 3-11 from EPRI Report EPRI NP-2129 indicates that the PVC insulation will have a loss of only 50% elongation for an exposure of 8E7 rads. This demonstrates that the wiring in the MOV actuators outside the containment will have no significant damage due to post accident radiation. Control Wire Failure Modes: Opens, Shorts, Grounds Opens, shorts, and grounds of the control circuit wiring within the MOV will not cause inadvertent operation of the associated M0V. Although open circuits and high resistance connections may be caused by the incorrect termination of control circuit wiring, the generic industry use of multistrand wiring with installation performed using controlled crimping tools and terminal lugs adequately prevents these types of hypothesized failures from occurring. In addition, open circuits will not occur as a result of control wire conductor failure / operation caused by current flow since the currents will be so ~ low in MOV control circuits. Circuit shorts and grounds (including both high and low impedance conditions) may hypothetically occur as a result of gross electrical l insulation breakdown or as a result of insulation leakage currents sufficient to cause misoperation of the valve control circuit. Gross electrical breakdown is typically considered as one end (flashover or i very low impedance shorts) of the spectrum of leakage current effects which may cause circuit inoperability or misoperation for the control voltage levels in question. Such gross electrical breakdown could only occur due to direct conductor-to-conductor, or conductor-to-ground contact. Phenomena such as thermal runaway and dielectric breakdown will not occur due to the control circuit's low voltage and current requirements. (Dielectric breakdown without substantial loss of mechanical properties can occur in medium and high voltage applications.) Such direct shorts are possible only where conductor breakthrough occurs as a result of cable insulation damage. In order t for conductor breakthrough to occur, cable insulation must be damaged to the degree necessary to expose the inner conductor to direct contact with adjacent conductors or other metallic components at ground I i potential, l l l l
r s g Evaluation of tial Deficiencies in Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring, NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-03, dated January 14, 1986 Page 6 Conductor breakthrough will typically only occur in two cases. The first case exists when substantial insulation embrittlement due to radiation or thermal damage combines with mechanical abrasion or agitation of the wire causing insulation material to crumble and break-off from the conductor. The second occurs when extremely high temperatures, or for certain materials radiation degradation, cause the insulation material to soften. This softening when combined with mechanical pressure may permit the conductor to become exposed. Under the operational and environmental stresses which may be experienced by the MOV control circuit wiring, neither type of conductor breakthrough should result. Extensive and severe thermal and radiation degradation is required to cause the level of insulation embrittlement which would permit insulation loss due to the minor vibration forces experienced during valve operation. Such severe embrittlement and loss of elongation typically occur in insulating materials only with radiation levels one or more orders of magnitude above the material's threshold dose. Control wire insulation softening and flow will also not exist due to the types of cable insulation typically used in the nuclear power industry (including PVC). For the insulation types typically used by the industry, the material softening temperatures are considerably higher than the temperatures likely to be found in the limit switch compartment. It can therefore be reasonably concluded that conductor breakthrough will not occur for typical valve control wiring. The configuration of the individual control wires within the limit switch compartment greatly minimizes the probability of the individual conductors achieving contact with grounded components or other exposed conductors. The use of individual multistranded insulated wires, rather than multiconductor cables, creates insulating air spaces between the . wires. These spaces greatly minimize the potential for the intimate conductor-to-conductor contact which is necessary to cause direct shorting or grounding. Control Circuit Failure Modes Analysis: Based on the typical circuit design (see Figure 1) used in the plant, control wire shorts or grounds within the MOV limit switch compartment will not reposition the valves erroneously. In these circuits, energization of both the open and close contactors is prevented by the normally open control switch contacts utilized in both circuit legs. This inherent circuit protection against shorts results from the use of momentary spring-return-to-normal control switch contacts with contactor seal-in. Therefore M0V's that are actuated are properly positioned prior to any insulation degradation which may occur during DBE environments, cannot be spuriously repositioned due to degradation of the control wiring.
c o~ n m v Evaluation of Potential Deficiencies in Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring, NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-03, dated January 14, 1986 Page 7 The same is true for the valves with automatic signal actuation, which have a contact in parallel to the hand switch and seal-in contact. For valves which require actuation, either automatically or manually during the most severe DBE environmental effects, only extremely low cable Insulation Resistance (IR) values can potentially affect valve performance. Hypothetically, should shorts of sufficently low IR occur in parallel with limit switches and/or torque switches in the MOV control circuit, overtorquing and possibly overtravel of the valve stem may result. For valves which are limit switch seated with torque switch backup, both the limit and torque switches must be shunted by control wiring shorts in order for sufficent overtorquing and overtravel to affect the valve's safety function. As analyzed above, the extreme level of control wiring degradation necessary to produce such low IR values is a low probability occurrence. Additional protection against valve damage due to overtravel can be provided by the MOV circuit thermal overloads located within the motor control center. When such overloads are sized in accordance with standard industry practice, overload (0L) tripping will result within 7 to 10 seconds under the stalled rotor conditions which exist as a result of operator overtravel. Overload operation can, therefore, provide further protection which will minimize the potential of any shorts to ~ cause valve failures due to overstroking. 4.0
SUMMARY
For valve operators located inside the Containment or Main Steam Valve Room, the operability analysis has demonstrated that 23 of the 32 M0V's in each unit will be positioned in or achieve their safety function position for accident mitigation prior to the occurrence of a significantly degraded environmental condition. The remaining 9 MOV's in each unit will require long term post accident repositioning. As a result, further evaluation by physical inspection was performed on these 9 MOV's and qualified wiring was installed as necessary. Subsequent valve operator internal wiring failures if postulated to occur due to long term post accident environmental conditions will not result in spurious repositioning of the MOV's due to the presence of open control circuit interlock contacts located outside the harsh environment. The remainder of the valves located outside the Containment or Main Steam Valve Room are in plant areas where the local environmental conditions do not exceed the combination of environmental conditions which could cause significant degradation of the operator internal control wiring. It can be concluded based on these analyses that continued operation with these valves in their present condition does not constitute a safety hazard. 1
Pron EPR.E NP- /558 / m Tables and Graphs of Rad. Endur. Data Table C-1 (Continued) Epoxy Identification Total Integrated Exposure) Scotcheast 212 1 x 10' rads (C) gamma 1.1 x 1036 n/cm (E > 0.5 MeV) 2 Stycast 1095 1 x 108 rads (C) gamma 2 x 10 5 n/cm -(E > 0.1 MeV) 2 Stycast 2651 MM 4.4 x 106 rads (C) gamma 3.3 x 1015 n/cm2 (E > 0.1 MeV) 12 007 1.8 x 106 rads (C) gamma 1.5 x 1015 n/cm2 (E > 0.1 MeV) 412 M 1 x 10' rads (C) gamma 1.1 x 1016 n/cm2 (E > 0.5 MeV) 420-A 1 x 10' rads (C) gamma 1.1 x 1016 n/cm2 (E > 0.5 MeV) 1126A/B 1.8 x 106 rads (C) gamma 1.5 x 1015 n/cm (E > 0.1 MeV) 2 CF.8793 9.4 x 107 rads (C) gamma 3.8 x 1015 n/cm2 (E '> 0.1 MeV) CF.8794 1.0 x 108 rads (C) gamma 4.0 x 1015 n/cm2 (E > 0.1 MeV) Unidentified (Mineral filled) 5.8 x 1010 n/cm (E = 1.0 MeV) 2 Damage Utihty of Plastic Incipient to mild Nearly always usable Mild to moderate Often satisfactory M Moderate to severe Limited use Polystyrene i e-Polyvinyl Carbo 2 ole Acrytonitrillbutad.ene/ styrene (ABS) i Polyimide i m = Polyvinyl Chlonde i rz Polyethylene Polyvinyl format i Polyvinylidene Chloruse
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\\ Q Polyvinyl Chloride, Plasticized / threshold - 5 x 105 rads / temperature at break. Reference 8 reports that DC resistivity of one PVC cable insulation was affected after 5 x 106 rads and sensitivity to hot water and steam was increased above this 6 value. Large decreases in oxidation resistance were noted above 5 x 10, Scission or crosslinking may predominate, depending on temperature and oxidizing conditions. Plasticizers and additives are not generally known for coninercial materials, but a fairly large range of radiation resistances occur for different materials (Figure 3-1). Reference 48 reports results for 4 and 20-mil samples of Geon 8630 irradiated in air at room temperature. The 4-mil sample lost approxi-mately 20% of original tensile strength after 7 x 106 rads, but retained less than 50% after 1 x 108 rads. The 20-mil sample lost less than 20% of original tensile strength at 1 x 108 rads. Elongation of the 4-mil sample was reduced 20% by 1 x 107 rads. 7 x 107 rads were required for the same change in elongation of the 20-mil sample. Similar indications of extensive oxidation effects were observed with 4-mil samples of Geon 8640 irradiated in air and vacuum. In air, tensile strength was decreased approximately 20% by 7 x 106 rads and 50% by 1 x 108 rads. Elongation decreased 20% at 2 x 107 rads and 50% at 8 x 107 rads. In vacuum, 7 rads and elongation was reduced 20% by tensile strength was reduced 20% by 7 x 10 6 x 107 rads. References 21 and 39 note marked differences in thermal properties of irradiated PVC. A reduction in the melting temperature of the polymer occurs in air (but not in vacuum). Reduction of the temperature at break of sampics heated under constant stress was noted for samples after 5 x 105 rads. After 1.1 i x 107 rads, a 30-400C reduction in temperature at break was achieved. The rate of HCL evolution is affected by the temperature during and subsequent to irradiation. GHCL = 5.41 (-900C), = 13 (300C), = 23 (700C) after 2 x 107 rads. Diffusion and permeability constant are increased by irradiation but may decrease again at higher doses. Crosslinking is inhibited in air, but may be enhanced by inclusion of polyfunc-tional materials, such as polyethylene glycol dimethacrylate. The temperature-oxidation resistance of consnercial materials wil1 vary with the effectiveness of free radical scavengers and antioxidants. Polyvinyl Fluoride / threshold approximately 107 rads / elongation. DuPont R-20 exhi-bits approximately 20% loss of elongation at 2 x 107 rads and 50% loss at 5 x 107 rads. Tensile strength was not appreciably affected below 1 x 108 rads. Sample thickness and dose rate were not given.48 Polyvinyl fluoride is also marketed as Tedlar. Radiation resistance is probably less at elevated temperatures.- One electron irradiation at 600C to 1.8 x 109 rads resulted in severe physical !l l 3-11 i
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I 9-page ne 99981 99/71/99 Table 2 e yr. arm ro air-r i e p. man. imin tra c. m evseers runCrica toration greesto to sanistion ennet sortir tone tres psi e tira etaaru s f.EGEND FOR NORMAL POSITION sin Favia atte Wars resilion siswat p a (ptpa str err. NC - Normally Closad eersta-a su ev=P tatti CTaf v 3,, g a n m 7m e omtv tinit swift" NO - Normally Open LO - Valve in Open Position with anymn.a swa ruse inttr crur y 5s to at a n 9 41 M4 e ontv tiait sviit" Operator Control Power or Motor Power Atiministratively sevisse.4 (Tat sie saett (int v 5e es no y v 5 steer run cts post a is etarr. tapait I na rest utternt p y,g, i LC - Valve in Cloned Position ,i i1vnies-a trwt to ams pirr tint v n se in) y n ute/r 794 tis puaq a m tw,r Operator Control Power o Motor Power Atiministrati evuesa a attun fans etst C 'nt t 58 to to v n Seit/t 7est sts to FF" Removed. I prfvt9998 9 aCCun faae Olst Cint t 58 98 10 i n 3519/7 7932 sls 10 Off. GENERAL _ LEGEND ) n0VM99C e aCCUn f ant Olst Ct=T y 38 tS to i n 5019/! 7051 sls 10 Orts N-% Y - Yv s e navet t r-a aCp stat trascrF to su at tint y 50 et no i n 5019/1 Me? Cis Puast a to ttrist CTMT - Containment Building MSR - Main Steam Valve Room ) y 5819 7Fo* auto etw sisant sata. artte ses SIS - Safety Injection Signal novisfra a atac tav ort ran pist traf v se es at V CIS - Containment Isolation Signd I nev19779-g trac tav ett ran sist Critt y seesE v Y 5m 77:= avia orte sisaat 5m urra sis novlsit O P aCCof (ini vrni GVttti Cfnf v 58 68 LC n n 5tf t 7615 I ft1vnM-t tusit als spty TO tint af Cini 50 80 tt n n Soft 78n ) m15fts-a 5% 9T I To n2 anatirts tini y 58 ft te n Y sm nn navnne a snet et t to ne amirts em v 5e se te a Y
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air ) 8E7V144ta O CTwi tte tv gitt (Tnt T 1809 9 Y 4 5081/1 7611 115 TO Ort 9 nrmietit 3 (firi tt# Sy Ostt CTRT T 59 28 NO Y 4 5851/1 'S'1 Sit YO crf 4 I nrfvletit a CTgf Cte $v Diit Cint ? 30 et un T n 5391/1 7431 115 TO rrrg i POV14410 a (Tat its St DISC (TNT T SI et un u 5931/1 7812 515 70 erra sev1846-8 (Cu 015C Rtt 74 BWNI CTwi T 50 It M Y R 500?/F 761# Ct1 Pua*T 910 ttDit I isw323s-g tini ties part itST IMO n il et #t 4 N Stil 7t ?8 304tY 1 417 SWITtu ) Imv1239 u tini trat paTE Ti$7 s,2 4 58 09 at 4 4 5til 76?9 0 0%Y (f RIT ?tif tX l I l l I 9 I 9 I I l h I I
( a 1 I f 's gsb ]r o O p ( ( i V e ts, 1 r c te is iw m .r i t i t o o .i s 0 t t U r t t t i. t a a a l t te t u U r s i, t s s U s .s s p e 0 a n s n t a 4 C t C e u e w m u t t te o f ? 7 1 Ff t 4 3 3 4 4 2 9 t 1 8 8 e 3 3 1 9 e 9 1 m7 m o r, n 1 7 7 6 6 7 6 1 9 6 5 r 7 3 7 7 4 4 R 1 s 1 3 3 7 9 7 7 t 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 t 7 on m3 m t t 5 s 3 e 7 7 3 8 3 o 3, /./ f t t r ? l r F t t 2 f 2 3 3 1 2 / t 7 / / / / / / / / / 9 9 8 9 9 9 9 t 9 9 9 f r n.i O e ./ 1 1 t 1 1 3 1 / / 0 / wi1 r 0 1 t t 9 3 8 8 8 0 8 8 e 8 8 O S s 1 7 1 1 5 e 1 i 3 t e s 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 s 5 5 S 3 9 t 5 3 t rt 5 3 i 8 s S f s e Y t, f a. b a i M a a 2 N T 1 Y T R p N N u N Y T R a Y l fr s ss a w T t f t
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t t C C o e, e, 1 e. I 0 n i M l t l l L es u II L I n 1 I psto t e o e 4 O C. I I C e e t s P P i t oa t i v 5 a r f K o t n n a a N W R 4 N R a a a a R W W N a N D i T s ( 40 ? ? ? 1 9 l t l s I i s 1 1 3 i s . i r t l f 2 t t i t P t t 1 1 7 i r i t i P s i 1 1 1 i i ti t s i a C 1 n i n 1 t ? ? O t 7 L 1F i 1 e ? t r f n, n a A s s i 8 e e 9 t t t s e Y . 4 4 4 s O O i m s s t l l Y Y s s U w P f t p F n l s t e R 9 R s s l s. i t i t r y y t i m.i i r Fi t t t i t L t i f t e t i f t t ,t '7 p i f t t f u r t O n s i i i i i t i l i m l C c U ,U T T 1 p r 1 m O o f e a t t L t L l e, a 1 f w r T 7 T t t P t U u U 4 n 0 wt w U U U U i t s O o C t 1 t T t ( c i i Y 0 0 0 O O l l C 4 n ..O o. i 2 s s 9 w 8 e O P C C c s s i 7 p o R t S s C C p p M u ws p s s s t 4 I R s s p U W O U U U F O .i 0 1 s V U t W s S U U T S S M W 1, mmf mT t O a t t T T u W P P t T T r t C W t, i a M M mf T t t T t p N n e E s N n W N r s i i t f T i W I ( c C C C c C c P e p f f i i f t T 8 ~ s 9 L u C C C t 4 t t ( ( t t 8 9 9 t 8 a 9 8 a t 4 4 9 9 n 9 4 8 t 4 a e 9 8 i 6 7 1 n f 9 4 9 1 7 t o 4 0 e A 7 t 9 ? , n S e 9 6 i 1 7 f i ? 9 9 S t n a W 4 9 i 9 7 1 R t 2 F 9 it ? t n t f 1 t t 1 0 9 t. R i 9 t 9 t t 1 s 9 e oP a 6 8 9 V t e V o 9 t wt a l m 9 t 9 9 W t e e t V v U v V V u v u V v v v o 1 r T / 7 e t o P T e, e, t,. I i W R ei t e I O E p m P t / m m - rI , m r II m M l M M c. y v v y v w I a 9 D 9 l i i
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