ML20215J625
| ML20215J625 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1987 |
| From: | Sherwin Turk NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Harbour J, Hoyt H, Linenberger G Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#287-3791 OL, NUDOCS 8706250060 | |
| Download: ML20215J625 (25) | |
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8 Helen Hoyt, Esq., Chairman Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Administrative Judge Administrative Judge-Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nucleu Regulatory Commission U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 l
Dr. Jerry Harbour Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Beard
. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 In the Matter of PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and f)
Docket Nos. 50-443, 50-444 Off-Site Emergency Planning -Ob-
Dear Administrative Judges:
On. June - 4, 1987,.the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
. filed its response
".o certain discovery requests made by the Massachusetts Attorney. General, SAPL and the Town of ' Hampton.
Attached as
" Appendix A" to that response was a document. entitled " Current FEMA Position on TAdmitted Contentions on New Hampshire Plans For Seabrook" which included, as " Appendix - D",
a letter from Robert Bores (NRC) to Edward A. Thomas (FEMA) dated February 18, 1987.
The Staff wishes to advise the Board and carties that the referenced letter of February 18, 1987, was effectively superseded by letter dated June 4, 1987 In order to avoid confusion, a copy of this subsequent letter, containing Dr. Bores' current views and proposed revisions to the RAC position paper, along with the " Attachment" referenced therein, is attached hereto.
Sincerely, k
Sherwin E. Turk Senior Supervisory Trial Attorney Encl. : As Stated cc W/
Enclosure:
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'JUN04 ggy Edward A. Thomas, Chairu n Rogional Assistance Committee Federal Emergency Management Agency John W. McCormack Post Office and Court House Boston, Massachusetts 02102
Dear Mr. Thomas:
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Reference:
RAC Corrnents on Transient Beach Population for Seabrook Station Subsequent to our. April 15, 1987 meeting of the Regional Assistance Committee on the above subject, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board issued its MEMORANDUF AND ORDER on April 22, 1987 relative to the Public Service Company of New Hampshire petition for a one-mile plume emergency planning :one.
In that document, the 30ard concluded that the current studies provided by the applicant did not provide a prima facie showing to warrant the granting of the one-mile plume EPZ petition.
The Board deliberately left open the possibility of granting the petition if convincing infonnation'l1s subsequently provided.
Even though the beach population issues differ substantially from the above litigation, because of it and because the NRC staff has not yet completed its review of all issues in the 5eebrook and "BNL" studies, I recommend that the RAC not reference these studies or specific conter,ts in our present consid-i eration of the beach population issues.
With that in mind, I am proposing reviseo sections for the RAC report.
These proposed revisions involve pages seven through ten.
For your convenience, a clean, rewritten copy of the RAC position paper incorporating these revisions is enclosed.
Should you have any questions concerning the above, please contact rne at FTS 4BE-1213.
I woulo be very happy to meet with yot, and/or the RAC to discuss my response.
LCM Robert J. Bores A
Technical Assistant Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards 1
Enclosures:
As stated bec w/ encl:
l W. Russell J. Allan J. Gutierrez W. Kane W. Johnston T. Martin R. Bellamy R. Bores
.J
i 1
a PROTECTION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.8EACH POPULATIONS BACKGROUND '
The requirments for emergency preparedness stte from 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1) and (2), which state that except as provided in 10 CFR 50.47(d) licensing of a facility for operstion up to $1; of rated power (relative to license for a nuclear power rcactor will be issued unless a finding is ude b
),nooperating i
s the NRC that 'there is reatenable assurance that adequate protec can and will be taken la the event of a radiological emergency.tive measures l
whether state ad local emergency plans are adequate and j
The NRC will the adeoney and i:nplementability of the licenste's onsite e
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j The FEM finding is prirarily based on the review of the state and local
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eurgency plans. Any other infonnation already available to FEMt may be used in considering whether there is reasonable assurance that the plans can be implemented.
Paragraph b offsite ecergency respons(e) plans for nuclear power reactors m of 10 CFR 50.47 requires that the onsite and 4
planning star.dards.
Dnergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Supp was issued to provide a corncn reference and guidance source for state and local governments and licensees in the developant of emergency j
s response plans and preparedness for response to a radiological emergency and for FEMA, NRC and other federal agencies for use in the review of those plans and preparedness.
i The planning basis adopted by NRC and FEKA for energency preparedness around
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nuclear peser plants was taken from NUREG 0396/ EPA 520/1-78-016, 'Plarning Basis for the Development of State and local Government Radiological Emerg Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Pcwer Plants".
objective of the emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in
'The overall some cases, freediate life savings) for a _spectrue of accidents that could 1
produce offsite doses in excer.s of the PAGs" (NUREG 0654).
it atternpted to identify the boundarthat the planning basis ranga from trivial ev of potential accident consequences, y parameters based on av'ilable knowledge a
timing of releases, and release charac-teristics (source tenn),
it should be noted that dos PAGS do not equate with lose of life or even a health hazard.es in excess of the EPA I
1 intendedTor use by protect'ive action decision rakers in arriving at a balance The PAGs were between radiation risk and that of taking a protective action in the absence of constraints to that action.
4 l
1 Enclosure l
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2 a-Relative to the edequacy of emergency preparedness for the Seabrook beach population, NURE6 0654 elements J.9 and J.10 appear to be pertinent to the situation, tienent J.9 states, in part, that each state and local plan must establish a capability for implerenting protective measures based upon protec-tive action guides and other criteria.
Element J.10 states that these plans to taplement protective measures shall include, in part: saps showing evacuation routes and areas, relocation (reception) centers and the population distributier, arour.d the nuclear facility by evacuation areas; the means to notify all seg:nents of resident and transient population; the means for pro-tecting persons whose mobility may be impaired; the neans of relocation; reception centers / host facilities; routes under energency conditions; projected traffic capacities of evacuation control of access to evacuated areas and organizational responsibilities for control; identification of and means for dealing with potential impediments to use of evacuation routes and contingency ceasures; time estfrates for evacuation of various sectors and distances based on a dynamic analysis; and the bases for choice of recoenended protective actions for the plume exposure pathway during emergency conditions, includin consideration of local protection available and estimated evacuation times. g REVIEW OF NEW HAMPSHIRE PLAN, REVISION ?, AUGUST,1986 J.9
-- The RAC review of element J.9, the establishment of capability for implerenting protective reasures, for both the State and local level plans, has indicated that no apparent action was warranted by the State at this time for this element.
This eierent was rated
" inadequate' for the State, however, because the RAC had not yet resolved the " beach population issue *, the subject of this document New Hampshire is also currently reexamining all ecergency resource.
needs and the resource tvailability and distrit'. tion to support protective action implerentation.
The resource needs and availability area will be reviewed by the RAC after completion of the NH study.
Fased on the RAC and my examination of the plans and preparedness for the beach population and those individuals in unwinterized housing, I conclude that these pop:14tions can be appropriately protected by implerenting those provisions of the current N8 erergency plans.
There appears to be no unique problem in this area that has not been adequately addressed.
J.10.a -- The RAC review of element J.10.a relative to beach population protective action implerentation, i.e., the raps of evacuation routes, of evacuation areas, and of reception ard host areas for both the State and local plans, reveal no inadequacies.
(An
'tradequacy" was identified with re mental sampling locations; however, gard to the sap of the environ-this is unrtlated to beach population protect 1on treasure implementation. Several minor clari-fications were recorrended for bus route maps. However, relative to the beach population, this eierent appears to be acequate.
l i
3 J.10.b -- The RAC review of element J.10.b, maps showing population distri-bution by evacuation areas around the nuclear facility, indic' te no a
inadequacies for either the State or local plans.
No actions were required of nor recommended to the State for this element.
J.10.c -- Relative to J.10.c the means for notifying all segments of the population, the PAC left the evaluation of the State portion of this element 'open" pending completion of the FEMA-REP-43 (now FEMA-REP-10 Nov. 85) review of the alert / notification system.
For the local plans this elesnent was rated ' inadequate" because details were not provided relative to provisions for identifying siren failures and for providing backup notification in those instances of identified siren failures.
It should be noted that this inadequacy was generic for all town plans and was not applicable only to the
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beach population.
The physical stren system and the administrative procedures, plans i
and means for alerting and notifying the public appear to be in place and adequate.
Provisions for early notification of beach populations with both stren tones and voice message capability are in place. The alert / siren system can be activated on an individual stren basis, in groups, or as the entire system to provide flexibility to the decision makers to acconwdate the circumstances of the event.
J.10.d -- Relative to J.10.d, the sneans for protecting persons whose mobility is impaired, the PAC identified no inadequacies at either the State or local level.
Provisions were found adequate for health care facilities, Rockingham County Jail, schools, etc.
Relative to
" individuals with special needs", however, the RAC left this item "open' pending a review at a future date by TEMA of the lists of such special needs individuals.
This open item is generic to the entire EPZ ad is NOT unique to the beach population.
The PAC also recocrended that the protection factors for special facilities be considered in any KI administration decision as they are when considering evacuation of these facilities. (The current provisions use no designated protection factors for special facil-ities when calculating projected thyroid doses for purposes of KI administration decisions.)
J.10.e -- Element J.10.e, provisions for use of K1, is not applicabit to the beach population, at least not in any unique sinse.
Therefore, no evaluation is considered here.
The RAC rated this elenent 'ade-quate'.
4 I
o.
j J.10.f. -- Element J.10.f. decision making for use of K! is not directly applicable to the beach population and, therefore-Ts not considered here.
The MC rated this. element " adequate'.
J.10.g -- Relative to J.10.g. the means of relocation, the MC found pro-
_ visions to be ' adequate" at both the State and local levels.
did, however, have a number of recommendations in this area relative The RAC to plan and procedure inconsistencies in the bus and ambulance the mechanism for determining precisely the number of sresour j
persons to be accoasnodated by the identified resources.pecial needs These inconsistencies, however, were closely evaluated by the RAC and were judged not to result in a lack of resource provisions to adequately accormodate those needing transportation, i
J.10.h -- Relative to J.10.h, relocation centers, the RAC found that provisions for reception centers and host facilities were ' adequate".
tional. needs or recommendations were identified.
No addi-J.10.1 -- Relative to J.10.1, projected traffic capacities of evacuation routes, the RAC indicated that the appropriate traffic capacity data were provided.
No inadequacies were identified for this ele:nent.
J.10.j -- Relative to J.10.j, control of access to evacuated areas, the RAC found no inadequacies.
I provisions to perform this function.The State has responsibility and adequate The only RAC recommendations workers and access logs.for this element concerned radiological directio I
J 10.k -- Relative to J.10.k. identification of and means for dealing with potential irnpediments to the use of evacuation routes, the RAC found no inadequacies but did have one additional recccnendation to be considered by the State for possible improvement.
Inventories of found to be ' adequate". equipment, procedures and letters of agreement w J.10.1 -- Relative to J 10.1, evacuation time estimates, the RAC has reviewed the "Seabrook Station Evacuate Time Estimate Stud i
RERP) and concluded that although the study was 'y"(Vol. 6 of the essentially adequate" in terms of format, there still exist a number of technical issues that are of concern and need be addressed.
technical concerns can be grouped into several areas:The bulk of these i
the evacuation tines appear to be overly pessimistic in that the " worst case situa-tions" were generall data or conditions; y utilized whenever there were uncertainties in i
inconsistencies in data or results were not clear; and maps and tables had some inconsistencies. satisfa l
9 5
I It should be noted that the purpose of Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) is not to provide data showing that any or all areas can necessarily be evacuated prior to plume arrival, but rather to provide the decision makers with the best estimate of times needed to evacuate a given area (s) under the circumstances such that the most appropriate decision can be made relative to whether to evacuate an area (s) and the timing of such recessendations.
J.10.m -- Relative to J.10.m. bases for choice of protective actions for the plume exposure pathway, the RAC left this ites "open", citing element J.9 in its coewnts.
No specific actions were asked of nor recom-mended to the State to resolve this issue. As with J.9,.there appears to be no unique problem associated with the beach populations which has not bien adequately addressed by the NH plans.
l l
Sumary - In reviewing the RAC connents relative to the adequacy of provisions i
for being able to protect the beach population, only element J.10.c was lef t ' inadequate" (lack of detailed provisions in local plans concerning the identification of stren failures and backup notifica-tion capability). Element J.30.d was left 'open' pending FEMA review of lists of ' individuals with special needs'. This ites is not specific to the beach population but is generic to the EpZ.
Elements l
J.9 and J.10.m were lef t "open", basically awaiting RAC resolution of the " beach population issue *, but citing no specific inadequacies.
As noted above, no' additional or unique actions appear to be required i
to adequately protect the beach populations. Element J.10.1, although rated ' adequate", can be considered "open" pending the provision of additional clarification of data / assumptions /results in the evacuation time study.
Overall, there appears to be no
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identified technical problem which has a significant potential for precluding adequate protection of the beach populations (including those persons residing in unwinterized shelters),
ADDITIONAL PLAN DISCUSSION The New Hampshire RERP for Seabrook site appears to meet or will reet the NUREG 0654 criteria (after RAC comments are resolved) in the generic sense. This reans that the plan should be adequate to provide reasonable assurance that
'I public health and safety can be protected during a spectrum of emergency scenarios. In addition, particular attention was given to specific features of the offsite land uses and derreography.
Specifically, the nearby beach areas and high seasonal populations have been studied in depth over a number of years and by a number of organizations.
Volume 6 of the NH RERP, Seabrook Station Evacuation Time Study, incorporates many of the results of those studies, expands on other studies and provides additional data and clarifications in other areas.
While the scope of Volume 6 iaciudes the entire EPZ, particular attention was focused on the beach areas, the seasonal populations and their evacuation during an emergency under a variety of conditions (ninety-five sets of conditions in all were examined in this study). For sumer accident i
i
6 scenarios, the evacuation time estimtes for the beach populations ranged from about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 30 minutes to about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 20 minutes after the o evacuate individual areas has been given.
Stailar evacuation ties estimates (ETEs) for the population area within a 2-mile radius of the plant range from 4
i 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 20 minutes to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 40 minutes according to the studies.
- Again, these studies tended to maximize parameters in the direction of increasing e vacuation. times.
(The more likely situation would involve more rapid evac-uations.) : As noted earlier, the ETEs are required to provide the decision m.akers with the best information (neither under-estimates nor over-est of the times likely.to be needed f 9 evacuate' a given area under the specific circumstances at the time of the accident. This inforsation is necessary to 1
make the optimum decision relative to the type and timing of protective action reconnendations for a given situation.
The State and local' plans include many special considerations for protecting the beach populations.
Some of those considerations are listed below.
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1.
Provisions have been made to consider closing the beaches or restricting public access to the beach at the Alert emergency classification.
At this classification level, no offsite action would be ordinarily warranted to protect the public, but its consideration here would provide additional time to clear the beaches or prevent additional public access to the beach, just in case the situation worsens.
Note: Even at the Site Area Emergency classification, one would ordinarily expect that offsite pro-i tective actions would not be necessarj to protect the public.
2.
An alert and notification system has been installed with the beach areas to provide siren coverage.
The sirens can be activated irdividually, in selected groups or as the total system, can be rotated for better coverage or fixed in any direction, and can also carry voice ressages and emergency instructions.
The system has backup activation capability locally in each town.
Administrative provisions and coordination of emergency instructions to be j
3.
broadcast have been provided to enable the decision makers the flexibility to get the most appropriate message aired in a timely manner for the i
i spectrum of possible scenarios.
The scopt of situations cov.ered range f
from that when the emergency organizations are fully staffed and are following a slowly developing situation to the unlikely case when the situation is rapidly developing, obviously severe in nature, and occurs prior to energency organizatinns being able to fully' staff or assess the situation.
4 Procedures and resources have been provided to assist the public in evacuating the beaches, for directing and controlling traffic, for providing transportation for those without vehicles and for removing impediments or obstructions along evacuation routes.
t
7 5.
Provisions have also been made to coordinate New Hampshire decisions regarding New Hanipshire beach populations with Messachusetts for consid-eration regarding the Massachusetts beach areas.
DISCUSSION The foregoing discussions have< indicated that the current NH plans meet or will meet the criteria of NUREG 0654 in a generic sense. Specific and cetailed procedures have been provided to assure early notification and evacuation of the beach population can be effected should the plant status appear to be threatening.
The review of these plans and procedures do not indicate the presence of concerns or situations involving the beach popu-lations which warrant unique solution or provisions beyond those already incorporated.
Relative to the beach population, the distance tc the Seabrook Station from the nearest beach area is almost two miles. This distance provides additional time to evacuate beach areas from the time of release until the front edge of the plume arrives over the beach area (assuming the wind is blowing to the beach). This distance also can provide considerable dispersion and dilution
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of the plume activity in traveling from the site to the beach.
(The magnitude cf concentration decrease is dependent on existing meteorological conditions, but could be several orders of magnitude.) Note:
If dispersion and dilution are small, then the impacted, albeit " hot" area must be small and the corresponding number of affected persons is also considerably smaller and presumably easier to protect.
It is also noted that when large, seasonal beach crowds are likely to be present (on hot and sunny days), the typical wind pattern is from the off-shore, cooler surface to the onshore, warmer surfaces of the land masses.
This means that any " sea breezes" would likely prevent the plume from traveling directly to the nearby beach areas when the beaches are most heavily populated. The sea breeze would also dilute a short tern plume even if a portion of it was recirculated to beach areas.
The analyzed severe accident scenarios (core melt with early containment failure) indicate that the major portion of the dose to the affected popula-tion from such an event is due to exposure to deposited radioactive materials on the ground surfaces rather than from the passing plume. The risk / consequence codes generally used (CRAC models or MACCS) all assume that the population is exposed to this ground depositt on for 24-hours af ter the arrival of the first portion of the plume and tc any additional plumes over that area.
In other words, the codes assume the t no protective actions are
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implemented for 24-hours after the release reaches the beach (or other areas ofinterest).
In view of the NH plans for beach closure and access control as i
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8 early as the Alert classification, tne plurce travel time to the beach areas and the r'elatively short (2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) time estimated to clear the beaches, there is reasonable assurance that the beach population would be adequately protected in the event of an accident at Seabrook Station. Thus, even if there were a prompt, severe, contaminating release and a portion of the beach population were caught in or under the plume for two hours during the eacuation process, their exposure to deposited radioactivity would only be 6pproximately ?/24 or less than one-tenth of the code assumed dose.
In 6dditicn, they would be avoiding any additional exposure to the plume (s) after leaving this area.
The cverall objective of emergency response plans, as cited in NUREG 0654, is
...to provide dose savings (and in some cases, immediate life savings) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of the PAGs.
It has never been the intent of emergency preparedness / emergency plans to gurrantee thot no one would ever be exposed to radiation, or exposed in excess of the EPA PAGs as a result of any accident or postulated accident. Rather, the purpose is to minimize the risks (produce dose savings) to the extent possible under the circumstantu of the given accident.
In this context, it is clear tnet it would be inappropriate to judge the adequacy of emergency planning on the basis of whether or not the plans and preparedness can guarantee that no one would be exposed in excess of the PAGs as a result of any accident scenario. As stated earlier, the PAGS are guidance tools for use by decision rnakers and are not levels of acceptable or unacceptable risks.
The adequacy of errergency plans must be based on a finding that "there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the ever:t of a radiological emergency." Edward Christenbury of the NRC defined the NRC position relative to " reasonable assurance" in his letter to Spence Perry of FEMA, dated June 18, 1986, (copy attached). This position appears to be applicable to the prctection of the Seabrcok area beach popu-lations.
I similar analysis for persons inhabiting non-winterized facilities would parallel ine above.
Furtner, this subset of the beach population would appear to be less at risk than the beach population with no shelter; would be a smaller number than the beach population; and would generally be treated as part of the local population group.
(These persons in properties on the beach front would be considered part of the beach population during daytime beach season.)
Since precautionary evacuation for nearby areas appears to be the accepted federal and state protective action strategy if tne EPA PAGs are projected to be exceeded, the sheltering potential of buildings, other than identified special facilities, is generally not considered for populations within about a 2 mile radius.
Persons inhabiting unwinterized buildings in this area would be treated in the same manner as other (year round) residents, i.e.,
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evacuated. Persons outside this area may be considered separately on an ad hoc basis by the decision makers. Finally, it is noted that habitation of unwinterized buildings is generic to all sites with nearby behch or resort areas and that this situation is not unique to Seabrook. The New Hampshire provisions for these individuals near the Seabrook site appear to be well advanced in comparison with those at other applicable sites.
9 CONCLUSIONS Following are some of the areas considered above which were utilized in arriving at a conclusion relative to the beach populations.
NH state and local plans essentially meet NUREG 0654 criteria generically Special provisions for beach populations in place No identified problems requiring unique or unaddressed solutions Provisions for early warning of beach populations Adequate transportation resources available for those needing public transit Beaches are nearly two miles from station affording delay in plume arrival and dilution and dispersion of plume Sea breezes would tend to keep plume from traveling directly toward beach when beaches are most populated ETEs for beaches are relatively small
" Reasonable assurance" does not equate with " absolute safety", i.e.,
guarantee of no exposures or exposures above the PAGs Based on the above, it appears that contingent on the completion of action by the State to resolve the other RAC concerns with the New Hampshire and local plans, those plans appropriately provide for dose savings for the spectrum of possible accidents and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the beach and unwinterized housing populations will oe protected and that these plans will essentially meet the criteria of NUREG 0654 anc the intent of the hRC regulations in this area.
Attachment:
Letter from Christenbury to Perry dated June 18, 1986 4
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UNITIO STAft6
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June 18,1988 l
cc:
'J. Allan J. Gutierrez Spence W. Perry. Acting General R. Starostecki Counsel 3
U"'
eder Emergency Management Agency f,.
eter 500 C Street 5.W.
T. h rtin Washington D.C.
20472 R. Bellamy B. Lazarus 6/24/86-TEM In the Matter of Public Service Company of New Hampshire, ej al.
(Seabrook Station. Ur.its 1 and 2)
Docket Nos. 50-443 OL and 50-444 OL
Dear Mr. Perry:
1 i
in response to a request made by Edward Thomas of FEMA Region I, we have evaluated, in conjunction with Joseph Flynn of your offlee, an undated memorandum prepared by Thomas Dignan of Ropes and Gray on behalf of the applicants for the Seabrook nuclear plarit
("Dignan Memoran dum",
a copy of which is attached Attachment A).
Our evaluation is set forth in the following discussion,gs e*
(
The Dignan Memorandum addresses what are described as "three misconcep-tions" pertaining to offsite emergency planning for the Seabrook nuclear plant, and concludes that they are " false as matter of law" (Dignan Memorandum at 1).
These purported " misconceptions are as followa:
a A.
That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no adverse effects on the public health and safety will occur no matter what kind of accident occurs at Seabrook.
l B.
That it must be demonstrated that the plans wiD assure that all persons located in the Emergency Plaadng Zone or some certain portion of it can be evacuated in some certain time.
In' particular, there have been assertions that the 1
plans must assure the sheltering or evacuation of j
persons from the beaches in approximstely 1/2 hour.'
l I
It should be noted, however, that under the Commission's regulations.
10 CFR S 50.3 only written regulatory interpretations provided by the General Counsel will be recognised as binding upon the Commission.
i ATTACHMGMT
^
Spence Perry, Esq..
C.
That - the plans must be designed, and shown to be able, to cope with a particular type of accident -- in particular, one involving '
early release of an radioactivity off-site.
1 For the reasons set forth below, it la ou'r opinion that, with minor clari-i fication, Mr. Dirnan's conclusions are essentially correct as to' items (A) and (B) abover however, his discussion of item (C) appears to contain an error 1
which requires correction.
DISCUSSION 1
'A.
Absolute Assurance of Perfect Safety.
As set forth above, item (A) concerns the question of whether an emergency response plan must be shown to guarantee that no adverse health and safety effects will occur, regardless of what kind of accident - may occur at the
. plant.
In our opinion, Mr. Dignan correctly concludes that "[nleither the Atomic Energy Act nor any regulation of NRC, whether dealing with emergency planning or not, requires absolute assurance of perfect safety" (Dignan Memorandum, at 1-2).
i As you know, prior to issuance of a full power operating license, NRC regu-lations require a finding "that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures cr.n and will be taken in the event of a radiological energency."
10 C.F.R.1 50.47(a)(1).
With respect to offsite matters, the NRC will base its finding on a review of the FEMA findings and i
determinations "as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented."
Id.,
5 50.47(e)(2).
These regulations plainly do not require any demonstration of " absolute assurance" that the will be totally protected in the event of a radiological emergency. public Rather, the intent of the. Commission's emergency planning re an accident-and achieve " dose savings" gulations is to reduce the impact of I
through protective actions that take
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into consideration plant conditions, evacuation times, shelter factors, and other conditions that may exist at the time of the accident.
FEf.lA-REP-1, Rev.1 states as follows (at 6):
The overall objective of emergency response plans is to 1
provide dose sayings (and in some cases immediate life
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saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doces in excess of Protective Action Guides (PAGs).
j The Appeal Board has similarly stated, "[t]he basic goal of emergency planning is... the achievement of maximum dose savings in a radiological emergency."
Cincinnati Gas 6 Electric Co. (Wm.
H.
Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1) ALAB-727,17 NRC 760, 770 (1983).
pence Perry. Esq.
c -
In Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
Units 2 and 3),
CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983), the Commission summarized Its rationale for selecting an emergency planning basis as follows:
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l The underlying assumption of the NRC's emergency planning regulations in 10 CFR I 50.47 is that, despite j
application of stringent safety measures, a serious nu-clear accident may occur.
This presumes that offsite individuals may become contaminated with radioactive material or may be exposed to dangerous levels of radt-ation or perhaps both.
Planning for emergencies is required as a prudent risk reduction measure for those i
individuals.
range of accidents with widely j
Since a differing offaite consequences can be postulated, the i
regulation does not depend on the assumption that a particular type of accident may or will occur.
In fact no specific accident sequences should be specided be-cause each accident could have different consequences both in nature and degree.
Although the emergency planning basis is independent of specific accident se-quences, a number of accident descriptions were con-sidered in development of the Commission's regulations, including the core melt sccident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
These statements demonstrate that the goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents, and that emergency planning ma' satisfy NRC regulations even though the potential for adverse health effects in an emergency has not been totally eliminated.
Notwithstanding our opinion that Mr. Dignu is essentially correct in his l
conclusion as to item (A), two statements containid in this portion of his memorandum require clariflestion.
First, he goes too far in asserting that "It has been recognized from the outset
. that if one assumes a major accident with offsite releases, some adverse effect on the pubite will, by definition, occur" (Dignan Memorandum at 2 emphasis added).
Contrary to this assertion, the occurrence of a major accident accompanied by offsite re-leases will not necessarily lead to adverse health effects.
Rather, in some circumstances, emergency planning may serve to avert the occurrence of any adverse health effects.
Further, whether any such health effects occur, and the extent of any such effects, will depend upon a host of factors, such as the type and quantity of release, the plume direction, meteorological conditions, exposure durations,
and the timely implementation of an appropriate protective response.
Se con 51y, his memorandum states that emergency planning is intended to limit any adverse hesJth effects to as low a level as reasonably possible.
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'given the facilities at hand" (Id. ),
possibly implying that additional i
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facilities wiD never be required to be built cr installed to satisfy NRC emergency planning regulations.
In support of this statement, Pir. Dignan cites the San Onofre decision, supra.
Hewever, that decision provides only limited support for this conclusion.
There, the Commission addressed only the issue of whether additional hospital construction should be undertaken, and concluded that such extraordinary meas'ures are not ree.uired.
B.
Evacuation Within A Specific Time Period.
The second item addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether the App!! cants must demonstrate that all or part of the plume exposure pathway EPZ can be evacuated in some specified time; in particular, this item addresses the question of whether the beaches in the Seabrook vicinity must be evacuated within approximately one-half (1/2) hour.
It is fir. Dignan's conclusion that
!!!!C regulations do not require that an evacuation be assured within any particular time (Dignan Memorandum at 2).
We concur with Mr. Dignan's conclusion as to this item.
In support of his conclusion on this matter, Mr. Dignan cites two decisions:
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), ALAE-727, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983), and Detroit Ediron Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983).
In Zimmer, the Appeal Board stated as follows:
The applicants are... correct in their insistence that the Commission's emergency planning requirements do not prescribe specific timo !!mits governing the evacua-tion of plume EPZs.
The matter of the time in which evacuation can be accomplished is left to t e determined on a case-by-case basis upon consideration of all rele-vant conditions prevailing in the specific locality.
But it does not follow, as the applicants would have it, that a particular evacuation plan need not be concerned with the efficiency with which evacution might be accom-plished given the conditions under which it must take place [n. 16 ).
Indeed, the Commission guidelines sug-gest the contrary.
If the responsible govern-mental officials are to make an informed decision respecting what is appropriate protective action in a given radiological emergency, they must have available to them time estimates which are realistic appraisals of the minimum period in which, in light of existing local conditions,
evacuation could reasonably be accom-plished.
'And, the nearer to the plant the area that might have to be evacuated, the greater the importance of accurate time estimates.
- n. 16/
Those conditions include, for example, the size and nature of the populatten, the available
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transportation facilities,
the existing road network, topographical features and political boundaries.
Zimmer, supr peal Board s*.t,17 NRC at 770-71.
Similarly, in the Fermi decision the Ap-ded:
[T]he Commission's emergency planning regula-tions do not specify the time within which the plume EPZ must be evacusted in the event of a nuclear emer-gency.
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, i IV, requires only that applicants provide "an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and perma-nent populations."
Fermi, supra,17 HRC at 1069 n.13.
Thus, there is no requirement that an evacuation be accomplished within 30 minutes.
Wh!!e some other functions must be capable of being accomplished within that time frame, those functions generally involve th notification of appropriate governmental officials and notification of the gnlie.
See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E.
I IV.D.
C.
Planning for A Particular Type of Accident.
The third issue addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether a facility's emergency plans must be designed to cope with a particular type of accident and, in particular, an accident involving an "early release of radioactivity off-site."
Two conclusions appear to be reached by Mr. Dignan in this regard:
(1) i that while emergency plans must be dealgned to cope with a spectrum of accidents, they need not be designed to cope with a specific accident or "any worst case accident" (Dignan Memorandum at 4),
and (2) that emergency p!rns are not required to be designed to cope with an early i
release of radioactivity (Id., at '-3).
While we agree with the first of these cor.clusions, the second Enclusion is incorrect and requires clarification.
First, Mr. Dignan is correct in stating that the emergency plane must be de-signed to cope with a spectrun of accidents, but are not required to address any particular accident sequence or a
" worst case sccident."
The Commission has decided. on a generfe basis, that compliance with its emergency planning regulations provides the reasonab'd assurance required by 10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(a): accordingly, offsite emergency plans are not reoufred to address particular accident sequences.
In the Statement of Consideration published upon adop'fon of the Commission's final emergency planning regulations, the Commission stated as follows:
The Commission recognizes that no single accident...
scenario should form the basic for choice of notif! cation capability requirentats for offsite aut'.iorities and for
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1 Spence Perry, Esq. i the pub!!c.
T.mergency plans must be developed that will have the flexibility to ensure response to a wide i
spectrum of accidents.
This wide spectrum of potentid accidents also reflects on the appropriate use of the offsite notification capabi!Ity.....
Any accident involving severe fuel degradation or core melt that results in significant inventories of fission products in the containment would warrant immediate i
public notification and censideration, based on the particular circumstances, of appropriate protective action because of the ootential for leakage of the con-tainment building.
In addition, the warning time avail-3 able for the public to take action may be substantially less than the total time between the original initiating event and the time at which significant radioective re-leases take place....
The reduction of notification times from the several hours required for street-by-htreet notification to minutes will afgnificantly increase the options available as protective actions un-
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der severs accident coaditions.
These actions could j
include staying indocrr, in the case of' a release that has already occurred or a precautionary evacuation in the I
case of a potential release thought to be a few hours away.
Accidents that do not result in core melt may also cause relatively quick releases for which protective actions, at least for the public in the immediate plant
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vicinity, are desirable.
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45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (1980).
Similarly, NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep.1, Rev. 1, provides as follows (at 6-7):
No single specific accident sequence should be isolated I
as the one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences, both in nature and degree.
Further, the range of possible selection for a planning basis is very large, starting with a zero point of requiring no planning at all because significant off-
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site radiological accident consequences are unlikely to occur, to planning for the worst possible accident, re-gardless of its extremely low likelihood.
The NRC/ EPA Tank Force did nc,t attempt to define a single accident sequence or even a limited number of sequences.
itath-er, it identified the bounda of the parameters for which planning la recommended, based upon knowledge of the
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potential consequences, timing, and release characterfs-f tics of a spectrum of sccidents.
Although the selected
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planning bards is independent of specific accident se-quences, a number of accident descriptions were con-sidered in the development of the guidance, including 3
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Spence Perry., Esq..
the ' core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study [ WASH-1400).
Accord, San Onofre, supra, 17 NRC at 533.
In Long Island Lighting Co.
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 603, 848 (1985) (cited in Dignan f.femorandum at 4), the Licensing Board dismissed a contention as-e serting that the emergency plans must be capable of coping with any worst esse accident (there involving the possible loss of offsite power); the Board stated, "NURMC-0654 does not require an adequate response for the ' worst possible accident' at Shoreham.
In sum, these regulatory and deciafons clearly demonstrate that emergency planning pronouncements for a nuclear plant is not required to particular accident sequence or a " worst case accident."be designed to cope with any concur with Mr. Dignan's memorandum.
In this respect, we The Dignan Memorandum is incorrect, however, in its conclusion that the emergency plans are not required to be designed to cope with an early i
release of radioactivity (Dignan Memorandum at 2-3).
This error appears to I
have resulted by confusing the " worst possible accident" for any accident involving an early release.
While the " worst possible accident" could involve an early release of radioactivity, other less severs accidents might also result in early releases and were included within the parameters which established the Commission's emergency planning basis.
The Statement of Consideration, quoted above, clearly recognizes that "early releases" sty occur; it is for this reason, in part, that tho Ifeensee is required to notb, e offsite authorities within 15 minutes after the licensee has declared an emergency, and that responsible offsite authorities have a capability to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have received notification from the licensee of an emergency condition.
1 The following guidance !s provided in NUREG-0054/ FEMA Rep.1. Rev.1 (at 13-14):
The range of times between the onset of accident cond!-
tions and the start of a major release is of the order of
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one-half hour to several hours.
The subsequent time period over which radioactive material may be expected to be released is of the ceder of one-half hour (short-term release) to a few days (continuous release).
[G)uldance on the time of release.... has been used in developing the criteria for notification capabilities..
(Other ressons for requiring prompt notification capabilities include faster moderate releases for which protective, actions are desirable and the need for sub-stantial lead times to carry out certain protective mea-sures such as evacuation, when this is indicated by j
plant conditions.)
J It should be noted that the responsible offsite authorities are not necessarily required, in all cases, to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have i
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l neelved notincation by the licensee.
Rather, the time in which the public is notiSed. will range from immediate notiScation (within' 15 minutes after state and local officials are notified that a situation exists which requires action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time urgent available for theci to make a judgment as to whether or not to activate the public notiScation system.
Also, it should be noted that the 15 minute i
criterion refers only to the time in which the public is to receive I
notification, and does not refer to the time in which protective actions are to l
be completed.
In sum, responsible offsite authorities must have received notiScation of the emergency situation within 15 minutes after the licensee has declared an l
euergency, and the offsite authorities must have the capability to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have ' received notification from the
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licensee.
Emergency planning for accidents involving 'early releases" is i
required -- although the protective action recommendations may be tasued i
before, during or after the occurrence of an offaite release of radioactivity.
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There is no requirement that protective actions be completed within 30 sinutes after the licensee has declared an emergency, j
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CONCLUSION j
For the reasons set forth above, the following conclusions are offered as to the matters referred to in the Dignan Memorandum:
I 1.
The basic goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact of end achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents;
- however, there is no requirement that absolute assurance be ' provided that i
adverse radiological effects will not occur.
2.
The Commission's energency planning regula-tions do not recluire that the evacuation of all or part of a plume exposure pathway EPZ be completed within any particular time.
3.
The emergency plans must comply with the Commission's emerirency planning regulations and there-by should be espable of responding to a wide spectrum of accidents; however, the plans are not required to be designed for any specific accident sequence or a " worst case accident."
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4, Accidents involving early releases are within j
Commission's emergency planning basis, however, the j
the regulations do not specify a time within which the I
recommended protec.tive actions are to be completed.
Sincerely, 4
Edward S. Christenb[
Director and Chief Hearing Counsel i
Enclosure d
cc:
J. Taylor E. Jordan T. Murley i
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MEMORANDUM i
i*his memerandum addresses three misconceptions which 1
I have arisen as to the standards to,which state and municipal k
em6rgency plans will be held in an NRC licensing proceeding.
l These misconceptions are:
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l A.
That the plant must be shown to guarantee that no 1
adverse effects on the public health and safety 1
I will occur no matter what kind of accident occurs at Seabrook.
i B.
That it must be demonstrated that the plans will assure that all persons located in the Emergency l
L Planning Zone or some certain portion of it can be i
i evacuated in some certain time.
l In parti:ular, there have been assertiens that the plans must assure the sheltering or
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evacuation of persons from the beaches :n approximately 1/2 hour.
C.
That the plans must be designed, and shown to be able, to cope with a particui$'r' type of accident --
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i in particular, one involving an early release of 1
radioactivity off-site.
Each of these prepcsitions is false as a matter of law.
First, the issue of absolute safety:
Neither the Atomic Energy Act ner any rer.;at;en of NRC. whether dealing w:th l
emergency planning or net. requires absolute assurance of
1 perft t safe y.
Indeed, it has been recognized from the outset of the formulation of the current emergency.
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planning j
regulat1ons that if one assumes a major accident with S
cffsste releases, some adverse effect on the public will, by def.nition, occur.
The purpose of emergency planning is to -
i have in place means and methods of coping with such an event in order to keep those effects to as lov a level as reasonably pessible given the facilities at hand.
Southern California Edison Co._ (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983).
Second, as to the proposition that the plana must be demonstrated to be capable of assuring evacuation of certai n
areas within a certain time:
This simply is not the law.
The Appeal Boards of the Comm:ssion have so held - flatly and v:thout equivocation.
C;nrinnati Cas & Electric Comeanv (Wr. h.
R.mmer Nuclear Power Etati:n. Unit No.
1, ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760. 770 (1983); The Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Ferma i
l Atom ; Power ?ls.nt, Unit 2). ALA3-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 ( 198 3 ). - Jndeed, the only activity which the requiat::ns specifically require to be capable of accomplishment in one-half hour is public notification.
And et is in that context the 1/2 hour rule as discussed in NUREG-0654, the NRC emergency planning guidance document Third, the proposition that the plans will be judged as t: adequacy aga:nst a certa:n type of accident and in particular ene involv:ng a release as soon as 1/2 hour:
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4 That prcpos:::en is not only bad law, it as directly i
contrary to the theory of the NRC smergency planning criter:a.
The theery upon which the regulations _ were based was that the planners should consider a spectrum of accidents.
The key is that the plan be shown to be flexible and capable of reducing the acverse effects to the greatest extent reasonably possible.
The Commission itself has stated:
"Since a range of accidents with widely differing offsite conrequences can be postulated, the regulation does not dependien the assumption that a particular type of accident may or will occur.
In fact, ne specific accident sequences should be specified because each accident could have different consequences both in nature and degree.
Although the emergency plar.ning brasis is independent of specific accident sequences, a number of accident descriptions were considered in development of the Commise:cn's regulataens, :.nclud:ng the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASM-1400).
j "It was never the intent of the regulation to require direc;.ly or indsrectly that state and lucal governments adopt extraordinary theasures, such as construct;on of additional hospi%als or recruitment of 1
substantial additional medical personnel, just to deal with nuclear plant accidents.
The emphasis is on p_rudent risk reducticn measures.
The regulation does not require dedication of resources to h&ndle every possible accident that can be imagined."
1 CLI-83-10, 17 NRC at 333.
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<a furthermore, there is no requirement that it be demonstrated that a plan will cope kith any worst case accident.
.NU.;IC-0654 simply does not require an adequata d
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response for the worst possible accident.
Long Island j
Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 603, 866 (1985).
In short, the standard by which any emergency plan is to be judged is whether or not it represents the best efforts of knowledgeab*e people through the use of reasonably available fac:11 ties to reduce to the maximum extent reasonably possible the adverse effects on the public health and safety which will result from off-site releases resulting from a spectrum of accisent scanaries.
The guiding principles, as recently stated by an NRC Licensing
- o Beard are:
"The purpcse cf emergency plannir.g is to achie'.e dose savings to the general pub *.;c in the event that radioactive material is accidentally released off site.
There is no minimum standard ef publ;c radiation dess which must be met in emergency planning.
"Absciuta protection of the public aga:nst all radiation doses connot be guar 2nteed and is nct required for all possible accident scenarios.
"The erargency response plan should not be developsd for any specific precenceived acc: dent sequence.
It sh.ould instead be framed to cope with a spectrum of accident possibilities including the we:*- accadunts2 4-s.
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"Tn re in no standard time required to
'be met for evacuation in a radiological
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. emergency.
Estimates are necessary.to determine accurately the actual time required.for evacuation. -These estimates are needed to aid in
. protective. action decisionmaking.
"No massive investment of resources (stockpiling of supplies or construction of hospitals) are required for emergency i
planning
'We will apply a practical standard of efficience of utilization of existing resources (such as roadways and manpower) in evaluating the acceptability of the evacuation plan."
LBT-85-12 et 782.
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