ML20215H700
| ML20215H700 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1986 |
| From: | Ridgeway D GEORGIA POWER CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Edles G, Kohl C, Wilber H NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#486-1232 OL, NUDOCS 8610240094 | |
| Download: ML20215H700 (27) | |
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DEUSSA A. RIDGmY October 22, 1986 goa'fEA3.
Gary J. Edles, Chairman ths. Christine N. Kohl Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory commission commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. Howard A. Wilber Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 In the Matter of Georgia Power Company, et. al.
(Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2)
Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425
Dear Administrative Judges:
On October 7, 1986, the NRC Staff served the Appeal Board and all parties to this proceeding with a copy of the "Ra-diological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Report" (September 19, 1986) prepared by FEMA based on its observations of the April 30-May 1, 1986 full participation exercise for the Vogtle Emergency' Planning Zone ("EPZ").
FEMA there concluded that the offsite emergency response plans provide " reasonable assurance" that " adequate measures * * * [can be taken] to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency" at Vogtle.
While a number of " Areas Recommended For Improvement" were identified in the Exercise Report, there were no " Deficiencies" or " Areas Requiring Corrective Action."
- Thus, federal regulations do not require further action by any party as a result of the exercise.
Nevertheless, the States of Georgia and South Carolina, the four counties in the EPZ, and Georgia Power Company have reviewed the " Areas Recommended For Improvement" and have identified re-sponsive actions for each.
The correspondence enclosed here for the information of the Appeal Board documents those actions.
See Memorandum, To Executive Director of GEMA, From D. Moffett, Re:
Plant Vogtle Exercise Report (October 20, 1986); Letter, To J.
j DiLuzio (GPC), From J. Moore (SCEPD) (October 7, 1986);. Letter, 8610240094 861022 PDR ADOCK 05000424 c
G PDR
)
SHAW, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNER $ Map INCLUDANG PROFE5SiONAL CORPORATIONS to B. Clack (GEMA) and J. Moore (SCEPD), From J. Varner (GPC)
(October 15, 1986).
Further, on October 14, 1986, the NRC Staff served' FEMA's-
" Interim Findings Report on the Adequacy of Radiological Emergen-cy Response Preparedness for Plant Vogtle, Georgia" (September 8, 1986).
FEMA there concluded that the offsite emergency response plans "are adequate and capable of being implemented and that offsite preparedness is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to~ protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency."
The Interim Findings Report also noted:
The qualifying exercise at Plant Vogtle did not include a medical drill as an objective.
How-ever, a medical drill is scheduled to be conducted on September 22, 1986, which, if successfully con-ducted, will provide the missing element and, at that time, this of-fice may assert that this planning standard [L. Medical and Public Health Support] is adequately addressed.
Interim Findings Report at 3, 20.
Enclosed, for your in-formation, is a copy of FEMA's " Medical Drill Evaluation Report, Plant Vogtle, Georgia" (September 22, 1986).
That report con-cluded:
The plant personnel, ambulance and hospital staff demonstrated a good knowledge of proper and adequate radiation emergency response capa-bilities.
All players took this drill very seriously and exhibited a strong desire to do an adequate, appropriate and thorough job.
i Medical Drill Evaluation Report at 5.
Respectfully submitted, Delissa A. Ridgway Counsel for Applicants Enclosures cc:
Service List (attached)
.~
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00LKEiED U%kC Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 16 Du z3 P 3 :47 In the Natter of
)
[0CbIbNIb f
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BRMP GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, et al.
)
Docket No. 50-424
)
50-425 (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
SERVICE LIST Gary J. Edles, Chairman Bernard M. Bordenick, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Executive Appeal Board Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C.
20555 Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Christine N. Kohl Atomic Safety and Licensing Bradley Jones, Esquire Appeal Board Regional Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C.
20555 Commission 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Howard A. Wilber Atlanta, GA 30303 Atomic Safety and Licensing
-Appeal Board Danny Feig U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio.n 1130 Alta Avenue Washington, D.C.
20555 Atlanta, GA 30307 I
Morton B. Margulies, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel i
Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Gustave A. Linenberger Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Oscar R. Paris Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Secretary Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Carol Stangler 425 Euclid Terrace Atlanta, GA 30307
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STATE OF CEOR2f A Bepartment of Befense 8
ecorgia Cmergency JHanagement EgentP siLLvJ.ctAcn P.O. Box 18055
- " " "'"'C " "
woaosapww.ma**'N Atlanta, Georgia 30316-0055
""^*NNo*m'"'"^'
TEL: (404) 656-5500 o
20 October 1986 MEMORANDUM 8~
Executive Director
/
T0:
- / M84 THRU:
C)igf nktfanning Plant Vogtle Exercise Report
SUBJECT:
As you are aware, subject report contained no observed deficiencies Accordingly, no response to FEMA areas requiring corrective actions.
Region IV is required or necessary.
Each of The report did identify some areas recommended f Based on this review, appropriate DNR and DHR Staffs on 6 October 1986.
A actions have been taken or will be taken to address each area.
discussion of each of these actions keyed to specific FEMA comm report is enclosed.
U lb'N
~
DAVID H. M0FFET REP Planning Officer
Enclosures:
(as stated) i OHM /sa l
I k
ACTIONS ADDRESSING AREAS. RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT PLANT V0GTLE 19 SEPTEMBER 1986 A.
Paragraph 2.1, Page 13 Area Recommended For Improvement 1.
==
Description:==
High noise levels in the FE0C impaired normal telephone conversation and effective monitoring of the ENN.
Recommendation:
It is recommended that the room directly across from the FE0C be used to house the person monitoring the ENN and Radiological Health personnel.
Response
To reduce the noise level in the FE0C, carpet will be installed.
In addition, a jack will be installed in the room l
directly across the hall so that the ENN terminal can be moved l
from the FE0C, if necessary.
B.
Paragraph 2.1.2, Page 16 Areas Recommended For Improvement:
1.
==
Description:==
Field teams were prepositioned at the Burke County E0C. Back-up field teams were not available for 24-hour staffing.
Recommendation: County and state members of the field teams should demonstrate activation and mobilization in a future l
exercise. A 24-hour staffing capability should be demonstrated.
l
Response
Annex D to the Georgia Radiological Emergency Plan l
(The Vogtle-Specific Plan) indicates that backup staffing for field teams is provided by federal personnel.
In accordance with the plan, during the Vogtle exercise, backup field team assistance was requested from the DOE Savannah River Plant (SRP),
who agreed to respond.
In any event, the State has the capability to provide 24-hour staffing, if necessary.
A roster of personnel will be prepared which will demonstrate this capability.
2.
==
Description:==
One ingestion pathway team had a micro-R meter instead of a CDV-700.
Recommendation:
S0P 6.0.3.7 should be revised to indicate this equipment change.
Equipment possessed by the teams in their kits l
should agree with the equipment check list.
1
.R.
t o
4 Response: S0P 6.0.3.7 provides that each field team should be equipped with either an Eberline E-520 or a CDV-700.
The referenced team was equipped with an Eberline E-520 in addition to the micro-R meter, and was therefore in compliance with the procedure.
S0P 6.0.3.7 will be revised to indicate micro-R meter availability, as well as circumstances where its use may be appropriate.
3.
Descri) tion: The dosimetry issued to the teams is different than t1at specified in the plan.
Recommendation:
The plan should be revised to reflect the proper and appropriate dosimetry which was worn by the team members during the exercise.
Response: The Base Plan, Appendix 9, will be revised to reflect the appropriate low range and high range dosimetry which would be issued in an emergency.
4.
==
Description:==
None of the teams performed open window readings, only closed window readings as stipulated in the S0P 6.0.3.6.
Recommendation:
S0P 6.0.3.6 should be re.ised to call for both open and closed window readings.
Such readings should be taken to assure that the air sample measurements are actually in the plume and not in an area outside of the plume where plume shine causes non-zero closed window readings.
Response
Eberline HP-270 instrument probes have been purchased and included in kits, and S0P 6.0.3.6 has been revised to provide for'open window measurements.
C.
Paragraph 2.2.1.1, Page 19 Areas Recommended For Improvement 1.
==
Description:==
Signs should be prominently displayed that direct evacuees to the Reception Center and to specific areas such as parking and reception.
Recommendation: More signs and directional arrows would be helpful in directing the flow of evacuees. Also, evacuees assigned to an alternate shelter who are proceeding in private vehicles should be given strip maps.
Response: Additional signs and directional arrows will be provided to direct evacuees.
All evacuees would report initially to the primary reception center.
If any had to be relocated to a backup facility, they would be transported by bus or other similar means of mass transportation, rather than by private vehicle.
-- --2
i 4
2.
==
Description:==
The Reception Center notified the E0C that it was open before all personnel were in place.
. Recommendation: All personnel should be in place and ready to receive evacuees prior to notifying the EOC that the Reception Center is open.
Response: As noted in the pre-exercise briefing of exercise controllers and evaluators, full reception center staffirg and the processing of evacuees were intentionally delayed during the exercise to avoid disrupting students' use of common areas such as the gym. The opening of the reception center was timely simulated to facilitate other parts of the exercise scenario.
In the event of an actual emergency, students would vacate the common areas of the school; reception center personnel would not notify the E0C that the center was open until all personnel were in place and ready to receive evacuees.
3.
==
Description:==
Traffic control and security were not evident during this exercise.
Recommendation:
Traffic control and security should be provided.
Response: Additional traffic control and security will be provided at the reception center.
4.
==
Description:==
Red Cross personnel did not arrive, although both shelter managers requested and expected Red Cross support.
Recommendation: Red Cross personnel should participate at
.the shelter in the next. exercise.
I Response: While a Red Cross representative was stationed in the Burke County E0C during the exercise, other Red Cross personnel were not available to participate. However, Red Cross personnel have reaffirmed their commitment to participate in future exercises and to respond in the event of an actual emergency.
5.
==
Description:==
It appears unrealistic to expect normal school activities to proceed while large numbers of evacuees are being registered and/or sheltered.
Recommendation: The County Plan should specify at what point schools would be dismissed.
Response: County School Superintendent Checklist procedures specify that school will be dismissed at the discretion of the School Superintendent.
This is consistent with the decision of the NRC Licensing Board, which granted summary disposition of the issue of reception center capacity.
FEMA supported that motion.
See " Memorandum and Order (Ruling On
' Applicants' Motion For l
3
-4 A
(July 17, 1986);
I Summary Disposition of Contention EP-5)"
"NRC Staff Supplemental Response to ' Applicants' Motion For Summary Dispostion of Joint Intervenors Contention EP-5 (ReceptionCenterCapacity)."
Paragraph 2.2.1.3, Page 21 D.
Area Recommended For Improvement Signs indicating evacuation routes and/or information warnings were not present at strategic locations
==
Description:==
1.
in the VEGP area or at the public boat ramps.
Permanent evacuation route signs should be installed at strategic locations in the VEGP area Recommendation:
boat ramps.
Temporary evacuation route signs are available and would be posted in an emergency to mark the routes
Response
designated for use by officials; all available evacuation routes might not be used, depending on wind direction other such factors.
Emergency warning signs have been limit this flexibility.
posted at the public boat ramps.
Paragraph 2.5.2, Pages 33-34 E.
Areas recommended for improvement related to I
of Georgia and South Carolina dated 15 October 1986.
l
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(El}e State of Soutly Garolina fHiliturg Eepartment 1
m OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
- 7. ESTON MARCHANT October 7, 1986 M AJOR GENF.RAL THE ADJUTANT GENERAL Mrs. Jean DiLuzio Nuclear Operations Department Georgia Power Company P.
O. Box 4545 Atlanta Georgia 30302 kw
DearMrJFA iLuzio:
As you know, we recently received the final report of the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant full participation exercise conducted on April 30 - May 1, 1986, from the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
The report was very laudatory with there being no " Deficiencies," " Areas Requiring Corrective Actions" and very few " Areas Recommended for Improvement."
We have reviewed the report with great interest.
At the end of the second paragraph in Part 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA (page 2),
FEMA states "no deficiencies and no areas requiring corrective actions were identified during this exercise."
There is no further action required by FEMA.
While neither NRC nor FEMA regulations require response to
" Areas Recommended for Improvement" those comments are address-ed as matters of routine coordination between the State of South Carolina and Georgia Power Company.
To wit:
1.
The problems with the Administrative Decision Line (ADL) and the Emergency Notification Network (ENN) are being corrected.
The ADL has been redesigned and tested.
A
- new, permanent ENN telephone system (like the Georgia system) is being installed and tested to replace the substitute system which South Carolina used for the exercise.
2.
Thermoluminescent Dosimeters (TLDs) have been issued at State and County levels in South Carolina.
Emergency Preparedness Division Rutledge Duilding 1429 Senate Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201 (801) 758 2826
i eg 3.
The planned siren to be located in Barnwell County is programmed by your organization to be operational December 15, 1986.
Tone alert radios have been issued to residents j
within the EPZ.
4.
The following improvements will be made:
a.
Additional training will be conducted for county public information personnel.
l b.
Pre-scripted messages will be revised.
j c.
Operations personnel at the FEOC will receive train-ing on posting correct units on the dose table and message verification procedures will be streamlined.
d.
Emergency' workers (including law enforcement person-nel) will be issued appropriate dosimetry, and record keeping cards.
KI will also be available for distri-i
- bution, if necessary, at the direction of state j
authorities, e.
Additional training will be given the Barnwell EOC Coordinator.
-f.
The remedial improvements recommended in the report and the objectives which were not demonstrated will be shown in subsequent exercises.
g.
The Allendale County EOC radiological officer will receive additional training in the.use of dosimetry equipment.
We have appreciated the fine support and assistance we have l
received from Georgia Power Company in the past and look forward to your continuing cooperation in the future.
Sincerely,
=-
JOSHUA P. MOORE Director JPM:JMC:ncs
M Ge' rgia Power CwTgny o
333 Piedmont Avenue Atlanta. Georgia 30308 t
Telephone 404 5264526 Mailing Moress:
Post Office Box 4545 Atlare.a. Georg;a 30302 GeorgiaPower Corporate Communication r C z^
tre soutvn rectr,c system October 15, 1986 Mr. Billy J. Clack, Executive Director Georgia Emergency Management Agency Post Office Box 18055 Atlanta, Georgia 30316-0055 Mr. Joshua Moore, Director State of South Carolina Military Department Office of the Adjutant General Emergency Preparedness Division Rutledge Building 1429 Smith Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Dear Sirs:
As you know, in the September 19, 1986, TEMA report on the Vogtle exercise of April 30-May 1, 1986, there were five areas recommended for improvement at the Emergency News Center. The following contains FEMA's descriptions and recommendations in these areas as well as Georgia Power Company's response:
1.
==
Description:==
Maps of the Savannah River Plant area and a chart for tracking activities such as sheltering, evacuation and opening of reception centers were not present at the Emergency News Center.
Recommendation: Providing the indicated maps and displays at the ENC would enhance the media briefings.
Response: A detailed map of the Vogtle EPZ (including the Savannah River Plant area) is available at the Emergency News Center.
Status charts to track such activities as sheltering, evacuation and opening of reception centers will be provided.
2.
==
Description:==
Additional telephones for incoming media calls are needed at the Emergency News Center.
Recommendation: Providing additional telephone lines for incoming media calls to the ENC would expedite information flow to the media.
m
E Response: The number of Emergency News Center phone lines for incoming media calls is being doubled.
In addition, in an emergency, a telephone response team would be available at Georgia Power Company corporate headquarters in Atlanta, with access to the same information as the News Center, thus reducing the load on the News Center.
3.
==
Description:==
The staff members on the ENC rumor control telephones were not kept up to date on events and were, therefore, not always well prepared to answer questions.
Recommendation: Procedures for keeping rumor control staff members better informed should be strengthened..
Response: Procedures are being revised to stress the need to keep rumor control staff informed.
This point also will be emphasized in training.
4.
==
Description:==
Although the ENC was fully staffed, mobilization procedures were not demonstrated.
Recommendation: Staff mobilization procedures for the i
ENC should be demonstrated in a future exercise.
Response: Staff mobilization of the Emergency News Center was not an objective of the April 30-May 1, 1986 exercise but will be demonstrated in a subsequent exercise.
5.
==
Description:==
Hard copy news releases were not always available in a timely manner at the Emergency News Center due to some coordination problems in the procedores for handling, numbering and distribution news releases.
l Recommendation: The procedures for handling, reviewing and distributing proposed and final hard copy news releases should be reviewed for adequacy. The staff should be provided with additional training to ensure proper coordination.
l l
-0
Response: Procedures for handling, numbering and distributing news releases are being revised and will be the subject of training.
If you have any questions or desire additional information regarding these responses, please let me know.
Thank you.
Sin ely' 7
\\
y John Varner each & Information Supervisor cc: Mr.
E. Morris Howard Mr. Larry Hill Ms. Jean DiLuzio i
l l
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4
Federal Emergency Management Agency u
m Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 October 7, 1986 Mr. Billy J. Clack, Executive Director Georgia Emergency Management Agency Post Office Box 18055 Atlanta, Georgia 30316-0055
Dear Mr. Clack:
Attached is the Medical Drill Evaluation Report for the Plant Vogtle medical drill conducted on September 22, 1986.
The. drill was satisfactory and completes the requirements of the initial full participation exercise conducted on April 30 -
May 1, 1986 at Plant Vogtle.
Should you have questions, please contact John Heard at 347-7079.
Sincerely, b.
Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological l
Hazards Division l
Attachment l
0 -
O Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlants, Georgia 30309 MEDICAL DRILL EVAURTIN REPORP PIRTr VCGTII, GEDIGIA S w =Ler 22, 1986 Evaluator: Gary Sizmms, DlHS; Cheerver: 'Ihtsnas Hakins, FDR On September 22, 1986, a medical drill was conducted at the Burke County Hospital in Waynesboro, Georgia. This drill was conducted to fulfill the requirement from fella memorandus dated August 5,1993,.
The drill was to address which set standard exercise objectives.
items no. 30 and no. 31:
No. 30 - demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities and No. 31 -
procedures for handling contaminated individuals.
demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated injured patients.
This drill went beyond these criteria and included the emergency medical response of the plant staff.
The drill started with the following scenario:
Mechanics are moving a heavy object.
A malfunction in the lifting mechanisms causes the heavy object to fall to the floor He crushing and pinning the right leg of one of the mechanics.
sustains open fractures to the lower rignt leg, ankle and foot, and multiple abrasions, lacerations and contusions.
A co-worker nearby witnesses the accident. He assures his own safety (i.e., assesses hazards in the area) then checks the injured worker's vital signs. He calls aloud for a co-worker te notify the control room for help. The control room operator notifies appropriate site rr~ ponse personnel.
The exercise began with the victim lying on his back, wearing protective clothing.
A heavy weight pinning his right leg. He was screaming. The plant first aid team arrives at the scene with appropriate supplies.
Since the response of the site response team was evaluated in April 1986 no critique is provided for their activities.
2-It was noted that several attempts to notify the ambulance service on 554 6666 were unsuccessful because of a busy signal. The contact was made using an alternate number 554 6651.
I do not know how widely this alternate number is circulated since the State of Georgia Plan only lists the main number.
It took approximately 29 minutes for the ambulance to arrive at the door of the facility after the call was made.
A security guard met the ambulance attendants to issue dosimeters.
The attendants were not aware of patients vital sipis and the most important issue appeared to be issuance of the dosimeters instead of assessment of the patient's condition. This process seemed a bit time consuming especially if the ptient is in critical condition.
The ambulance attendants were provided with protective clothing by plant personnel at the entrance to the controlled area. The i
attendants were briefed by the plant rescue team and completed their i
assessment of the patient's condition. The Health Physics (HP) 3 Technician apprised them of the extent and location of the contamination and monitored and directed their activities with regard to contamination.
The patient had been wrapped in a sheet, moved to a clear area, and placed on a rigid stretcher in preparation for transport. The ambulance attendants completed their emergency treatment, secured the life stpport devices, prepared the patient for transport and moved the patient to the ambulance. The floor of the ambulance was covered with heavy plastic.
The elasped time from ambulance arrival at the plant to departure for the hospital was approximately 24 minutes.
The actions by the ambulance attendants and communication with the EOC and the hospital were not monitored.
The hospital had been informed of the nature and extent of the injured patient and had prepared the receiving area well 1.1 advance of the arrival of the patient. The hospital personnel were dressed in protective clothing. Most of the outside receiving area as well as the floor of the special recovery room was covered with heavy protective plastic.
The Burke County Hospital has a dedicated radiation emergency treatment room with its own entrance beside the regular entrance to the emergency. Since the parking lot and driveway paving were not complete at the time of this drill, the ambulance had to unload approximately 20 feet from where the normal unloading area will be.
This created some awkward pathway movements but should be eliminated i
when the construction is complete. The time of transport from the plant to the hospital was approximately 30 minutes.
~
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The elasped time from notification to the control room of the accident to delivery to the hospitc1 treatment room was approximately 90 minutes.
At this point in the drill it was learned. from hospital personnel that a major auto / truck accident with multiple burn injuries had occurred nearby. The ambulance was quickly stripped of the plastic liner and put back into service.
Due to the emergency, the survey of the ambulance attendants, equipment and supplies and the inside of the ambulance was not conducted. Therefore, the appropriateness of this procedure and the decisions concerning the release / decontamination of the above mentioned was not evaluated.
I believe that a second plant HP Technician followed the ambulance to perform these functions. The same HP Technician that assisted the plant rescue time, rode in the ambulance and was present ir, the ER for continued radiation.
monitoring and assistance with contamination control. He reported to the hospital staff the areas of patient contamination upon arrival in the ER.
The hospital staff immediately began assessing the patient's condition and administering ~ appropriate medication. There were three hospital staff members plus the plant technician in the treatment area with two or more support staff immediately outside the treatment room. A nu: se outside the treatment room was used exclusively for recording information on the patient's record and another for securing supplies and medications that were not already in the treatment room.
The dressings were removed from the injured area and at first discarded in the trash can. These dressings were recovered a short time later and placed in a closed container for late evaluation.
The patient was reported to have the following contamination levels; Hands:
3mR/h Forehead:
2000 cpm Ankle:
2mR/h Leg:
2mR/h The priority for decontamination was established as the injured area and debridement was begun ny the physician. The foreign matter and tissue removed from the woend was placed in a container for evaluation.
At this point in the drill e the first of the burn. victims arrived and the exercise was terminated. This was necessary due to the limited hospital staff and the number of patients in this accident.
Therefore, the following items of concern were not observed:
1)
Patient decontamination techniques and control procedures.
2)
Management of contaminated waste (including liquids that may have been used for wound cleansing).
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Determination of successful patient decontamination.
3)
Survey and transfer of patient to regular hospital environs.
4)
Proper removal of protective clothing, departure to clean 5) area, body survey, equipment and room survey, dosimeter
. collection and documentation and general miscellaneous decontamination and clean-up of the treatment area.
C(PWlENTS The procedure for issuing dosimeters to as6ulance personnel 1.
could be streamlined to save time.
Protective clothing could be issued to ambulance attendants so 2.
they could, if indicated, be dressed on arrival.
Transmission of information regarding patient's condition, 3.
nature of injury and vital signs to the ambulance enroute by the plant rescue team would be beneficial.
Thorough distribution of alternate ambulance telephone numbers 4.
l should be assured.
Considerations should be given to practice proper extrication 5.
. procedures if' patient must be moved up flights of stairs.
Reporting of radiation measurements in varying units (mR/h and 6.
cpm) may confuse some ambulance and hospital personnel.
The air vent in the radiation emergency treatment room at the 7.
hospital should be covered to prevent potential air-borne contamination from entering the rest of the hospital.
i The containers used in the ER for contaminated
- dressing, 8.
skin, etc. should be handled in a manner to avoid cross contamination, i.e., the outside of one container had blood from a glove and this container was placed in a foam filled This could result in transfer of contamination to suitcase.
the foam and suitcase.
The floor covering in the treatment room should cover the 9.
entire floor (from wall-to-wall, a narrow uncovered area existed along one side of the room) to minimize spread of contamination.
The covering used for the ambulance, the entrance to the ER and 10.
The on the floor of the treatment room was heavy plastic.
State of Georgia RFP - Annex D. Page 56. Table F-2 A-1 reads "If contamination.is suspected, have the P.reatment area i
The floor area prepared for receiving a contaminated patient.
from the emergency entrance to the treatment room should be This plastic is not absorbent covered with absorbent paper".
and in the case of wet contamination, run off could occur.
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. 11. Medical drills are expensive and time consuming. However, they do serve a very useful purpose. By keeping to a minimum, the simulation (particularly of the non-invasive medical techniques) by all players will assure they know exactly what to do in a real emergency. Mcy times constraints and limitations of protective clothing can create problems not otherwise imagined, i.e., removal of pen from shirt pocket to record patient data presented a problem to an attendant.
Therefore, it is suggested that this type of drill be conducted frequently even if only evaluated by in-house personnel.
- 12. The plant personnel, ambulance and hospital staff demonstrated a good knowledge of proper and adequate radiation emergency response capabilities, All players took this drill very seriously and exhibited a stronfi desire to do an adequate appropriate and thorouWi job. "he exercise,while prematurely aborted, demonstrated good basic skills in handling / treating, and adequate hospital facilities for a limited number of contaminated injured patients. As with any drill, the ability to perform effectively and efficiently will improve with continued practice.
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o 1
MEDICAL SUPPORT MODULE s
OUTLINE 2
I.
COMMUNICATIONS......................................................
4 II. HOSPITAL FACILITIES & PROCEDURES....................................
6 III. AMBULANCE FACILITIES & PROCEDURES...................................
8 IV.
S CEN ARI O............................................................
e e
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4 2
MEDICAL SUPPORT MODULE I.
COMMUNICATIONS Yes No N/A N/0 L.1 1.
Name the hospital (s) you observed:
1.
Burke County Hosoital. Waynesboro. GA X
2.
3.
L.1, 2.
Did each hospital receive and verify a message stating that a radiological in-cident had occured?
-hospital #1.............................
X
-ho s p i t al _ # 2.............................
~
~
-hospit al #3............................. [
F.2, 3.
Which of these hospitals (by number) had L.1 emergency consunication links to:
si
-local EOCs
-congregate care f acilities si
-aabulances in transit
-radiological laboratories F.2, 4.
Describe the communication links L.1 listed above.
Burke County has an emergency center that receives all fire, police and anbulance calls. They dispatch the antulance and have direct comunication with the hospital.
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v-3 Comma:icacic a Summary In your own words, describe and evaluate the demonstrated activities, Put capabilities,. and resources, or lack thereof, covered by this section.
the facts recorded in the "yes/no" questions in perspective.
Explain the deficiencies, and also note the exceptionally good performances.
See cover memo
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4 II. HOSPITAL FACILITIES & PROCEDURES Yes No N/A N/0 L.1 1.
Was a health physicist present, or available on short notice, to advise
. hospital staff?
-H o s pit al # 1.............................
_X_,,
-Ho s p it al # 2............................. _
-H o s pit al # 3............................. _
L.1 2.
Did the hospital have the necessary equipment for determining whether & how a patient was contaminated?
X
--H.f1....................................
-H.f2...................................._
-H.f3....................................
L.1 3.
Was this function demonstrated satisfactorily?
- H. #1...................................
,X_,
-H.#2..................................._
-H.f3...................................
L.1 4.
Did the hospital have the necessary equip-ment to decontaminate a patient?
X
-H.#1...................................
-H.f2...................................
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-H.f3...................................__
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L.1 5.
Was this function demonstrated satisfactorily?
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-H.#1............4....................._,,,,,,,
- H. #2...................................,_
-H.#3...................................
L.1 6.
Did the hospital staff follow sound procedures in handling patients, so as to avoid spreading contamination?
(e.g.
closing air ducts)
X
-H.#1...................................
-H.#2...................................
-H.#3..................................._
L.1 7.
Does the hospital have an arrangement with a radiological laboratory for analysis in support of emergency operations?
1
--H.
- 1...................................
-H.#2..................................._
--H.
f3...................................
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Bospitol Summary In your own words, describe and evaluate the demonstrated activities, capabilities, and resources, or lack thereof, covered by this section.
Put the facts recorded in the "yes/no" questions in ' perspective.
Explain the deficiencies, and also note the exceptionally good performances.
See cover memo 1
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6 III. AMBULANCE FACILITIES & PROCEDURES Yes No N/A N/0 L.4 1.
Did an ambulance and crew participate in the exercise?.............................
X L.4, 2.
Was the crew provided with:
X K.3.a
-a survey me t e r 7.........................
X
-did they demonstrate its proper usef....
~
-d os ime t e rs 7............................. T
-did they demonstrate their proper uset.. X L.4, 3.
Did the crew demonstrate procedures for:
K.5.b
-decontamination of a patient?........... _
1 preventing contamination of ambulance and crew7............................... L L.4 4.
Did the crew know which area hospitals were capable of handling contaminated patients? X L.4 5.
Was a patient actually transported to a hospital for exercise7.................... X L.4, 6.
If so, were. ambulance and crew checked K.5.a.
for contamination after the patient was removed from the ambulance?............... X K.5.b F.2 7.
Did the ambulance have two-way radio com-nunication with:
X
-t he hos pit al?...........................
-the local E0C 7.......................... X
~ ~
-traf fic control pers onne17.............. X 0
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Ambulanco 4
Summary In your own words, describe and evaluate the demonstrated activities, Put capabilities, and resources, or lack thereof, covered by this section.
the facts recorded in the "yes/no" questions in perspective.
Explain the deficiencies, and also note the exceptionally good performances.
See cover memo
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IV.
SCENARIO Summary:
Comment on the adequacy of the scenario.
did it provide enough activity? Was it realistic? Did it test areas of earlier deficiency?
See cover memo l
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