ML20215H352
| ML20215H352 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/16/1987 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8706240073 | |
| Download: ML20215H352 (152) | |
Text
ORIGlNAL 1
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Meeting with States and Affected Indian
.,j Tribes on the Status of the National High Level Waste Program Location:
Washington, D.
C.
Date:
Tuesday, June 16, 1987 Q
Pages:
1 - 84 m
Ann Riley & Associates Jourt Reporters 1625 l Street, N.W., Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 8706240073 B70616 PDR
.7
.q 1
D I S C~L A 1 MER 2
3 4
5 6
This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on 8
6/16/87 In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, h
g
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9
- N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain f
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12 inaccuracies.
13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CF,R 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this t r a n s c r'i p t
-s 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may 21 authori=e.
22 l
23 24 25
1 1
.1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.3 4
MEETING WITH STATES AND AFFECTED INDIAN TRIBES ON THE F
STATUS OF THE NATIONAL HIGH LEVEL WASTE PROGRAM
- P
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6 7
[PUBLIC MEETING]
8 9
Nuclear Regulatory Commission W
10 1717 H Street, Northwest l
11 Washington, D.C.
12 13 Tuesday, June 16, 1987 14 15 The commission met in open session, pursuant to 16 notice,-at 2:05 p.m., the Honorable LANDO W.
ZECH, Chairman of 17 the commission, presiding.
4 18 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
i i
19 LANDO W.
- ZECH, Chairman of the commission j
20 THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Member of the Commission 21 JAMES K. ASSELSTINE, Member of the Commission i
22 KENNETH CARR, Member of the Commission i
23 24 25
2 C
1 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT THE TABLE:
2 3
W.-PARLER 4
S.
CHILK 5
R. JIM 6
W.
BURKE 7
R. HALFMOON 8
D. WHITE 9
D.
PROVOST
._'3R 10 M. MURPHY 11 R.
STOREY 12 B.
SMITH 13 S.
FRISEMAN 14 15 16 17 m
18 19 20 21 22 i
J 23 24 s....
25 s
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3 l
PROCEDINGS 2
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
3 This afternoon, the Commission will hear from the several 4
states and affected Indian tribes on how they view the status 5
of the National High Level Nuclear Waste Program.
6 Commissioner Bernthal will not be with us this 7
afternoon.
B Last week, the Commission was briefed by Mr. Ben 9
Rusche of the Department of Energy on the Department of Energy
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he 10 efforts to keep the national program moving and in meeting the 11 requirements of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
12 Today's discussion with the states and affected 13 Indian tribes is both timely and useful in providing a broad 14 perspective on the status of this program.
15 The Department of Energy has noted the need for 16 greater involvement by the states and the affected Indian 17 tribes in their technical program and the NRC recognizes the 18 importance of cooperation between all involved parties in 19 attempting to reach a resolution of issues in a timely manner 20 and on the ultimate success of this important national program.
21 This afternoon the Commission will hear a number of 22 speakers.
In order to keep our meeting on schedule, I would 23 appreciate it if each individual and each organization being 24 represented today will attempt to keep their presentation to 25 the alloted times.
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4 l
Do any of,my follow Commissioners have any opening f~
2 remarks to make?-
3
. COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Just a quick comment, 4
Lando.
I commend you for scheduling this meeting.
We have had 5
a number of periodic meetings with DOE and I think to a certain 6
extent, we may have lost touch a little bit-with the current 7
thinking of the:affected Indian tribes and the states.
I'think 8
this is an excellent idea to have this meeting, apart from 9
specific' decisions that the Commission has to make.
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.I think this gives us a little broader opportunity 11 for exchange in an understanding of where the tribes and states 12 think we are in this program.
I think it is an excellent idea.
r-13' CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
I appreciate
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14' that.
I certainly agree this is a very important meeting.
15.
Unless any of my fellow Commissioners have any other 16 opening remarks, I'd like to ask Mr. Russell Jim, representing 17 the Yakima Indian Nation, our first speaker, to introduce the av 18 representatives at the table and proceed with your briefing.
19 Please proceed, sir.
l 20 MR. JIM:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, 21' as Commissioner Asselstine said, think it is a timely meeting 22 and I appreciate this opportunity.
I have an oral statement I 23 would like to read.
24 My name is Russell Jim.
I am the Manager of the 25 Nuclear Waste Program for the Yakima Indian Nation.
We are
4 5
adjutant to Hanford and the Hanford site is located on seeded 1
i 2
land that we consider to be used by us according to the Treaty 3
of 1855.
4 Without further ado, I shall read my prepared 5
statement.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Please proceed.
7 MR. JIM:
My name is Russell Jim.
I am the Manager 8
of the Nuclear Waste Program of the Yakima Indian Nation.
I 9
would like to thank you for this opportunity to present the
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we 10 views of the Yakima Nation about the status of the Federal 11 Nuclear Waste Disposal Program.
12 I would like to discuss the very different 13 conclusions that are reached by the respective parties about 14 the suitability of the sites DOE has recommended for 15 characterization.
We are convinced that the process that has 16 been used to select the sites for characterization and the 17 results of that process are seriously flawed.
18 Looking at the same information and process, experts 19 who are optimistic, including the Commission, conclude that 20 t7ere is no reason not to proceed with the sites recommended by 21 DOE for characterization.
22 What is the basis for these differences in 23 conclusions?
All of the p'arties agree on one point; not enough 24 is known about the sites at this time to make conclusive 25 determinations about their suitability.
The differences of
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opinion revolve around the appropriate degree of conservatism
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2 to use in making the assumptions that are necessary to fill in 3
the gape in our present understanding.
4 DOE almost invariably makes optimistic assumptions.
5 DOE's largely unfounded conclusion is that all the sites are 6
suitable for repositories.
7 The NRC in contrast, has identified significant 8
issues for all of the sites which must be resolved if they are 9
to be found licensable.
Significantly, the Commission's
'r=a 10 official stated position appears to be that if these issues are 11 not resolved, they could prevent licensing of any of the cites.
12 In spite of this presumption, the Commission concludes that 13 there is no reason not to proceed with characterization of the 14 three recommended sites.
15 The Commission apparently supports characterization 16 of the recommended sites because it cannot now be determined 17 conclusively that any would be unsuitable.
We hold the more 18 conservative view that the adverse conditions at some if not 19 all of the sites are sufficiently numerous and serious to 20 dictate their elimination from consideration.
21 We believe that the Commission should not be 22 supporting characterization of the recommended sites when by 23 its own admission, there are potentially disqualifying 24 conditions at all of them.
25 A conservative program with e comprehensive national
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l screening using truly selective siting guidelines could p
t 2
identify sites which the Commission could endorse more 3
enthusiastically.
Instead of having to say that significant 4
issues could disqualify any of the sites, NRC should be able to 5
say it cannot identify any issues that would prevent licensing 6
of the recommended sites.
7 DOE takes the approach that it need not find the best 8
sites but rather only suitable ones.
DOE looks at these sites 9
and sees no significant problems.
The Commission looks at
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10 these sites, sees significant problems and concludes they 11 should be characterized to resolve the problems.
Tribes and 12 states and most of their citizens look at the sites, see the 13 same problems, and conservatively conclude that since we could l
14 obviously do much better, we should do so.
15 Which approach should govern implementation of the
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16 waste program?
If public confidence in nuclear waste disposal 17 is truly crucial to its success, as Congress declared in the
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18 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, then the implementing and regulatory 19 agencies should adopt the conservative approach urged by the 20 states and tribes.
The reason for this is simple.
The 21 American public does not share DOE's optimism about this 22 enterprise.
The people are, in general, very skeptical about 23 the ability of our institutions to safely manage and dispose of 24 hazardous materials.
25 Because of its skepticism, the public will never
s 8
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1-accept nuclear waste disposal unless it is convinced that this (s
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2 activity is being carried out as carefully as possible. :The 3
people of the Yakima Indian Nation and the public as a whole,
'4 Lwant assurance that the Federal Government is truly working to 5
find the best possible sites to dispose of these materials.
6 What they see instead is a program that refuses to 7
accept the need for conservatism and which could obviously have 8
come up with a much better slate of sites.
They see sites that
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9 are selected because the Government already owns them, rather T:e l 10 than because of their favorable geologic characteristics.
They 11 see these sites have many common sense problems, like flowing I
12 groundwater, nearby rivers, valuable aquifers, and earthquake 13 faults.
14 They see DOE doing a comparative evaluation of the 15 sites then choosing for characterization the site, Hanford, 16 that ranks in last place for virtually all considerations.
)
17 The advantages of a conservative approach hold true
-w 18 even if the scientific optimists are correct in their assertion 19 that there are no significant technical impediments to 20 successful waste disposal but rather only perceptual or 21 political impediments.
Even if perceptions are the only real 22 problem, it should be apparent that the Government and industry 23 cannot alleviate the widespread perception that nuclear waste 24 disposal is unsafe by simply asserting the contrary, and always 25 making the most optimistic assumptions.
Indeed, such a course l
9
'4 1
of action only worsens public skepticism.
> 7-2 The present opposition of tribal and state 3
governments to the implementation of the nuclear waste program 4
is simply a' reflection of the views and concerns of their 5
citizens.
So long as the people see a program that is based on 6
unbounded optimism, which they do not share, and that rejects 7
the need to try to find sites for repositories that are among 8
the best that can be found, they will never accept a program as 9
safe.
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10 Consequently, their tribal and state governments will 11_
reflect that skeptical attitude and it will be very difficult-12 for the program to succeed.
13 In his remarks to you last week, Ben Rusche mentioned ~
14_
the participation of affected states and tribes at the recent 1
- 15 Basalt Waste Isolation Hydrologic Testing meeting, and stated 16 that consensus had been reached that DOE's planned tests were 17 appropriate.
While we agree there was a consensus that the m
18 meeting was productive and cooperative, there was not technical 19 consensus on the adequacy of the test plans.
20 Technical representatives of the-Yakima Indian Nation
-21 raised numerous issues concerning the number and location of 22 planned tests which have not yet been addressed.
We look 23 forward to further discussion with DOE about these issues and-24 expect that NRC staff will also be interested in their 25 resolution prior to the commencement of testing.
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l In conclusion, we sincerely.believe that the If^
2 Commission would in the long run be more helpful to the. success
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3 of this program if it took a more involved and demanding 4
approach to site selection, rather than deferring to DOE's 5
' excessively optimistic approach.
6 That concludes my oral statement, Mr. Chairman.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
We will go to 8
the next speaker, please.
9 MR. BURKE:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
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'"3e 10 the Commission.
My name is Bill' Burke.
I am the Director at 11 the Umatilla Nuclear Waste Study Program.
12 The Umatilla Tribe appreciates the opportunity to 13 appear before the Commission and to present our perspective on 14 DOE's repository program.
We have been reviewing the 15 transcripts of your meetings with Ben Rusche the last few years 16 and have found his comments on progress in the repository 17 program to be consistent with many of DOE's favorable findings m
18
.in the EAs, in that they are overly optimistic.
19 As an affected Indian tribe under the Nuclear Waste 20 Policy Act, the Umatilla Tribe has broad authority to conduct 21 independent oversight of DOE's repository program and to ensure 22 that the tribe's interests, namely our treaty rights, are 23 protected.
24 Our involvement in the repository program over the
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25 past four years has generated considerable tribal cynicism and
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11 1
distrust of DOE's implementation of its duties under the s
2 Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
DOE's manipulation of the site 3
selection process for the first repository and their indefinite 4
postponement of the second repository evidenced a callous 5
disregard of their statutory obligations under the Nuclear 6
Waste Policy Act and of the need to make siting decisions based 7
on technical merit rather than political and programmatic 8
expediency.
9 Reports from the NRC staff substantiate our concerns.
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10 Because of DOE's failure to conduct the repository program 11 conservatively, there is a strong need for vigorous oversight 12 of DOE's characterization activities by the NRC and affected 13 parties.
We have been gravely concerned by DOE's publicly 14 stated working hypothesis at the outset of the site 15 characterization that each of the three sites will be found 16 suitable for development as a repository and that each site 17 will easily meet the EPA standards.
-a.
18 Your staff has reviewed DOE's environmental 19 assessments and their analysis challenged important DOE 20 findings and conclusions for the first repository sites.
The 21 NRC's comments on the Hanford environmental assessment found 22 that many of DO'E's findings of favorable site conditions were 23 based on sparse data that could just as easily support 1
24 alternative findings adverse to DOE's interpretation, 25 The NRC characterized many of DOE's favorable t
l...
12
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1 findings as premature, extremely tenuous and reached by means (s
2 other than a conservative approach.
The NRC claimed that many 3
of DOE's environmental assessment conclusions were overly 4
favorable or optimistic.
The findings and conclusions that 5
were the subject of your staff's critical review went to.the 6
heart of Hanford's containment capability.
They included 7
concerns about groundwater travel time, the tectonic.
8 suitability _of the site, earthquake swarms and life expectancy-9-
of the' waste package and the potential for human interference
.W 10 in the vicinity of a site because of the presence of geothermal 11 resources.
12 There are several particular concerns we have that 13 suggests your staff's warning is appropriate.
The Umatilla and
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14 Nez Perce Tribes and our consultants are actively engaged in an 15 investigation of the presence of commercial quantities of oil 16 and gas resources in the vicinity of the Hanford site, which 17 could disqualify the site under the siting guidelines.
mw 18 I would be happy to provide you with a summary of our 19 findings to date after this hearing.
20 Suffice it to say here that oil and gas exploration 21 activities around Hanford are increasing in an era of depressed 22 exploration budgets.
DOE's dismissal of the issue in the 23 Hanford environmental assessment based on the current economics 24 of this rapidly depleting, non-renewable resource of great
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25
-potential value surrounding a repository required to isolate
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1 radioactive wastes.ftt thousands of years, defies reason.
y lt 2
Let me take this time to remind the Commission of the L
3 close working relationship that NRC and all affected parties 4
experience during the environmental assessment process.
We 5
encourage the commission and your Staff to again' share comments 6
on the site characterization plan, especially during NRC's site 7
characterization analysis-phase.
Both the NRC and the tribes 8
should be sure that DOE adequately addresses all technical.
l.
9 issues and not distort results from the people we represent.
I 15e 10 Addressing these technical issues will require that 11 DOE implement a conservative site characterization program that 12 assumes nothing and one that purports to disprove disqualifying 13 conditions and that conservatively analyzes each site's 14 performance.
15 In addition, DOE must open the process to close 16 inspection and greater involvement by the NRC and the affected l
17 parties.
We have found DOE to be extremely reluctant to accept
}1 18 the broad authority of affected parties under the NWPA.
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19 The tribe has confronted DOE's reluctance in
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20 consultation, cooperation, negotiations over the last two 21 years, which we terminated last January.
As you are aware, 22 Congress withheld $79 million of DOE's 1987 budget, pending i
23 Congressional certification of DOE's progress in negotiating 24 C&C agreements.
The Umatilla Tribe has withdrawn from C&C I
25 negotiations because of DOE's insistence on narrowly
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1 interpreted provisions concerning the authority of affected p
v 2
Indian tribes.
3 A related issue of mutual concern to the NRC and the 4
tribe continues to be an issue of our onsite representatives at 5
Hanford.
Neither representative has been given full access to 6
records, meetings, personnel, or facilities as intended by 7
Appendix.VII of the NRC/ DOE's site-specific agreement.
It is-8 the combination of DOE's flawed implementation of the 9
repository program since the NWPA was enacted and their failure -
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10 to permit the affected parties to assume the level of 11 involvement and participation Congress intended that has 12 brought this program to its knees.
13 In summary, the Umatilla Tribe desires a close m
14 working relationship with the NRC.
Like NRC, we feel that the 15 DOE has been overly optimistic in their approaches to technical 16 issues.
Public confidence in DOE's performance has eroded to 17 the point of virtual non-existence.
Both the NRC and the
-4 18 Umatilla/Naz Perce onsite representatives have had difficulty 19 accessing information and meetings.
We feel the NRC and the 20 tribe need to stand firm on their resolve to improve DOE's 21 performance under NWPA, even if it means going to Congress for 22 a remedy.
23 Thank you.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
We appreciate s_
25 it.
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1 The next speaker, please.
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2 MR. WHITE:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of 3
the Commission.
4 My name is Del T. White.
I am a member of the Nez 5
Perce Tribal Executive Committee, which is the governing body 6
for our tribe, and also I serve as the Chairman of the 7
Subcommittee on Nuclear Waste of the tribal government.-
With 8
me today is Mr. Ron Halfmoon, our Nuclear Waste Policy Manager 9
for the tribe.
.W
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10 We appreciate this opportunity to share with you our 11 views concerning the implementation of the Nuclear Waste Policy 12 Act.
We have prepared a statement, which I will submit for 13 the record of this meeting, and I would like at this time to 14 summarize our statement.
'k 15 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Certainly.
Please do.
16 MR. WHITE:
First off --
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Excuse me.
I'd like to ask Mr.
m:
18 Burke, you referred to a paper that you are preparing and said 19 you'd be pleased to send it to the Commission, and we would be 20 pleased to receive that, if you would send it to us when it's 21 ready.
22-MR. BURKE:
We will.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
Proceed.
24 MR. WHITE:
Thank you.
k.
25 First off, I would like to make clear that the Nez l
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16 1
Perce Tribe has publicly committed that if we can be convinced 2
that the repository which is proposed to be placed within our 3
possessory and usage rights areas, areas guaranteed to us by 4'
treaties ratified by the United States Senate, is safe, that no 5
reasonable scenario exists under which dangerous levels of 6
radioactivity will be released from the repository, we as a 7
tribe will not exercise our statutory authority to disapprove 4
8 the Hanford site.
9 I start with this point, because it has been widely
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10 assumed that all criticism of DOE and its implementation of the 11 Act stem from an unyielding bias against the repository 12 program, and that is simply not an accurate assumption.
We 13 believe that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is a good legisla: ion, but legislation that has not been properly 14 15 implemented.
DOE's performance under the Act does not provide 16 us with much confidence or the Department with much 17 credibility.
-a 18 Much of our view is based on DOE's performance in the 19 first repository siting process.
Our complaints boil down to a 20 belief that regardless of work preliminary to site 21 characterization, Hanford was going to be selected for non-22 scientific institutional reasons.
Our concerns have been 23 heightened by the scholarly criticisms of the selection of 24 Hanford by experts not associated with any state or tribal 25 program.
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_Our concerns are intensified by the fact that DOE has
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2 announced that its working hypothesis is that each of the three 3
states to be characterized is, in fact, acceptable and 4
licensable by the NRC.
This approach is a prime example of 5
what, in our view, is the failure of DOE to operate from a 6
conservative assumption.
7 As you are aware, the NRC Staff has consistently 8
recommended a conservative approach as opposed to DOE.
DOE 9
seems more or less to have an optimistic approach in that
.3e 7-10 matter.
DOE's failure to follow a conservative approach, 11 coupled with our belief that non-scientific considerations may 12 control site selection, cause us profound doubt as to the 13 impartiality of DOE's scientific program.
e 14 We are further concerned that DOE may attempt to 15 limit our own investigational opportunity of potential 16 disqualifying factors.
Delays in DOE processing of tribes' 17 grant applications, for example, have prevented us from m
18.
carrying out important data collection in a timely manner.
DOE 19 has also resisted our efforts to investigate the potential for 20 human interference with the Hanford site arising from oil-and 21 gas exploration and the possibility that commercially viable 22 quantities of oil and gas exist in the Pasco Basin.
23 For its part, DOE is too aggressively pursuing its 24 site characterization activities.
Consultation, to be
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25 effective, should mean more than informing us of a decision
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1 after the decision has been made.
Good consultation should I'
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2 involve participation before decisions are finalized.
3 DOE's plan to begin drilling at Hanford is an example 4
of both DOE's haste and its failure to effectively consult.
5 The DOE proposal to drill 600 feet down into the first basalt 6
level, in apparent violation of the 1987 Appropriations Act 1
7 regarding restrictions against drilling of exploratory shafts, 8
was made and adopted without any consultation with the State of Washington or the three affected Indian tribes.
.'?he 9
-J 10 At the minimum, we are very concerned that such 11 drilling, which is proposed to be conducted prior to uhe 12 completion of hydraulic studies, will destroy the integrity of 13 the results of groundwater testing.
14 There are, however, some recent developments 15 pertaining to DOE and consultation that evidence some 16 improvement.
Two DOE decisions -- tribal eligibility for 17 ll8 (b) (3) impact assistance and the eligibility of all m
18 117 (c) (3) elements for consultation and cooperation agreements 19 in the negotiation process -- have been positive.
20 We believe that the role of the NRC in the nuclear 21 waste process is critical, As you may be aware, we are most 22 disappointed, as the Commission failed to insist that DOE stand 23 by its earlier commitment to NRC that the preliminary 24 determination of suitability would not be made until the 25 characterization process has yielded sufficient information.
k 19
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Nevertheless, we are pleased with the general course 2
of our interaction with the Commission and its Staff.
We are 3
particularly pleased with the proposed rulemaking on rules 4
governing NRC proceedings under the licensing of a geologic J
5 repository and your decision to involve all affected states and 6
tribes.
7 We would like to explore with NRC and its Staff other 8
substantive areas for the development of a close working
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relationship.
Our respective reviews of site characterization
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10 plans would be a good area.
Another area would involve 11 coordination of our onsite representatives at the Hanford site.
12 And we urge the Commission to continue its vigorous review of 13 DOE's technical investigation.
In particular, we hope that NRC 14 will continually urge the use of conservative assumptions by 15 DOE in its analysis of the suitability of Hanford for a 16 repository.
17 Mr. Chairman, that concludes my brief statement.
_4 18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
19 Any comments or questions from my fellow 20 Commissioners?
Mr. Asselstine?
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
As I listened to Ben Rusche 22 a week or so ago, what struck me was the statements he was 23 making then sounded awfully familiar and similar to the ones he 24 was making about a year or so ago.
Yet, when I look back over 25 the past year, it seems we really haven't made much progress.
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20' 1
More'than anything else, this-program has'been characterized by p
'2 controversy and dispute.
There doesn't appear to be a strong 3
consensus within Congress yet'as to what needs to be done to 4
correct the problem, although the perception that the program 5-is in' trouble is fairly widespread.
6 I would be interested in your thoughts on what needs-7-
to be done to get this program back on track.
If you had the abilitytoreshapeobrestructuretheprogram,whatwouldyou 8
9 do to help restore a consensus that this program is proceeding
.h-T-
10 in a rational and prudent basis and that it is likely to result 11 in a successful conclusion?
1 12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Do you want to ask any specific l
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13 member of just anybody who would like to deal with that 14 question.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Any one of you who would 16 like to respond.
17 MR. JIM:
Mr. Asselstine, there are numerous ways m
18 perhaps the corrections could be made.
We are aware that the 19' Congress has considered numerous pieces of legislation.
- Again, 20 the perception from DOE is there is no problem.
Indeed, first 21 of all, I would recommend that we go back, for instance, get 22 back to the laws that we interpret.
It has been flawed from 1
23 the time the guidelines were made, clear up into the time when 24 the preliminary determination of the site selection process 25 came through.
21
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1 It seems to be steam rolling ahead without all of the i
g 2
milestones met on the critical path.
Even though political-3 wise, they have introduced an amendment to the mission plan and 4
from there, they have suggested the reasoning is to consult I
5 more with the tribes and states, yet on the same hand, they i
6 will not allow only 90 days for the study of the site 7
characterization plan, which is in excess of 10,000 pages and 8
over 2,000 references.
9 They stand firm on that.
They will not allow any
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10 more time than 90 days and yet they-seem to base their 11 amendment plans on the length of time, the five year additional 12 time for consultation.
That would be one recommendation that i
l f-13 at least would give us the proper time to study the documents.
l t
14 The other would be, if you are going to consult and 15 cooperate, which means we would be in on some of the decision
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16 making processes, on a technical basis, we do have 17 technologists that are very knowledgeable, and we would gladly
--i as 18 submit either to the DOE, as we have or to this Commission, 19 anything that you would request on a technological basis, 20 either as a programmatic thing or something of significance.
21 I would like to add that we get along well with the 22 field office in Richland, Hanford.
The people there are fairly 23 understanding and they try to cooperate with us as best as 24 possible.
It seems that decisions from the top coming down are 25 what stirs up controversies.
The timetable, it's somewhat
. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ =
22 discouraging when you think you have everything working fairly 1
2 well, much better than something that has been done in the past 3
and all of a sudden, a decision from the top throws everything 4
into a quandary.
That's a brief attempt at trying to get this 5
thing back on track.
.I'm sure my colleagues would have some 6
other suggestions for you.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
8 MR. BURKE:
I had an opportunity recently to visit 9
with the Department of Energy at the Umatilla Reservation and
' 'ae 10 had an opportunity to share with them an old Indian word that I 11 am sure most of you are aware of.
It's an Indian word in the 12 vernacular of the non-Indian.
That Indian word is "how."
That 13 Indian word or that word, if we use it as an acronym to
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14 indicate some values that I think are very important to any 15 culture, those being honesty, openness and willingness, I think if we would use these basic fundamental kind of values in going 16 17 about implementing the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, we would find m
18 we would have a great deal more success.
19 We have found this true, as I indicated earlier in my 20 statement, that we have had more trouble with the consultation 21 and cooperation.
As a matter of fact, it was a policy person 22 from the Umatilla Tribe that characterized the C&C as 23 confrontation and coercion.
That was a good characterization 24 of our negotiation meetings.
(._
25 I think it is very important that we consult and very
23 1
definitely cooperate.
We found this to be true with your 7,
Commission.
You have been very cooperative with us.
We t.
2 3
appreciate that.
4 I would concur with the statements that Mr. Jim has 5
made.
I'm sure that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act as written is 6
a good act and if implemented properly, would give us the 7
results we are looking for.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
Anyone else?
9 MR. WHITE:
I don't know what we can do about it "ast 10 because I can't talk for the states, but I can talk for the 11 tribe's.
If we are talking only about the Nuclear Waste Policy 12 Act, there is a tribal developed consensus.
As I noted, the 13 act is good and a lot of time and effort has been put into the 14 act and the letter and spirit of the legislative intent is very 15 good.
The people carrying out the act, I think that is the 16 problem or the basis of a lot of disagreement.
As you heard 17 before, the steam rolling effect.
It comes down to an a
18 universal kind of thinking, the scientific basis is being over 19 shadowed by political aspects.
All this deals with our 20 credibility.
21 When I look at the Nuclear Waste Policy Act from a 22 tribal standpoint, tribal viewpoint, we had a rough time just 23 trying to explain and educate everybody involved as to our 24 rights under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
It has been a 25-continual battle to make various people understand.
24 o
1 We have good rapport with the policy people but when
(~.
2 it gets down to the field people, it just sometimes breaks 3
down.
I guess communication always breaks down at a certain 4
level.
5 on the funding process, I think we are ironing that 6
out.
The funding process was somebody made determinations that 7
were ineligible for some impact assistance due to some wording 8
in the act.
To me, that showed me, and this is just my 9
personal assumption, that it stopped us from doing what we are Y==.
supposedtobbdoing,protectingourboundariesofour 10 11 reservations plus our rights and positions and also the health
\\
12 and welfare of our people.
13 C's Those kind of studies were the basis for our
~
14 involvement.
Maybe it is nobody's fault but just a breakdown 15 in communications.
We had a big battle and it has been 16 continuous.
I think things are getting better the more we let 17 people know how we look at things and how we feel.
That is 18 what we are here for.
I think the more we sit down at a table 19 like this, the better off we will be in the long run.
20 The main thing that everybody has in the back of 21 their mind, especially the people I represent, everybody gets 22 to the point where they think there is not going to be an 23 objective basis for any kind of repository anyplace, that it 24 will be based on political aspects.
That's the scare that I x-25 think has everybody going.
~'
25 1
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Several of you mentioned in 3
your statements the lack of a conservative approach by the 4
Department of Energy, particularly a failure to take a 5
conservative approach in interpreting the existing data that is 6
available.
I think you noted that has been a concern of ours 7
as well.
Our staff mentioned that, both on its comments on the 8
draft environmental assessments and also on the final 9
environmental assessments.
.,"3st ;
10 I would be interested in hearing whether you see any 11 signs of improvement over the past several months, particularly 12 as we have all begun to engage in some more of these detailed 13 technical meetings on the individual sites and issues 14 associated with those sites.
15 Do you see a recognition on DOE's part of the concern 16 you all have and we have had in this area and an attempt to 17 deal with it, beyond repeatedly pointing out this problem to 18 DOE 7 Are there things you see that we could do, that the NRC 19 could do, our staff, to try and move the Department more in the 20 direction of taking the kind of conservative and questioning 21 and challenging approach to evaluating and interpreting the 22 data that at least we all seem to believe is necessary?
23 MR. JIM:
It's very difficult in the alloted time 24 here to try to promote a recommendation to get this back on
\\~
25 track in a conservative way.
I can only take perhaps some
26
~
1 instances.
I do not believe there is too much improvement in g..,
t 2
the manner in which the conservative approach is being 3
utilized.
They seem to assume that on a technical basis, 4
drilling an exploratory shaft, it is necessary without all the 5
technical studies being done, even to the point of wanting to 6
start the shaft and not drill through the basalt, just through 7
the overlying materials and then move and drill the next one.
8 It seems to be assuming that characterization is 9
going to go ahead without all the technical information.
They
?==.:
10 do not yet have the hydrologic baseline.
As you remember, 11 clear back in 1986 when they first envisioned drilling the 12 shaft, they said they would have the hydrologic baseline.
They 13 do not have to this day that information that is so necessary 14 to any further consideration of a shaft.
15 That's one consideration, one of many.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Any other comments?
17 MR. BURKE:
I would like to say -- I guess one of my
-4 18 observations as far as the conservative approach is concerned, 19 one thing the Department of Energy has not considered or maybe 20 has considered, something that I as an Indian person am very 21 cognizant of, that is what we are doing here is that we are 22 placing into the bowels of the earth, our Mother earth, 23 something that is alive.
It is my belief that if I put 24 something into the ground to give back to the eadth, it is dead
(
25 and dust to dust, and that concept.
What we are doing here is
27
~
1 putting something-alive into that earth.
This seriously y..
2 concerns me.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
One last question.
Bill, I 4,
think you mentioned the involvement the staff had with the 5
tribes and states on our sharing of comments on the draft 6
environmental assessments, bringing you into the process.
7 Do you feel that has continued?
Are there further 8
opportunities where we could improve involving you all as full 9
participants in the meetings that we have, not only with you
._ we 10 all but with the Department of Energy as well?
Do you see 11 progress in terms of your being continued to be full 12 participants in the process, having access to information, s
13 being able to share ideas and concerns and where you identify 14 concerns, being able to have those addressed, and do you see 15 some progress with the Department of Energy as well?
16 I guess I would ask in particular, is there any cause i
17 for optimism that we are moving in the right direction in the
-m 18 way the Department of Energy handled the amendments to the 19 mission plan?
Do you feel you had an opportunity to make your 20 comments and to have those comments thoughtfully considered by 21 the Department of Energy before they went forward with their 22 changes?
23 MR. BURKE:
Yes.
In responding to that, I do feel 24 that there has been some improvement.
There has been some
(_
25 improvement in that the Department of Energy is willing to come e
28 1L to the Umatilla Tribe, as an affected Indian tribe, to the
. / ~'
C 2
reservation proper and to listen to the governing body of our 3
reservation, the Board of Trustees, and I think this is a I
4 marked improvement, and I think if this continues and the NRC 5
has been willing to do this, and I think with this kind of 6
cooperation and consultation, I think things will improve.
7 MR. JIM:
On the other hand, Mr. Chairman and 8
Commissioner Asselstine, we can go on and have some types of
~
9 consultation and cooperation meetings until we're all blue and 75e 10 gray in the head.
But unless our considerations, our 11 suggestions, are taken to heart and utilized, then a meeting 12 just for the sake of a record, then the meeting is useless.
13 In Las Vegas, for instance, when we assumed that they 14 were coming to try and utilize the C&C process, and when we 15 asked for certain issues -- for instance, the 90-day extension 16
-- they stood their ground and said no.
And we just couldn't 17 seem to get across the point that we need to contribute
_a:
18 something.
We need to -- for instance, on the mission plan, 19 all our suggestions to the amendment of the mission plan were 20 supposedly reviewed, and we questioned them.
The DOE says, 21 "Yes, we reviewed them."
We asked, "Did you implement any of 22 that into the mission plan," and they didn't answer affirmative 23 or negative, which means to us they probably reviewed them, and 24 that was about it.
.,.(,,
25 We think we have something very valuable to
l
~
29
.1 contribute to this whole Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and going
.p
\\
2 back into the history, I appreciate Mr. Asselstine's 3
involvement and others to see that the particular language j
4 involving the indigenous people of this country be involved.
5 And they were very fortunate when the Act was passed in a lame 6
duck Congress, and from there we assumed that we would then 7
contribute to the nation, a national concern.
ml 8'
We have, and we will continue to do so for the 9
benefit of all people.
We realize _ the magnitude of the jobs
.W 10 you have, but we hope that the Department of Energy and others 11 realize the magnitude of the jobs we have.
We are responsible, 12 as Program Managers, under this little segment of the world and 13 this segment of a policy, to see that the best suited technical 14 site is found.
15 Perhaps if it is proven beyond the shadow of a doubt I
16 that the basalt is a medium, I guess we're going to have to 17 perhaps accept that.
But still remains the question:
On top 18 of all the others, even if basalt is a medium, why so close to 19 the Columbia River, when we have the second largest basalt 20 formation in the world?
21 There are better sites.
Thank you.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much?
23 Commissioner Roberts, anything?
24 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
No questions, Mr. Chairman.
A 25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Carr?
30
~
1 COMMISSIONER CARR:
I noticed, Mr. Burke, in your 2
backup paper that you mentioned you're behind schedule because 3
of funding.
Are your funding problems over?
4 MR. BURKE:
No, not at this point.
We have not got 5
our funding problems completed to this date.
6 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Is there a process that works?
7 MR. BURKE:
I haven't found it.
8 COMMISSIONER CARR:
And do you still have a prime 9
contractor that you are using?
.W 10 MR. BURKE:
Yes, uh-huh.
11 COMMISSIONER CARR:
And who is he?
12 MR. BURKE:
The Council of Energy Resource Tribes are 13 our technical consultants.
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Well, let me thank all of you for 15 your presentations today.
I certainly thing that your being 16 here is important.
j I
17 I agree with many of your thoughts.
I particularly
-l
-w 18 like Mr. Burke's reference to the importance of honesty, 19 openness, and willingness, and also Mr. Jim's comment here 20 recently about the seriousness of discussions and the 21 importance of listening to each other.
I think that's what 22 you're saying and actually trying to work things out together, 23 and Mr. White's comments on the necessity to continue 24 cooperating.
k.
25 Let me just say, I perhaps could summarize all this
31
~
1 by an emphasis on the listening to each other, and truly
(
2 listening, not just hearing each other, but listening and 3
trying to carry out our responsibilities, as Mr. Jim has also 4
alluded to just moments ago on the seriousness.
We're all 5
responsible.
We all have a responsibility somewhere or another 6
to the fellow citizens of our country, not only for this 7
generation but for future generations.
m 8
So we do indeed have grave responsibilities, to the 9
point where we listen to each other, we try to do the very best.
=?se 10 we can, and I know, speaking on behalf of all of my colleagues 11 as well as the Staff, I appreciate very much your meaningful 12 contributions and would request your continuing support in 13 order to help all of us arrive at the very best solution 14 possible for the fellow citizens of our country that we all 15 represent, and I deeply respect your views and your comments, 16 and we thank you very much for being with us today.
17 Thank you, gentlemen.
m 18 MR. BURKE:
Thank you 19 MR. WHITE:
Thank you.
20
[ Panel excused.]
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Could we have the next panel come up 22 forward, please?
23 Mr. Don Provost is first on the list.
Is that the 24" way you're going to proceed?
If not, we'll start that way
(
25 anyway and let you proceed any way you wish.
We welcome all of
32 1
you to the Commission.
.g 2
Mr. Provost, would you proceed?
3 MR. PROVOST:
Mr. Chairman and members of the 4
Commisrton, thank you for inviting me to present the State of 5
Washington's concerns about the high-level nuclear waste 6
program.
7 For the record, I am Donald Provost, Performance w
8 Assessment Manager of the Department of Ecology's Office of 9
Nuclear Waste Management.
g 10 Before I make specific comments, I will briefly 11 discuss our earlier participation with NRC.
Our first major 12 involvement was with the 1982 site characterization report on 13 the basalt waste isolation project.
State representatives had
(' ^l 14 routine discussions with the NRC Staff, and we are pleased with 15 the excellent work of the Staff.
16 The draft site characterization analysis, together 17 with comparable reports from the State of Washington, affected 18 tribes, and USGS influenced the U.S.
Department of Energy to 19 significantly improve the BWIP program.
20 Since
'82, we have worked closely with NRC Staff.
21 Recent meetings on Hanford hydrology issues and on general 22 technical positions were excellent examples of NRC's fair and 23 independent approach.
Your onsite representative is doing an 24 excellent job and is a credit to the Commission.
(_
25 As you know, we are at a critical juncture of the
33
^
l high-level nuclear waste program.
The site characterization s
2 process is on the brink of total collapse.
USDOE credibility 3
is at an all-time low.
N2C and other affected parties may be 4
painted with the same brush if we do not address the 5
credibility issue now, rather than wait'until we are in a 6
crisis situation.
7 Today NRC finds itself in a position reminiscent of 8
its earlier nuclear power licensing efforts.
NRC Staff review 9
of the license is limited to specific NRC responsibilities.
. ~.
v=e; 10 Cost, schedule, need, and management capabilities were not 11 reviewed.
The result was an extended controversial, 12 contentious licensing hearings which led to higher costs with a 13 great loss of credibility for the utilities and the NRC.
14 NRC chose to narrowly limit Staff review of the
'1 15 environmental assessments to the Commission's specific 16 responsibilities.
The decision was not to review USDOE costs, 17 schedule, or overall ranking of the sites.
This approach was m
18 taken, even though there is a compelling record which documents 19 defective data collections, lack of adequate quality assurance, 20 a disregard of important data, biased interpretations of data, 21 and overoptimistic site evaluations.
22 Hanford was ranked dead last in both pre-closure and 23 post-closure comparison of sites.
In the years since Hanford 24 was selected as one of the three sites to be characterized, the
\\.,
25 situation at Hanford has worsened.
The stop-work order has not
34 1
been lifted, because adequate quality assurance is not yet in
(..
2 place.
3 DOE disregarded important information which could 4
disqualify the site.
When preparing the Hanford hydrology 5
program, USDOE did not schedule consultation with the NRC, 6
states, or tribes during that period.
USDOE has not yet 7
provided critical data concerning historic contamination of 8
deep aquifers by iodine 129, as promised.
The cost of site 9
characterization has increased in this last year between 10 and
'es 10 20 percent already.
11 It is important for you to understand some of the 12 reasons we in the State of Washington are so adamant in our 13 position that the site selection process must be brought to a 14 halt.
The May 28th decision must be retracted, and the process 15 must be restructured before this program goes on.
16 We have identified many serious problems which cannot 17 be brushed aside by simply attributing them to the NIMBY 18 syndrome.
Our concerns are real, and they are substantial, and 19 if we get into site characterization long-term, we will be 20 bringing these issues up to both your and USDOE.
21 Our approach is similar to the NRC Staff's major i
1 22 issues and resolution process.
We will look for fatal flaws 23 early in the process, and we would hope that DOE does the same 1
24 thing, arrange their SEP to look at fatal flaws early in the
(_,
25 process.
1
35
~
.1 Briefly, our technical issues include groundwater
.(~
\\
2 travel time.
The State of Washington, affected parties, and' 3
U.S. NRC consultants believe there is a significant likelihood 4
that groundwater travel time would be less than that required 5
by NRC regulations.
6 Exploratory shaft drilling.
Drilling of exploratory 7
shafts will disturb the groundwater system, which could lead to
-s1 8
the loss of perishable hydrology data.
Exploratory shaft 9
drilling should not start until the pre-ES hydrology programs
.W 7-10 have been completed and the NRC, states, and tribes have an 11 opportunity to consult with DOE concerning the study results.
12 Geologic features.
Scientists have identified a l
1
)
13 suspected fault pattern within the controlled area study zone.
14 USDOE plans should include provisions for early drilling to 15 determine the extent of the suspected fault pattern.
16 Presence of natural resources.
There is strong 17 evidence to suggest the presence of natural resources in the
-w, 18 vicinity of the proposed repository.
Methane, geothermal 19 resources, and groundwater could attract future prospectors to 20 the site.
After the final EA was issued, USDOE determined that 1
21 the proposed repository site at Hanford would be a gassy mine.
1 22 Retrievability.
The Act requires that nuclear waste 23 packages must be retrievable after placement in a repository.
24 Hanford's high rock stresses causes serious retrievability
.\\~
25 problems, and USDOE has attempted to engineer around the
36 I
1 problem.
At an early stage'of the program, the plan was to p
2 place multiple canisters in long boreholes.
In the EA, USDOE 3
described an approach which utilized short boreholes.
Now 4
USDOE is considering a shallow trench approach.
Each 5
succeeding approach has greatly increased cost, while not 6
providing confidence that canistats can be retrieved.
7 Miner safety.
Shaft and tunnel construction will 8
relieve in situ stresses which could lead to spontaneous 9
fractures within the rock and rockbursts from walls of shafts T== !
10 and tunnels.
Physical stresses caused by high temperatures and 11 a wet environment will require that miners work shorter hours.
12 A loss of ventilation could allow methane concentrations to 13 reach levels which could cause explosions or asphyxiation.
m 14 Earthquakes.
The many small earthquake swarms or 15 microearthquakes which occur in the immediate vicinity of the 16 Hanford site indicate the release of rock stresses.
The 17 distribution of swarms gives an indication of where fracturing a
18 is occurring in the basalts, and these fractures are possible 19 groundwater pathways.
The earthquake locations appear to 20 coincide with the geologic features mentioned earlier.
21 Radionuclide and chemical contamination.
Previous 22 activities have resulted in heavy chemical and radionuclide 23 contamination of the controlled area study zone.
Independent 24 experts should conduct an evaluation of how defense wastes,
(,
25 such as iodine 129, have reached deep groundwaters on and off
37 1
the' reservation.
(
2 Program and data management.
USDOE's high-level 3
' waste management program has been plagued by serious program 4
and data management problems.
The overall management approach 5
has been based on competition among several different 6
repository projects.
This has led to inconsistent management 7
and data quality at different sites.
USDOE is now planning to 8
contract for an overall manager for site characterization 9
programs at the three candidate sites.
This is probably an 10
' improved apprc~ch, but a management contract will not be in 11 place for at least two years.
Clearly, substantial site 12 characterization should not occur until a new management 13 philosophy is operational.
^
14 The scope of the State of Washington review 15 activities will continue to cover all health, safety, 16 environmental, socioeconomic, and technical issues.
We-ask 17 that NRC broaden its review.
At a minimum, wrongdoing, lack of 18 disclosure, ethics violations, or misconduct should be 19 investigated prior to the time DOE submits the license 20 application to the Commission.
21 Simply stated, NRC needs to put teeth in its 22 investigative process.
In summary, the high-level nuclear 23 waste program is on the brink of collapse.
A stronger NRC role 24 at this time would be a prudent decision.
A stronger NRC role
(.'
25 would help ensure that ratepayer and taxpayers money is well
38 1
spent.
(%
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
I have Mr.
3 Murphy, I believe, next on my list.
Is that all right?
4 MR. MURPHY:
That's fine.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Please.
6 MR. MURPHY:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of 7
the Commission.
I want to echo the remarks that my colleagues 8
have made here today with respect to our gratitude toward the 9
Commission in hearing again the concerns of the states and Y=u 10 affected Indian tribes.
11 I will not, however, echo many of the remarks that my 12 colleagues have made here today but merely adopt and on behalf 13 of the State of Nevada, associate myself with many of those 14 remarks, particularly with respect to the problems we see in 15 the area of consultation and cooperation, lack of conservatism 16 in the Department of Energy's approach to the technical side of 17 the repository siting proposals and several other areas that I
_m!
18 see no real need to repeat here today.
19 Likewise, I am not going to read my prepared 20 statement, Mr. Chairman, but with your permission I would like 21 to highlight a couple of areas that I think exemplify some of 22 the concerns that we see in the overall program and which in 23 one case at least cause us and I submit ought to cause the 24 Commission some serious concern.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Excuse me, and we will submit.your
39 1
entire statement for our record.
(
1 2
MR. MURPHY:
Thank you very much for reminding me of j
s 1
3 that, Mr. Chairman.
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Yes, please proceed.
5 MR. MURPHY:
At the outset, I would like to apologize
{
6 on behalf of Bob Loux who was unable to make it here today.
l 7
His legislature in Nevada is in the process of winding down its 8
business and reviewing such things as budgets and it is 9
difficult for Bob to leave the state under those circumstances._,
W 10 Hence, once more he called the second team into the 11 bridge.
I also want to echo as my prepared remarks do Mr.
12 Provost's indication and others, I believe earlier, of our
-n 13 basically good relationship, good working relationship, with 14 your staff and how that relationship has, we think, improved 15 significantly and continues to improve significantly, I should 16 say, in recent times.
17 The best example, the most recent example of that, I
-a 18 guess, from my own point of view is the fact that your staff 19 took the time to deliver to us at least to myself at my hotel 20 last night when I checked in, the transcript of Mr. Rusche's 21 remarks last week as well as the quarterly report which your 22 staff gave you.
23 That kind of courtesy and accommodation is extremely 24 helpful.
We only wish that we receive the same sort of k
25 courtesies and accommodations from time to time from the s.
40 1
Department of Energy.
~.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
We appreciate that comment and let me 3
also just commend our staff for that and also ask the staff to 4
please continue to do that.
I think that would be helpful.
5 (Laughter.)
6 MR. MURPHY:
I knew there was a reason I remembered 7
to say that.
8
[ Laughter.]
9 MR. MURPHY:
Let me just for a moment focus on one of
='e j 10 the concerns that we have and to try to use it as an example of 11 what we see as a shortcoming in the overall program and maybe s
12 explain very briefly why we think it is a concern and that is 13 the environmental -- the lack of a site specific environmental 14 baseline.
15 Now to many people, particularly those people who 16 don't live in that area and who don't live with the nuclear 17 waste repository program, it probably seems as though we are m
18 nit picking when we say, "Why haven't you conducted a bugs and 19 bunny survey of the Yucca Mountain site before proceeding with 20 underground site characterization activities?
What could you 21 possible do to so significantly harm the environment to case 22 that kind of concern?"
23 I don't want to take the time to engage in a defense 24 of the desert environment today, but I do want to make this
~
25 point and that is, that, to us, is an example of what is f
41 1
perhaps the most fundamental and underlying concern which all p
2 of us have with respect to the Department's approach to 3
managing this process and that is the continued unwillingness 4
to cut square corners in siting and developing and in the 5
future operating a repository.
6 We see that not only as a serious legal regulatory 7
and technical shortcoming in the program and I frankly forecast 8
that in the event that the Department does not conduct a site
'l 9
specific baseline itself or fund the State of Nevada to do so
=nn 10 itself, that that issue will be revisited at the time the 11 Commission is required to decide whether or not they conduct 12 the final EIS.
13 But be that as it may, that is again symptomatic of 14 the underlying problem we see in the Department's management of 15 the overall program and that is, they simply wherever they can 16 it seems to us have thought of ways to shortcut the process, 17 that is evident in the lack of conservatism in the technical a
18 program which your staff has again most recently pointed out to 19 you and which everybody here today has talked about.
20 It is evident, I feel, in the failure to make any 21 adequate and meaningful attempts at furthering the consultation 22 and cooperation process.
It is true that in some areas there 23 is improvement.
24 There is improvement in the State's ability to l(
25 participate in the coordinating groups and things of that 1
42 1
nature, although there.certainly are continuing problems even p
i.
2 in that area but with respect to meaningful consultation and 3
cooperation,.with respect to.the kind of problem that' Russell 4
Jim alluded to and that is unwillingness to heed and to give 5
some credence to the problems which the states and affected 6
Indian tribes bring to this process is exemplified by this 7
environmental baseline problem where they are again cutting 8
across the bias of the process rather than cutting square 9
corners.
Me 10 We don't think that this process can possibly succeed 11' until the Department sees that shortcoming and determines as 12 the Act requires in my view that they must rigidly conform with 13 all of the obligations that the Act places upon them and all of 14 the obligations which this commission's regulatory rulemaking 15 decisions place upon them.
16 Another problem which we see that I want to touch 17 upon very briefly is the upcoming involvement of the National 18 Academy of Sciences.
Again in my prepared remarks, I briefly 19 indicate what that concern is.
I just again want to highlight 20 that again today because I don't think that I can possibly 21 leave you with a strong enough impression of how seriously we 22 feel that potential for that problem is.
23 It appears to us that the Department will be seeking 24 not only National Academy of Science oversight, technical 25 oversight into the way the site characterization program is
43 1
conducted but will, in fact, be looking for what I describe as 2
the Academy's imprimatur over this entire process.
3 Two indications of that in my view at least are the 4
Academy's declination to review the underlying raw data on 5
which the Department is basing its judgments and its future 6
activities and the apparent inclusion on the Academy's panels 7
of experts in the areas, so-called areas, of public policy 8
including legal and regulatory affairs.
9 I can't for the life of me figure out why public
,W 10 policy experts should be included on a panel of technicians 11 whose avowed purpose at least is to oversee the technical 12 sufficiency and the adequacy of the methodology of the site 13 characterization program if it is not indeed with a view toward 14 somehow rendering a judgment with respect to the regulatory 15 adequacy of the decision which the Department ultimately hopes 16 to make.
17 I think the Commission should view that kind of m
18 involvement by the National Academy with extreme caution less 19 you or your successors when this issue is finally brought to 20 you with a license application should really effectively be 21 coopted in your ability to render a truly independent judgment 22 in this area.
23 A couple of points with respect to the quarterly 24 report, we see some real merit in the topical licensing
/
(.
25 suggestion which your staff has made.
I have touched upon
~
44 1
conservatism already.
fs
\\,
2 I want to strongly endorse the notion and we have 3'
talked about this for a long time in the State of Nevada as 4
well as in the States of Washington and Texas, I am sure, we 5
strongly endorse the notion that the Department ought to 6
somehow find a way to bifurcate and I don't know if I.would 7
stick with that word in particular, but somehow find a way to 8
resolve those technical issues which can be resolved through 9
surface and laboratory activity before proceeding with
,g 10 exploratory shaft construction particularly if as in the case 11 of volcanism tectonics, the presence of valuable mineral 12 resources, et cetera, that the staff points out at Yucca
~
13 Mountain, if those issues are potentially disqualifying, if 14 they are and if they can be resolved through surface and
-15 laboratory activity, it is beyond me, beyond my capability to 16 understand!, why the Department doesn't proceed to do so before 17 committing
- the resources that they are talking about to proceed my 18 with explcratory shaft construction.
19 Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I may, since this, I take 20 it will be the last opportunity for us to visit with CommibsionerAsselstine, on behalf of the State of Nevada, I 21 22 want to express our gratitude for the way that we have been 23 treated during his tenure on the commission, the fact that we 24 have enjoyed tremendously working with you, Mr. Commissioner,
.l' 25 and as you begin what I hope will be a hiatus, a short hiatus,
1
)
45 1
from government, again on behalf of the State, we wish you non
)
r-
i 2
but fair winds and falling seeds.
1 3
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Thank you.
4 MR. MURPHY:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
Mr. Frishman.
6 MR. FRISHMAN:
That is hard to follow up!
7 (Laughter.)
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Do your best.
I'm sure you will.
9 MR. FRISEMAN:
My name is Steve Frishman.
I am 3me 10 Director of the Texas Nuclear Waste Programs Office.
I, too, 11 would like to say that we very much appreciate being able to 12 meet with you on this basis and I hope we can keep this up as
~,
13 regularly as Mr. Rusche can.
14 I first would like to point out that in some recent 15 activities, I and my staff had some gratifying experiences with 16 your staff in geotechnical and engineering issues, where we 17 have joined in meetings with the Department of Energy and have
.a 18 been very pleased to see that we agree on many of the issues 19 and agree on the reasons for why many of the topics that are 20 brought up are issues and should remain issues.
21 I see this as a very positive development.
I hope it 22 continues.
I know my staff is committed to trying to keep that 23 going in the right direction.
I get the sense your staff is, 24 too.
I am real pleased about that.
'U '
25 I'd like to follow along, furthering what Mr. Murphy
46 1
was trying to develop in his comments to you.
I'm not really s
2 interested and I think you have probably heard all you need to 3
hear, as I pretty well associate myself with most of what you 4
have heard this afternoon, and I'm not very interested in going 5
back and talking about how it is going.
6 I'm much more interested in talking about how it will 7
go from the perspective of the role of the Commission, if 8
Congress permits this program to go forward as it is or if it 9
gets redirected and it goes forward in some other way.
There if5te 10 are some large issues out there that I think need to be looked 11 at, at the Commission level, to give not only your staff some 12 guidance but also to give those of us who are affected parties 13 some sense of how the Commission is going to come down on some 14 issues where we already have the set ups under the current 15 program.
16 I will probably ask many more questions than I 17 answer.
That's also my intent.
There are many areas where I 18 think the Commission's role has not been sufficiently defined 19 either by existing circumstances or just because it has not had 20 to be defined yet, or it is defined differently in your 21 regulatory documentation and in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
i 22 The first that I just can't resist, I have twice this
{
i 23 Spring already heard Hugh Thompson say that at least one of 24 these three sites is certainly licensable.
I've heard that in
(
25 testimony before the Senate.
The first time was in response to 1
I l
47
~
l a question.
I thought, maybe he was just out there a little
\\
2 bit and this is what he thought.
I heard him very 3
intentionally and deliberately say it the next time.
4 I've very interested in'what the basis for that 5
statement is.
In the first instance, he was asked if he would 6
care to say which one and save the ratepayers at least $2 7
billion.
8 (Laughter.)
~'
9 MR. FRISHMAN:
He declined.
I really am very W
10 interested in what the basis for that is.
There are a number 11 of possibilities.
I'm not trying to be totally naive.
I will 12 list what some of those possibilities are.
13 Just based on the level of information that you know-14 about the sites, based on rock type, based on the hydrogeologic 15 setting, based on geographic location, public versus private 16 land, the first one characterized, or is it simply just to show 17 confidence.
I think the latter is the case.
-a 18 Let me ask a few questions that I think need to go 19 along with that conclusion if you will accept that as a working 20 conclusion.
21 If that is really what is behind it, of the six 22 remaining sites, are any of them certainly licensable, those 23 that were not selected for characterization.
of the sites that 24 were surfaced in the draft ARR that has now been put on the 25 shelf, are any of those certainly licensable?
s
48 R
1 I think th'ese are the key questions that stand behind 2
that statement.
My thought is that the statement should be 3
made, if it is to be made, it should be made in a clear and 4
unambiguous way or the statement should at least be explained 5
to the congress when it is made.
I think we are in a situation 6
now where the identification and selection of these three sites 7
is highly contentious.
You are aware of the technical issues 8
involved from the responsibilities you and your staff have.
I 9
think it does not serve well to feed on statements that may not.
10 be entirely understood by those who are listening.
11 Let me go on to a few other issues.
We can relax a 12 little bit now.
13 I have been asking for a couple of years now of your 14 staff and never really received a satisfactory answer because 15 maybe I'm not listening very well, as discussed earlier, and 16 that is I am still very confused about what " resolution of 17 issues" really means.
I'm very concerned about that because I m.:
18 tend to immediately begin to think about that phrase in terms 19 of a later licensing process.
20 I would be very interested to be able to receive for 21 all our benefit, some kind of a clear statement of what is 22 meant when we are all talking about " resolution of issues" in 23 site characterization.
I see some possibilities that are not 24 very attractive ones, that have to do with the potential for
(;
25 some early and piecemeal licensing decisions being made as
49
~
l opposed to the informal conference which is directed by 10 CFR
(,.
i.
2 60.
3 I also see a possibility for some guidance to the 4
Department of Energy that may be a little bit more in the area
{
5 of what to do and how to do it rather than why to do it.
6 That's another issue that I find in my own mind, no 7
pun intended, unresolved.
8 Another area we have been through under one context
'l 9
in the past and I think is worth bringing up again, and Mr.
'r=re :
10 Murphy touched on it to some extent, that is the Nuclear 11 Regulatory Commission has a separate NEPA responsibility.
The 12 Nuclear Waste Policy Act directs you shall adopt to the extent 13 practical the EIS for site selection, that is issued by the
(
14 Secretary of Energy.
15 To date, there has been not only a reluctance but a 16 refusal to look at issues that are other than licensing issues I
17 on the part of the Commission.
I think there is maybe some 18 basis for that just on the level of resources available and the 19 relative timing in the entire process moving toward licensing.
l 20 I would be very interested in what the Commission intends as 21 its participation or non-participation or some type of process within the DOE's EIA process, that they will be starting 22 23 probably within a year to a year and a half, should the program 24 proceed on their schedule.
25 I think it's important for you to be developing how
o-50 1
you are going to do that, because a number of things are p,
"O 2
. hanging on that.
Your separate responsibility is really one 3
where you don't have the level of freedom that the Department 4
of Energy has taken to itself under the Nuclear Waste Policy.
5 Act.
Preliminary determination of suitability, which we all
~6 sat at this table and discussed at great. length.
It puts you 7
in the potential position of having to deal with an EIS that 8
really only can analyze one site, because the other sites are 9
essentially found to be "no action" alternatives.
They have 10 been disqualified.
11 How are you going to deal with that under your 12 separate NEPA. responsibility?
I don't think you have the level x
13 of freedom that the Department of Energy may have in 14 interpreting its EIS or NEPA responsibility that way.
15 This brings to mind one of those same hearings I 16 discussed earlier where Senator Johnston in a dialogue with Ben 17 Rusche finally got to the point where they could talk about
.a 18 this bright new idea of store the fuel until it's cold and take 19 a relaxed site characterization program in sequence, one site 20 at a time, after all the baggage was cleared off, Mr. Rusche 21 being able to describe whether he liked that idea or not.
He 22 finally was able to indicate it may make some sense and then 23 finished his statement or his response to Senator Johnston by 24 saying, hopefully, we will pick the right one first.
\\
25 Well, this does not instill a great deal of
' 4 51 1
' confidence.
I think it puts you as a commission in a very, 2
very difficult position relative to NEPA.
3 We have been encouraging the Department of Energy to 4
find a way to integrate socioeconomic and environmental plans 5
and approaches with the SCP, so you can lay their whole site 6
characterization program and its implications and all of its 7
impacts out and what each study does and ultimately leading to 8
the development of an environmental impact statement and at the 9
same time gaining a baseline as discussed earlier.
T==
10 We have been raising that issue for two years now, 11 although just about three weeks ago we were told by the 12 Department one more time, and they were just about ready to tr'y 13 to issue some SCPs, gee, we will have to think about that.
The
(<
's 14 public is not going to find it acceptable to deal with the y
15 geotechnical issues of site characterization without dealing 16 with the other issues that are equally and to many of them more 17 important, which are the impacts that go on today in the
_m.
18 affected environment and to the socioeconomics of the areas in 19 which they live.
20 I urge you to begin thinking about what your role 21 should be early in the EIS process so that whenever you do get 22 to a licensing position, that it will be very clear to everyone 23 how you are going to deal with your NEPA responsibilities.
At 24 this point, it is again unresolved in my mind and I think k,;,
25 unresolved in your minds.
~
52 1
A couple more, I have some others and I will probably g,
's.,
2-will be sending you letters on and off as they become urgent.
3 The project decision schedule has a designated time' 4
for when the Department of Energy will come to you for 5
concurrence for the use of any radioactive material during site 6
characterization, as stated in Section 113 of the Act.
The 7
constraints of that within the Act are minimum amount 8
necessary, no more than ten metric ton equivalent, also fully 9
retrievable.
It only requires the concurrence of the
_.n!3e 10 Commission.
11 Remember how long we spent, those of you who were on 12 the Commission at the time, discussing what " concurrence" meant 13 on the guidelinesI I'm not sure any of us are yet satisfied
~
14 with what " concurrence" means or meant.
15 What will be the standard of judgment in that 16 concurrence?
Will it be a reasonable assurance those standards 17 under the Act will be met?
Will it be a requirement for the 18 use of some proven technique toward some very narrowly defined 19 and, or are we looking at a programmatic type concurrence as i
20 opposed to a case by case concurrence?
21 These are difficult questions.
We are dealing with 1
22 not only high level waste during site characterization.
When i
23 you access any radioactive material, I can read the Act just as
'I 24 narrowly as the Department of Energy can.
To me, "any" means 1
25 "any."
High level waste, I think you will have to look at one
53 1
way.
I submit to you that other than high level waste used i
2 during site characterization is most likely required to be a 3
licensed activity already.
4 I think there should be some guidance and direction 5
being developed now on how you are going to deal with that 6
request, even though it has not come to you yet.
It has been 7
announced that it will come to you.
8 Just one quick one on the MRS, since we have not 9
heard about MRS yet today.
In the licensing considerations for
,T=e i 10 the MRS, including an EIS, first of all, will the need for the 11 project be considered?
Will the alternatives to the proposed 12 action be considered?
I think they are going to have to be but 13 will they be?
14 In trying to determine the needs and alternatives and 15 whether in fact the project should go forward from your 16 perspective, will you be making considerations on an ALARA 17 basis, looking at a total waste management strategy, or will
.a 18 you only be looking at the MRS as essentially an end point 19 fixture?
20 I think I'll leave it at that.
Thank you.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
Ms Storey, I 22 believe you are next.
23 MS. STOREY:
Thank you.
I am Ruth Ann Stercy, 24 Director of the Utah _'Jh Level Nuclear Waste Office.
I would
(_
25 like to thank the Commission for the opportunity today to
54 e
1 provide comments.
For the sake of brevity, I will just g,.
(
2 summarize our comments and I have provided a copy of those to 3
you.
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Fine.
We will put your full comments 5
into the record, too.
6 MS. STOREY:
Thank you.
Today I want to comment on a 7
problem specific to the Utah site.
The State of Utah supports 8
the purposes of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and has endeavored
'l 9
to participate in the nuclear waste program in a manner 10 censistent with those purposes and its obligations under the 11 Act.
12 While DOE is not currently considering it as a
~
13 candidate site, the Davis Canyon site in southeastern Utah has 14 been nominated by the Secretary of Energy as suitable for 15 characterization and may remain eligible for characterization.
16 We, thus, share with the NRC the concern that the 17 siting of the nation's first repository for spent nuclear fuel
-u 18 and high-level radioactive waste be based on a sound, reasoned 19 technical approach to issues of site safety.
20 We do believe, however, that the site 21 characterization program proposed in the final Environmental 22 Assessment for the Davis Canyon site is inadequate for the 23 purposes of meeting the licensing requirements of 10 CFR 60.
24 We have further concluded that a technically adequate
\\...
25 site characterization program SJ J.La tite cannot be performed
55 1
consistent with the requirements of the Act and the siting
(
2 guidelines of 10 CFR 960.
3 The State of Utah must therefore respectfully 4
disagree with the conclusion on the suitability of the Davis 5
Canyon site that was expressed in a recent letter from the 6
Chairman to Senator Bennett Johnston which states that the NRC 7
staff review of the five final EA's did not identify concerns 8
which would call into question the suitability of any of the 9
five sites for site characterization.
h.%.
10 Questions of suite suitability for characterization 11 are inherently questions related to the licensability of the 12 site.
If an issue relating to the safety of a site cannot be
- ~
13 resolved through characterization, then a site cannot be 14 licensed and that site is not suitable for characterization.
15 Both DOE and NRC staff have concluded that 16 groundwater movement is a likely mechanism by which significant 17 amounts of radionuclides could be released to the environment m
18 and thus represent perhaps the most significant safety concern 19 in determining a site's licensability.
20 In its review of the Davis Canyon draft and final 21 EAs, NRC staff has concluded that adequate characterization of 22 groundwater movement in and near the Davis Canyon site may 23 require drilling activities to be conducted within Canyonlands 24 National Park.
\\_
25 Based on its own technical review, the State has 1
56
~
1 similarly concluded that adequate characterization of the site 2
will require drilling to be conducted in the Park.
The 3
drilling activities that would have to be conducted within the 4
Park, however, cannot be conducted consistent with the Act and 5
existing Federal law governing the use of national parks.
6 The Department of Interior.has advised DOE that the 7
activities proposed for site characterization of Davis Canyon 8
would conflict irreconcilably with the previously designated 9
resource-preservation use of Canyonlands National Park,
.'de 10 activities which do not even call for drilling in the park.
11 In order to adequately address the safety questions 12 at Davis Canyon, therefore, DOE would likely have to conduct 13 site characterization activities within Canyonlands National 14 Park.
Such activities, however, would disqualify the site
.i 15 under the siting guidelines of the Act and Federal law 16 governing the use of national parks.
Thus the site cannot be 17 adequately characterized and is not suitable for 18 characterization.
19 The State of Utah therefore urges the Commission to 20 reexamine its position on the suitability of the Davis Canyon 21 site for site characterization.
We are continuing to pursue this and other issues of concern regarding the suitability of 22 23 the Davis Canyon site and we look forward to working closely 24 with you and your staff in addressing this and other matters s
25 related to DOE's site selection activities conducted under the
57
~
1
- Act, y~
1 2
Thank you.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you, very much.
Mr. Smith.
4 MR. SMITH:
Mr. Chairman and members of the 5
Commission, I am Ben Smith and I am here to present a summary 6
.of Governor McWherter's testimony that he would like for the 7
Commission to hear.
8 I do note that Tennessee if last on the agenda today, 9
but I can assure you that that is a real contrast from the
' au
'Y 10 perception that we have in Tennessee that Tennessee is on the 11-top of the agenda of the nation to solve this nuclear waste 12 problem.
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Before you proceed, we will put all 14 of the Governor's statement in our record, too, and you may 15 summarize it for us.
Thank you very much.
16 MR. SMITH:
The State of' Tennessee rejects the i
17 proposal to develop a monitored retrievable storage facility at
-a 18 Oak Ridge.
This is the position of both the Governor and the 19 General Assembly of Tennessee.
20 Tennessee has rejected the MRS proposal because the 21 DOE has failed to demonstrate a need for this expensive 22 project.
The DOE proposal is not a viable solution for the 23 problem of isolating nuclear waste from the human environment.
24 Rather, it is a temporary solution inappropriate for waste 4
(_
25 materials that will remain dangerously radioactive for 10,000 i
58 1
years.
f' 1
2 The Nuclear Waste Policy Act provided a mechanism for 1
3 the staten and the tribes to be involved in participating in 4
the process of structuring the Nuclear Waste Management System.
5 Tennessee has participated by conducting what we think is a 6
very rigorous analysis of the liRS proposal.
7 He think that we have taken a constructive stance by 8
proposing ways to improve the nuclear waste management system.
9 We think a ;better system can be devised; one which results in
'ise 10 lesEi risk to the public and lower cost.
11 Though the need for this project is gaged in large 12 part by projections of the amount of spent fuel which will be
^
13 generated by the utilities, as a baseline point, Tennessee 14 study team undertook an independent look at the projections of 15 spent fuel ar.d we recommended some different assumptions for 16 these projections.
17 The most significant recommendation was that an
-~
m 18 increase burn-up of fuel should be taken into account.
19 incidentally, DOE has only recently modified its projection 20 assumptions along these lines.
21 Two years ago, DOE projections for spent fuel for he 22 year 2000 were 20-percent higher than the Tennessee study team.
23 Today, the difference is only two percent.
24 As the projections of spent fuel drop, so do the 25 claimed benefits of the voided reactor storage costs
l e
59
~
l attributable to MRS.
2 You should be aware that the actual cost savings to 1
3 utilities will not be the $150 to $450 million dollars earlier 4
claimed by DOE, but the savings with an MRS of avoided storage 5
costs will likely not exceed $100 million.
The reactor storage 6
problem may well be solved by the management at the individual 7
reactors determining the appropriate mix of transshipment 8
between reactors, of on site transfer between pools, of at 9
reactor rod consolidation and dry storage.
.W 10 At a number of the reactors, there will be decisions 11 made before 1998 to consolidate fuel rods to conserve storage 12 space.
These early initiatives by the utilities are consistent 13 with the DOE assumption that consolidated fuel was the 14 preferred waste form for repository emplacement.
15 I am sure that you are already aware that several at 16 reactor rod consolidation demonstrations have taken place.
17 others are planned by private firms anxious to do the job in a
.a le competitive business fashion and prove that the process can be 19 done safely.
20 They are interested in making a buck off rod 21 consolidation and they are being asked to compete with a large 22 Federal facility to do this instead of private enterprise doing 23 it.
24 There have been no licensing problems in carrying out 25 these demonstrations.
When the consolidated fuel is placed
60 1
back into existing storage pools, unit costs will be lower than
. ( ~.
2 for MRS fuel handling and storage.
3 For some reactors where further pool storage may not 4
be appropriate, fuel either consolidated or not, can be stored 5-at the reactor site in dry storage casks.
The technology for 6
such casks is maturing.
Such a cask is already licensed in 7
West Germany.
There have been-successful demonstrations here 8
and we understand that the utilities working with the NRC are 9
moving toward general licensing of dry storage casks at 10 reactors without additional site specific approvals.
11 If this is true, this will streamline the licensing l
12 process avoiding what has been termed by DOE a morass of 13 licensing concerns which would concern if the waste were stored I
14 at reactors.
We don't foresee this type of difficulty.
15 Taken together, the advancing technologies and at 16 reactor rod consolidation and dry cask storage and the 17 diminishing projections for the volume of spent fuel which will
--I
-a 18 be generated suggest that the primary functions for which an 19 MRS was planned might well be handled routinely at the reactor 20 sites by the time an MRS could become operational.
21 When all of these factors are fully considered, it is 22 clear in our view that there is no immediate crisis of 23 accumulated spent fuel at our reactors.
We simply don't need 24 an MRS to tide us over until a repository is ready.
25 Many of the nation's utilities are already involved
61 1
in advancing sound management of nuclear waste.
They are 1
2 proving at reactor rod consolidation and dry storage.
These 3
efforts should be reinforced and rewarded.
4 DOE could begin by developing a credit system for 5
fuel consolidated at the reactors.
Such a credit system would 6
recognize the benefits that we get by having consolidated fuel 7
moved throughout the system resulting in fewer casks and fewer 8
shipments through the states that we are all concerned about.
9 DOE should concentrate on cask design that serve both,
' e=se 10 reactor storage and transportation functions and an appropriate 11 family of dual-purpose casks should be standardized by DOE for 12 competitive manufacture.
13 The final point in our approved plan with a no MRS 14 system is that we think that much more of the spent fuel should 15 be moved by rail than is currently proposed.
The benefits of 16 such a proposal would be substantial.
With large rail casks, 17 fewer shipments would be necessary and cost and radiation m
18 exposure to the public could be reduced.
19 To maximize the use of this mode, DOE should become 20 actively involved in upgrading the cask handling and shipping 21 capabilities of some of the reactors.
An important point that 22 we make is that the non-standard shipping capabilities of the 23 reactors should not be allowed to stand as a major constraint 24 to creating an optimal waste management system for this
(
25 country.
62 1
Tennessee studies indicate that we could reduce the p
\\
2 amount of cask miles of shipping through the states down from 3
1.4 million annually with MRS to one million with a non MRS and 4
an improved transport plan.
5 We feel strongly that such improvements should be 6
made regardless of whether an MRS is built or not.
If an MRS 7
were located-in Tennessee, the number of cask miles through our 8
state and other states could be minimized by making these 9
improvements.
.T==
10 We are not sure whether NRC will take the role of 11 having a close examination of the costs versus benefits of this 12 project, but there certainly should be an examination of this.
13 The life cycle system cost increase is attributable to MRS 14 climbed from two billion to $2.6 billion between December of 15 1985 and April 1986.
Earlier this year, the estimate was 16 reduced downward, probably the first Federal project that I eve 17 heard of of a cost estimate going downward.
~
18 The reasons are inadequately documented.
The General 19 Accounting Office has revealed that the cost estimates do not 20 include a lengthy list of expensive items.
One such item is 21 likely compensation to the impacted State and community would 22 could add up to a billion dollars.
23 We feel that the projected economic benefits fall far 24 short of justifying the enormous cost of an MRS.
The most 25 favorable scenario of benefits includes a repository in m
1
9 63
~
l Washington and produces only $650 million dollars of benefits f.
2 for a three billion dollar project.
3 MRS cannot be justified as DOE has attempted on 4
subjective statements of improved system management.
You need
)
5 to take a close look at the very tight schedule linkage between 6
MRS and repository development and consider on top of that the 7
fact that the MRS inventory comes up to its proposed limit in 8
just a few years of operation and then try to visualize the 9
claimed benefits of system flexibility and reliability and
.=de 10 these claimed benefits are not just believable when you look at 11 those limits.
12 The State of Tennessee is deeply concerned about the m
13 events of the past two years regarding implementation of the l
14 Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
During this period, there as been an 15 ominous drift away from the Act's original intent along with a 16 false sense of urgency about the need for temporary waste 17 storage facility.
-a 18 This change is evident in the recently proposed 19 Mission Plan amendments which move MRS to the forefront to 20 receive spent fuel at the same time a permanent solution is 21 delayed.
22 The DOE proposal is ominously accompanied by 23 statements by some utilities and nuclear industry 24 representatives calling for unrestricted use of'the MRS.
They u.
25 seek to drop the schedule linkage to repository development
64
~
l 1
proposed by DOE and call for lifting.the cap on MRS storage t
2 capacity.
3 Such actions and statements point toward a mind set 4
that, in effect, would accept a temporary solution to a serious 5
national problem with environmental implications for the next 6
10,000 years.
7 The question before us all, the Congress and the NRC, 8
is whether we are prepared to take a stand now and reject'the 9
notion that we can pass this problem onto other generations or
,1se!
10 whether we are going to deal with it now.
I 11 Put simply, Tennessee wants no part of a de facto 11 2 above ground repository.
Tennesseeans are also disappointed 13 that the siting of the MRS was accomplished without 14 participation by our state.
Our State was singled out before 15 any discussions with DOE took place and were not afforded the 16 same rights as states chosen as potential candidates as a 17 repository site.
a 18 We do not think that the congress intended for the 19 MRS host state to be selected in this manner.
The people of 20 Tennessee and our state government are unconvinced that MRS is 21 either economically or environmentally sound and we urge you to 22 examine this proposal closely.
23 One final point, since NRC seems sincerely interested 24 in the nature of the working relationship between DOE and the
(.
25 States and Tribes, I want to bring up one further communication
l 1
65
~
1 problem we have had with the DOE.
2 Without bringing up minor problems, I will focus 3
attention on one at the top.
Two governors of Tennessee have 4
corresponded with the Department of Energy about the MRS 5
proposal.
Four letters have been sent.
There has been no 6
direct response to any of these letters from the governors of 7
8 Most recently Governor McWherter wrote Secretary 9
Herrington on March 25th to state his early position on Mission
,'I4 l 10 Plan amendments in the MRS proposal.
Governor McWharter's 11 letter.to Ben Rusche formally submitting comments on the l
12 Mission Plan amendments was sent on April 3.
On' April 27, 1
13
-Governor McWherter wrote to Ben Rusche again to complain about 14 the lack of coordination with the State on changes that were 1
15 made to the MRS proposal before it was sent to Congress.
16 There has been no response as of this date to any of 17 these letters.
I can tell you, too, from working in'the
--j
"(
18 Alexander Administration that Governor Alexander tried, too.
)
19 After spending nearly a year involving the state agencies, i
20 university study teams and a panel of nationally recognized 21 advisers, Governor Alexander transmitted the State's comments 22 on the MRS proposal by letter dated February 5, 1986.
23 There has been no response to the two-page letter 24 from the Governor, no response to the 67 pages of comments and e
k=
25 questions which were prepared on a tight schedule dictated by
o 66 1
. DOE and with over a million dollars of funding assistance from A;
2 DOE.
The volume of mail for DOE must be overwhelming.
3
[ Laughter.]
4 MR'. SMITH:
We understand the need to categorize 5-comments for mass response and, in effect, our comments'en the 6
' Mission Plan amendments have been responded to in this way but 7
DOE might set some priorities in the management of this 8
correspondence to give special attention to those items signed 9
by. governors or the leaders of Indian Tribes.
10 Thank you for the opportunity to comment.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you all for your statements.
12 Questions from my fellow Commissioners?
Commissioner 13 Roberts?
14 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Tennessee is definitely not 15 lowest on the list around here.
16 (Laughter.]
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Asselstine?
aa 18-COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Just a couple.
19 Mel, in your comments, you talked about -- I don't 20 know whether " bifurcation" is the right word either -- but you 21 talked about priority consideration of issues that had the 22 potential to be disqualifying issues for the first round sites 23 and that might be resolved of either surface exploration or 24 laboratory work.
(s 25 I'd be interested also, Steve and Don and Ruth, if
67 1
you all have a view on the potential value of beginning to look
.(
i 2
at those issues fairly early on, rather than saying, "Let's 3
jump in on a full-scale characterization effort that involves 4
sinking of a shaft," if, in fact, it's possible to determine 5
one way or the other on some of these other issues, whether 6
they would end up disqualifying a site.
7 Do you think that kind of an approach makes some 8
sense?
^'
9 MR. MURPHY:
Well, if you're directing the question 10 at me, yes.
Nevada has always thought that approach made some 11 sense, going back to the days in 1983 when we were arguing 12 about the guidelines at this very table, and, you know, that 13 brings back the memories of the argument about the Department's
( ~.,
14 double negative approach to the guidelines, you know, where the 15 evidence is not sufficient to indicate that something is not 16 disqualified, and that's their -- it epitomizes their very 17 approach to this whole problem, the technical concerns, in our m
18 view, and that is, at certain points in the process, no 19 information is better than any information, because no i
20 information does not disqualify a site.
21 We think that doesn't make much sense at all from a 22 policy point of view, anymore than it does from a technical 23 point of view, and there are -- I can't defend the technical 24 approaches, but it seems to me a given -- I don't think any of k_.
25 us question the fact that there are certain areas of technical l
68 1
concern shared by the State of Nevada and the Nuclear 2
Regulatory Commission Staff which can be addressed and 3
resolved, to use Mr. Frishman's vernacular, without penetrating 4
the surface with an exploratory shaft.
5 Some of that will obviously require borehole 6
drilling.
But volcanism -- you mentioned at the hearing -- at 7
the meeting last week, Mr. Asselstine, tectonics, some other 8
areas that it seems to me are ripe for that kind of
~~
9 consideration, and I just don't understand why the Departnerat 10 doesn't take that approach, didn't take that approach in 1963.
11 We have been told -- and I don't know that there's 12 anything official in this respect yet -- but we have 13 indications that the Department intends to announce roughly a 14 six-month delay in the publication of their Yucca Mountain site 15 characterization plan, so it seems to us that they have the 16 opportunity to advance some of these surface considerations --
17 that is, assuming that they can get their stop-work order m
18 lifted -- that's another issue, of course -- and perhaps deal 19 with some of these issues.
20 We think there are serious possibilities that some of 21 these questions might be resolved in favor of disqualifying the 22 site.
If that's the case, gosh, it seems to me that they ought 23 to get about that as quickly as they possibly can.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
Steve?
(.
25 MR. FRISHMAN:
I'd like to respond to that, too, i
l I
4
~'
69 1
'maybe'in a little different way.
(.
-2 First of all, I think what's happening, and we're 3
seeing it, and we have been complaining about it up until now, 4
and now it's finally sort of over the edge, if you go back to 5
the instruction in the 1980 programmatic EIS, whether we agree 6
or not, what it_said was, up to the point of selecting sites 7
for characterization, the Department could afford itself an 8
assumption of suitability in the absence of any killers being 9
seen.
W 10 once you begin characterizing, it flops over.
The 11 Department bears the full burden of proof.
To date, we are not 12 seeing them accepting that burden.
We see a continuation of 13 the assumption of suitability.
And the way I analyze it,
~.-
14 although I haven't really explored it with them yet, is they 15 take their guidance to continue doing that from the admonition 16 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act that says, " Don't characterize 17 any more than you need to."
18 So I think they have willingly built themselves into 19 a trap.
I think for the Deaf Smith County site, certainly 20 going out and drilling some more boreholes would make a great 21 big difference.
They haven't got a hole in that site.
They 22 don't even have one near it.
They don't even know if they've 23 got enough salt at that site in depth for a repository.
Of 24 course, they don't say what it takes to have one either.
(_
25 But they understand by their own choice little or
70 l
- 1-nothing of the Ogallala Aquifer, little or nothing about the l
f'~
j 2
Santa Rosa Aquifer, since they deferred studying that prior to 3
naming the site.
4 So, yeah, a number of the questions, if they turn'out
/.-
5 not to be killers,.you have a tremendous leg up on site 6
characterization.
You know a lot more about what you night 7
want to do in the way of building a shaft and designing it,
)
8' just for safety purposes, and also to outline what studies 9
might be necessary.
10 I see the whole shaft approach -- and I've been 11 calling it this lately; I seem to be the one who puts names on 12 things around here -- and I've been calling it the Iwo Jima 13' approach, because that's what it looks like to me:
Get that 14 shaft there and build your case around it.
I 15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Don?
16 MR. PROVOST:
We've been proposing and discussing 17 what we call the. fatal /~4aw approach for a long time, and at 18 the recent hydrology meeting, this was a major discussion item.
19 And again, in this case, a very strong case that NRC and 20 ourselves believe that there's significant likelihood that 21 groundwater travel time would be less than that required by 22 NRC, that could be answered by getting some more information on l
23 effective porosity.
24 It was interesting.
The attitude of one of the
\\.
25 members of the team was that, well, that wasn't our purpose.
71
~
1 Their purpose was to get Hanford through the gate, and so that,
(
2 to us, exposed a great feeling of what their purpose was.
It 3
was not to do that.
Their purpose was to get it through the 4
gate.
That was the purpose of the hydrology program.
l 5
We're developing a presentation that would put 6
together all the tests that we think would be necessary for 7
this type of approach, and we'd be happy to share.that with you 8
when it's finished very shortly.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I think that would be very
-I 10 helpful.
11 Ruth, I don't know if you've got anything?
12 MS. STOREY:
We share some of those same concerns and 13 have expressed them in comments to DOE.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Lando, it does seem to me 15 that this is an idea that the Staff may have hit on that may 16 make a lot of sense, and I think it may be worthwhile, 17 particularly in view of the comments of the states, to 18 encourage the Staff to continue to explore that issue with DOE.
I 19 I know we raised it last week, and Ben said he'd take
'20 a look at it.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Well, I'd like to establish to take a
(
22 look at it, too.
I think they're aware of what took place last 23 week, too, and since today's discussion has emphasized it, I 24 agree that the Staff should look at that and get back to us.
25 MR. MURPHY:
You know,'I think another -- with your
72
~'
1 prarmission, Mr. Chairman --
i 2
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Sure.
Go right ahead.
3 MR. MURPHY:
Another consideration ought to be, you 4
know, in all frankness, it's likely to be at least two years i
5 before Congress coughs up enough money for them to conduct 6
their underground site characterization program under any 7
circumstances.
It would be time wasted, it seems to me, if 8
they don't. set about disposing of some of these issues that can 9
be disposed of from the surface during that period of time.
,T=e:
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
One other question.
11 Several of you talked about concerns about DOE taking shortcuts 12 in the process, the lack of conservatism that we've talked 13 about already, the absence of meaningful consultation and 14 cooperation, and unwillingness to heed your comments and 15 concerns and, to some extent, ours as well.
16 I get the sense sometimes that our approach is, well, 17 we have this ultimate barrier at the end of the process, which 18 is our licensing process and making our license decision, and 19 we can warn DOE ahead of time of these potential pitfalls, and 20 if they don't heed those warning, then ultimately they'll pay 21 the price down the road, and we don't have to be quite as 22 aggressive as we otherwise might be at this early stage in the 23 process.
24 I'm interested in whether you sense that kind of an
(!"
25 attitude as well, whether you think that's a wise course to
73
~
1 take, and what more we could do at this stage in the process to
( ~.
C 2
try and aggressively pursue some of these concerns that our 3
Staff has, that you all have, about the direction that the DOE 4
is going in the program to try and maybe get some earlier 5
responsiveness to these kinds of concerns.
6 Steve?
7 MR. FRISHMAN:
In partial response to that, it's one 8
of the pieces that I didn't talk about a few minutes ago, has
~
9 to do with the whole process of reviewing the SEP.
And I think.'f5:e 10 your Staff has already told them that it's going to take, to 11 review the SEP -- and this is not for the updates -- a minimum 12 of about six months, maybe even longer.
But there's also been 13 an agreement to review that part related to the shaft in about 14 three months, so they can get going with the shaft.
15 And we spent -- your Staff and our technical people 16 and some of us as Program Managers spent some time about a year 17 ago with DOE working out an arrangement, how all this could
--i m
18 happen.
The umbrella on the whole thing was, DOE was willing 19 to proceed at risk, and we were very unhappy about having to 20 sit there over a day and a half and hammer out an agreement on 21 how many pages of rationale they needed for study plans before 22 they produced the SEP, if they wanted to work on a site.
23 It seems to me that if the Commission wanted to 24 become more aggressive, this is one area where you could just E.
25 insist:
We must review the entire SEP in order to assure I
74
~
1 ourselves that there are not incompatibilities between those 2
aspects of the shaft and studies associated with the shaft.
3 We discovered in the meeting -- one of the recent 4
engineering meetings that I said I was so please with -- one of 5
the things we discovered, again your Staff and mine together, I 6
think, was that DOE seemed to be mush more interested in the 7
building of the shaft, the construction and mining aspects of 8
it, than they were in the testing aspects.
9 The shaft is a test facility, and this is something -,
3at !
10
- the question just kept coming up, all the way to the point of 11 their finally having to agree to some information that we had, 12 and that's when you use freeze wall construction, based on the 13 way they had planned to take the shaft down, it's unlikely you 14 can keep a working wall usable for any kind of data collection 15 for more than a day to about three days.
16 That didn't seem to be of concern.
The concern was 17 to get to 2605 or whatever the number was that day, because it am 18 shifted by 75 feet that day, too.
19 I think if you're looking for a place to be 20 constructively aggressive, what you can do is begin trying to 21 use what leverage you have from the technical side, convincing
' 22 the Department of Energy that it serves no one for them to 23 proceed at a level of risk that, in fact, ultimately impacts on 24 the judgments the Commission is going to have to be making, on
(.
25 the judgments that the states and tribes are going to have to
4 75 1~
be making, regarding disqualifications and regarding 2
disapprovals.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, Ben?
4 MR. SMITH:
I think the DOE has such a tremendously 5
difficult job to do to put in place the waste management system 6
for the country, in order to do that, they really should have 7
an image of being technically unassailable in what they're 8
doing.
'9 In looking at a basic feature of designing the
' fast 10 program -- that is, projecting waste volumes for the future --
11 we found that some of their assumptions were outmoded, didn't 12 fit with industry practice, and pointed that out.
Later, DOE s.-
13 adopted some of the recommendations for projection assumptions 14 of our Tennessee study team.
15 It seems to me that with the technical part of the 16 program so basic to the design of the program, that NRC might 17 want to look into those basic assumptions surrounding the 18 system ~and evaluate the design parameters for the whole system.
19 You're going to be involved in it later on, and I'm sure you're 20 going to want to feel comfortable that it makes sense for the 21 country.
22 I don't know to what extent NRC has already been 23 involved in the waste projections, but I think that's a field 24 that's ripe for review.
i.
25 MR. MURPHY:
I guess I would pretty much second those
76
~
1 remarks.
One way -- you know, I guess I can't force myself to
[
b l' eave the room after patting you on the back to criticize you a
^
s 2
3 little bit as well -- one way'would be to somehow find a way to 4
accelerate a little bit your own regulatory rulemaking process.
5 We, for example -- I cite in my prepared' remarks _RPRM 6-60-2, which was filed in 1985 and has yet to be acted on.
7 Those kinds of things can give signals, clear signals, to the 8
Department of Energy as to which way they ought to proceed, 9
last they risk falling off the precipice.
h 10 Another way I would suggest, I guess, we -- Mr.
11 Frishman alluded to it -- I like to call it -- I believe I 12 called it in my prepared remarks "the integrated site 13 characterization plan," the SEP itself,' not in a separate 14 document, the SEP itself must, in our view, address the 15 technical, economic, social, and environmental aspects of site 16 characterization.
17 If I were a one-man staff of the Commission and if uw.
18 the Department of Energy didn't present me with auch an SEP, I 19 would not begin the review.
I would just say, "This is not a 20 complete document.
The timeclock hasn't even begun to run yet.
21 Whether it's three or six months is irrelevant.
You bring me 22 an integrated SEP, or we aren't even going to begin reading 23 it," things of that nature.
24 It's a ticklish job to, you know -- I cautioned the 4(-
25 Commission with respect to the NAS, just sitting in your seats
77
~
l as independent regulatory Commissioners is a difficult and 2
delicate task, and you can't forecast your actions one way any 3
more than you can the other.
But there are some things, I 4
think, some areas were you could give some little more clear 5
direction.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Don?
l 7
MR. PROVOST:
I agree with the earlier discussions 8
and I think that one of the things that is very basic to a 9
review like this is early release of data to both NRC and het 10 states and tribes.
We are seeing problems now, as I mentioned 11 earlier, on the iodine data.
It's not being released as 12 promised.
This was a very basic issue at Hanford, how did that 13 material get down that deep that quickly.
That should be a 14 prerequisite.
They just aren't producing the data.
This is 15 very clearly Appendix VII problems and so on, that just isn't 16 happening and should be a part -- SCP will exacerbate problems 17 in SCP review if this type of information doesn't come quickly.
-- I
)
m 18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I asked Ben last week about 19 his assessment of where we stood on quality assurance, the 20 quality assurance program.
Don, you mentioned the stop work 21 orders are still in effect.
I would be interested in your 22 assessment and also Steve's and Mal's of where you think the 23 DOE QA program is now, particularly given the importance of 24 that as a prerequisite that DOE has acknowledged before they
(.
25 will proceed to present us with their site characterization
4 78 1
plans.
2 MR. PROVOST:
I think this week they probably lift a 3
partial, a partial lift on the work order which allowed them to 4
do more specific work on the wells and so on.
They still have 5
quite a ways to go to get the project in shape.
My major 6
concern is one of the earl'ier chapters of the SCP that we 7
received had to do with quality assurance and the problems that 8
were brought up in our review of the site characterization 9
report in 1982 and NRC comments at that time are still not 10 resolved.
Those are the organizational accountability within 11 headquarters, and especially after May 28th decisions and how 12 those were made.
That becomes a very critical issue to us, 13 that accountability in headquarters and their QA program.
14 The preliminary chapters of the SCP still show the 15 same situation that was there in 1982 that was complained about 16 by all of us in 1982.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Steve?
a 18 MR. FRISHMAN:
With the salt program, first, the stop 19 works were not necessary because work wasn't moving any way.
I 20 anticipated such a question and asked one of my staff people 21 and got a very clipped answer, slowly improving but still in 22 disarray.
The projects are all apparentiy different.
23 Headquarters in some cases is ahead of the projects on quality 24 assurance, just planning, and in some cases, they are behind.
25 The quality assurance people from one site to the next disagree s
79
~
1 with each other.
Headquarters tends to disagree with all of
(~
2 them sometimes.
3 We have committed to participating in that to 4
whatever extent we can, to try to get a quality assurance 5
program that at least becomes one of the parts of the program 1
6 that is not contentious and shouldn't be contentious.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
One quick question 8
for Ben on the MRS.
Ben, you talked about the need for 9
justification for the MRS and your concerns.
It always struck
,%i 10 me that if there was a benefit to be gained from a monitored 11 and retrievable storage facility, it was in providing some 12 relief from the kinds of pressures to move ahead on an 13 accelerated schedule for a repository, pressures generated
(-
14 largely because of utilities, and for providing that kind of 15 relief, what you did in essence was provide sufficient time to 16 do the repository job properly and thereby help ensure that the 17 MRS would not become the de facto final resting place for the
-a 18 waste.
Other countries appear to take that kind of approach.
19 The Swedish approach is largely structured along those lines.
20 I am curious as to whether you see a benefit to be 21 gained that way, in that kind of role for the MRS, not so much 22 a question of absolutely can you safely store the spent fuel on 23 site for extended periods of time but rather a mechanism for 24 relieving some of these pressures that might drive a schedule
( _.
25 in a way that jeopardizes the success of the repository program
80 4
1 itself.
I would be interested in your reaction to that.
2 MR. SMITH:
Obviously, storage is the answer to 3
relieve the pressures on the repository system, where that 4
storage is to take place in the system, where it makes sense to 5
store the fuel is the question.
As we see the technology J
6 developing for dry cask storage at the reactors and we see the 7
successful demonstrations of that, we see no reason to have the 8
added cost of a centralized facility to move the waste twice,
~'
9 once from the reactors to storage and once from storage to the
?=e !
10 repository.
It makes a lot more sense to move it once in large 11 rail casks, reducing the shipments and cask miles through the 12 states, rather than seek to relieve the pressure by building
{
one centralized facility.
13 14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Thank you.
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Carr?
1 16 COMMISSIONER CARR:
I have no questions, Mr.
17 Chairman.
a 18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
There have been a lot of questions 19 asked and certainly we want to make sure they get answered.
I 20 would encourage you and I presume you are doing this anyway, 21 the questions you have and the things you are bringing up, you 22 are working closely with our staff and if you are not 23 satisfied, I'm sure you won't hesitate to write to the 24 Commission.
We want to respond to you.
Some of the things
\\
25 that have been brought up here are very important.
I don't
81 I
want to miss anything that you are concerned about.
(~ +
s 2
You have brought not only some important questions 3
but also some important suggestions and thoughts.
Be sure 4
those thoughts do get to the staff and to the Commission if you 5
think it is necessary.
I don't think we need to wait for these l
6 periodic meetings to bring up some of the very important things i
7 that were brought up here today.
I hope you will continue to
,1 8
let us work with you.
9 The impression I have, not only from the Commission T=e' 10 but the staff is they are working closely with the states and 11 Indian tribes.
I think it is extremely important that 12 communications be open.
Some of the comments we had earlier I 13 think apply equally again.
I don't want to be repetitive.
The 14 willingness and the openness and the great respect we have for 15 what we are trying to do and the responsibilities we are 16 carrying out, it is extremely important.
We want to conduct it 17 with integrity and openness and as we approach the licensing
-a 18 phase, at that point, we have great responsibilities here in 19
, the Commission.
20 We hope you will be free as you have been to give us 21 your thoughts and your candid views.
I know in your own 22 organizations you have a considerable amount of technical 23 competence.
You live in the area.
You have a tremendous 24 responsibility to the people you represent.
s,
25 We feel those same responsibilities.
We want to
4 82
~
1 continue to work very closely with you and continue to have
(
2 these kind of meetings.
We want to make sure we keep you 3
informed.
Please don't hesitate to ask the questions on a 4
daily basis if necessary rather than waiting for these 5
meetings.
I feel confident you do, but I just wanted to 6
emphasize that.
We solicit your questions.
We want to work 7
very closely with you as we move ahead on this very, very 8
important project for all the citizens of our country.
^
9 Are there any other comments from my fellow
.'he 10 Commissioners?
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Lando, I don't know if the 12 staff has considered how they want to treat these quarterly 13.
reports to the Commission on the progress on the program.
It 14 might be useful, along the lines you just suggested, to share i
15 those with the state folks as well.
That way, they have a 16 sense of what we are hearing in terms of the progress of the 17 program every three months or so and they will get a sense of m
18 what issues are important to the staff and what issues are of 19 interest to the Commission as the program moves forward.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
We will ask the staff to take a look 21 at that.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I think it is in the 23 interest of providing that open communications.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
It sounds like a good suggestion.
3
\\ _.
25 COMMISSIONER CARR:
I think we should share this
2 83 1
transcript with the DOE.
(-
\\-
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Absolutely, especially some 3
of the suggestions.
4 MR. MURPHY:
When we sign our grants, we have to 5
promise to provide them everything we create, but the same 6
commitment doesn't necessarily flow back to us.
7 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Speaking of funds, do you have 8
the same problem the tribes do with funds?
9 MR. MURPHY:
I have a 5:00 plane to catch,
se :
10 Commissioner Carr.
Yes, we have a serious continuing funding 11 problem with the Department which I don't need to go into 12 detail on.
^
13 COMMISSIONER CARR:
I didn't think I had to ask.
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I thank all of the states and the 15 affected Indian tribes.
16 MR. JIM:
Mr. Chairman, in appreciation again for 17 this opportunity, this may be the last time we will address Mr.
18 Asselstine as Commissioner.
We hope to see him in the future 19 and we wish him luck, we thank him for his contribution not 20 only to this Commission but to the nation.
We thank you all 21 very much.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much for those 23 comments.
We appreciate that.
Commissioner Asselstine has 24 indeed had a special role in representing the Commission on the 25 state programs, as you know.
We are all grateful to him for i
84
- p-that contribution, not only the states and Indian tribes, but 1
.2 the staff and the Commission also appreciates _the special 3
interest he has shown in that role he-has played in the past 4
few years.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Thank you.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
With that, we stand adjourned.
7 (Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.]
8 9
,%l 10 11 12 13
(
14 15 i
16 17
.- a 18 19 20 21 22 l
23 24 25
e s.
1 1
2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 3
4 This is to certify that the attached events of a 5
meeting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
Meeting with States and Affected Indian Tribes 7
TITLE OF MEETING:
on the Status of the National High Level Waste
)
1 Program i
l 8
PLACE OF MEETING:
Washington, D.C.
']
)
9 DATE OF MEETING:
Tuesday, June 16, 1987 I
5=w 10 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of the Commission taken 5.
13 stenographically by me, thereafter reduced to typewriting by 14 me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the 16 foregoing events.
17
-w 18 h --
h '-
arilynn M. Nations 19 20 21 22 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
23 24 25
9Q s
6/16/87
' SCHEDULING NOTES TITLE:
MEETING WITH STATES AND AFFECTED INDIAN TRIBES ON THE STATUS,0F NATIONAL HIGH LEVEL WASTE PROGRAM SCHEDULED:
2:00 P.M., TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 1987 (OPEN)
DURATION:
APPR0x 1-1/2 HRS PARTICIPANTS: PANEL 1 YAKIMA INDIAN NATION 10 MINS
- RUSSELL JIM, MANAGER NUCLEAR 'JASTE PROGRAM UMATILLA INDIANS 10 MINS WILLIAM BURKE NUCLEAR WASTE PROJECT MANAGER NEz PERCE TRIBE 10 MINS h n
- RONALD T. HALFM00N, MANAGER NEZ PERCE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT PROGRAM PANEL 2 STATE OF WASHINGTON 10 MINS
- DON PROVOST TECHNICAL ISSUES MANAGER OFFICE OF HIGH LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT
{
j STATE OF NEVADA 10 MINS
- MALACHY MURPHY SPECIAL DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF TEXAS 10 MINS
- STEVE FRISHMAN, DIRECTOR NUCLEAR WASTE PROGRAMS OFFICE STATE OF UTAH 10 MINS
- MS. RUTH ANN STOREY, DIRECTOR UTAH HIGH LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE OFFICE STATE OF TENNESSEE 10 MINS
- BEN SMITH EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GROUP DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT
________j
W
'4 STATEMENT CP RUSSELL JIM MANAGER, NUCLEAR HASTE FROGRAM YAKIMA INDIAN NATICN before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
" Status of the High-Level Radioactive Kaste Disposal Program" June 16,1987 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission--
My name is Russell Jim.
I am Manager of the Nuclear Waste Program of the Yakima Indian Nation.
I would like to thank you for this opportunity to present the views of the Yakima Na tion about the status of the federal nuclear waste disposal program.
I would like to discuss the very different conclusions that are reached by the respective parties about the suitability of
. the sites DOE has recommended for characterization.
We are con-vinced that the process that has been used to select sites for characterization--and the results of that process--are seriously flawed.
Looking at the same information and process, experts who are optimistic--including the Commission--conclude that there is
v w
6 2-no reason not to proceed with the sites recommended by COE for characterization.
What is the basis for these dif ferences in conclusions?
All of the parties agree on one point:
Not enough is known about the sites at this time to make conclusive determinations about their suitability.
The differences of opinion revolve around the appropriate degree of conservatism to use in making the assump-tions that are necessary to fill in the gaps in our present understanding.
COE almost invariably makes optimistic assump-tions.
DOE's largely unfounded conclusion is that all the sites are suitable for repositories.
The NRC, in contrast, has identified significant issues for all of the sites which must be resolved if they are to be found licensable.
Significantly, the Commission's of ficial stated position appears to be that if these issues are not resolved, they could prevent licensing of any of the sites.
In spite of this presumption, the Commission concludes that there is no rea-1 I
. tf.
$' son not to proceed with characterization of the three recommended sites.
The Commission apparently supports characterization of the recommended sites because it cannot now be determined con-clusively that any would be unsuitable.
We hold the more conser-vative view that the adverse conditions at.some if not all of' the sites are suf ficiently numerous and serious to dictate their elimination from consideration, We believe that the Commission should not be supporting characterization of the recommended sites when by its own admission there are potentially disqualify-ing conditions at all of them.
A conservative program with a comprehensive national screening using truly selective siting guidelines could identify sites which the Commission could endorse more enthusiastically.
Instead of having to say that significant issues could disqualify any of the sites, NRC should be able to say that it cannot identify any issues that would pre-vent licensing of the recommended sites.
1 j
L(
s 4-DOE takes the approach that it need not find the best sites, but rather only " suitable" ones.
DOE looks at these sites and 1
i f
sees no significant problems.
The Commission looks at these 1
i sites, sees significant problems, and concludes that they should j
l be characterized to resolve the problems.
Tribes and states, and most of their citizens, look at the sites, see the same problems, and conservatively conclude that since we could obviously do much better, we should do so.
Which approach should govern implementation of the waste program?
If public confidence in nuclear waste disposal is truly crucial to its success, as Congress declared in the NKPA, then the implementing and regulatory agencies should adopt the conser-vative approach urged by the states and tribes.
The reason for this is simple: the American public does not share DOE's optimism about this enterprise.
The people are, in general, very skepti-cal about the ability of our institutions to safely manage and dispose of hazardous materials.
.c t
5-Because of its skepticism, the public will never accept nuclear waste disposal unless it is convinced that this activity is being carried out as carefully-as possible.
The people of the Yakima Indian Nation, and the public as a whole, want assurance that the federal government is truly working to find the best possible sites to dispose of these materials.
What they see instead is a program that refuses to accept i
the need for conservatism, and which could obviously have come up with a much better slate of sites.
They see sites that are selected because the government already owns them, rather than because of their favorable geologic characteristics.
They see that those sites have many common sense problems, like flowing k
groundwater, nearby rivers, valuable aquifers, and earthquake faults.
They see the DOE doing a comparative evaluation of the sites, then choosing for characterization the site--Hanford--that I
ranks in last place for virtually all considerations.
The advantages of a conservative approach hold true even if the scientific optimists are correct in their assertion that
ga
'n' 6-there are no significant technical impediments to successful waste. disposal,'but rather only perceptual, or political in.p e d i-ments.
Even if perceptions are the,only real problem, it should be apparent that the government and industry cannot alleviate the widespread perception that nuclear waste disposal is unsafe by simply asserting the contrary, and always making the most optimistic assumptions.
Inceed, such a course of action only worsens public skepticism.
The present opposition of tribal and state governments to the implementation of the' nuclear waste program is simply a reflection of the views and concerns of their citizens.
So long as the people see a program that is based on unbounded optimism (which they do not share), and that rejects the need to try to find sites for repositories that are among the best that can be found, they will never accept the program as safe.
Consequently, their tribal and state governments will reflect that skeptical attitude, and it will be very difficult for the program to succeed.
o
,f.,
to I
7-In his remarks to you last week, Ben Rusche mentioned the participation of affected states ano tribes at the recent BWIP hydrologic testing meeting, and stated that consensus had been reached that DOE's planned tests were appropriate.
While we agree that there was a consensus that the meeting was proouctive and cooperative, there was not technical consensus on the ade-quacy of the test plans.
Technical representatives of the Yakima Indian Nation raised numerous issues concerning the number and location of planned tests which have not yet been addressed.
We look forward to further discussion with DOE about these issues, and expect that NRC staf f will also be interested in their resolution prior to the commencement of testing.
In conclusion, we sincerely believe that the Commission
)
would in the long run be more helpful to the success of this pro-q l
i gram if it took a more involved and demanding approach to site i
selection, rather than deferring to DOE's excessively optimistic approach.
- b, CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE UMATILLA INDIAN RESERVATION BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION June 16,1987 Com missioner Zeck, and Members of the Com mission, my name is Bill Burke and I am the Director of the Umatilla Nuclear Waste Study Program.
The Umatilla Tribe appreciates this opportunity to appear before the Commission and to present our perspective' on DOE's repository program.
We have been reviewing the transcripts of your meetings with Ben Rusche the last few years and have found his comments on progress in the repository program to be consistent with many of DOE's favorable findings in the EAs in that they are overly optimistic.
As an affected Indian tribe under the NW PA, the Umatilla Tribe has broad authority to conduct independent oversight of DOE's repository program and to insure the Tribe's interests, namely our treaty rights, are protected. Our involvement in the repository program over the past 4 years has generated considerable tribal cynicism and distrust of DOE's implementation of its duties under the NWPA.
DOE's manipulation of the site selection process for the first repository and their " indefinite postponement" of the second repository evidenced a callous disregard of their statutory obligations under the NWPA and of the need to m ake siting decisions based on technical merit rather than political and programmatic expediency.
The resulting public outcry, the lawsuits and the battle lines drawn by host states and affected Indian tribes have doomed the development of public confidence in nuclear waste facilities that Congress found essential.
If site characterization proceeds in a m anner similar to site selection, and we see no reason to suspect it won't, then the NRC can count a contentious and bitterly adversarial licensing proceeding.
We share the NRC's 1
stated objective of seeking to have licensing issues resolved satisfactorily prior to the licensing hearing.
Our experience in the repository program to date, however, does not inspire any confidence that that will be the case.
Reports from the NRC staff substantiate our concerns.
Because of DOE's failure to conduct the repository program conservatively, there is a strong need for vigorous oversight of DOE's characterization activities by the NRC and affected parties.
We have been gravely concerned by DOE's publically stated working hypothesis at the outset of the site characterization that each of the 3 sites will be found suitable for development as a repository and that each site will easily meet the EPA standards.
Your staff has reviewed DOE's Environmental Assessments and their analysis The challenged important DOE findings and conclusions for the first repository sites.
NRC comments on the Hanford Environmental Assessment found that many of DOE's findings of favorable site conditions were based on sparse data that could just as easily support alternative findings adverse to DOE's interpretation.
The NRC charac-terized many of DOE's favorable findings as " pre m ature ", " extremely tenuous" and reached by means other than a " conservative approach."
The NRC claimed many of DOE's Environmental Assessment conclusions were " overly favorable" or " optimistic."
The findings and conclusions that were the subject of your staff's critical review went to the heart of Hanford's containment capability.
They included concerns about groundwater travel time, the tectonic suitability of the site, earthquake swarms, and life expectancy of the waste package and the potential for human interference in the vicinity of the site because of the presence of geothermal resources.
The NRC made similar critical comments about the Yucca Mountain and Deaf Smith sites as well. The NRC report concluded that DOE 's claim concerning the superior pe r formance of each site in meeting the EPA standard was " overly optimistic."
Looking ahead to site characterization, your staff sounded the alarm about where DOE's repository program could lead. The staff warned:
2
"The significance of the above concerns is to DOE's ongoing preparation of the site charac-terization plans and eventually to site charac-terkzation activities, since both the general over optimism as well as the specific concerns could result in inadequate testing programs and inadequate information at the time of licensing."
There are several particular concerns we have that suggest your staff's warning is appropriate.
The Umatilla and Nez Perce Tribes, and our consultants, are actively engaged in an investigation of the presence of commercial quantities of oil and gas resources in the vicinity of the Hanford site which could disqualify the site under the siting guidelines.
Oil and gas exploration activities around Hanford are increasing in an era of depressed exploration budgets. DOE's dismissal of the issue in the Hanford Environmental Assessment based on the " current economics" of this rapidly depleating, nonrenewable resource of great potential value surrounding a repository required to isolate radioactive wastes for thousands of years defies reason.
In December 1986, Amoco Production Company requested participation from all interested parties, including the Tribe, in laboratory analyses of a number of well cuttings from two of the deep Shell tests, the Bissa # 1-29 and the Yakima Minerals
- 1-33.
The Tribe received a grant modification from DOE to expend $3,000 to participate in this research and be able to utilize the resulting data. In May 1987, the CTUIR and the Nez Perce Tribe, sponsored a workshop to review a number of logs of Hanford area wells. The Yakima Nation, the states of Washington and Oregon, and the NRC attended this workshop. The logs reviewed at this time showed that considerably more methane gas was present in the basalts and their interbeds than was understood from the literature.
A paper by a Rockwell geologist (Deacon R.J.,1987), presented several days after this workshop, stated that data from the three deep Shell wells 3
indicated that:
...the structure of sub-basalt sedim ents... suggests that entrapping conditions may have occurred that could contain major hydrocarbon reserves.
In F.Y.1988,. the CTUIR plans to develop study plans for hydrogeology and for structural geology /seismotectonics.
The BWIP SCP, DOE documents, and information from outside DOE will provide a basis for determining what types of studies will be done.
Other affected parties, and organizations as well as NRC staff, have worked on hydrogeology and seismotectonic issues again finding DOE's claims over optimistic.
We feel the studies we plan will help the Tribe understand NWPA issues and we urge the NRC and their staff to work closely with the Tribe on these critical issues. Let me remind the commission of the close working relationship the NRC and all affected parties had especially with the Tribe during the Environmental Assessment Process.
We encourage NRC and their staff to work with us again by sharing comments on the SCP.
Our team of consultants and NRC's consulting team should meet especially during NRC's Site Characterization Analyses (SCA) phase.
We desire early and close communications with NRC's staff, Both the NRC and the Tribe should be sure DOE adequately addresses all technical issues and not skav results for our people and environment.
Addressing these technical issues will require that DOE implement conservative site characterization program that assumes nothing and one that purports to disprove disqualifying conditions and that conservatively analyzes each sites performance.
In addition, DOE must open the process up to close inspection and greater involvement by the NRC and the affected parties.
We have found DOE to be extremely reluctant to accept the broad authority of affected parties under the NWPA.
The Tribe has confronted DOE's reluctance in C & C negotiations over the last two years which we terminated last January. As you are aware Congress withheld
$79 million of DOE's 1987 budget pending Congressional certification of DOE 's 4
i
progress in negotiating C & C agreements.
The CTUIR has withdrawn from C& C narrowly interpreting NWPA provisions l
negotiations because of DOE's insistence on concerning the authority of affected Indian tribes.
A related issue of mutual concern j
to the NRC and the Tribe continues to be an issue with our on-site representatives at Hanford.
A NRC report evaluating the effectiveness of your on-site licensing repre-sentative program concluded:
"Through the OR [On-Sit o Representative] program has provided the staff with an exclusive source of important l
I information, DOE and DOE Project representatives have I
not been giving the ors the access to records, meetings, personnel, and facilities intended in Appendix 7 to the j
Site-specific Agreement and needed to be fully effective.
Interactions with DOE and DOE Project representatives l
have been the least effective at BWIP where the OR has been restricted from access to some draft information, select meetings, and other interactions with various DOE Project representatives.
The restrictions imposed by DOE /Rockwell can be largely attributed to differences in interpretation of Appendix 7 which affect not only the OR program, but interactions with NRC headquarters staff I
l as well.
The report goes on to note that the Nez Perce and Um a tilla representative at Hanford is experiencing similar problems.
I "The Nez Perce/Umatilla Indians already have such a rep-resentative at BWIP, with whom the BWIP OR has frequent interaction.
Difficulties that have been encoun-tered in this area are primarily due to DOE reluctance to release or make information available for staff review."
1 5
I
I.
For instance, both the NRC and the Umatilla/Nez Perce On-Site Representatives were not allowed to attend a Hydrologic Task Force meeting and other internal meetings at Rockwell (Westinghouse now).
It is the combination of DOE's flawed implementation of the repository program since the NWPA was enacted and their failure to permit the affected parties to assume the level of involvement and participation Congress intended that has brought this program to its knees.
In summary, the Umatilla Tribe desires a close working relationship with NRC.
Like NRC, we feel the DOE has been overly optimistic in their approaches to technical issues.
Public confidence in DOE's performance has eroded to the point of virtual nonexistence primarily due to a siting process that is deraged and a deraged schedule.
Both the NRC on-site representative and the Umatilla/Nez Perce On-Site Representatives have had difficulty entering critical DOE planning meetings.
We feel the NRC and the Tribe need to stand firm on their resolve to improve DOE's performance under the NWPA even if it means going to Congress for a remedy.
6
e UMATILLA NUCLEAR WASTE STUDY PROGRAM NRC BACKGROUNDER Sum m ary-l The Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation (CTUIR) has been involved in the High-Level Nuclear Waste Program since 1983 in developing technical information to prepare the Tribe in its< understanding of high-level nuclear waste issues of particular importance to the Tribe.
It is felt that as these studies continue and issues become better defined, that the Tribe will put itself in a position to participate in a meaningful and informed way at the NRC licensing hearing, if the Hanford site progresses to the licensing phase.
1.0 Scientific and Technical Foundation of the NWSP The Nuclear Waste Study Program (NWSP) was established by the CTUIR after careful consideration of its roles and responsibilities as an "affected Indian tribe" under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA).
Upon its designation by the Secretary of Interior as an affected tribe in the Fall of 1983, the CTUIR commissioned a " scoping study" by the Tribes prime contractor. This scoping study included a regional characterization of tribal resources potentially affected by a nuclear waste geologic repository at the i
I Hanford site which includes portions of the Tribe 's treaty protected possessory and usage rights area.
This study also evaluated various modes of tribal participation in the NWPA vis-a-vis the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and other cognizant federal, state, and tribal governments.
The CTUIR scoping study resulted in a determination by the Tribe that is participation in the NWPA should be based upon direct, active involvement by tribal governmental leaders in all pertinent aspects of the siting, technological developments, and decision-1
making processes associated with its role as an "affected Indian tribe" under the Act.
Recognizing that it did not possess the necessary scientific and technical resources to participate on a "one-to-one" basis with the vast technological resources of the DOE,
~
the Tribe committed itself to building a technical team of consultants which would be capable of reviewing, monitoring, and evaluating the extremely large body of technical data and information which would be generated by DOE and its contractors and by other federal agencies throughout the NWPA siting and development process.
2.0 Activities and Accomplishments Since its foundation, the Umatilla NWSP has proceeded from the " pre-characterization" phase to the present " site characterization" phase which is designed to engage the Tribe fully in cooperative intergovernmental review, monitoring, and other participation processes as well as in the conduct of independent tribally sponsored technical analysis, impact assessments, and public informational activities.
During the period 1984 until mid-1986, the NWSP was oriented to DOE's precharacterization site evaluations and i
included a variety of related tribal efforts.
The Tribe performed technical reviews i
l and submitted formal com ments on several key NWPA documents during the precharacterization period. These included:
Draft Mission Plan for the Civilian Radioactive Waste o
Management Program
" Proposed General Guidelines for Siting oi ueologic Repositories" Draf t Environmental Assessment for the Hanford Site. Washington o
Several hundred scientific reference documents, associated with the Draft Environmental Assessment (DEA) and other DOE and NRC documents, were reviewed by the Tribe's technical team during this period.
Other major NWPA docum ents, including the ' Office of Civilian Radioattive Waste Management (OCRW M) dra f t Transportation Business Plan and draft Transportation Institutional Plan were also 2
l e
reviewed and formally commented upon during this precharacterization period.
The i
Tribe provided written comments also concerning the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Hanford defense waste disposal alternatives which have implications for the NWPA repository program.
l Meanwhile, the U matilla NWSP was preparing contingency plans for its larger and long-term roles in the event that the Hanford Site was formally recommended for site characterization.
Assisted by its technical contractor team, the Tribe evaluated various approaches to its site characterization monitoring efforts and adopted a strategic plan for participation.
Immediately following the May 28,1986 decision by the Secretary of Energy and the President recommending that the Hanford Site be among the three sites to be characterized, the Tribe took steps to convert its contingency plans into an " action plan" which specifies the major tribal projects to be conducted during the site characterization phase.
Its Comprehensive Program Plan was completed in October 1986 and was submitted as a " deliverable" to DOE.
This strategic plan describes a program of work to be performed by the Tribe, its program staff, and its technical contractors for the review and evaluation of DOE activities and for independent environmental, socioeconomic, and cultural assessments.
The NWSP Comprehensive Program Plan provided for development of specife project plans which were also issued as " deliverables" in October 1986. These plans included:
o Environmental Surveillance Plan; Socioeconomic and Cultural Assessment Plan; and a o
Preliminary Risk Assessment Method Plan, j
o 3
Another major project of the Um atilla NWSP is the analysis of site characterization activities by DOE.
To facilitate effective monitoring of the Basalt Waste Isolation Project (BWIP) at Hanford throughout the site characterization phase, the U matilla Tribe and the Nez Perce Tribe entered into a mutual assistance cgreement which l
provides for a qualified full-time on-site representative at Hanford. This position and an office was established in Richland, Washington in mid-1986.
To date, the Tribe has utilized a highly qualified technical contractor team consisting of geologists, hydrogeologists, nuclear engineers, economists, environmental scienctists, and other professional specialists in virtually all aspects of its program.
This techni~ 11 team has worked continuously since 1984 in reviews and analysis of DOE technical developments and has provided scientific services for the planning of tribal projects.
As proposed in its FY 1987 grant application to DOE, this existing team would be expanded to include approximately 12 additional part-time or full-time professional consultants to accommodate the much greater workload for the BWIP site characterization phase and associated tribal assessment activities.
l One of the significant examples of the Tribe's " oversight" activities concerning DOE siting efforts has been a recent study initiated by one of the Tribe's senior consulting geologists (who also served as the interim on-site tribal representative at Hanford) related to potential oil and gas resources in the Hanford area.
Section 112(a) of the NWPA of 1982 requires the DOE to prepare " general guidelines for the selection of sites in various geologic media."
Section 112(a) then states that:
...Such guidelines shall specify factors that qualify or disqualify any site from development as a repository; including factors pertaining to the location of valuable natural resources,...
l 4
l l
I
1 i
The most likely natural resources to be found in or below the Columbia Plateau
)
I basalts in the Hanford area are oil and gas, ground water, and geothermal resources.
l On page 6-184 of the Hanford Environmental Assessment, released on May 28, 1986, DOE states that, "the presence of hydrocarbons from beneath the basalts is, at best, speculative."
On the preceding page, however, DOE contradicts this conclusion by stating that Shell Oil and Atlantic Richfield have completed and tested four wells in the area, although they were " deemed noncommercial."
In at least one of these wells, a significant amount of gas was produced, but current prices were too low to support major field development.
These wells were deep and very expensive to drill in the tough plateau basalts, but exploration in the area continues at a rapid pace. In I
a period of low oil and gas prices, combined with a nationwide decline in oil company budgets for domestic exploration, this activity is particularly significant.
The interest in the Hanford area as a potential oil and gas exploration target zone is also shown by the requests for exploration by oil companies.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Washington Division of Geology and Earth Resources have received over 150 lease applications for areas within the Hanford Reservation. During 1986 alone, more than 250 line miles o't seismic exploration data were collected in the Hanford area.
A fifth wildcat exploration well was also granted a permit to drill to 15,000 feet, a very expensive undertaking with current exploration budgets.
As stated by DOE in the Hanford Environmentla Assessment (EA) (page 6-183):
" A small, depleted, low pressure, natural gas field in basalt that was in production from 1929 to 1941 is present on Rattlesnake Mountain at the southern edge of the Hanford Site (11 kilometers (7 miles) south of the reference repository location).
At current econornics, the old Rattle-snake Hills gas field is noncommercial."
5
As in the previous example, the DOE conclusion on repository disqualification is based on " current economics," not on long-term supply / demand curves for natural gas disqualifier for repository site on " current economics" of a resources.
Basing a rapidly depleting, nonrenewable natural resource of great value seems unrealistic.
Instead, the disqualifying condition should be oriented to the long-(up to 1,000 years) postclosure period when such resources may be sufficiently valuable to attract exploration ventures and thus making the site subject to " human interference."
In addition, this "small, depleted, low pressure" field produced a total of 1.3 billion cubic feet of gas prior to 1941 (McFarland,1983, Washington Div. Geol. Info. Cire. 75).
The presence of natural gas in the plateau basalts is becoming a concern to DOE for a reason other than economic development.
DOE recently began discussing the potential for redesigning the exploratory shaft. This redesign is apparently due to the need for increased ventilation of methane gas in the basalts at the repository horizon.
The change in diameter of the exploratory shaft from 6 feet to 9-12 feet indicates a significant change in the amount of ventilation deemed necessary for worker safety.
The deep exploration wells, the seismic profiles, and surface geophysics, such as aerial magnetometer and side-looking radar surveys, are beginning to delineate features that may directly impact the repository program. Since structural traps, such as folds and faults, are the first places explored for oil and gas resources, a significant amount of new structural data are being acquired.
Piecing some of these data together in a logical manner was the goal of the CTUIR interim on-site representative at Hanford in mid-19 8 6.
His cross-section (see attached fold-out page) presents some of these geologic data in a diagra m matic form.
This cross-section shows that several thrust faults may have been present in the old Rattlesnake Hills gas field, as indicated by a potentially repeated series of Oligocene (older) coal seems overlying Miocene 6
1 i
(younger) basalts.
Several major folds north of Rattlesnake Ridge, such as the Yakima, Um tanum-Gable Mountain-Gable Butte, and Saddle Mountain anticlines, may be bounded on their northern flanks by similar thrust faults.
Thrust faults in the Wyoming-Idaho Overthrust Belt have, in the past 20 years, become the most important onshore oil and gas exploration province in the continental United States and Canada.
This indication of potentially significant faults near the Hanford Site should be evaluated by DOE for the impact of capable faults and seismicity on the location of a repository.
This tribally sponsored study concerning potential hydrocarbon resources at Hanford further supports the Tribe's contention that the site may not be suitable for characterization.
The Tribe contends that, at the very least, DOE should provide for a drilling and test program to determine the extent of subterranean faults and potential hydrocarbon resources at the site during characterization.
However, at present, DOE does not plan to conduct such tests.
It should be noted that these tribal activities were coordinated to the extent possible with those of the State of Washington, which shares similar concerns about the Hanford site.
Tribal critiques of DOE site evaluation activities have also raised concerns about the adequacy of DOE efforts regarding: (a) planned hydrologic testing: (b) off-site environmental impacts within the Tribes's treaty protected possessory and usage rights area; (c) quality assurance programs at Hanford; and (d) impacts associated with transportation of spent fuel and other high-level radioactive wastes (HLW) through the Tribe's reservation and treaty rights area.
While substantial progress has been made in recent months in convincing ' DOE that its plans for site characterization and impact 7
o assessment activities need tv be expanded substantially so as to encompass all credible scenarios associated with repository and transportation operations, the Tribe believes that the " schedule-driven" approach to site characteriza' tion by DOE may militate
]
against conducting truly comprehensive drilling, in-situ, and other testing programs sufficient to characterize the site.
]
The Umatilla NWSP is behind schedule because of funding but is prepared to expand its site characterization analysis and monitoring and its independent impact assessment activities in order to fully exercise its " oversight" and cooperative roles with NRC under the Act. However, recent issues have been raised by DOE regarding the Tribe's rightful and lawful roles under the Act.
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6 I
STATEMENT OF DEL T. WillTE I
NEZ PERCE TRIBAL EXECLTTIVE COMWITTEE
'lV THE NUCLEAR REGULA'IDRY OCDNISSION j
JUNE 16, 1987 Chairman Zech, members of the Conmission, my name is Del T.
White.
I am a member of the Nez Perce Tribal Executive Conmittee
("NPTEC") and Chairman of the NPTEC's Nuclear Was te Subconmi t t ee.
The NPTEC is the Tribe's governing
- body, and the Subconmi t t ee bears primary responsibility for the development of tribal policy on nuclear waste issues.
We are pleased to have the opportunity to present our views t o t h e Comni s s i on.
I.
Objections to the First Repository Siting Process Throughout the process of investigating, nominating, and r ecomnendi ng sites for characterization for the first repository, the Nez Perce Tribe has strived to maintain both the objectivity and the technical integrity of our programatic efforts.
We do not claim, of course, to be objective in all respects.
Given the choice of either having or not having a facility that may endanger natural resources on our reservation and in the area in which the Tribe may exercise rights of possession and use, obviously we would prefer not to have it.
We nevertheless have expressed the view that if DOE can persuade us that no reasonable scenario exists under which dangerous levels of radioactivity will be released f rom a repository at Hanford, we will not exercise our right to disapprove the selection of Hanford.
In.certain respects, of course, this is hardly a major concession on our part.
If we are convinced that there is no possibility of harm to treaty resources, it would be both unethical and, more signifi-
- cantly, ineffective for us to exercise the right of disapproval.
Unfortunately, a number of actions of the Department cause us to have a low level of confidence in DOE's evaluation of this critical issue.
Our complaints boil down to a belief
- that, regardless of the outcome of the work preliminary to site characterization, Hanford was going to be selected for non-scientific institutional reasons.
Not having been privy to the deliberations of the Department in nominating and recommending sites for characterization, we cannot provide an exhaustive list of the institutional reasons for the selection of Hanford.
Those reasons, however, certainly must include the fact that a large number of DOE personnel and DOE contractors' personnel already were at the Hanford site.
As you know, work at Hanford directed at a high-level waste repository was under way while the Act was being considered by Congress.
i This is not to say, of course, that we have identified at this early date factors that disqualify Hanford from consideration as a repository site.
What we are saying is
- that, of the five sites
o a
r ec oninended, Hanford clearly is the site most likely to be disquali-fled during the character iza t ion ' process.
DOE was well aware of this j
fact when it reconmended Hanford for characterization; so aware, in j
fact, that it was necessary for DOE to systematically remove the many j
negative references to Hanford from early drafts of the Multi-l Attribute Utility Analysis ("MUA") of the sites nominated for charac-l terization for the first repository.
DOE's justification for selec-l ting Hanford despite its ranking last in both pre-closure and post-l closure factors comes down to a claim that the " geological diversity" j
requirement of the NWPA compelled the selection of Hanford. This claim is fallacious on at least two grounds.
First, the Nuclear Regulatory Consni s s i on has made clear that the Pdiversity" requirement is met by the selection of sites representing only two rock types.
- Thus, it simply was not necessary to pick sites of three different types.
Second, if DOE's view of the " diversity" requirement is accepted, then Hanford and Yucca Mountain were destined to be selected from the issuance of the first area r econmenda t i on reports, in that they were the only non-salt sites under consideration.
Evidently, DOE is asserting that, even if the tuff or basalt sites had shown likely disqualifying factors during the preliminary investigations, they nonetheless would have to have been selected for characterization.
Our concerns are heightened by the scholarly criticism of the selection of Hanford by experts not associated with any state or tribal program.
- Indeed, the strongest criticism of the first-round site selection process has come from people involved in the prepar-ation of t he MUA and the review of the site selection methodology by l
the National Academy of Sciences.
Professor Ralph L.
Keeney of the l
University of Southern California critiqued the DOE decision in a i
monograph entitled "An Analys is of Portfolio of Sites to Characterize I
for Selecting a
Nuclear Repository."
In his
- analysis, Professor Keeney conducted a
" portfolio analysis" for selecting sites for characterization, concluding that Hanford should not be characterized.
Similarly, Professor Detlof von Winterfeldt, who participated in the review by the National Academy of Sciences of DOE's methodology for siting the first repository, reported to Mr. Rusche that:
In brief, I believe that the conclusions drawn in the reconmenda t i on report are based on selective and misleading use of the analysis prescribed in the methodology report
[MUA].
It is extremely hard to find in the methodology report any support for the selection of the specific set of three sites recommended for characterization.
- Instead, I find a convincing analysis that clearly rejects the Hanford site and, furthermore, supports the i
selection of the Richton Dome site over the Deaf Smith site.
The way the methodology report was interpreted in the r econmenda t i on report, in my opinion, comes very close to a misuse of an other-I wise excellent analysis. __
J
i These criticisms leave us concerned that DOE selected llanford regardless of the unfavorable results of the preliminary investiga-tions.
This in turn leads us to believe that, if DOE already has decided that it wishes to construct a repository at the IIanf ord Site, it is going to do so regardless of the outcome of the scientific investigations mandated by the Act.
We have little confidence in the objectivity of DOE's conduct of the technical investigations of the sites.
The selection of llanford clearly indicates that the program is not driven strictly by scientific consl63 rations.
However we may wish to characterize the considerations that led to the selection of Hanford, quite clearly those considerations were not scientific.
Our concern is intensified by the fact that DOE has announced that its " working hypothesis" is that each of the three sites being characterized are in fact acceptable and licensable by the NRC.
By assuming before detailed work has begt.
that the site is acceptable, DOE may be preordaining its conclusio...
This danger is all the more i
genuine in light of the NRC staff
(>nments on the Environmental I
Assessments issued for the three first-round sites.
A general criticism by NRC staff of the DOE program is that DOE consistently falls to use conservative assumptions in carrying out its technical studies.
Given the profound danger posed by potential releases of high levels of radioactivity, the very least that we can ask is that DOE proceed conservatively in its investigations.
DOE's "can do" attitude s imply mus t not be allowed to prevail over serious concerns relating to the health, safety and welfare of the human beings.in the area of the proposed repository.
Among t he conmen t s from NRC staff on the Environmental Assessment f
of the Hanford site were the following:
q (1)
The analysis presented in the final EA on natural resources does not consider avail-able geothermal resource information.
(2)
The existing limited data on potential fault activity supports the view that f aul t ing may exist at or near the Reference Repository Location.
(3)
The final EA did not take into consideration the potential impact of microcarthquake swarms on the tectonic suitability of the Reference Respository Location.
(4)
The high level of confidence DOE assigns to its finding that groundwater travel time at Hanford will exceed one thousand years is inappropriate due to the limited hydrogeo-logic data base.
1 These
- concerns, when combined with DOE's non-conservative approach and our belief that considerations other than scientific may be controlling the site selection process, cause us profound doubt as to the impartiality of DOE's scientific program.
As noted above, investigations have not reached the point where disqualifying factors can be identified with confidence.
Given what already is known about iia n f o r d,
we believe it clear that Hanford is more likely to be disqualified than other sites not r ecomnende d for characterization.
In the face of criticism of the selection of Hanford, DOE must find a way to redeem that choice.
We are deeply concerned, therefore, that the DOE scientific program will be designed not to discover such disqualifying factors.
We are further concerned that DOE will attempt to limit our investigations of potential disqualifying factors.
Delays in DOE's processing of the Tribe's grant application, for
- example, have prevented us from carrying out important environmental data collection in a timely manner.
The consistency of the pattern of bureaucratic inertia leaves us believing that DOE is intentionally hampering our investigative efforts through the grant process.
Another example involves the Tribe's plans to investigate the potential for human interference with the Reference Repository Location arising from oil and gas exploration and the possibility that oil and gas reserves in paying quantities exist in the Pasco Basin.
DOE has resisted our efforts in this connection, and quite clearly wishes to prevent us from pursuing this investigation.
Even as DOE continues to hamper our program's investigative
- efforts, it is pushing forward with its own investigation at an inappropriately rapid pace.
The most recent example of DOE's haste is its plan to begin drilling as soon as possible at the Hanford Site.
As you know, Congress prohibited the drilling of exploratory shafts in the Fiscal Year 1987 appropriations statutes.
DOE, however, seems to believe it can escape this prohibition by drilling "only" 600 feet down to the first layer of basalt at the Reference Repository Location.
Our first objection to this proposal is that it was formulated
- and, indeed, adopted without any consultation whatsoever with the three affected tribes and the State of Washington.
We believe this failure to consult is a regrettable example of bad faith on DOE's part in the consultation and cooperation process.
More pertinently for the Comni ss i on 's purposes, however, is the possibility that this drilling-(which is to be conducted prior to the completion of hydrologic studies) will destroy the integrity of the results of groundwater hydrology testing.
DOE's plan of action very clearly demonstrates that it is willing to sacrifice the scientific and technical integrity of its investigative efforts to budgetary and scheduling consider-ations.
In the short run, this plan can only further aggravate existing tensions between DOE and the affected tribes and the State of Washington.
In the long run, it may place this Conmi s s ion in the difficult position of having to reject data critical to a proper
_4_
license application.
Clearly it would be better for DOE to complete at least on those matters that may surface characterization disqualify the Hanford Site from further characterization - before sinking a shaft and creating the disruption to the environment that necessarily will result.
In short, we doubt the impartiality and the scientific bases of DOE's decision-making.
DOE has prevented us from carrying out our
_l Independent investigations.
If the first-round siting process survives judicial review and continues in past fashion, DOE faces a virtually certain notice of disapproval in addition to well-armed opposition in licensing proceedings.
In many
- respects, the current difficulties the program is experiencing might have been avoided had DOE taken a proper view of how relations were to be carried on with the affected tribes and states.
We do not underestimate the difficulty of involving tribes and states in the repository siting process.
Such involvement,
- however, is mandatory and we are most disappointed with the way that DOE has carrled on these relations during the site seltetion process.
I The most gross example of the Department's failure arose with the Secretary's May 28, 1986 decisions.
At a meeting in Albuquerque only six weeks earlier, DOE representatives had promised the tribes and states at least 15 days notice of the release of the EAs and promised to try to give 30 days notice.
As the Committee knows, the tribes and states were not given 30 days notice; they were,give 30 minutes notice.
I Moreover, we never were given any indication that a postponement of second repository work was under consideration.
Given the very j
significant role Congress established for the tribes and states, it is
{
unimaginable that DOE would make such a decision without at least l
sdvising the tribes and states that the matter was under consider-ation.
The result of the illegal postponement of the second 1
repository and the failure to adequately involve tribes and states in the first round site selection process is the 40 or so lawsuits now q
pending against the Department.
Recent developments have softened our views to some extent.
The positive resolution of the impact assistance and Section 117(c) issues have given us some confidence that the Department has the capability of being fair and reasonable in its relationship with the Tribe.
We attribute this improvement in our relationship with the Department to the personal interest that Mr.
Rusche has taken recently in the Tribe's concerns, as well as the ascension of Stephen Kale to the position of Director of the Office of Geologic Repositories.
These recent improvements have led directly to our willingness to engage in negotiations for a consultation and cooperation agreement with the Department.
Nevertheless, these improvements only carry so far.
The fact remains that the postponement of the second repository is illegal and i
seems based on political not scientific considerations.
We will continue to mistrust the Department unless and until that decision is reversed and site-specific work on the second repository resumed.
The Act calls for contemporaneous investigations for both repositories.
We cannot accept any less without sacrificing the interests of our constituents.
l All that the tribes and states have asked is that DOE carry out the spirit and letter of the NWPA.
We continue to believe that the process established by the Act is scientifically and fiscally sound, i
fair to all affected parties, and, most importantly, protective of l
public health and safety.
It is the implementation that has been flawed; so badly flawed, in our view, that we must return to an early point in the process and revisit each key prog r anma t i c decision.
By doing so, the NWPA process can be salvaged without sacrificing the fairness and the profound regard for public health and safety embodied in the Act.
II.
'IYIE ROLE OF THE NUCLEAR REGULA'IDRY OCBNISSION DOE's failure to conduct proper institutional relationships has not been limited to its dealings with the affected tribes and states.
Another example of DOE's failure to properly involve entitles having statutory responsibilities arises from its decision to issue a
preliminary determination of suitability on the three sites chosen for characterization before having gathered scientific data critical to any determination of suitability.
As you well
- know, Mr.
Rusche indicated to this Conmission that the preliminary determination of sui tabili ty would not be made until the characterization process had yielded sufficient information to allow the Department to make a
meaningful assessment of the suitability of sites undergoing characterization.
DOE later unabashedly reneged on this conmi tmen t.
We were most disappointed that this Commission failed to insist that Mr. Rusche stand by his earlier assertion.
Nevertheless, we are pleased with the general course of our interaction with t he Comni s s i on and its staff.
A good example of the Comni s s i on 's conscientious conduct of its responsibilities under the Act is the proposed negotiated rulemaking on rules governing NRC proceedings on the licensing of a geologic repository.
We believe that such a forum is an effective means of addressing the concerns of all interested parties and, moreover, the decision to involve the affected tribes and states intimately in the development of these rules is wholly consistent with the unique role that Congress established for the tribes and states in the NWPA.
We would like to explore with the Comniss t on and Its ataff other sutstantive areas for the development of a close working relationship with
- NRC, particularly during our respective reviews of Site Characterization Plans to be issued later this year.
The review of these plans is a critical pr ogr anma t i c undertakings both for this Conmi s s i on and for the tribal program.
We are concerned thct, given the volume of the SCP and the limited resources available both to the. _ -
Tribe and to the Conmi s s i on,
the review will be only marginally sufficient.
It may be that the Tribe and the Conmission can stretch those resources by cooperating in the SCP review process and complementing one another's activitles.
Another area in which a closer working relationship between the
]
Tribe and the Conmi s s i on would give positive results involves our re pective on-site representatives at the llanford Site.
Again, we i
would like to explore ways in which to develop a more formal and comprehensive relationship between Conmission staf f and tribal staff.
I With the decision of the President on May 28, 1986, to select the IIan f o r d Site for characterization, the Tribe's program entered a new phase.
We first developed a comprehensive program plan to guide the Tribe's NWPA projects throughout the characterization phase.
We then developed an environmental surveillance plan for the characterization
- phase, and a plan for assessing the social, economic and cultural impacts of a repository at the IIanford Site.
The Tribe's technical contractor staff consists of approximately 45
- people, of whom some 75% are professionals in the fields of
- geology, hydrology, environmental
- sciences, chemical and nuclear engineering, economics, regional
- planning, business administration, education, law, and radiological / health physics.
This core group is supported by other part-time and full-time consultants in such fields as atmospheric
- sciences, geohydrology, mining engineering, archaeology, anthropology, socioeconomic
- analysis, and other pertinent disciplines.
This team has been involved in reviewing, monitoring, and evaluating a
large body of scientific data and technical documentation generated under the NWPA, and has produced a number of technical
- reports, conmen t a r y,
and planning documents to support tribal deci s ion making under the Act.
In addition to our current focus on the analysis a nd mon i t o r i r.g of site characterization activities at llanford, many tribal efforts are directed toward the more long range goal of preparing for participation in licensing proceedings before this Conmission should the llanford Site be chosen for a repository.
To date, tribal conment s on DOE's site evaluation activities have raised concerns about the adequacy of DOE cfforts regarding (a) possible oil and gas reserves in the IIan f or d area; (b) planned hydrologic testing; (c) off-site environmental impacts within the Tribe's possessory and usage rights area; (d) quality assurance programs at IIan f o r d ;
and (c) impacts associated with transportation of spent fuel and other high-level radioactive waste through the Tribe's reservation and treaty rights area.
Some progress has been made in recent months in persuading DOE that its plans for site characterization and impact assistance need to be revised substantially so as to encompass all credible scenarios associated with repository and transportation operations.
The Tribe believes, however, that DOE's schedule-driven approach to site characterization 1
may prevent the necessary comprehensive drilling, in-situ, and other testing programs.
_7
j s..,
4 We urge t he Comni s s i on to continue its vigorous review of DOE's technical investigation.
In particular, we hope that the Comni s s i on will continue to insist that DOE employ conservative assumptions I
regarding its analysis of the suitability of IIanford for a repository.
L Given the ' highly. dangerous nature of the materials which will be disposed of at a
repository, such conservatisism is not only appropriate, it is absolutely necessary.
Mr. Chairman, we again express our appreciation to t he Comni s i on for the opportunity to share our views and discuss the current state of the NWPA program.
I would be happy to try to answer any questions
).
you may have.
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g STATEMENT OF DONALD O. PROVOST STATE OF WASHINGTON TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION June 16,1987 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission: Thank you for invit-l ing me to present state of Washington concerns about the high-level nuclear waste program. For the record, I am Donald Provost, Performance Assessment Manager of the Department of Ecology's Office of Nuclear Waste Management.
Before I make specific comments, I will briefly discuss our earlier par-ticipation with NRC. Our first major involvement was with the 1982 Site Characterization Report (SCR) on the Basalt Waste Isolation Project (BW'IP). State representatives had routine discussions with NRC staff. We were pleased by the excellent work from NRC staff.
The draft Site Characterization Analysis (SCA), together with com-parable reports from the state of Washington, affected tribes and USGS, influenced the U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) to signifi-cantly improve the BWIP program.
Since 1982, we have worked closely with NRC staff. Recent meetings on Hanford hydrology issues and on general technical positions were..
4 e
excellent examples of NRC's fair and independent approach. Your on-site representative is doing an excellent job and is a credit to the Commission. ~
As you know, we are now at a critical juncture of the high-le. vel nuclear waste repository program. The site selection process is on the brink of total collapse. USDOE credibility is at an all time low. NRC and the other affected parties may be " painted with the same brush" if we do not address the credibility issue now, rather then wait until we are in a crisis situation.
Today NRC finds itself in a position reminiscent of its earlier nuclear power plant licensing efforts. NRC staff review of the license was limited to specific NRC responsibilities. Cost, schedule, need, and management capabilities were not reviewed. The result was an extended, controversial, contentious licensing hearings which lead to much higher costs and a very great loss of credibility for the utilities and NRC. NRC chose to narrowly limit staff review of the environ-mental assessments to the Commissions specific responsibilitier. The decision was not to review USDOE cost, schedule or overall ranking of l
the sites. This approach was taken even though there is a compelling record which documents defective data collections, a lack of adequate quality assurance, a disregard of important data, biased interpretations of data, and over optimistic site evaluations.
Hanford was ranked dead last in both the pre-closure and post-closure comparisons of sites. In the year since Hanford was selected as one of the three sites to be characterized, the situation at Hanford was i
worsened. 1
I 6
0
-- The stop work order has not been lifted because adequate quality assurance is not yet in place.
-- USDOE disregarded important information which could disqualify the site.
-- When preparing the Hanford hydrology program, USDOE did I
not schedule consultation with NRC, states or tribes.
-- USDOE has not provided critical data concerning historic contamination of deep aquifers by iodine 129 as promised.
-- The cost of site characterization has increased between 10 and j
20 percent.
It is important that you understand some of the reasons we in the state of Washington are so adamant in our position that:
-- the site selection process must be brought to a halt:
the May 28th decisions must be retracted; and i
the process must be restructured before this program goes on.
We have identified many serious technical concerns which cannot be brushed aside by simply attributing them to the NIMBY syndrome.
Our concerns are real and they are substantial.
I Groundwater Travel Time: State of Washington and USNRC con-sultants believe that there is a significant likelihood that ground-water travel time would be less than that required by NRC regula-tions.
i 4
Exploratory Shaft (ES) Drilline: Drilling exploratory shafts will disturb the groundwater system, which would lead to the loss of
" perishable" hydrology data. ES drilling should not start until the pre-ES hydrology programs have been completed and NRC, states and tribes have an opportunity to consult with USDOE concerning study results.
Geologic Features: Scientists have identified a suspected fault pattern within the controlled area study zone (CASZ). USDOE plans should include provisions for drilling to determine the extent of the suspected fault pattern.
Presence of Natural Resources: There is strong evidence to sug-gest the presence of natural resources in the vicinity of the pro-posed repository. Methane (natural gas), geothermal resources, and groundwater could attract future prospectors to the site.
After the final EA was issued, USDOE determined that a proposed repository at Hanford would be a gassy mine.
Retrievability: The Act requires that nuclear waste packages must be retrievable after placement in a repository. Hanford's high rock stresses cause serious retrievability problems and USDOE has attempted to engineer around the problem. At an early stage of the program, the plan was to place multiple canisters in long bore-holes, in the EA, USDOE described an approach which utilized short boreholes. Now USDOE is considering a shallow trench approach. Each succeeding approach has greatly increased cost while not providing confidence that canisters could be retrieved..
4 i
Miner Safetv: Shaft and tunnel construction will relieve in situ stresses which could lead to spontaneous fractures within the rock l
1 and rockbursts from walls of shafts and tunnel. Physical stresses caused by high temperatures and a wet environment will require that miners work shorter hours. A loss of ventilation could allow methane concentrations to reach levels which would allow explo-sions and/or asphyxiation.
Earthauakes: The many small earthquake " swarms" which occur j
in the immediate vicinity of the Hanford site indicate the release of l
rock stresses. The distribution of such swarms gives an indication of where fracturing is occurring in the basalts. The fractures are possible groundwater pathways. The earthquakes locations appear l
1 to coincide with the geologic features mentioned earlier.
Radionuclide and Chemical Contamination: Previous Hanford I
activities have resulted in heavy contamination of the controlled 1
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area study zone (CASZ). Independent experts should conduct an evaluation of how defense wastes such as iodine 129 have reached deep groundwaters on and off the reservation.
Program and Data Management: USDOE's high-level waste man-l L
agement program has been plagued by serious program and data management problems. The overall management approach has been based on competition among several different repository pro-jects. This has led to inconsistent management and data quality at different sites. USDOE is now planning to contract for an over-all manager for site characterization programs at the three candi-date sites. This is probably an improved approach, but the man- _
agement. contractor will not be in place for at least two years.
Clearly, substantial site characterization should not occur until a new management philosophy is operational.
The scope of the state of Washington review activities will continue to cover all health, safety, environmental, socioeconomic and technical issues. We ask that NRC broaden its review. At a minimum, wrong doing, lack of disclosure, ethics violations or misconduct should be invectigated prior to the time USDOE submits the license application to the Commission. Simply stated, NRC needs teeth in its investiga-tional process, in summary, the high-level nuclear waste program is on the brink of collapse. A stronger NRC role at this time would be a prudent deci-sion. A stronger NRC role would help ensure that ratepayer and tax-payer money is well spent.
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o Statement of MALACHY R. MURPHY Special Deputy Attorney General State ~of Nevada before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 16,1987
yyy;wwe;nww yr~~e w :~mwwmggermygyreepspw?M5ws?v,meMwagny Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. My name la Malachy R.
Murphy. I am a Special Deputy Attorney General of the State of Nevada, and appear here today on behalf of the State. We again appreciate the opportunity to periodically review for you some concerns we have with the conduct of the repository siting program, particularily in those areas which might involve the Commission. My remarks here today will be brief. I intend to highlight only those areas of significance. I will, of course, be happy to respond to questions from the members of the Commission at the conclusion of these presentations.
Before outlining the problem areas, however,I want to bring you some good news. The state has in the past enjoyed a good and,I think mutually satisfactory, working relationship with your staff. Recently we have seen significant -
improvement in meeting notification and coordination in general. I am thus pleased to report that a good relationship has gotten even better.
First, as you are probably aware, Nevada is engaged in a running debate with DOE over the adequacy of its proposed environmental monitoring program in connection with site characterization, and in particular whether or not any such program not founded upon site specific environmental baseline data can ever be considered adequate, and in compliance with the requirements of S 113 of the NWPA. Unfortunately, our disagreement in this area is not with DOE alone, but is k
apparently with your staff as welt This is evidenced by a series of correspondence between Bob Loux of the Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office, and Robert
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1 Browning of your staff, culminating in Mr. Browning's letter to Mr. Loux of March 19, 1987.
3
' To us, it is fairly fundamental that any reasonably adequate mitigation plan,
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which is required by S 113 to the NWPA to be included in a site characterization plan, must be based upon site specific environmental baseline information. We remain at a loss to understand how DOE can plan to monitor and or mitigate impacts without such a baseline. The Department admits that no such baseline exists, and that the only data in its possession is " historical". For any mitigation planning to be based on less than objective, site specific information, rather than subjective insites drawn from historical data, simply will never be acceptable. It thus remains our position that a credible environmental assessment, based upon site specific environmental baseline information, must be a component of the Yucca
- Mountain SCP, and that the baseline must be established prior to any further disturbance to the site as a result of site characterization activities.
The Commission must, of course, review and comment upon the site characterization plan. We urge the Commission, when it is presented with such a 1
plan for Yucca Mountain, to insist upon an integrated document, addressing the complete technical, environmental, and socioeconomic program of 4
characterization, including an adequate site specific environmental baseline.
)
I As you know, that is not the end of our concern in this area. Section ll4(b) of the NWPA provides that the Commission shall"to the extent practicable" adopt i
2
&v:9ytgWtRrt3p??W*~e*M{??fW##MWM+'**??PMW'5fn%:mM'#ny@W**Tn"?"7'vq any DOE final EIS prepared in connection with an application for a construction authorization for a repository. We do not see how the Commission can adopt an EIS if DOE continues to rely only upon " historical" data. In the event it does so, of course, it will simply be too late to correct that failure, since the Yucca Mountain environment will have been so altered as a result of site characterization that establishing any accurate environmental baseline post hoe will simply be impossible.
On April 7, of this year Mr. Loux submitted to Mr. Rusche a proposal to the effect that, if the Department continued tri be unwilling to do that job, it should
. fund Nevada to establish the baseline itself: We have to date received no response to that proposal. We understant that the Department will announce a six month delay in publishing the Yucca Mountain site characterization plan, pushing its release date back from August of this year until March of 1988. In view of thet delay we see no real excuse for the Department's contined refusal to establish an environmental baseline, or alternatively to provide the financial assistance necessary to allow the state to do that job itself.
In Mr. Browning's letter to Mr. Loux of March 19, 1987, he indicates that this issue will be addressed in connection with the Commission's rulemaking to amend 10 C.F.R. parts 51 and 60 to conform with the provisions of the NWPA. We trust 1
this issue will indeed be addressed squarely, as soon as possible, and we look forward to a continuing dialogue with the Commission on this matter.
3 i
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.-. ~. m n.aw,, -:,ysy 9 On a similar issue, we continue to experience unacceptable problems in obtaining financial assistance for our independent technical study program, particularly in those areas in which we share major technical concerns with your staff. Mr. Loux has recently received some informal, tentative indications that the state's program will be fully funded, but he as yet does not have all the necessary funding in hand. That is simply inexplicable, in our view.
Nevada also shares the same reservations that almost everyone else involved in this process has regarding the Department's amended Mission Plan. I won't unnecessarily extend my remarks by going into the details of our concerns in that area. We have expressed them directly to the Department, of course, and on several occassions to the Congress. Lerme just reiterate what continues to be our position that the amended Mission Plan is seriously and legally flawed. We frankly have no confidence whatsoever that the Department will be able to succeed in siting and developing a repository under that plan.
I In another significant area we are confused as to the role which the i
Department proposes that the National Academy of Science is to play in the site j
characterization process. It was originally our understanding that the NAS was asked to act as a technical reviewer of the adequacy of the Department's characterization activities at three sites; as sort of a super peer reviewer, if you i
will. More recently, however, we are advised that the Academy does not intend to independently examine DOE's raw data, upon which many of its characterization i
activities and decisions will be based. It is precisely in that area, of course, that l
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many of our, as well as that of your staff's, most fundamental concerns with DOE's technical program lie. What sort of meaningful contribution can the Academy make in this area if they are to ignore totally any problems associated with the Department's underlying data?
Additionally, the Academy intends to establish three review panels, each to be made up of members with expertise in various areas, including "public policy, legal and regulatory matters". Again, if the role of the National Academy is simply to provide an independent review of the Department's technical site characterization program, why the need for expertise in public policy, legal and regulatory affairs? This should cause the Commission, we submit, as much concern and uneasiness as it causes us. We continue to fear that the Department will attempt to obtain the imprimatur of the National Academy, of what we have already heard Senator Bennett Johnson refer to as "the Supreme Court of Science".
If, indeed, the Academy's panels are to somehow pass upon or opine with respect to the Department's compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, including, for example,10 C.F.R. part 60, that would put a future Commission in a very difficult l
position, and have at least the potential to implicate the Commission's ability to review a license application without unnecessary political and institutional pressure to approve it.
i Nevada will raise these questions with the NAS itself at its meeting scheduled for Seattle on July 15. We will also, of course, resist any attempt to have the Academy play a role which could in any way effect the Commission's 5
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g, ability to exercise a completely independent judgment at the critical stage of licensing any proposed repository.
Nevada has earlier, in response to your Federal Register notice of December 18, 1986, indicated our support for the notion of negotiated rulemaking on document management and controlin a licensing proceeding, what we shorthandedly refer to as a licensing support system (LSS). We look forward to working with the Commission's staff, and the negotiated rulemaking committee.
We understand the necessity for delay in,the originally proposed schedule, but we nevertheless hope that the committee is formed and the negotiated rulemaking commenced at the earliest possible time. That process is important to all the parties, and will undoubtedly take longer than we all optimistically anticipate.
Someone, someday, will be involved in a proceeding to license the nation's first high-level nuclear waste repository, and the ground rules governing discovery and document control in that proceeding should be established at the earliest practicable date.
Finally, our conviction goes stronger daily that, should DOE continue on its present ill-advised course, the process of siting and developing needed repositories for the nation's high-level nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuelis doomed to failure. We see no evidence whatsoever of the Department's willingness to step back and restructure the entire process, commencing with objective, scientifically based guidelines, to conduct a national search for a repository site free of the biases adhering in the present program, and to take the steps essential to any hope l
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%wm.v.ni. u.a.s, wywrpmmyqwwsg,;p;cemyeg.yergueryenvyyewtnpwwmuss gea.ssmeng of some day achieving the state, tribal, and public support, including truly meaningful consultation and cooperation, without which this process cannot possibly succeed.
Again, Mr. Chairman, we appreciate very much the opportunity to meet with you here today, and to share some or our concerns regarding this process. I will, of course, be happy to answer any questions which you, or any members of the Commission might have.
M 7
4 STATE OF UTAH COMMENTS TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION JUNE 16, 1987 The State of Utah thanks the Commission for the opportunity to provide comments on the site selection activities undertaken by the U.S. Department of Energy pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (the Act). Utah supports the purposes of the Act and has endeavored to participate in the repository site selection process in a manner consistent with those purposes and its obligations under the Act. Utah has a continuing interest in the site selection process,-because two sites in southeastern Utah, Davis and Lavender Canyons, have been identified by the Secretary of Energy as potentially acceptable for the first repository.
In addition, Davis Canyon has been nominated as suitable for site characterization. While DOE is not currently considering it as a candidate site, Davis Canyon may remain eligible for recommendation as a ' candidate site under the provisions of the Act. We thus share with the NRC the concern that the siting of the nation's first I
repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste be based on a sound, reasoned technical approach to issues of site safety.
our analysis of the technical issues related to the siting of a repository at 1
the Davis Canyon site has led us to conclude that the site characterization l
i program proposed in the final Environmental Assessment for the site is inadequate for the purposes of meeting the licensing requirements in 10 CFR t
Part 60.
We have likewise concluded that a technically adequate site i
characterization program for the site cannot be performed consistent with the requirements of the Act and the siting guidelines in 10 CFR Part 960.
1 l
1 i
We must therefore respectfully disagree with the conclusion on the suitability of the Davis Canyon site expressed in a letter from Commissioner Zech to Senator Bennett Johnston, dated April 13, 1987.
In that letter, Commissioner Zech stated that "the NRC staff review of the five FEA's (final Environmental Assessments) did not identify concerns that would call into question the suitability of any of the five sites for site characterir-4. ion."
We assume that the standard of suitability implied in Commissioner Zech's letter is that stated in NRC's standard review plan for the draft EAs and in NRC's comments on the draft and final EAs, which is based primarily on the siting guidelines in 10 CFR Part 960 and on the the licensing requirements in 10 CFR Part 60.
As Commissioner Zech noted in his letter of April 13, the "licensability" of a site must be determined through site characterization.
The question of whether a site is suitable for characterization--whether it can be l
characterized--is therefore inherent in its suitability for licensing.
If an Issue relating to the safety of a site cannot be resolved through characterization, then a site cannot be licensed and that site is not suitable for characterization.
Both DOE and NRC staff have concluded that groundwater movement is a likely mechanism by which significant amounts of radionuclides could be released to l
l the environment. Groundwater movement thus represents perhaps the most significant safety concern in determining a site's licensability. The l
suitability of the Davis Canyon site for licensing therefore depends upon an adequate determination of hydrogeologic parameters such as groundwater travel time to the accessible environment and likely paths of groundwater flow.
These parameters can only be determined through an adequate characterization l
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of hydrossologic' conditions in ths vicinity of ths Divis Ccnyon site.
During the initial phases of the site screening process DOE estimated hydrogeologic conditions at the Davis Canyon site by means of simple conceptual models with limited supporting evidence. However, the licensing j
requirements of 10 CFR Part 60 demand detailed site-specif1'c hydrogeologic data that have been collected with an appropriate drilling and testing program that is based on a valid conceptual model.
Such a model must be based on appropriate assumptions regarding potential groundwater flow paths, assumptions based on detailed factual familiarity with conditions at and around the site. As stated by NRC staff in the draft Generic Technical Position on Ground-Water Travel Time, " Data collection must be focused on identifying and quantifying paths so that a hiah dearee of confidence is I
provided that potentially faster paths have not been overlooked." (emphasis
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added)
Experts in hydrogeology retained by the State have concluded that a likely path of groundwater flow in the Davis Canyon area is westward, through Canyonlands National Park and into the Colorado River.
Indeed, the importance of determining groundwater movement with a high degree of accuracy at and near the site is emphasized by the fact that any radionuclides released from Davis Canyon would likely be released into the Colorado River, the major source of water for the southwestern United States.
Thus NRC staff has concluded that a site characterization program sufficient to produce " data critical to the understanding of the hydrology and the geology of the Davis Canyon site" may require studies such as' t!' drilling of groundwater monitoring wells to be conducted within the Park. The State has similarly concluded that the principles of conservatism, also stated in the siting guidelines and the
N ceneric Technical Position cited above, require that characterization of the Davis Canyon site will likely require drilling within Canyonlands National Park, in order to obtain adequate data regarding groundwater movement in the vicinity of the site.
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The drilling activities within Canyonlands National Park that would likely be requiled in an adequate site characterization program, however, cannot be conducted consistent with the Act and existing federal law. Under the previously designated use of the Park mandated by federal legislation, such activities are precluded by the disqualifying conditions in the siting
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guidelines.
Indeed, DOE has repeatedly acknowledged that it cannot and will not conduct drilling inside Canyonlands National Park to characterize grourAwater movement.
In addition, in a letter to Ben Rusche dated November 7, 1986, the Department of the Interior has advised DOE that the activities proposed for site characterization would conflict irreconcilably with the previously designated resource-preservation use of Canyonlands National Park.
These activities do not even call for drilling in the Park.
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If the suitability of the Davis Canyon site for characterization is evaluated against a standard based on the criteria in 10 CFR Part 960 and 10 CFR Part 60, then it is clear that Davis Canyon is not suitable for characterization.
In order to ensure that the site meets the safety requirements in 10 CFR Part 60 DOE would likely have to conduct site characterization activities within Canyonlands National Park that would disqualify the site under the siting guidelines, the Act, and federal law governing the use of national parks.
The State of Utah therefore urges the Commission to reexamine its position on the suitability of the Davis Canyon site for characterization, in light of the
lN impcets thth cn edgusta sits cherectsrization program would likoly imposa on Canyonlands National Park.
I We are continuing to study this and other issues of concern regarding the Davis Canyon site's suitability for characterization, and we would be happy to provide you with further information. We look forward to working closely with you and your staff in addressing this and other matters related to DOE's site l
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selection activities conducted under the Act.
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5 STATE OF TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT CORDELL HULL BUILDING j
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37219-5402 June 10, 1987 Mr. Samuel J. C hilk, Secretary Nuclear Regulatory Commission, W a shington, DC 20555 1
Dear M r. C hilk:
Enclosed you will find fifteen copie s of a brie f state ment by Governor Ned McWherter for the meeting of the Commission with state s and tribe s on June 16.
I will repre sent Tenne ssee at that meeting, and will summarize Governor McW herter's statement.
I will be traveling on June 15.
My itinerary calls for me to. arrive in W a shington in the late a fternoon on June 15.
I plan to stay at the Mayflower Hotel should you need to deliver a tran script of M r. Ru sche's statement to me there.
Sincerely, Ac Ben L. Smith Environmental Policy Group BLS/rne Enclosure s (15) 4 i
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l STATEM ENT OF NED R. MCWHERTER GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE l
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Pre sented to the United State s Nuclear Regulatory Commission W a shing ton, DC l
June 16, 1987
4 The state of Tenne ssee rejects the proposal to develop a monitored retrievable storage facility at Oak Rid ge, Tenne s see.
This is the position of both the Governor and the General A sse mbly.
Tenne ssee has rejected the M RS proposal becau se the DOE has failed to de mon strate a
need for this e xpen sive project.
The DOE proposal is not a viable solution to the problem of isolating nuclear wa ste from the human environment.
- Rather, it is a
temporary solution inappropriate for wa ste matcrials that will remain dangerou sly radioactive for 10,000 years.
My
" notice of disapproval" of the siting of an MRS in Tenne s see (attached) was delivered to the Congress on May 28, 1987.
The notice of disapproval of the General A ssembly was submitted along with mine.
The se notices were submitted a't this time out of an e xtre me abundance of caution given the significant legal uncertainty as to when such notice was timely.
Our e f forts to re solve this issue in federal court led to the conclu sion that it was ultimately up to the Congress to determine the timeline ss of any " notice of disapproval" which is issued.
The Nuclear Wa ste, Policy Act provided the state s with certain rights and with a
chance for participation in
structuring a national sy ste m for the final disposal of spent nuclear fu el.
Tenne s see has soug ht to protect and to exercise its rights under this law.
Protecting our procedural' rights ha s been a
difficult ta sk, due largely to the ambiguity of the language which was added to the Act to require a study of monitored retrievable storag e.
Neverthele s s, Tenne ssee has participated by conducting a
rigorou s analy sis of the MRS proposal.
W e have taken a con structive stance by proposing ways j
i to improve the nuclear wa ste management sy ste m.
We believe that
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a better sy ste m can be devised; one which re sults in le s s risk
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to the public and lower cost.
My comments address su ccinctly the perceived need for the MRS propo sal, the propo sal's c o st, and the important ethical concerns in postponing the ultimate solution to thic problem for another generation.
M RS IS NOT NEEDED l
Much of the debate regarding the M RS propo sal has focu sed upon the de sired location of the facility.
To some extent, the e motional atmosphere in which this debate has occurred has distracted attention from the more important que stion of whether s.
the MRS is needed to en sure the su cce s s of the nuclear wa ste program.
S tudie s undertaken in Tenne s see and by the General Accounting Office in W a shington raise seriou s q ue stion s about the prudence of this project.
The Tenn e s see studie s indicate that the rod con solidation and storage function s propo sed for the MRS can be accomplished effectively at the individual reactor site s.
The DOE could encourage this alternative with two initiative s.
The fir st would provide utilitie s with credits for fuel con solidation.
The second would make available to utilitie s dual purpose ca sk s suitable for storage at the reactors and adaptable for later tran sportation directly to the permanent geological repository.
The ca se for pur suing an alternative for on-site storage is l
streng the ned by independent projection s of the amount of spent fu el which nuclear utilitie s will generate.
In fa ct, DOE recently adopted a number of the wa ste projection a s su mption s which the Tenne ssee study team u sed in 1985.
Two year s ago, DO E projection s for spent fuel for the year 2000 were 20% hig her than the Ten ne s see stu dy.
Today the difference is only 2
percent. _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
As wa ste volu me projection s drop, so do claims of av oided reactor storage co st s attributable to MRS.
DOE has te stified that the se saving s would amount to $150 to $450 million assuming the fir st repo sitory was developed on time.
The se anticipated saving s,
- however, were ba sed upon earlier wa ste volu me projection s that have sin ce been discounted.
You should be s.
aware that the actual co st saving s likely will not exceed $100 million.
S ub stantially lower projections for spent fuel repre sent an e xtremely important issue in the debate over whether there exists a " crisis" of accumulated nuclear wa ste at our reactors.
A number of reactor s probably will decide to con solidate fuel rod s at their site s to con serve available storage space.
For
- some, this decision will come well be fore
- 1998, the most
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optimistic date for star t-u p of the fir st repository and the late st date projected for beginning M RS operation s.
Such early initiative s by the utilitie s are con sistent with the DO E a ssumption that con solidated fuel is the de sired wa ste for m for repository emplacement.
Congress should seek to encourage su ch bene ficial action s by the utilitie s.
In recent year s utilitie s and private support companie s have i
been developing technolog y to con solidate fuel rod s under water in the reactor storage pools.
Some dry con solidation concepts also have been advanced.
Several rod con solidation demon stration s have taken place.
Others are planned by private 1
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4 fir ma an xiou s to prove that the process can be done sa fely.
W hen the con solidated fuel is placed back into e xiting storage pools, unit costs will be lower than for MRS fuel handling and storage.
, Fcr some reactor s where fu rthur pool storage may not be N
appropriate, the fuel, either con solidated or not, can be kept at the, reactor site in dry storage ca sk s.
The technolog y for such cask s is nearing maturity.
Such a cask already is licen sed for u se in W e st Germany.
American utilitie s and the NRC are
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moving toward general licen sing of dry storage ca sk s at reactor s without additional site-specific approvals.
Taken
- together, the advancing te chnologie s in reactor con solidation and storage and dimisished projection s for the volu me of spent fuel which will be generated sugge st strongly that the primary Sanction s for which M RS was conceived mig ht well be handled routinely at reactors by the time an M RS could become operational.
The motivation for such a policy would be j
nothing more than sound management by the utilities.
With the se option s available to the utilitie s, the need for a temporary wa ste repo sitory is no longer ju stifiable on grounds of cost or sa fe ty.
1 The ta sk now should be to rein force and reward the step s which have already been made toward sound management of America's nuclear wa ste.
DOE could begin by developing a credit -
F sy ste m for fu el con solidated at the reactors.
Such a sy stem of credits would recognize the bene fit s to the wa ste management sy ste m that re sult from the u se of fewer ca sk s and fewer shipment s through' the sta te s.
W ith this incentive, technology re finemen t for at-reactor con solidation could be moved forward at a quicker pace in re spon se to DO E 's efforts to organize and s.
fund demon stration s.
DOE should accompany the se efforts with a closer examination of er. sk de sign s that cou.1d serve both reactor storage and tran sportation fu nction s.
Such cask s would reduce fuel handling and worker exposure.
An appropriate family of dual purpose ca sk s I.hould be standardized by DOE for competitive manu facture.
In addition, DO E should pur sue plan s to move more - of the spent fuel by rail than is currently propo sed.
The benefits of such a proposal would be sub stan tial.
W ith large rail ca sk s fe wer shipments would be nece ssary and costs and radiation e xpo sure to the public could be reduced.
To maximize u se of this
- mode, DO E should become actively involved with the utilitie s in upgrading the ca sk handling and shipping capabilitie s of some of the reactors.
DOE could help' to coordinate shipping ca mpaig n s u sing dedicated train s.
The n on-standar d ' shippin g capabilitie s of the reactors should not be allowed to stand as a major con straint to creating an optimal 1
wa ste manage:aent sy ste m for the nation.
Te nne s see 's studie s indicate that such improvements could reduce the number of o
ca sk-c.ile s of shipping through the states down from 1.4 million annually with M RS, to 1.0 million with NO M RS and an improved tran sport plan.
MRS COSTS OVERSHADOW THE BENEFITS Determining the cost of M RS to the nation' and to Tenne ssee has been extremely difficult.
Life cycle sy ste m cost increa se s attributattle.to MRS climbed from $2.0 billion to $ 2.6 billion between December 1985 and April 1986.
A s the General Accounting l
O ffice has revealed, even the latter figure' did not include a longthy list of e xpen sive ite m s.
One such ite m, likely compen sation to the impacted state and community, could. ea sily reaen 9.L oillion.
Apart from costs a s sociated with the M RS con stru ction, operating cost estimates contained in the proposal recently sent i
to Congress have been reduced dramatically, and warrant efitical e xamination.
P. a sed upon highly que stionable a s sumption s, l
e stimate s of total sy stem life cycle cost increa se s due to M RS have been recently reduced from $ 2.6 to $ 1.6 billion.
The billion dollar reduction roceived in su fficient documentation in the proposal, was not e xplained prior to the proposal being sent to Congress and should, therefore, be highly su spect.
The projected economic bene fits appear to fall far short of ju stifying the enormou s. cost of the M RS.
The most fav orable scenario of bene fits, which includes a repository in W a shing ton, could produce only $650 million.
B ene fit s ratios for all other scenarios are far lower.
The que stion is whether $3 billion should be appropriated for an M RS proposal of dubiou s economic l
be ne fit.
An issue of this magnitude should be re solved on the I
ba sis of sound data that is' not subject to whims of arbitrary change.
i THE INTENT OF THE NUCLEAR W ASTE POLICY ACT We und er stand that the primary mission of the commission is to protect tne public health and a ssure the sa fety of nuclear
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facilitie s (including nuclear waste facilitie s) through licen sing and over sight.
In addition, we urge the NRC to take a hard look at the need for this project and the costs involved.
There should be an a s se ssment of the underlying congre s sional purpo se of the Nuclear W a ste P olicy Act.
The pa st two years have been characterized by an unnece ssary sen se of urgency regarding the development of an M RS.
DO E 's in sisten ce in late 1985 that the proposal be acted upon immediately by the Congress is evidence of this generated sen se of urgency.
The MRS proposal was e xpedited at that time de spite reque sts by Tenn e s see of ficial s for adequate time to allow citizen s and the state review team to study the propo sal and develop -
comprehen sive comments to be meaning fully in corporated into the proposal to C ong re s s.
Only litigation initiated by the stat 2's Attorney General elowed ' the proce ss temporarily.
Yet almost two years a fter the litigation was initiated, the state's q ue stion s and concern s remain.
Other recent action s have served to undermine the congre s sional purpose of the Nuclear W a ste Policy Act.
The proposed five-year "e xten sion "
of the date for a
fir st repo sitory, and the proposed
" postponement" of site-spe cific work on a second repository have created unwarranted pressure to proceed quickly with the M RS project.
Recent empha sis on an l
l unauthorized M RS and the proposed sched ule "e xten sion" to develop the authorized portion s of the sy ste m con stitute a
1 distortion of the intent of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act..
i A long-term solution for nuclear wa ste is an issue of the highe st priority.
The Congre ss recognized this when it enacted
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the Nuclear W a ste P olicy Act.
The funda mental principle was then, and still should be, that solution s for the problem should j
not be de ferred to another generation.
At issue today is whether~
the propo sal to store nuclear wa ste in a
su r face facility would serve only to delay final isolation of the wa ste from the human environment.
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4 CONCLUSION The state of Tenne ssee is deeply concerned about events of the past two years regarding implementation of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
During this period there has been an omirfou s drift away from the Act's original intent, along with a false sen se of urgency about the need for a te mporary wa ste storage facility.
This change is evident in the recently proposed Mission Plan Amendments which move M RS to the forefront to receive spent fuel at the sa me time a permanent solution is delayed.
This DOE proposal is accompanied by state ment s from some utilitie s and some nuclear indu stry repre sentative s calling for "unre stricted -
u se " of the M RS.
They seek to drop the schedule linkage to repository development proposed by DO E and call for lifting the cap on M RS storage capacity.
Such action s point toward a
mind-set that, in e ffe ct, would accept a " temporary" solution to a seriou s national problem with environ mental implication s for the ne w 10,000 year s.
The que stion is whether we are prepared to take a stand now and reject the notion that we can pa ss this problem on to our children and grand children.
Put
- simply, Tennessee wants no part of a de facto above-ground repository.
The people of our state believe that the shortcon.:.ng s of this proposal are not limited to the practical con sideration s of sa fety, c o st, and techn ological fea sibility.
They also in clude issue s that reach to the heart of the relation ship between the state s and the federal government.
A fter two year s of examining
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I the pr opo sal, the people of Tenne ssee and our state g ov ern ment are unconvin ce'd that the proposed M RS facility is either e conomically or environmentally sound.
M oreover, twe do not believe that the process of designing and locating the facility has been conducted in good faith.
We think the - Congre ss intended that a potential MRS host state would have the same procedural rights as the state s which are potential candidate s-for hosting a permanent repository site.
Tennessee has not been afforded the se rights.
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