ML20215G567
| ML20215G567 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1986 |
| From: | Robey R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Case E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RAR-86-34, NUDOCS 8610210009 | |
| Download: ML20215G567 (5) | |
Text
t Commonwealth Edison Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station 22710 206 Avenue North Cordova, Illinois 61242 Telephone 309/654-2241 RAR-86-34 October 8, 1986 Mr. Edson G. Case, Deputy Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Case:
Enclosed please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments completed during the month of September, 1986, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the safety evaluation is being reported in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.
Thirty-nine copics are provided for your use.
Respectfully, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION h-R. A. Robey Services Superintendent bb Enclosure cc J. Wojnarowski f
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SPECIAL TEST 1-83 Special Test 1-83 results were completed on August 11, 1986. This test is the Unit One Cycle Nine Startup Test.
Safety Evaluation 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the unit will be operating at normal startup and steady state operating conditions. No unusual or unanalyzed valve or equipment configurations are called for by any of the test pro-cedurcs. The startup program is made up entirely of existing Station procedures. All data will be taken externally, that is, data acquisition will not interfere in any way with normal systen operation.
No tests will be performed which will affect the capability for safe shutdown of the plant, or ' jeopardize the safety of the public.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the normal function and intent of all systems involved in the testing will not be altered. No new type of equipment is to be installed which has not been analyzed previously.
No new valve line-ups or special operating procedures will be used in conducting any of the startup tests.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the testing program itself will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
In fact, the purpose of the Startup Test Program in to satisfactorily demonstrate that Technical Specifications can be met and that the plant may continue to operate safely.
o SPECIAL TEST 1-92 Special Test 1-92 was completed on June 23, 1986.
The purpose of this test was to investigate the communication adequacy of hand held radios without the use of the repeater system by dispatching personnel to locations in the plant which would be required by Appendix R Safe Shutdown, establishing communications both with and without the repeater system.
Safety Evaluation 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because radios will not be operated near equipment that they might interfere with..
i 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because participants will not be operating or working with any equipment other than hand held radios.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because actions taken in this test will not involve or impact any Technical Specification systems.
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SPECIAL TEST 2-53 On August 12, 1986, Special Test 2-53 was completed. This test was performed to determine if Chemical Decontamination of irradiated nuclear fuel bundles has an adverse effect on any fuel burdle components. This project is intended to ultimately lead to fuel-in-place full vessel and Recirculation piping decontamination prior to the start of work during an outage for ALARA.
Safety Evaluation 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because test results have shown that decontamination solvents do not react with the neutron absorbing material (Boraflex) in the high density fuel storage racks.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because as the decontamination solvents do not react with Boraflex, there will not be a change to the K f the spent EFF fuel pool.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because, as the solvents will not change the K value f the spent fuel pool, the margin of safety E
addressedinf$chnicalSpecification5.5.Bisnotreduced.
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SPECIAL TEST 2-64 Special Test 2-64 results were completed on September 4, 1986. This test was conducted to find a source of the noise causing Turbine Control Valve oscillations.
Safety Evaluation 1.
The~ probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an' accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because adjustments to load limits, potentiometer, load reference, and pressure setpoint bias knobs will allow Reactor pressure to slightly increase and decrease with pressure regulated by Control 4
j Valves or.3ypass Valves. The Reactor pressure scram setpoint will not be changed. All adjustments will be done within the normal means available to the Operator, except step III.
The Instrument Mechanics will lower the 'B' regulator bias until 'B' pressure regulator takes control in step III. This will be done slowly so as to have a minimal impact on the system.
i 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because adjustment to Control Valve and pressure amplifiers will be performed slowly to prevent any transients to the system.
The procedure for placing the recorder into the system was revised and evaluated to Save minimal impact on the EHC controls.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because Reactor pressure and Turbine
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overspeed trips will not be altered.
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