ML20215G024
| ML20215G024 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/12/1986 |
| From: | Sniezek J Committee To Review Generic Requirements |
| To: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8612240204 | |
| Download: ML20215G024 (27) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E
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WASHINGTON D.C.20655
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- .....**G DEC 121986 NEMCRANDUM FOR:
Victor Stello, Jr.
c Executive Director for Operations FROM:
James H. Sniezek, Chaiman Comittee to Review Generic Requirements
SUBJECT:
FINUTES OF CRGR MEETING NtiMBER 102 The Comittee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) met on Thursday, December 4, 1986, from 1-5 p.m.
A list of attendees for this meeting is en-closed (Enclosure 1).
4 1.
R. Burnett and P. Dwyer (NMSS) presented for CRGR review the Proposed Policy Statement Endorsing Industry Guidelines for Access Authorization at Nuclear Power Plants. This matter ir discussed in Enclosure 2.
2.
B. Boger and D. Jones (NRR) presented for CRGR review the proposed Comission Policy Statement Concering Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours. This matter is discussed in Enclosure 3.
The enclosures contain predecisional information and, therefore, will not be released to the Public Document Room until the NRC has considered (in a public forum) or decided the matter addressed by the information.
In accordance with the ED0's July 18, 1983, directive concerning " Feedback and Closure on CRGR Reviews," items 1 and 2 above require written responses from the cognizant office to report agreement or disagreement with CRGR recomenda-b tions in these minutes. The responses, which are required within 5 working days after receipt of these meeting minutes, are to be forwarded to the CRGR Chairman and if there is disagreement with the CRGR recommendations, to the EDO for decisionmaking.
Ouestions concerning these meeting minutes should be referred to Walt Schwink (492-8639).
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9C ames H. Sniezek, Chairman I
ommittee to Review Generic Requirements
Enclosures:
As Stated y
8612240204 861212 PDR REVGP NRCCRGR MEETIt4G102 PDR
..s DEC 121986 cc: Comission (5)
SECY Office Directors Regional Administrators CRGR Members-W. Parler R. Burnett P. Dwyer B. Boger D. Jones Distrihtuion:
JSniezek JRoe JZerbe PRabideau JClifford GZwetzig ROGR Staff FHebdon WLittle RErickson MLesar PDR(NRG/CRGR) cContratFile%3 V
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DATE :12/IL/86
- 12/s2 /86
- 12/// /86
- 12/12186 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
.s LIST OF ATTENDEES CRGR MEETIt!G FO. 10?
December 4, 1986 CRGR MEMBERS D.F. Ross R.E. Cunningham R. Bernero R. Starostecki J. Heltemes W. Olmstead (for J. Scinto)
OTHERS J.H. Sniezek W. Schwink R. Capra J.E. Zerbe E.W. Brach S. Wiggington R. Major R.L. Fonner K. Jamgochian J. Yardumian J. Partlow B. Boaer D. Jones H. West, Jr.
8-J. Clifford P.J. Polk C. Ader M. Lopez-Otin N. N. Beeson I
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. to the Minutes of CRGR Meeting No. 10?.
Proposed Policy Statement Endorsing Industry Guidelines for Access Authorization at Nuclear Power Plants R. Purnett and P. Dwyer (NPSS) presented for CRGP review a proposed Comission paper containing (1) a policy statement that endorses (without modification)
" Industry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Programs,"
and (2) a Federal Register Notice to withdraw a proposed rulemaking that is replaced by the policy statement. The proposal is intended to reduce the threat of insider sabotage'of a nuclear power plant. The attachment (briefing slides) was given to the CRGR members during the meeting.
SECY-85-381, the Insider Safeguards Rules, dated November 79, 1985, provided a package of three final rulemakings for Comission approval. These rules were (1) the Access Authorization Rule to establish screening requirements for nuclear power plant personnel to include background investigations, psycholog-ical evaluations and a continual behavior observation program; (2) the Search f
Requirements Rule to modify personnel entry search requirements at power reac-tors; and (3) the Miscellaneous Amendments Rule to clarify and refine require-ments for the protection of vital locations containing safety-related equipment at nuclear power plants. By SECY memo of June 25, 1986, the staff was directed to publish the Search Requirements and Miscellaneous Amendments Rule in final form. This action was completed with the publication of these two final rules in the Federal Register on August 4, 1986 (50 FR 97817, 51 FR 27827). With regard to the Access Authorization Rule, the staff was directed to prepare an NPC policy stater.ent replacing the proposed rule and endorsing an industry proposed initiative for an access authorization program for power reactors.
(Several industry groups commenting on the proposed rule, including the
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Nuclear Utility Management and Resource Committee (NUMARC), requested that the proposed rule be withdrawn and replaced by an industry initiative for an access authorization program based on NUMARC guidelines.) NUMARC representatives have interacted with the staff in the development of the policy statement endorsing the industry program guidelines which are entitled, " Industry Guidelines for Nucle'ar Power Plant Access Authorization Programs." The Commission endorsed this approach as an alternative to the access authorization rule with the understanding that (1) a review procedure would be an important element of the program for use in the event employment of a permanent employee was to be terminated as a direct result of a denial or revocation of access authoriza-tion, and (2) all power reactor licensees would amend their physical security plans to commit to the guidelines and to follow Commission policy on access authorization which would provide for NRC oversight; i.e., inspection and en-forcement. NUMARC, acting as the representative for all licensees in this respect, has agreed with these conditions which have been incorporated in the policy statement.
(L The proposed policy statement defines the policy of the NRC regarding unes-corted access to protected areas and vital areas at nuclear power plants.
Through this policy, the Commission endorses the industry program (guidelines) i that includes background investigation, psychological evaluation, and a be-havior observation program. The program was developed by representatives of an industry group, NUMARC.
NIHARC has committed its member utilities to incorpor-ate the provisions of the program in NRC-approved security plans. The staff
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plans to monitor this program through its normal inspection and enforcement i
l activities.
' 4 Each utility will imple:nent an access authorization program in accordance with the guidelines. These guidelines have been designed with the objective of achieving high assurance that personnel granted unescorted access authorization to the protected and vital areas of nuclear power plants are trustworthy and reliable and, therefore, do not pose a threat to commit sabotage which could result in radiological release. The guidelines define the acceptable levels for conductint "d eialuating the elements of the screening program. Major elements inclu',e background investigation, physiological evaluation and be-havior observation. Additionally, the guidelines (1) provide evaluation cri-teria for the determination of access authorization, (2) establish provisions for accepting unescorted access authorization from other utilities (3) include a grandfathering of personnel who were perviously screened (4) discuss records maintenance, and evaluation and audit of the access authorization program to assure the utility's unescorted access authorization program is in accordance with the guidelines incorporated by reference in the security plan.
The CRGR had reviewed the proposal for rulemaking (the Accesss Authorization Rule) that is to be replaced by the proposed policy statement (CRGR Meetings 40 and 82). AM each review, the Comittee concluded that the backfit (rule-
)
making) was appropriate based on a review of the proposed requirements and the analysis of benefits and costs resulting from the rulemaking. Mr. Purnett noted, and the CRGR agreed, that an additional backfit analysis was not needed for the proposed policy statement because the policy endorses industry guide-lines which are considered by the staff to be equivalent in substance to the 4
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requirements, benefits and costs of the " Insider Rules" proposal previously reviewed by the CRGR, E00 and Commission.
f The focus of the CRGR review was to assure that before an individual is permit-ted unescorted access to any protected / vital area of a nuclear power plant, the identity and criminal history (if any) is known and considered before deciding to grant such access. The Committee concerns and recommendations to resolve those concerns follow:
(1) While the proposed policy statement (endorsement of industry guidelines) is intended to reduce the threat of insider sabotage of a nuclear power plant, implementation of the proposal would permit granting unescorted access to vital areas prior to receiving the results of a criminal history check or positive verification of identity. Furthermore, the vast major-ity of plant workers (current and previous) would be grandfathered and granted temporary (temporary workers) unescorted access to protected / vital
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areas, and there# ore would not be subject to the entire screening program.
The staff concluded and the CRGR agreed that grandfathering of permanent employees was acceptable due to the following considerations:
Staff experience with permanent enployees indicates that they are not likely to commit sabotage, l
. There is little uncertainty about the identity of permanent employees due to worker relationships with other workers, managers and various organizations.
NRC's rulemaking requiring fingerprinting and FBI criminal history checks will apply to those grandfathered. Because they are permanent employees they very likely will be sub,iect to FBI criminal history checks.
Permanent employees are subjected to utility preemployment screen-ing/ verification programs.
These considerations normally do not apply to temporary (180 days or less) workers. Therefore, the CRGR recommended that the proposal be modified to permit temporary workers unescorted access only after there has been posi-tive identification of the worker and the results of the FBI criminal
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history check have been considered.
(2) The proposal provides that licensees are to implement the guidelines via changes to site / plant security plans. The proposed policy states that these security plan changes are to be reviewed / approved by NRC prior to implementation. The CRGR asked what guidance / criteria will be used by NRC licensing staff to review / approve these security plan changes.
Pr. Burnett clarified; the staff expects that the security plan change submitted by each licensee would consist of a sentence committing to the industry guidelines and a copy of the appeal procedure for denied / revoked
access authorizations. He explained that the staff planned to review only the appeal procedure. The comitment would be accepted at face value with IE inspection to assure appropriate implementation of the commitment to implement an access authorization consistent with the policy endorsed guidelines.
The CRGR concluded that because the licensing staff was willing to accept the comitment (significant changes to the access authorization program) without review, review of the appeal procedure seemed superfluous.
In this regard, the CRGR recomended that the proposal be changed to reflect a consistent staff approach - licensing staff acceptance of the comitment and the appeal procedures with IE inspection to assure appropriate imple-mentation.
It is recognized that related changes in the security plan necessary to be consistent with the comitment to the industry guidelines may be reviewed by the licensing staff.
f Emergency access and NpC unfettered access (including its contractors /
(3) consultants) was not addressed in the proposal. The CRGR recommended that such access be addressed in the proposal. Further, the Comittee recom-mended that the staff assure that NRC provisions for access to licensee facilities be in place prior to implementing the policy.
(4) Because the proposed NRC policy statement endorses a proposed industry I
initiative (guidelines) comitted to by all licensees, there was sorre concern about the manner in which certain language in the staff proposal 1s used; i.e., shall, should, expects, etc.
In this regard, the CRGR l
recomended that NMSS work with OGC to assure that appropriate language is used consistently throughout the proposal.
..6 7
In sumary, the CRGR recomended that the proposal be modified as discussed in (1) through (4) above and then approved by the EDO for Comission consideration.
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'. 'l or ru menorts r e cwe f*EETING " /02..
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e CRGR BRIEFING POLICY STATEMENT ON ACCESS AUTHORIZATION AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS I
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ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM HISTORY
- PROPOSED CLEARANCE RULE PUBLISHED FOR COMMENT (1977)
- COMMISSION ESTABLISHED HEARING BOARD (1978) i
- BOARD RECOMMENDED (1979)/AND COMMISSION DIRECTED (1980) l
- DEVELOP AN ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE FOR POWER REACTORS l
- SAFETY / SAFEGUARDS REVIEW COMMITTEE (1982/1983)
- RULE PUBLISHED PROPOSED (1984) 1
- COMMISSION DIRECTED POLICY STATEMENT (1986) e u
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i MAJOR FIFMENTS OF POLICY STATEENI O
ENDORSEMENT OF NUMARC GUIDELINES ON ACCESS AUTHORIZATION AT POWER R' ACTORS E
O DOCUMENTATION OF NUMARC COMMITMENT FOR MEMBER UTILITIES TO REVISE SECURITY PLANS 0
PLAN AMENDMENTS INSPECTED / ENFORCED BY NRC 0
APPEAL PROCEDURE FOR DENIED / REVOKED CLEARANCE AN l,MPORTANT PROGRAM ELEMENT i
0
" CERTIFIED" NRC EMPLOYEES EXEMPT FROM PROGRAM i
O NOT A BACKFIT, PROGRAM IS VOLUNTARY 0
IMPLEMENTATION WITHIN 180 DAYS OF PLAN AMENDMENT APPROVAL 1
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3
P NOV 18 W6 ".
e MAJOR ElFMENTS OF INDUSTRY GUIDELINES.
O THREE COMPONENT SCREENING i-O CONSISTENT WITH FEDERAL LAW AND NRC RULE ON FBI CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECKS 0
EVALUATION CRITERIA O
SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR TEMPORARY WORKERS j
0 TRANSFERRABLE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION UNDER FULL SCREENING PROGRAM i
j 0
APPEAL PROCEDURE FOR DENIED / REVOKED CLEARANCE-PERMANENT EMPLOYEES 0
AUDITS w/ AUDIT CRITERIA 0
GRANDFATHERING I
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4 f
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. to the Minutes of CRGR Meetino No. 102 Proposed Comission Policy Statement Concerning Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours B.BogerandD. Jones (NRR)presentedthesubjectpolicystatementforCRGR review. NRR recomends that this policy statement be issued by the Commission for public coment. When issued in final, the policy statement would supersede the Comission's June 1,1982 policy statement on the same subject. A copy of the handouts used by NRR during the presentation is attached to this enclosure.
This policy statement was transmitted for CRGR review by mamorandum from H. Denton to J. Sniezek, dated November 13, 1986. In addition to the policy statement, the CRGR review package included:
(1) the proposed Comission Paper transmitting the policy statement; (2) a sumary of the responses from IE and the regions to a memorandum dated 03/05/86 from NRR requesting input on the proposed revision to the policy statement; (3) a response to a memorandum from DFDROGR dated 09/29/86 reouesting addi-tional information to support CRGR review; (4) the Safety Issue Panagement Systems (SIPS) report on the proposed policy statement; (5) a copy of the 00/30/85 staff requirements memorandum (SRM) directing the staff to update the policy statement; and (6) a copy of the DEDROGR memorandum dated 09/29/86.
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During his presentation, Mr. Boger stated that the objectives of the revised policy statement were to:
(1) respond to the 09/30/85 SPM to update the policy statement; (2) consolidate staff guidance on this subject into one document; (3) provide consistency with recent staff practice by moving away from pre-scriptive regulation and streamlining plant technical specifications; (4) include new guidance on the subject of I?-hour shift schedules; and (5) allow a public coment period of 30 days on the revised policy statement.
Mr. Boger stated that the revised policy statement included a combination of unchanged guidance and new or revised guidance. The following remains un-changed from the guidance published in the Comission's June 1,1987, Policy Statement on Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours:
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-2 (1) control of overtime for operational safety is the responsibility of licensees; (2) licensee management is responsible for approving deviations from recom-mended guidelines on a case-by-case basis; (3) the average number of hours worked per week should be 40; and (4) the guidelines for the maximum number of hours worked during a given period (no more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in a 24-hour period, 74 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br /> in a 4R-hour period and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any 7-day period).
The new or revised guidance contained in the proposed policy statement includes:
(1) new guidance on the maximum number of consecutive days a person may work; (2) new guidance on the direction of shift rotation; (3) new guidance for utilities using a 12-hour shift schedule; (4) revised guidance to clarify that the current limit of working 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a 7-day period is not intended to be used for an indefinite period of time; and (5) revised guidance on what personnel should be covered by overtime limits.
In ending his briefing, Mr. Boger stated that as a result of the proposed policy statement, licensees would be permitted to apply for an amendment to remove limits on overtime from their technical specifications.
In doing so, procedures for controlling overtime would still be required to be included in i
licensees' administrative procedures but not in their technical specifications.
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Finally, the proposed policy statement would inform licensees that NRC would no longer inspect licensees' programs for controlling overtime. However, licen- -
sees' performance would be evaluated if necessary to determine: (1) if long-term degradation in overall licensee performance, as monitored by the SALP process, was linked to excessive use of overtime or (2) unsafe plant conditions resulting in an incident were caused in part by licensees failure to properly control the use o# overtime by plant personnel.
l The CRGP had a number of coments and concerns associated with the proposed policy statement. The majority of these centered around five areas: (a) pos-sible inconsistent interpretations, (b) addressing comments from other offices and regions, (c) safety rationale for deleting current requirements from the technical specifications and moving them to administrative procedures, (d) basis for new or revised guidance, and (e) general concern with the ap-proach outlined in the Commission paper. At the end of the meeting, CRGR recomended not going forward with the proposed policy statement. Thus, some of the specific coments raised by the CRGR, and summarized below, may be j
superseded by the overall recommendation regarding final disposition of this package. CRGR's overall recomendations regarding this proposed policy state-ment are presented at the end of the meeting summary.
. POSSIBLE INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATIONS:
CRGP believes that the Comission paper and policy statement as written has apparent inconsistencies which could be subject to different interpretations.
On one hand, the paper states that the NRC will allow licensees the option of moving overtime limits from their technical specifications to administrative procedures and NRC will no longer inspect licensees' programs in this area. On the other hand, page 1 of the policy states: "The purpose of the policy state-ment is to set forth the guidelines the Commission will use to judge the ade-quacy of a licensee's procedures governing the control and use of overtime."
In addition, Section F of the policy statement entitled " Enforcement," says that NRC intends to evaluate the effectiveness of licensee administrative con-trols in the systematic evaluation of licensee performance. Thus, as currently written, it is not clear that NRC's actual intent is to conduct only reactive inspections of administrative procedures for control of overtime in response to events or degraded performance and not conduct routine programatic inspections of administrative procedures for control of overtime.
i Beginning on page ? of the proposed Commission Paper, NRR provides the ratio-nale for the changes in enforcement policy regarding shift overtime. The CRGR expressed concern with items 1 and 4 of the rationale.
Rationale number 1 states:
Commission policy to move away from prescriptive regulation, to recognize licensee responsibility for operational safety, and to adopt performance-based regulatory approaches.
The CRGR believes that the overtime limits shown on pages 9 through 11 of the revised policy statement do not represent a shift to performance-based regu-lation. Rather, they could be interpreted as even more prescriptive guidance than is contained in the current policy statement. Thus, as written, it is not b
clear that NRR's intent was to provide guidance on an optimum shift schedule,,
based upon research and operating experience, to minimize the fatigue effects of shift work, such that the short-tem limits on an individual's overtime are effective in minimizing fatigue-related human errors.
Rationale number 4 of the rationale states:
Technical specifications should be streamlined to contain only those constraints on reactor operation of imediate concern to safety.
Yet, the first paragraph under "Recomendations" on page 7 of the Policy Statement says:
The Commission regards limits on the use of overtime by personnel who perform " safety-related functions" to be necessary to protect public health and safety. Excessive use of overtime can cause fatigue which might result in unsafe nuclear power plant conditions.
CRGR believes that this wording difference between the Commission paper and the policy statement is inconsistent with NRR proposed administrative controls in
4 lieu of technical specifications controls for overtime, because items that are necessary for protection of public health and safety are normally controlled by regulation, license condition or technical specification.
The CRGR suggested that the " Recommendations" section of the proposed Comission paper might be worded differently to avoid confusion regarding whether this is a " final" policy statement or a " proposed" policy statement.
CRGR felt a better way to phrase item I would be to recomend that the Comission, " Approve issuance of the Proposed Policy Statem:nt on Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours for public comment."
CRGR pointed out that the "Sumary" section of the policy statement states:
Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33 identifies safety-related activities which should be covered by written administrative procedures. These procedures include nuclear power staff working hours.
Because the effective edition (Revision 2) of RG 1.33 does not specifically include procedures for nuclear power plant staff working hours, perhaps the second sentence should be reworded to state that: "These procedures should include nuclear power plant staff working hours."
A portion of the "Sumary" section of the policy statement, reads: " Licensees are required to develop, implement, monitor, and enforce procedures which limit work-related fatigue." CRGR expressed a concern that if licensees remove existing requirements for limiting overtime from their technical specifica-tions, this statement would no longer be true. NRR pointed out that the re-quirement for licensees to have administrative procedures to control overtime would still be contained in the technical specifications; however, the specific overtime limits would be removed. Thus, licensees could administratively change the actual limits without prior NRC approval of these limits, b
CRGR also expressed some concern with the last phrase of the following sentence on page 5 of the policy statement: "The NRC wishes to make it clear that it is 7
the responsibility of licensees to set and enforce limits on excessive overtime as necessary to assure safe operations and maintenance of nuclear pcwer plants, rather than to distract licensees and the NRC staff with the technicalities of l
compliance." CPGR considers it inappropriate to characterize compliance with l
NRC regulations as " technicalities of compliance."
ADDRESSING COMMENTS FPOM OTHER OFFICES AND REGIONS It was recognized during the meeting that NRR had solicited comments from IE and the regions in developing the proposed policy statement. A sumary of their coments was included as Enclosure ? to the Comission Paper. However, since some of the formal coments identified in Enclosure 2 were not incorpor-ated in the final version of the policy statement, CPGR recomends that either be deleted or a rationale for not incorporating the comments be included. In any event, NRR should have a good rationale for not implement-ing the provisions set forth in the comments.
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. Similarly, following development of the revised policy statement, NRR requested the concurrence of OGC, IE, RES and NMSS.
CRGR recommended, in the future, that packages clearly state what offices have and have not concurred.
If an office does not concur, the basis for going forward, absent such concurrence, should be specified.
SAFETY RATIONALE FOR DELETING CURRENT REQUIREMENTS FPOM THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:
CRGR members raised some concern regarding the following statement on page 1 of the proposed Commission paper:
Overtime worked by nucle, e power plant personnel has not been identified as an actual contributor to reportable events or to have degraded the safety of plant operations. This suggests that the current policy is effective.
With respect to the first sentence, CRGR was concerned that this statement might be focused too narrowly. On its face, it also appears to be inconsistent 4
with the 04/03/86 and 04/09/86 responses to NRR from Reaions I and II, respec-tively. While the staff may not have identified a specific " reportable occur-rence" that was directly tied to excessive use of overtime, some regions have expressed at least a " generic" concern with this issue.
In addition, there have been cases where long-term, continued poor performance has been closely coupled with insufficient staffing. This insufficient staffing has led to routine and excessive use of overtime at some facilities.
With respect to the second sentence, where overtime controls are working pro-perly at facilities, the CRGR questioned whether this is really the result of an effective policy statement or was it more likely the result of NPC requiring 1
4 technical specification limits in this area.
BASIS FOR NEW OR REVISED GUIDANCE:
During the CRGR meeting, NRR identified and discussed portions of the policy statement that provided new or revlsed guidance to licensees. These items include: (1) revisions to list o; staff members who perform " safety-related" functions; (2) new guidance on consecutive work days and direction of rotation for routine 8-hour and 12-hour shifts; and (3) revised guidance on management controls on overtime. Except for the new guidance on 12-hour shift schedules, most of these items are not discussed in the Commission paper. The Commission paper characterizes the changes from current policy as " minor additions" that are " insubstantial in impact on licensees and are already a matter of current practice." The CRGR believes that these changes in generic staff position, which will be used "to judge the adequacy of a licensee's procedures governing the control and use of overtime," even though implemented through a policy statement, require a backfit analysis in accordance with 50.109.
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Although these changes may represent " minor additions" and would have "insub-stantial impact on licensees," the CRGR was also concerned that NRR was not in a position to state what technical specifications requirements were actually in place at all plants as a result of implementing NUREG-0737, Item I.A.I.3.
NPR reported sampling technical specifications from 50 plants with inconsistent results (i.e., some facilities controlled overtime inaccordance with the model technical specifications issued by Generic Letter 82-12 while others did not).
CRGR also expressed concern with NRR's position regarding the generic applic-ability of overtime guidance for 12-hour shift schedules. NRR stated that since the staff guidance for 12-hour shifts had been approved for use by Duke Power Company at Oconee, McGuire and Catawba, that made the guidance an "ap-proved" staff position.
[ Note: subsequent to the CRGR meeting, NRR identified that.12-hour shifts were also approved on a plant-specific basis for use at Callaway and Sheron Harris and that other plants have approached project mana-gers and DNFT about changing to 1?-hour shifts.' CRGR pointed out that such guidance may have been approved on a plant-specific basis; however, before such guidance can be approved for generic applicability, the appropriate analysis and finding, as stated in the CRGR charter, must be made.
CRGP recommended that before the staff authorize additional facilities to utilize routine 12-hour shifts, the staff obtain CRGR review of the generic staff acceptance criteria.
GENERAL CONCERM WITH THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN THE COPMISSION PAPER:
A great deal of the CRGR meeting focused on a statement in the second paragraph of the " Discussion" section of the policy statement. The paragraph states:
The NRC will no longer specify as requirements particular limits to 1
overtime nor directly inspect against or enforce such limits.
Rather, it is a licensees' responsibility to set and enforce limits to overtime.
b Based on the NRR presentation, the CRGR was not convinced that proceeding with, a revised policy statement and allowing licensees to remove overtime limits and controls from their technical specifications was necessarily in the best inter-i est of plant safety. CRGP understood that NRR was directed by the Commission to update the policy statement; however, based upon the wording of the 09/30/85 SRM, it appears that the updating of this policy statement was part of a broad initiative to update all Commission policy statements. Thus, in providing this guidance to the staff, it did not appear to CRGR, that the Comission directed any specific changes in regulatory approach be taken (i.e., deletion of over-time limits from technical specifications).
In some areas, such as Training & Accreditation and Fitness for Duty, the nuclear industry has volunteered to take the initiative in developing guide-lines which address NRC concerns. Full industry support of those guidelines has been accomplished through NWARC and the mcnitoring of industry implemen-tation has been accomplished through the INP0 plant evaluation program. NRR was asked if they had considered using this approach for nuclear power plant staff working hours. NRR indicated that while that approech may have merit, it was not an option they had considered. NRR stated that they used the Fitness
. for Duty Policy Statement as a model in developing the proposed policy state-ment, but in place of industry-supported guidelines, had substituted NRC l.
guidelines. According to NRR, the guidelines in the policy statement reflect the results of NRC research and analysis of operating experience for 8-hour and 12-hour shifts and a carry-over of the limits for individual overtime from the existing policy statement.
Based upon the information presented at the CRGR meeting, comments from the regional administrators, the recommendations from NRC's contractor in NUREG/CR-4248 to make overtime limits an enforceable requirement, and the ab-sence of any industry position or consnitment in this area, the CpGR did not support removal of this item from plant technical specifications.
The CRGR also spent a great deal of time discussing the section of the policy statement entitled, " Staff Performing Safety-Related Functions." As currently proposed by NRR, the policy statement would state:
Administrative procedures should be developed and implemented to limit the-working hours of nuclear power unit staff who perform " safety-related functions." Such procedures include but are not limited to shift super-visors, shift technical advisors, licensed operators, non-licensed oper-ators, operations personnel who temporarily fill a position on shift, health physicists, and the licensee's and its vendors' key maintenance personnel. " Key maintenance personnel" are those personnel who perfom -
and supervise those who perfom - maintenance, repair, modification, or calibration of safety-related structures, systems, or components. The tem " key maintenance personnel" applies to all personnel who are actually performing " safety-related functions," regardless of whether or not they are assignad to the shift crew."
It was not clear to GRGR why other personnel who clearly perform safety-related functions were not included in the functional listing of personnel to whom 4-these procedures should apply. Some of the personnel in this category include; i
quality control and assurance personnel, chemistry personnel, and security personnel. According to Enclosure 2 to the Consnission Paper, " Solicitation of I&E and Regional Input to the Draft Policy Statement," personnel who perform these functions were recommended for inclusion by at least some of the offices /
regions. NRR stated they were not included for two reasons. First, in defin-ing the scope, NRR believed it was appropriate to include only those personnel who had direct, hands-on involvement with safety-related equipment and systems.
Second, from a backfit perspective, NRR did not believe it could justify the expansion from the current policy to include all such additional personnel.
CRGR believed that overtime limits should clearly define the maximum amount of overtime hours a person performing a safety-related function could work.
Individuals who are required to work in excess of these limits should not be l
assigned safety-related duties. CRGR also believed that the policy statement should clearly express the position, that overtime limits are the maximum limits and, that in many cases, these maximum limits might be too liberal.
It should be the licensee's responsibility to ensure that the maximum number of hours worked is comensurate with the job being perfomed.
I
?
CRGR also expressed some concern with reference to the SALP process in the policy statement. The Enforcement section of the policy statement, says that NRC intends to evaluate the effectiveness of licensees' administrative controls in the SALP program. However, the policy statement also says that NRC will no longer inspect licensee performance in this area. Without inspection findings or some other riethod to evaluate licensee performance, the SALP process could not be used in the manner described in the policy statement. Therefore, CRGR recomends that reference to SALP in the policy statement be deleted and that the intent of NRC to only inspect in this area in the event of degraded per-formance or in response to specific events be clarified.
CRGR RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.
Based upon the comments and concerns discussed in the CPGR meeting, CRGR recomends that the EDO not issue the proposed policy statement to the Commission for their consideration at this time.
2.
CRGR is concerned that the approach taken by NRR in the Commission paper (i.e., alle licensees to remove work hour overtime limits from their technical spe.nifications) may not be the best regulatory position for NRC to take on this matter. CPGR recommends that NRR, with input from the other program offices and regions determine:
(a) whether NRC should develop (or revise) and issue either regulatory requirements or policy and guidance in this area.
(b) as appropriate, weigh the various alternatives to the current ap-proach including possibly: (1) rulemaking; (2) issuing revised technical specifications; (3) issuing a Regulatory Guide; (4) issuing a policy statement; (5) working with NUMARC/INPO to develop industry-sponsored guidelines in this area which could be endorsed by NRC; or (6) leaving the current requirements and policy statement in place.
3.
After evaluation of the alternatives in item ? above, and taking into account applicable CRGR comments, provide a recommendation to the EDO.
4.
The revised product should be reviewed by CRGR.
I
,r Attachment to Enclosure 3.
PRESENTATION TO THE CRGR i
REVISED POLICY STATEMENT ON
.c NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STAFF WORKING HOURS 6
BRUCE A B0GER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR DIO SION OF HUMAN FACTORS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (301) 492-8807 DECEPSER 4,1986
6 DLLECTIVES o
SATISFY SRM OF 9/16/85 TO UPDATE POLICY STATEMENT o
CONSOLIDATE STAFF GUIDhinE FOUND IN VARIOUS DOCUMENTS INTO A SINGLE DOCUMEtiT o
PROVIDE CONSISTENCY WITH RECENT STAFF PRACTICE
' MOVE AWAY FROM PRESCRIPTIVE REGULATION STREAMLINE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS so INCLUDE GUIDANCE ON 12-H0VR SHIFT SCHEDULES
' V :..,
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PROVIDE 30-DAY COMMENT PERIOD i
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UNCHANGED GUIDANCE 1
o RECOGNIZE LICENSEE RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPERATIONAL SAFETY o
RECOMMENDED AVERAGE NUMBER OF HOURS WORK PER WEEK ARE 40 o
GUIDANCE ON OVERTIME NO MORE THAN 16 HOURS IN A 24-HOUR PERIOD NO MORE THAN 24 HOURS IN A 48-HOUR PERIOD NO MORE THAN 72 HOURS IN ANY 7-DAY PERIOD
., j,o MANAGEMENT APPROVE CASE-BY-CASE DEVIATIONS FROM RECOMMENDED J
GUIDELINES S
n--
I REVISED /NEW GUIDANCE PROVIDE GUIDELINES ON NUMBER OF CONSECUTIVE WORK DAYS o
INCLUDE GUIDELINES ON DIRECTION OF SHIFT ROTATION o
PROVIDE GUIDELINES FOR 12-HOUR SHIFT SCHEDULE o
UPDATE LIST OF STAFF MEMBERS WHO PERFORM " SAFETY REL o
FUNCTIONS" CLARIFY CURRENT LIMIT OF 72 HOURS IN A 7-DAY PERIOD IS NO o
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INTENDED FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD 4-e e
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RESULT 4
o PERMIT LICENSEES TO APPLY FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMENDMENTS TO REMOVE LIMITS ON OVERTIME o
LICENSEES TRANSFER LIMITS ON OVERTIME TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES o
LICENSEE PERFORMANCE EVALUATED TO DETERMINE IF FATIGUE RELATED LONG-TERM DEGRATION OF PERFORMANCE MONITORED VIA 5ALF 19
- 'R8;Ess-UNSAFE PLANT CONDITIONS DUE TO FATIGUE ASSOCIATED WITH EXCESSIVE OVERTIME SUBJECT TO ENFORCEMENT ACTION g
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