ML20215D891
| ML20215D891 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1986 |
| From: | Markey E HOUSE OF REP., ENERGY & COMMERCE |
| To: | Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| CON-#486-1043 OL-1, NUDOCS 8610140349 | |
| Download: ML20215D891 (3) | |
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AND POWER or ms COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMEW [ET 10 A10 :5 WASHINGTON. DC 20515 October 9,1986 QQ.g., _
y ER.e:u Honorable Lando W. Each, Jr.
. SERVED OCT 1 0 1986 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Dear Mr. Chairman Yesterday the Commission's Atomic and Safety Licensing Board issued a "no power' license to Public Service of New Hampshire for the seabrook nuclear power plant.
In the past, every issuance of a license to load fuel has invariably been followed by licenses for low-power and then full-power operation.
I sincerely hope that the Commission and its licensing board are not intent upon rushing headlong down this same fateful path for Seabrook without giving the fullest consideration to the serious unresolved issues raised by State and local governments regarding the ability to plan for a serious emergency at the plant.
Seabrook differs f rom most other nuclear plants.
At Seabrook, as at the Shorehan plant in New York,'it has become clear that the plant may have been sited in a location which may preclude adequate emergency planning and preparedness.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and 13 local communities have communicated forcefully to the Commission their conviction that it is not possible to craf t workable emergency plans that would adequately protect their citizens in the event of a serious reactor accident.
These conclusions reached by State and local governments must neither be treated lightly by the Commission, nor circumvented by regulatory artifice.
State and local governments historically bear direct responsibility for protecting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.
Likewise, State and local governments must provide the first emergency response if a serious accident occurs.
A principal lesson learned from both the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents was the importance of emergency planning and preparedness.
Both the President's Commission investigating the TMI accident and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's own Special Inquiry Group investigation recognized that State and local government participation in emergency planning is required j
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P Tho Banorcblo Lcnds W. scch, Jr.
october 9, 1986 Page 2 if the public is to be protected in the event of an actual emergency.
As you will recall, af ter Three Mile Island, both Congress and the NRC explicitly recognized that a failure to establish a workable emergency plan in affected communities -
i.e., one that will provide reasonable assurance that the public can and will be adequately protected - could well result in some plants being denied an operating license.
The Commission itself concluded in its August 19, 1980 rulemaking that emergency
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preparedness was absolutely " essential" to protect the pblic and recognized that "there is a possibility that the operation of some reactors might be affected by this rule through inaction of State and local governments or an anability to comply with these rules.'
The intent of both the legislation and regulation was to I
safeguard public safety.
A failure by the Commission to guard against even the appearance of a rush to judgment can only serve to further diminish the public's confidence in the integrity of the regulatory process.
The Atomic Safety and licensing Board has recently concluded several days of highly emotional hearings regarding low-power licensing at Seabrook.
The earlier words of Commissioner Asselstine concerning Shoreham are equally relevant to Seabrook:
The emergency planning contentions [in the shoreham case] differ from most contentions in nuclear plant license proceedings.
Most such contentions., if decided in f avor of the intervenors, are correctable through additional inspections, license conditions, or hardware or procedural changes to the plant.
However, the emergency planning contentions [at Shoreham), if decided in f avor of the intervenors, would likely prevent full-power operation of the plant.
In such circumstances, it makes little sense to allow low-power operation of the plant -- operation that i
would contaminate the facility and complicate subsequent maintenance -- until the emergency l
planning contentions are resolved.
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Tho Esnorcblo Lcnds W. Ecch, Jr.
October 9,1986 Page 3 A license to load fuel is one thing; a license to operate at low-power is quite another.
Contaminating the plant when there is no assurance that the plant will ever operate at full-power will not serve the public's interest.
Failing to comprehensively address the deep concerns of Massachusetts and 13 local communities regarding emergency planning before issuing a low-power license can only serve to damage the credibility of the entire licensing process.
If the public trust in the NRC is to be maintained, the Commission must make every effort to assure that public that its concerns are being heeded.
The duly elected state and local governments and the citizens they represent must feel assured that their legitimate objections are not being ignored, circumvented, or buried in a hasty rush to licensing.
Therefore, I strongly urge the commission to stay aw decision of'the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board concern /
- ,ng issuance of a low-power license at seabrook until all issues i
surrounding State and local participation in emergency planning and preparedness have been fully and completely resolved.
Sincerely, Edward J. Markey Chairman
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