ML20214U261

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 65 & 58 to Licenses NPF-2 & NPF-8,respectively

ML20214U261
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	09/09/1986
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20214U253	List: ML20214U252 ML20214U261
References
TAC-60826, TAC-60827, NUDOCS 8609300558
Download: ML20214U261 (2)

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 65 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-P AND AMENDMENT NO.58 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT-NOS. 1 AND ?

DOCKET N05. 50-348 AND 50-364 Introduction By letter dated February 7,1986, Alabama Power Company (the licensee) proposed Technical Specification changes for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and ? in response to an inconsistency between the FSAR safety analyses and the Standard Technical Specifications of Westinghouse-designed NSSS plants. The inconsistency involves the number of reactor coolant loops operating in Mode 3 during the postulated rod bank withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition.

Technical Specifications 3.4.1.2, 4.4.1.2.2 and Bases 3/4.4.1 allow operation with only one loop.

According to the Westinghouse analyses, the Mode 2 analysis for the rod bank withdrawal accident, which requires all three reactor coolant locps operating, envelopes the Mode 3 conditions. However, the Farley Technical Specifications currently allow only a single reactor coolant loop to be operating during Mode 3.

As a result of this inconsistency, the licensee proposes two solutions:

(1) All three loops must be operating in Mode 3 to satisfy the analysis for the rod bank withdrawal accident since all three coolant loops are required to be operating in Mode 2, er L?i the rod control system must be disabled to ensure that this accident cannot occur. The disabling of the rod control system may be accomplished by opening the reactor trip breakers or shutting down the rod drive motor / generator sets.

Therefore, the licensee proposes that the Technical Specification reactor coolant loop operability requirements for Mode 3 be modified to reflect the conservative plant procedural requirements already in place. Our evaluation follows.

Evaluation Technical Specification 3.4.1.? LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION is revised to reflect the new requirements consistent with the licensee's proposals, i.e., all three loops must be operating in Mode 3 or the rod control system must be disabled to ensure that the rod withdrawal accident cannot occur.

This change removes the inconsistency from the Technical Specifications.

Thus, these changes are acceptable.

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t Technical Specification 4.4.1.2.? SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS is revised to require three coolant loops operation to be verified to be in operation at least every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This change is consistent with the new LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION. Thus, the change is acceptable.

Technical Specification Bases 3/4.4.1 is revised to be consistent with the analyses in Mode 3.

The single failure considerations that require two loops be operable at all times are unchanged. ~The change is acceptable.

Safety Summarv Our reviev c,T the licensee proposed Technical Specification changes concerning reactor coolant loop operability make the Technical Specifications consistent with the rod withdrawal accident analysis during Mode 3 operation. Therefore, on the basis of our evaluation, we conclude that the Technical Specification changes for reactor coolant loop operability during Mode 3 operation are acceptable for Farley Units 1 and 2.

Environmental Consideration These amendments involve a change in the installation or use of the facilities components located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR 20. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.?2(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not te inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: September 9, 1986 l

Principal Contributors:

S. Wu E. Reeves