ML20214S894

Application for Amends to Licenses NPF-9,NPF-17,NPF-35 & NPF-52,adding Action Statement to Tech Specs to Allow Units to Remain at Power for Up to 72 H W/More than One full-length Rod Inoperable But Trippable.Fee Paid

ML20214S894
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire, 05000000
Issue date:	06/03/1987
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML20214S895	List: ML20214S894 ML20214S898
References
TAC-65528, TAC-65529, TAC-65530, TAC-65531, NUDOCS 8706100038
Download: ML20214S894 (5)

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DUKE POWER GOMPANY P.O. BO x 3 3!8 0 CHARLOTTE,N. .C. 2L.442 TELEPHONE IIAL II. TUCKER (704) 373-453t vice reesmewv 41%LRAE PRODE CTION June 3, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

Catawba Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Technical Specification Amendment Movable Control Assemblies

Dear Sir:

This letter contains a proposed amendment to the Technical Specifications for Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52 for Catawba Units I and 2 and NPF-9 and NPF-17 for McGuire Units 1 and 2. The attachmant request involves the addition of an Action Statement for Specification 3/4.1.3.1 which would allow the

• unit to remain at power for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with more than one full-length rod inoperable but trippable. The attachment contains the proposed change and a discussion of the justification and safety analysis. The analysis is included pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91 and it has been concluded that the p oposed amendment does not involve significant hazards considerations.

This request involves one amendmnet request to Catawba's and McGuire's Technical Specifications. Accordingly, pursuant to 10 CFR 170.21 a check for $150.00 is enclosed.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91 (b) (1) the appropriate North and South Carolina State Officials are being proviued a copy of this amendment request.

Very truly yours, 7n Hal B. Tucker RWO/61/sbn Attachment AR$

8706100038 870603 PDR ADOCK 05000369 PDR p

U. S. Nuclstr Ragulatory.Commi=cion June 3, 1987 Page Two xc: -Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Caorgia 30323 Mr. Heyward Shealy, Chief Bureau of Radiological Health South Carolina Department of Health &

Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, Soutn Carolina 29201 American Nuclear Insurers c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library The Exchange, Suite 245 270 Farmington Avenue Farmington, CT 06032 Mr. W. T. Orders NRC Resident Incpector McGuire Nuclear Station i

M&M Nuclear Consultants 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10020 INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Mr. Dayne Brown, Chief Radiation Protection Branch Division of Facility Services Department of Human Resources P. O. Box 12200 Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 Mr. P. K. Van Doorn NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station 4

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commizad.cn June 3, 1987 Page Four HAL B. TUCKER, being duly sworn, statas that he is Vice President of Duke Power Company; that he is authorized on the part of riaid Company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this revision to the Catawba Nuclear Station Techneial Specifications, Appendix A to License No. NPF-35 and NPF-52 and the McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, Appendix A to License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; and that all statements and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

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Ital B. Tucker, Vice President Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of June, 1987.

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u Discussion and Analysis of No Significant Hazards Consideration The proposed change to the Action Statements for Technical Specification 3/4.1.3.1

- Movable Control Assemblies, would allow the unit to remain at power for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with more than one control rod inoperable but still trippable.

On March 2, 1987, a fuse blev in the rod control circuitry for Catawba Unit 2.

Several rods in one shutdown bank were therefore inoperable in that they could not be moved by the control rod drive mechanism. These rods were still trippable, that is, these rods would have inserted into the core given receipt of a Reactor trip signal. Therefore, the rods were still fully capable of performing their intended safety function of shutting down the reactor. This situation has occurred at several other Westinghouse plants and the proposed amendment was previously requested to be incorporated into NUREG-0452 (see attached letter from Mr. E. P.

Rahe, Jr., Westinghouse to Mr. Cecil O. Thomas, NRC/NRR, dated December 21, 1984.

During performance of the Control Rod Movement periodic test (Surveillance 4.1.3.1.2), there have been some " Control Malfunctions" that prohibited a control rod bank or group from meving when salected, as evidenced by the demand counters 7

and the Digital Rod Position Indicators. In all cases, when the control malfunctions were corrected, the rods moved freely (no excessive friction or mechanical interference) and were trippable at all times.

This surveillance test is an indirect method of verifying the control rods are not immovable or untrippable. It is highly unlikely that a complete control rod bank or bank group is immovable or untrippable. Past surveillance and operating history provide evidence of "trippability".

Based on the above information, during performance of the rod movement test, if a complete control rod bank or group fails to move when selected and can be attributed to a " Control Malfunction", the control rods can be considered

" Operable" and plant operation may continue while ACTIONS c. and d. are taken.

If one or more control rods fail to move during testing (not a complete bank or group and cannot be contributed to a " Control Malfunction"), the affected control rod (s) shall be declared " Inoperable" and ACTION a. taken, j For Specification 3.1.3.1 ACTIONS c. and d. , it is incumbent upon the plant personnel to verify the trippability of the inoperable control rod (s). This may be by verification of a control system failure, usually electrical in nature, or that l the failure is associated with the control rod stepping mechanism.

The recommendations contained in the attached letter concerning the determination of the cause of rod inoperability will be incorporated into the appropriate station procedures.

This proposed change has already been incorporated into several other plants' Technical Specifications (e.g., Diablo Canyon and Joseph Farley). l l

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1 10 CFR 50.92 states that a proposed amendment involves no significant hazards

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considerations if operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or ,

l (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any

' accident previously evaluated; or '

1 1 (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

i The proposed amendment does not involve an increase in the probability or

! consequences of any previously evaluated accident. With the control rods still trippable, all of the previous assumptions made in the accident analyses remain i valid.

4 The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind j of accident from any accident previously evaluated. This amendment would not l change the design or normal operation of the plant. In essence, thic change would j allow an additional 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> to find and repair the cause of the rods j inoperability. This additional time is justified in that the rods are still trippable and would perform their intended safety function of inserting negative ,

reactivity into the core if called upon.

The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Since the inoperable rods will drop into the core upon receipt of n i reactor trip signal, there is no reduction in the margin of safety.

j Additional discussion and justification is provided in the above referenced Westinghouse letter.

4 I For the reasons stated above, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not i involve significant hazards considerations.

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