ML20214P828

Describes Prompt Actions Taken to Ensure That Work Performed in Accordance W/Nrc & Util Radiation Protection Requirements,Per Insp Rept 50-344/87-08.New Onsite Radiation Protection Review Committee Will Be Implemented by 870701

ML20214P828
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	05/13/1987
From:	Cockfield D PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
NUDOCS 8706040059
Download: ML20214P828 (3)

Text

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David W. Cockfield Vice President. Nuclear May 13, 1987 Trojan Nuclear Plant Docket 50-344 License NPF-1 Mr. John B. Martin Regional Administrator, Region V U.S. Nuc1 car Regulatory Commission Creeksido Oaks Office Park 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Crook CA 94596-5368

Dear Mr. Martin:

Radiation Protection Performance During the current refueling outage at the Trojan Nuclear Plant, there have been sovocal occurrences of radiation protection performance which did not moet Portland Conoral Electric (PCE) standards or Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations. As a result, conditions were created which could have resulted in personnel exceeding NRC radiation exposuro limits.

NRC letter to PCE (Mr. R. A. Scarano to Mr. D. W. Cockfloid) datoa May 8, 1987 forwarded NRC Inspection Report 87-15 concerning radiation protection performanco during this period. PGE Licensoo Event Report 87-08 dated May 8, 1987 reported specific radiation protection problems which havo occurred.

This lotter describos the prompt actions that PCE has taken to ensure that work is performed in accordance with NRC and PCE radiation protection requirements. This lotter also describos the long-term actions that havo or will be taken to correct the basic causes that led to the performanco problems.

The following prompt actions woro taken to improvo existing radiation protection performanco:

a. Work in Containment was stopped from April 17 until April 26, 1987 following tho identification of the exposure of the Radiation Protoc-tion Technician to the highly radioactivo particle on his rubbor anti-contamination boot.

b. An investigation was initiated to determino: (1) the source of fuel pollot debris found on the reactor vossol flango, (2) how this fission product material was spread to areas outsido the reactor cavity, and (3) the source of the highly radioactivo particle found on the Radia-tion Protection Technician's rubber boot. To comploto this investiga-tion may require the shipment of the fuel pollet dobris from the [

reactor voscol flango and tho highly radioactivo particle on the rubber g3(p boot for offolto analysis, sU 0706040059 G70513 ADOCK 05000344

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, Mr. John B. Martin May 13, 1987 i Page 2

c. An evaluation was completed of radiation exposures to: (1) the Radia-tion Protection Technician who had the highly radioactive particle on his rubber shoe on April 17, 1987, and (2) other persons who were externally contaminated on or after April 9 from fuel pellet debris or who may have received unmonitored extremity dosimetry while working in the refueling cavity. These evaluations showed that no persons exceeded NRC radiation exposure limits.

d. An investigation was initiated of the radiation protection practices that lead to the potential for workers to exceed radiation protection limits. This evaluation, which is still underway, has thus far identi-fled deficiencies in radiation protection procedures, performance, documentation and evaluation of radiation surveys, worker and Radiation Protection Technician training, and Radiation Protection Technician supervision.

e. The Institute of Nucicar Power Operations (INPO) was requested to complete an evaluation of radiation protection practicos. This evaluation was conducted on April 28-30, 1987 and showed need for improvement in the following areas:

(1) Increase supervisory oversight of Radiation Protection Technicians in the field. A lack of first level supervisor positions contributed to the lack of direct supervision.

(2) Evaluate the ability of the radiation protection organization to handle significant radiological problems while maintaining control of routine activities. The small size of the radiation protection group does not allow flexibility to offectively plan radiological work during high work load conditions.

(3) Establish performance standards in general employee training in radiation protection.

(4) Enhance the Radiation Work Permit system.

(5) Improve scope of pre-job radiological surveys.

(6) Define responsibilities and oversight function of corporate radiological protection organization.

(7) Improve procedures and equipment for control of radioactive particles.

An additional follow-up evaluation before the end of the outage was requested.

f. An improved radiation protection program for control of radioactive particles was implemented, including issuance of new procedures, purchase of additional radiation survey equipment, retraining of L

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N W BOCiliCCOff4MN1y Mr. John B. Martin May 13, 1987 Page 3

< ih all workers onsite, and providing additional training to Radiation '

Protection Technicians.

g. The Trojan Radiation Protection technical staff was augmented temporarily with three health physicists from Washington Public Power Supply and Southern California Edison. Additional contract radiation protection supervision of technicians was provided.

The following additional actions are being taken to further improve radiation protection performance:

a. Develop a broad scope integrated plan for improving radiation protec-tion performance. This plan, which will be. completed by August 1, 1987, will address NRC findings and concerns, the INPO recommendations, and recommendations resulting from PGE investigations.

b. Implement by July 1, 1987 a new onsite Radiation Protection Review Committee to review radiation protection practices and to ensure that acceptable corrective actions are taken for radiation protection occurrences.

c. Implement by July 1, 1987 a Radiation Event Report sirilar to the existing Event Report which will ensure radiation protection problems receive adequate review, evaluation, corrective action, and management attention.

d. Provide additional staffing in Trojan Radiation Protection and Corporate ,

Radiological Safety Branch to increase technical support and to improve supervision of Radiation Protection Technicians. An evaluation is underway to determine the precise staffing increases required. This evaluation should be completed by August 1, 1987.

I intend to monitor radiation protection performance and to take additional corrective actions as required to achieve high levels of radiation protection performance.

Sincerely, Q '

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c: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mr. David Kish, Director State of Oregon Department of Energy

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