ML20214P199
| ML20214P199 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1986 |
| From: | Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| References | |
| 86-4, NUDOCS 8612040108 | |
| Download: ML20214P199 (4) | |
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O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station November 26, 1986 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 29555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-79 DOCKET NO.59-272 UNIT NO. 1 REPORT 86-4 SPECIAL REPORT l
l This Special Report describes the circumstances surrounding the impairment of certain fire doors for greater than seven (7) days.
Since the doors were impaired for greater than seven (7) days, this report is being submitted for informational purposes in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.ll.a.
Sincerely yours, J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager-Salem Operations MJPapc Distribution 861204010G 861126 PDR ADOCK 05000272 gh s
eda The Energy People fsS 2T8:3 611 Fk 12 84
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SPBCIALfREPORT! NUMBER 86-4 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:
~ Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 98838 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Fire' Barrier Inoperable-For Greater Than-Seven (7) Days Event Date(s):
11/95/86 Report Date 11/26/86 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.86-358 f
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Unit 1:
Mode 1 - Reactor Power Level 1994 - Unit Load 1175 MWe Unit :2:
Mode 6 - Refueling Outage DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
This special Report describes the circumstances surrounding the degradation of fire barriers due to certain fire doors being impaired for greater than seven (7) days.
This report is being submitted for informational purposes in accordance with the requirements of i
Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.ll.a.
Technical. Specification _3.7.11 states:
"All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."
Action Statement.3.7.ll.a states:
"With one (1) or more of the above required fire barrier.
penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an. hourly fire watch patrol.
Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration (s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next (38) days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and 4
plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration (s) to functional status."
Note that the Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 (with Action Statement) is nearly identical to Unit 2's.
The only differences are 4
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UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 86-4 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE __lspnt'd)
Unit 1 Technical Specification uses the terms " functional" and "non-functional" whereas Unit 2 Technical Specification uses the terms " OPERABLE" and " inoperable", respectively.
On November 5, 1986, three (3) fire doors were found damaged.
These doors.are located at the entrance to the elevator (Door #128-1) in the Auxiliary Building 198' Elevation (Unit 1 side), the entrance to the Auxiliary Building on 199' Elevation (Door #137-1) Unit 1 side, the entrance to.the Auxiliary Building on 198' Elevation (Door
- 136-2) Unit 2 side.
All these doors are located in high traffic areas.
Doors 136-2 and 137-1 were found to have damaged hinges and door 129-1 panic bar was inoperable nor could the door close completely due to a problem with the door's Gyro-Tech (which controls the door's ability to open and close).
On October 2, 1986 an hourly fire watch patrol was established in support of the initiation of the Unit 2 third refueling outage.
The areas included in the patrol include Zones 1 andL2.
These Zones comprise the entire Auxiliary Building (both Units)-and the entire Service Building.
The fire watch patrol checks fire door penetrations in these areas.
The patrol will be continued for the duration of the outage or extended as necessary in support of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a requirements.
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The specific cause of the fire door impairments could not be
' determined, other than attributing their impairment to the high volume of traffic experienced during the current Unit 2 outage.
Doors 137-1 and 136-2 were repaired and returned to a functional status on November 28, 1986.
Door 128-1 was returned to a functional status on November 19, 1986.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.
This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment.
The penetration fire
. barriers are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.
The inoperable fire
. doors constitute a breach of the associated fire barriers; however, appropriate actions were taken to comply with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.
A one hour roving fire watch has been in effect since the onset of the Unit 2 outage and the detectors in the vicinity of the fire barriers have been operable for the probable duration of impairment.
This action provides adequate assurance that a fire will be readily detected and extinguished; thus, alleviating the possibility of a fire affecting adjacent portions of the facility.
This occurrence therefore involved no i
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- UNIT.1 SPECIAL REPORT 86-4 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
(cont'd) undue risk to the health or safety.of the public.
However, because the fire doors were not returned to a functional status within seven (7) days, as specified by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, this report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.2.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The doors were returned to a functional status on November 19, 1986 (door-129-1) and November 28, 1986 (doors 137-1 and 136-2).
Dooro 137-1 and 136-2 hinges were welded.
Door 128-1 " panic bar" was repaired and the Gyro-Tech mechanism was adjusted.
The one hour fire watch patrol established at the beginning of the Unit 2 outage will remain in effect for the duration of the outage.
No further corrective action is deemed necessary.
As stated in the Description of Occurrence section, on October 2, 1986 an hourly fire watch patrol was established to patrol the Auxiliary Building and Service Building for the durationlif the current Unit 2 refueling outage.
This practice was initiated as of.
the.last Unit 1 refueling outage (earlier this year).
Due to the extensive work involved during a refueling outage, PSE&G has determined it to be prudent to establish an hourly fire watch patrol
.for the duration of refueling outages.
i i
Ge eral Manager -
Salem Operations MJPapc SORC Mtg.86-898 i '
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