ML20214L648

Application for Amend to License DPR-21,revising Tech Specs Per Attachment 1 Re Current Min Critical Power Ratio,Lhgr & MAPLHGR Operating Limits to Reflect Cycle 12 Operation. Proposed Tech Specs Required Prior to Startup

ML20214L648
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	05/21/1987
From:	Mroczka E NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML19292H313	List: B12531, Proposed Tech Specs,Amending Current Min Critical Power Ratio,Lhgr & MAPLHGR Operating Limits to Reflect Cycle 12 Operation.Affidavit Encl ML20214L648 ML20214L686
References
B12531, NUDOCS 8706010037
Download: ML20214L648 (4)

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HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 k L J 74%[',7,~0 ~~~, (203) 665-5000 May 21,1987 Docket No. 50-245 B12531 Re: 10CFR50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Reload ll/ Cycle 12 Pursuant to 10CFR50.90, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), hereby proposes to amend its Operating License, DPR-21, by incorporating the changes identified in Attachment 1 into the Technical Specifications of Millstone Unit No.1.

These proposed changes will amend the current minimum critical power ratio (MCPR),

linear heat generation rate (LHGR), and maximum average planar linear heat generation rate (MAPLHGR) operating limits to reflect Cycle 12 operation. These changes are consistent with those proposed in correspondence between the Staff and General Electric by letters dated March 9, 1987,(1) and March 4,1987.t2) The core reload, which consists of 196 General Electric Type GE8 x 8EB (GE-8B) fuel assemblies, is described in Attachment 2, " Supplemental Reload Licensing Submittal for Millstone Unit No.1 - Reload 11," dated April 1987. Attachment 3, " Loss of Coolant Accident Analysis Report for Millstone Unit No.1 - Supplement 1," dated April 1987,is the General Electric proprietary document waich is submitted to support the requested changes.

As Attachment 3 contains information proprietary to General Electric Company, it is supported by the enclosed affidavit signed by General Electric, the owner of the information. The affidavit sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission and addresses with specificity the 8706010037 870521 PDR ADOCK 05000245 P PDR (1) 3. S. Charnley (General Electric) letter to M. W. Hodges (USNRC), "Recom-mended MAPLHGR Technical Specifications for Multiple Lattice Fuel Designs,"

dated March 9,1987.

(2) 3. S. Charnley (General Electric) letter to M. W. Hodges (USNRC), "Recom-mended MAPLHGR Technical Specifications for Multiple Lattice Fuel Designs,"

dated March 4, 987.

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f U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B12531/Page 2 May 21,1987 considerations listed in paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulat-ions. Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the information which is proprietary to General Electric be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10CFR2.790.

The proposed LHGR Technical Specification will allow a higher LHGR limit of 14.4 kW/ft for the new GE8 x 8EB (GE-8B) fuel bundles being placed in the core with this reload. This change was previously discussed in correspondence between the Staff and General Electric.(W The use of the new GE8 x SEB (GE-8B) fuel bundles and the General Electric GEMINI /ODYN methodology, which was used to determine the proposed MCPR operating limits, was 11, respectively, described of the Generaland approved Electric by the Standard NRC Stafffor Application in Amendments 10) and Reactor Fuel.(4 NNECO has reviewed the attached proposed changes pursuant to 10CFR50.59 and has determined that they do not constitute an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety (i.e., safety-related) previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) has not been increased. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Final Safety Analysis Report has not been created. There has not been a reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The new MAPLHGR curves and MCPR and LHGR values will not only accurately reflect the new core conditions subsequent to this refueling outage, but they will also ensure that safety analysis assumptions will be maintained.

NNECO has reviewed the proposed changes in accordance with 10CFR50.92 and has concluded that they do not involve a significant hazards consideration in that these changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Per 10CFR50.46, all requirements will be met for Cycle 12 operation as long as the MAPLHGR limits are met. The MAPLHGR limit for the GE-7B fuel bundles applies for all the lattices in the bundle. However, since the GE-8B fuel contains axially zoned gadolinia, the MAPLHGR limits for GE-8B is lattice-specific. Hence, only the most limiting lattice is placed in the Technical Specifications. The process computer will automatically compare the calculated MAPLHGR to its appropriate lattice limit. If hand calculations are required due to process computer unavailability, the calculated MAPLHGR value will be compared to the most limiting lattice value regardless of actual lattice location.

(3) 3. S. Charnley (General Electric) letter to L. E. Phillips (USNRC), "NRC Approval of 14.4 kW/f t Limit for GE8 x SE/B Fuel," dated March 31,1987.

(4) General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, GESTAR II, NEDE-240ll-P-A-8-US, May 1986.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B12531/Page 3 May 21,1987 Thus, there is no impact on the consequences of a LOCA due to this change.

Additionally, limiting MCPR transients were analyzed. The MCPR safety limit for Millstone Unit 1 is 1.07. The operating limit is arrived at by adding the calculated A CPR for the limiting transient to the safety limit value (1.07 + ACPR). This ensures that the safety limit will never be violateri for any expected operational transient. The limiting MCPR event for Millstone Unit 1 is the load rejection without bypass event, which for Reload 11 results in an MCPR limiting condition for operation (LCO) of 1.39. Should additional MCPR margin be required, systematic rod scram timing can be conducted every 120 days on 15 or more control rods. This would bring the MCPR LCO from 1.39 to 1.34. The MCPR LCO for Cycle 12 is substantially lower than that for Cycle 11 (1.39 vs.

1.48). This margin improvement is due to the use of new methods (ODYN Code) for calculating ACPR for pressurization events. Additionally, there is no adverse impact on overpressurization events due to the proposed changes.

Therefore, NNECO concludes that these changes do not impact the consequences of any transient relating to MCPR concerns since the safety limit will not be violated for any expected operational transient. Additionally, these changes do not impact the consequence of any design basis loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs). Since no new failure modes are introduced, there is no increase in the probability of any accident previously analyzed.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. Fuel operational limits are set such that plant response to all design basis transients and accidents are bounded by the FSAR analyses. Additionally, since a mistocated fuel bundle loading error will result in an MCPR greater than the safety limit, and since the A CPR for a misoriented bundle is zero, no potential for creation of a new unanalyzed event exists.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Adequacy of protective boundaries is ensured by the set operational limits. In addition, the proposed changes do not impact the technical basis for any Technical Specification.

Hence, NNECO concludes that there is no decrease in any margin of safety.

The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of standards in 10CFR50.92 by providing certain examples (51FR7751, March 6,1986). The changes proposed herein are enveloped by example (vi), a change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are l clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component 1 specified in the Standard Review Plan. The proposed changes, which will support  !

Cycle 12 operation, represent the application of a small refinement of a previously l used calculational model or design method. l The Millstone Unit No. I Nuclear Review Board has reviewed and approved the attached proposed revision and has concurred with the above determinations.

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B12531/Page 4 May 21,1987 NNECO would like to bring to the Staff's attention that these proposed Technical Specifications are required prior to start-up from the upcoming refueling outage. As such, we respectfully request NRC review and approval commensurate with this schedule.

In accordance with 10CFR50.91(b), we are providing the State of Connecticut with a -

copy of this proposed amendment.

Pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR170.12(c), enclosed with this amendment request is the application fee of $150.

Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

LJ E. Y)Mo6zka (/

Senidf Vice President cc: W. T. Russell, Region 1 Administrator

3. 3. Shea, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No.1 T. Rebelowski, Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No.1 Mr. Kevin McCarthy Director, Radiation Control Unit Department of Environmental Protection Hartford, Connecticut 06116 STATE OF CONNECTICUT)

) ss. Berlin COUNTY OF HARTFORD )

Then personally appeared before me, E. 3. Mroczka, who being duly sworn, did state that he is Senior Vice President of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, a Licensee herein, that he is authorized to execute and ille the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Licensee herein, and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

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