ML20214K673
| ML20214K673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1986 |
| From: | Roisman A Citizens Association for Sound Energy, TRIAL LAWYERS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, P.C. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#386-374 OL, NUDOCS 8608220040 | |
| Download: ML20214K673 (21) | |
Text
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MLATfD 00.
U BEFORE THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Aui 19 R251 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board garr re -.
fu,9 In the Matter of
)
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TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY,
)
Ok t. Nos. S0-445-OL.
et al.
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50-446-OL
)
(Comanche Peak. Steam Electric
)
Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
CASE RESPONSE TO APPLICANTS ' MOTION POR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE 6/27/66 DISCOVERY AND MOTION TO COMPEL 4
Pursuant to 10 CFR $2.740(f), and for the reasons discussed l
below, CASE moves this Board to issue an order compelling Applicants to respond to the items in Intervenors' June 27, 1986, Request for Production 'of Documents, to which Applicants object in their response of August 1, 1986 Applicants devote a substantial portion of their response to accusing CASE once again of trying to use the operating license i
proceeding to obtain discovery that will only be used in the construction permit proceeding.
Applicants' Response at 2-4, 9-11.
Applicants suggest that CASE should have to rewrite any request made in the OL proceeding that duplicates a CPA request.
Id. at 4, fn 2.
This suggestion is ridiculous, because the facts that are relevant to the CPA proceeding are virtually all b
L relevant to the OL proceeding.
See discussion in CASE's July 31, l
1986,. Response to Applicants' Motion for Protective Order of July 16, 1986, at 1-3.
As discussed in that document, Applicants have tried to deny CASE a right to intervene in the CPA proceeding on 8608220040 860819 i
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{DR ADOCK 0500 3 3Db 5
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the grounds that their concerns about the construction permit are being addressed in the OL proceeding.
In their Motion for Protective Order of July 16, 1986, Applicants did an about-face and decided that the issues in the two cases are significantly
- different from each other.
Motion of July 16 at 8, n.
8 Applicants now go even further and claim that. "the two dockets are not ' companion' proceedings" and have nothing in common except that they concern the same plant.
Motion of August 1, at 3.
In reality, the issues in the two cases are distinct, but they arise out of the same events, and thus all of the discovery requested so far in the CPA proceeding is also relevant to the OL proceeding.
It would be a waste of time for CASE to reword its requests in the OL docket simply because they were already made in the CPA docket.
In order to support their argument that the present requests are not appropriate in the OL proceeding, Applicants distort the scope of the issues in that proceeding.
They argue that the scope.is narrow based on the Board's Memorandum and Order of December 28,1983 (Scheduling Matters), which reopened discovery j
with respect to "new information filed in resonse to matters previously lef t open by the decisions of the Board."
Applicants ignore the subsequent decisions of the Board, which more specifically outlined the scope of discovery, in particular the Memoranda and Orders of March IS, 1984 (Clarification of Open Issues), October 2, 1985 (Applicants' Motion for Modification),
August 16, 1985 (current Status of Discovery), June 26, 1966 2
. _ _ _, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ ~ ________:_._.. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _...... _. _. _ _ _ _ _
(Board Concerns), and August 8, 1986 (Assistance to the Board).1 The Order of August 16, 1985, provides at p. 3:
Discovery shall now be in order if it relates to the activities or findings of the Staff's TRT or the Applicants' CPRT that are directly or indirectly related to Contention 5 Additionally, discovery shall be in order if it is now directly or indirectly relevant to Contention 5 because of new information derived from those findings or this discovery process... 2 The Board has expressed a particular interest in material relating to "the way in which management exercised its responsibility for the construction of Comanche Peak,"3 the overall " pattern of construction and design deficiencies,"4 the history and root causes of breakdowns in quality assurance and control,5 harassment of workers and other deviations from Appendix B requirements,0 and management credibility.
As discussed in more detail below, the documents requested here are all relevant to these issues.
See also the discussion in Intervenors' Motion to Compel of July 31, 1986, at 6-7 1
See also Memorandum of August 29, 1985 (Proposal for Governance of the case).
2 The Board notes in footnote 2 of this order that "[dliscovery l
will also be appropriate where new information highlighted the importance of information that did not previously seem important."
3 Memorandum and Order of October 2,1985, at 2, 4
Id. a t 1.
- 5 Memoranaum of June 26,1986, at 3-4; Memorandum and Order of August 29, 19d5, at 5; Memorandum of August 8, 1986, at 1-2.
6 Memorandum and Order of Octooer 2, 1985, at 3 1
4 3
Discovery Relating to CPRT Applicants also assert their determination to release CPRT results only under the terms that they unilaterally set up in their response of October 27, 1985,.to CASE's Interrogatories of August 27, 1985 While only a part of tne documents requested are affected by this limitation,7 CASE feels it important to point out that the Board has not agreed to all of the procedures outlined in the October 27, 1985, response.
Instead, the Board decided to rule on conflicts between CASE and Applicants concerning CPRT discovery as they arose.
The Board stated that if the parties could not agree it would weigh the in process needs of the CPRT against CASE's need for the information.
Transcript of Hearing of November 11, 1985, at 24,257-24,259, 24,261.
Moreover, Applicants have not been producing CPRT results in an adequate manner (at least insofar as deficiency paper is concerned).
The files they have produced so far have not been complete and were scattered throughout various locations the plant rather than being collected at a central location.
at See Affidavit of Adam Palmer attached to CASE Motion to Compel of 7
Most of the requested documents concern the history of the problems at the plant and of management's response to them.
For the most part the CPRT has not addressed these issues but focussed instead on a determination of whether the alleged deficiency is a deficiency and if not how to repair it.
Significantly the central CPRT working files in Dallas, which Applicants represented as containing "the entirety of CPRT, lock stock and barrel" (November 12, 1985, Prehearing Conference, Tr.
24,228), include virtually no deficiency paper.
In addition, this, discovery is focussed on the history of the allegation and thus does not involve CPRT documents but rather pre-CPRT documents for which there is no "in process."
Inasmuch as tne CPRT is in itself a response to the plant's deficiencies, the request does not primarily cover CPRT material.
4
J u ly 31, 19 8 6..
i If Applicants intend to withhold particular documents on the grounds that they are results of CPRT activities, they should identify the documents specifically so that the Board can address the issue using the balancing test it adopted at the November 12, 1965, hearing.
i i
Discovery Regarding Minority Owners of CPSES Intervenors cannot accept the decision TUEC appears to have made to include material in the possession of the minority owners of the project only when it is specifically requested.
Applicants' Response a t 6 Intervenors have no problem with Applicants' decision that TUEC be the lead Applicant for purposes of discovery, but, if Applicants use this method, TUEC must provide all information responsive to each request that is in the hands of any of the Applicants, including the minority owners, as well as any of their contractors, subcontractors, or other agents or employees.
Page 1 of the request of June 27, 1986, is worded so as to request explicitly all such information.8 In particular, Intervenors believe that the minocity owners l
prooably have materials responsive to Request No. 6, since they are likely to have kept their own notes of the meetings of the Owners Committee and to have presented documents at those 0
This is not the first time that Applicants have tried to avoid their responsibility' to produce documents that were not in TUEC's actual possession.
During the hearing of November 12, 1985, TUSC claimed that it should not have to produce documents in the possession of its agent Stone & Webster.
The Board ruled that TUEC, ratner than Intervenors, was required to request the documents from 'its agent.
Transcript of November 12, 1985, llearing at 24,2bS-24,2do.
S
meetings.
TUEC's.Obiections,t_o, Specific Roquests o
Request No. 3_:
The Applicants'. response appears to mean that they did not consider any written evidence about the plant when they made their statement that they had such serious concerns about its status that they would not operate it even if a license were granted.
The response, however, is worded in such
.a way that it could also be interpreted to mean that they did base the statement on written evidence, but they do not know 'all the documents that were consulted.
If Applicants know of any documents that were consulted, they should produce them, and
.their response is incomplete until they do so.
If Applicants did not rely on any such documents in making their statement, it is difficult to see how they had a reasonable basis for making it.
The statement was clearly made in order to give assurance to the Board that Applicants are seriously concerned about the condition of the plant.
If Applicants did not specifically review the written materials pertaining to the I
plant's problems, this appearance of concern was a sham.
Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the attorney who signed the pleading was supposed to have determined that it had i
an adequate basis in f act and that it was not made for any improper purpose.
If the quoted statement had no acequate basis in fact and was made merely to mislead the fsoard, appropriate sanctions should be imposed on both Applicants and their attorneys, following Rule 11.
Intervenors will not seek such sanctions at this time, 3
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however, but instead intend to file additional interrogatories in order to probe more deeply into the actual basis for the quoted s tatemen t.
Applicants' other objections to Interrogatory 3 are exa.nples of the collerplate objections Applicants raise to most ot Intervenors' requests in a manner that creates needless delay and wastes the time of all concerned.
Applicants claim that tne question is overbroad, although it is worded narrowly, requesting only the specific documents and other information Applicants used as a basis for the statement.
A request for discovery is overbroad if it asks for materials that are not reasonably likely to be relevant to the issues in the case, or if it is so general that a reasonaole person could not understand it.
Scuderi v_.
Bos ton Insurance Co. 34 P.R.D. 4 63, 4 66 (D. Del.1964).
The basis for the quoted statement by TUSC management is relevant to the issue of management credibility as well as management',s responsiveness to the deficiencies of the plant.
A reasonable person would have no trouble understanding what is being requested here.9 9
The Board nas ruled (Memorandum and Order of october 31, 1985 (Procedural Rulings; Board Concern About wA for Design) at 4):
In the interest of efficiency we require parties raced oy a discovery requ,est considered to be overly broad to explain why the request is too broad and, if reasioie, to interpret the request in a reasonable fashion and to sup of reason. ply documents... witnin the realm Applicants are out of compliance with tnis ruling.
Instead of interpreting requests reasonably and complying with them, they routinely ooject on tne grounds of overbreadth, fail to provide 7
Applicants also ooject because they believe that the question encompasses communications between counsel and representatives of Applicant.
Although tney do not identity the grounds for this objection, they are presumably invoking attorney-client privilege or. the attorney work product aoctrine, which has been incorporatea into 10 CFR $2.740(b)(2).
But Applicants cannot witnhold whole groups of documents on the grounds that some of them are protected.
They must identify specifically the documents concerned and the basis for asserting i
that they should not be released, so that the Board, rather than the Applicants, can decide whether attorney-client privilege or 32.740(b)(2) applies.
See more complete analysis under Interrogatory 6.
Request No. 4:
Applicants' objections to this request can be reduced once again to the f amiliar. claims of overbreadth and lack of relevance to issues in the OL proceeding.
The request asks for (1) all documents that evaluate the findings made in the documents identified in Attachment I to Applicants' Response to Interrogatories dated June 16, 1906 (CPA Docket), (2). documen ts proposing responses to those findings, and (3) documents implementing such responses.
The documents listed in Attachment 1 were requested by Interrogatory 2 of Intervenors' Request of May 15, 1986 (CPA Docket), and consist of audits, reviews, diagnoses, evaluations, consultant reports, in-house audits, or other i
anything out a conclusionary explanation for this claim, and make no effort to interpret the request more narrowly and provide at least some of the requested documents.
U k
I
i reports which Applicants received from the beginning of construction to the present assessing, analyzing, commenting on, discussing, or offering an opinion on the plant's construction, procedures, compliance with industry or agency standards, or management style or competence.
Thus the request is relevant to the issues of management'.s credibility and how it has responded to the problems brought to its attention by documents such as those listed in Attachment 1.
i The request may also lead to the discovery of evidence relevant to the issues of harassment and intimidation of the authors of some of the documents in Attachment 1.
The documents are described with sufficient particularity that the request is not overbroad.
See discussion under Request No.
3.
Attachment I was supplemented by Attachment B to Applicants' Supplemental Response of July 3,1986, which was filed af ter Intervenors had filed their June 27, 1986, Request for Documents.
Intervenors expect that Applicants will apply Request No. 4 to the documents listed in the supplement as well as the original answer.
In addition, the Supplemental Response of July 3, 1986, is an evasive and incomlete answer. Applicants state therein only that they have included those documents "which might reflect upon their ability to complete construction of the safety-related systems, structures and components of CPSSS Unit 1 within the i
time provided by the construction permit."
Neither the question as posed, nor the Board's Order of June 27 requiring Applicants to su'pplement their answer of June Ib, allowed for limiting the response to documents reflecting on Applicants' ability to complete construction.
Intervenors intend to pursue this matter i
9 t
in the CPA docket wnen tne Stay of Discovery is lif ted.
4 The self-imposed limitation on Applicants' response is even more ibappropriate in the OL docket.
Intervenors ask that the soard require the Applicants to comp'lete their supplemental answer and then to apply Request No. 4 to it.
Request No. S:
Applicants' only objection here is that "the only possible evidentiary value" of the requested documents would be to the CPA proceeding.
Applicants are using the wrong a
standard, since material requested in discovery does not have to be admissible into evidence.
It only has to be reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Even under Applicants' standard, however, the documents requested are relevant to the OL proceeding oecause.
I they relate to Applicants' explanation of their delay in completing the plant, and thus to their competence and J
crealbility.
Since CASE alleges that the delay resulted from the breakdown in quality control caused by the narassment of quality control personnel, these documents are likely to reveal information about harassment and intimidation as well.
See CASE Motion to Compel of July 31, 1986, a t 5.10 i
10 Although Request No. 5 is concerned with the same issues as Interrogatory 1 of CASB's Request of July 2, 1986, it does r ot ask for the same information.
Interrogatory 1 asks for the documents on which Applicants intend to rely to show in the CPA proceeding,
" goof cause" that were used in TUEC's letter of January 29,wnile Request No. 4 asks for tne c 1986, requesting l
an extension of the construction permit.
i 1
10
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Heauest No. 6:
Applicants' first objection to this request, which asked for minutes and notes of Owners Committee meetings at which the status of the plant was discussed as well as documents assessing the status of the plant that were presented at those meetings, is on the ground that some portions of the minutes are not relevant to the open issues in the OL proceeding.
As in their response to Request No. 3, Applicants are withholding an entire group of documents on the grounds that they object to certain portions of some of them.
Applicants should not be allowed to proceed in this manner, but should be required to produce the material to which they don't object and specifically state their objections to the rest.
Applicants' second objection uses the same approach.
They object "to the extent the evidentiary value of the information sought would be useful only in connection with the CPA docket."
Applicants' August 1 Response, a t 11.
Moreover, Applicants again ignore the language of 10 CFR s2.740(b)(1), which does not restrict discovery to admissible evidence but allows for discovery of any material that is reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Applicants appear to concede that some of the material requested is relevant to the OL proceeding.
The truth is that all of it is highly likely to be relevant, because a central issue in the proceeding is the way management dealt with its responsibility to maintain quality assurance and quality control in th'e design and construction of the plant.
Management includes the minority owners as well as TUEC.
The way the owners assessed the status of the plant goes to the heart of this issue.
11
Applicants also claim that all notes and' ainutes of meetings, as well as documents presented at meetings, are protected oy 10 CFR $2.740(b)(2) because they were prepared in preparation for trial.
This claim is farfetched, to say the least.
The trial preparation or attorney work product doctrine has been narrowly interpreted by the courts on the grounds that it obstructs the search for truth and provides only indirect and speculative benefits.
Resident Advisor / Board v. Rizzo, 97 F.R.D. 74 9, 7S2 (E.D.Pa.1963); Lundy v. Interfirst Corp.,
105 F.R.D. 499, 504 (1965).
In order to withhold material alleged to be work product, a party must do more than assert an unspecific general claim.
The burden is on the party making the claim to identify specifically each item for which the claim is made and explain tne basis for asserting that it was prepared in anticipation of litigation.
In Re Shopping Carts Antitrust Litigation, 9S F.R.D. 299, 306 (S.D.N.Y.1982); Compagnie l
Francaise d' Assurance y2 Phillips Petroleum, 105 F.R.D.
16, 41 i
(S.D.N.Y. 19 8 4 ) ; 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice 120.64 (2) (1964).
The reason for providing this information is that the court, rather than the party, is supposed to determine whether to apply the work product doctrine, which is only a qualified privilege and must yield at times to the needs of the party seeking discovery.
Applicants here have not ioentified any specific items nor explained their casts for asserting that they were prepared in preparation for trial.
They have only made a general claim that everything tnat was done at tne meetings was in preparation for 12
i trial because it involved efforts to obtain a license.
Such a claim, if valid, could apply to all data related to the license applica. tion and produce the absurd result that no relevant data is discoverable.
In order to withhold particular documents, Applicants will have to show not only that they were aware of impending litigation, but that the primary reason for creating the document was to assist with the litigation.
United States v. Gulf Oil Corp.,,
760 F.2d 292, 296 (TECA 1985).
Materials prepared in the ordinary course of business, rather than primarily for trial, are discoverable.
The defendant in Gulf argued that certain documents were attorney work product because their subject matter related to the litigation, and they were prepared in order to comply with federal securities laws.
The court held that they were not work product because they were not created primarily in preparation for litigationll similarly, in Soeder y. General Dynamics Corporation, 90 i
F.R.D. 253 (D.Nev. 1960), written materials prepared by a defendant aircraft manufacturer after one of its planes crashed was held not to be prepared in anticipation of litigation, even though the defendant reasonably expected to engage in litigation after the crash.
The court held that since the defendant also wanted to improve its product, prevent adverse publicity, protect i
1 11 See also discussion in Spaulding t Denton, 6 8 F.R.D.
342 v
345 (D. Del. 1975), suggesting that unless material was prepare,d j
for or requested by an attorney it is generally not within the work product exception.
The court in Spaulding did exempt the eaterial at issue there, l;
rule.
Id. at 346 but ref rained f rom stating any general l
l 13 i
f its economic interests, and promote safety, tne in-house report had been prepared in the ordinary course of business.
In the present case, the owners meetings are conducted on a regular basis for the purpose of jointly man' ging the plant and a
presumably the owners primarily address similar concerns about the plant's safety and economic viability.
Most of the documents presented at these meetings must also address these concerns, and the technical issues involved.
Technical documents are also likely to be outside the scope of work product claims.
Loctite Corp. v. Pel-Pro, Inc., 607 F.2d 577, So2 (7 th Cir.,1981).
Even if some of the material requested was in fact prepared in preparation for trial, CASE meets the requirements of 10 CFR m2.740(b)(2), which provides tnat material prepared in anticipation of littaation should De produced if the party seeking discovery has a substantial need for it and cannot obtain it in any other way.
The requested documents are crucial to Intervenor's case, because, as discussed above, a central issue in the case is the way in which the owners as a whole exercised their responsibility for the quality of construction.and design.
The information these records will reveal about how minority owners interacted with TUSC in making decisions cannot be obtained in any otner way.
Applicants also tnrow in a vague claim of attorney-client privilege at the end of their objection to Request No.
6, although they have not even decided wnether they are asserting this privilege or reasserting the work product doctrine.
Like a work product claim, attorney-client privilege must be 14
specifically asserted for specific documents.
In Re Shopping Carts, supra, at J05.
The mere fact that material is communicated to or by an attorney does not bring it within the scope of this privilege.
Id. at 306 Applicants should produce this material or identity it and provi*de a specific basis for withholding it.
In the meantime they cannot use it as an excuse for withholding the rest of the requested material.
Responses of Minority Owners Intervenors request that the minority owners as well as TUEC i
specifically address Request No. 6, since it seems likely that they might have notes of meetings or documents presented at them that TUEC does not have.
If they do not have such material, they should so state.
Specific Responses Brazos:
Intervenors request that Brazos be required to produce its materials at the CASE office in Dallas or at Brazos's attorney's office in Washington, D.C., where Intervenors can reasonably obtain access to them.
CASE is already substantially disadvantaged by having to travel to Glen Rose and Dallas to see documents.
Adding Waco and Georgia (as Tex-La suggests) is neither fair nor necessary.
Ooviously counsel in Washington, D.C.,
representing th'ose owners can accommodate the documents, assuming they do not already have them.
Finally, there is no indication of the volume of the documents.
If they are not too voluminous, having them all copied and sent to CASE could be the most feasible solution.
TMPA:
TMPA makes a planket claim of attorney-client 15
privilege and work product doctrine.
As discussed under Request No. jt supra, the burden is on the party making such claims to specifi'cally identify the items for which they are made and the basis for each claim, so that the soa'rd can evaluate the merits of each claim.
TMPA must either provide this information or produce the requested materials.
Even if some of them are protected, they are absolutely essential to an adequate resolution of the 0L proceeding, because they are independent analyses of Comanche Peak, not carried out by the principal owner or under its supervision.
Since the gravamen of the present litigation between TUEC and the minority owners is that only TUEC is resonsible for the present condition of the plant, the assessment by these minority owners and any warnings given by them or representations made to them could be extremely valuable in finding out why.all these problems went 4
unaddressed for many years.
If TMPA wishes to protect its interests in the District Court litigation, Intervenors are willing to comply with any reasonable protective order.
Tex-Las Intervenors ask the Board to require Tex-La to i
produce its materials at CASE's office or at the office of tex-La's attorney in Washington, D.C.,
rather than in Georgia, a nighly inconvenient location for Intervenors.
Tex-La asserts its intention to withhold communications between itself and its attorneys as well as accuments which it
)
believes to be attorney work product and/or documents prepared in j
anticipation of litigation.
As discussed under Request No. 6 n
supra, a party making sucn claims has the burden of identifying 4
5 16
i c
materials specifically and explaining the basis for each claim.
Failing such an explanation, it must produce the documents.
As discussed above with reference to TMPA, independent monitoring studies such as those described in Requests No. I and 2 are of the hignest priority in determining whether Comanche Peak should get an operating license, and, since each such study is unique, the information contained in it cannot ce obtained by alternative means.
Under 10 CFR 32.74U(b)(2), the Board should require Tex-La to produce all such materials even if they are (which we dount) substantially devoted to the mental theories and t
i impressions of attorneys, because the need to look objectively at 1
the plant's problems outweighs the need to protect the attorneys' privacy.
CONCLUSION TUSC and its co-owners have not made a good f aith attempt to respond to the discovery.
Their pleading is full of blanket objections, which fail to fill even the most rudimentary pleading requirements tor their assertion.
It is unconscionable that such i
4 a pleading is made by experienced trial counsel, and.it can only be assumed that the pleading was made for the sole purpose of harassing CASB, delaying discovery, and forcing CASS to incur substantial effort and expense to ootain discovery to which it has a right.
None of the owners made any effort to reach an amicable settlement of the discovery controversy.
TUEC and TMPA i
were particularly brazen in their stonewall retusals to respond.
We urge this Board to consider the numerous sanctions available
)
i to it to assure that such bad faith pleading does not continue.
f-
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' ~ ~ ~ ~
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t Respectfully submitted, OA 3 k /g ANTHONY 3.
/
Trial i.awyers for Public Justice 2000 P Street, NW, #611 Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 463-u600 Counsel for CASE Contributing Law Student Ann Hunter Antioch Law School O
l l
Id
. - - - - -.--O.
o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD i
In the Matter of
).
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TEXAS UTILITI8S GENERATING
)
COMPANY, et al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-445-OL
)
and 50-446-OL (Comanche Peak Steam Electric
)
Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
l CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE By my signature below, I hereby certify that true and correct copies of CASS's RESPONSE TO APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE 6/27/86 DISCOVERY AND MOTION TO COMPEL have been sent to the persons listed below this 15th day of August 1986 by:
Express mail where indicated by *; Hand-delivery where indicated by **; and First Class Mail unless otherwise indicated.
4 Administrative Judge Peter ~ B. Bloch**
3270 Aberfoyle Place, NW Washington, D.C.
20015 Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom 1107 West Knapp Stillwater, Oklahoma 74075 Dr. Walter H. Jordan u81 W. Outer Drive Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 dlizabeth 8. Johnson Oak Ridge National Laboratory P.O.
Box X, Building 3500 oak Ridge, TN 37830 Ellen Ginsberg, 8sq.
u.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20$55 1
i e
l Robert A. Wooldridge, Esquire Worsham, Forsythe, Sampels
& Wooldridge 2001 Bryan Tower, Suite 3200 Dallas', Texas 75201 l
Nicholas Reynolds, Esquire **
Bishop, Liberman, Cook, 3
Purcell & Reynolds 1200 17th Street, N.W., 7th floor Washington, D.C.
20036 Geary S. Mizuno, Esquire Office of. Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Renea Hicks, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Supreme Court Building Austin, Texas 78711 Mrs. Juanita Ellis President, CASE 1426 S. Polk Dallas, Texas 75224 Mr. W.G. Counsil Executive Vice President Texas Utilities Generating Co.
Skyway Tower, 25th Floor 400 N. Olive Street Dallas, Texas 75201 Mr. Roy P. Lessy, Jr.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Mr. Thomas G. Dignan, Jr.
i Ropes & Gray 1
225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 2
Mr. Thomas G. Dignan, Jr. **
c/6 Ropes & Gray 1001 22nd Street, NW 7th floor Washington, D.C.
20037 ANTHONY
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