ML20214G874
| ML20214G874 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1978 |
| From: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Benaroya V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0195, CON-WNP-195 NUDOCS 8605230003 | |
| Download: ML20214G874 (4) | |
Text
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DOCKET FIL v_
- " f ' M NRR READING FILE ICSB READING FILE MEMORANDUI4 FOR:
V. Benaroya, Chief, Auxiliary Systens Branch, DSS FROM:
T. A. Ippolito, Chief, Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, DSS
SUBJECT:
WPPS 2 - FIRE PROTECTION - FIRST ROUND OUESTIONS Plant Name:
Washington Public Power Supply System Nuclear Project 2 Docket No:
05-397 Milestone ib:
N/A Responsible Branch Auxiliary Systems Branch and Project Manager:
M. Greenberg Requested Co:apletion Date:
Unknown Review Status:
Complete In accordance with our joint memorandum of July 19, 1977, the ICSB has reviewed the applicant's response to Appendix A to your Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1. is a set of questions requesting additional information and presenting staff positions which have resulted from our review of the instrianentation and control aspects of the applicant's response.
In addition to recommending that you forward Enclosure I to the applicant for resolution, I would like to call your attention to the comments presented in Enclosure 2.
It is believed that these consents should assist the primary and other secondary reviewers.
Orfgf0Ji Sired bf
.. I. A. Ippodta Thomas A. Ippolito. Chief Instrumentation and Control Systems i
Branch, DSS
Enclosures:
As Stated
Contact:
R. Scholl X27387 cc:
S. Hanauer R. Mattson
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SASHINGTON NUCLEAT POSIR PROJECT 8 2 FIRE REVIEW FIRST ROUNC QUESTIONS 031.057 Clarify the discrepancy between the description (2. 2. 2) of the standby service water system, which states (2. 7) that the HPCS SSW pump and the Division 1 SSW (2-247) pump are located in the 1A SSW pump house, and the statement that no credible fire can damage both the HPCS AND THE RCIC systems. Include in this clarification:
(1) A description of the physical separation and electrical independence between the division 1 de circuits which provide power to the RCIC system and the division 1 circuits which are in SSW pump house 1A.
(2) A discussion of the consequences of a loss of both division 1 and 3 ac and de circuits on safe shutdown as a result of an uncontrolled fire in SSW pump hcuse 1A.
031.058 The discussions of the consequences of design basis (2-39) fires in Section 2 of the Fire Plan are insuf ficient.
(2-43)
For each of the rooms and spaces which are identified in Section 2 of the fire report, provide the (2-47) specific information requested below:
(2-55)
(2-236)
.(1) Identify each Class 1E circuit which passes through a room or space, (2) Describe the consequences on safe shutdown of a loss from fire of each (separately) and all (collectively) of the circuits which are identified in response to (1) above, (3) Describe how each rcom and space satisfies the construction permit physical separation and electrical independence criteria, (4) Describe how the Class 1E sources are isolated from faults resulting from fire in the circuits which pass through a ecom or space, and (5) Describe how these circuits are protected from the effects of a fire in the room or space.
0 31.0 59 (RSP) It is the staff's position that the present design (0.5.a) which includes Class IE ac sources and incandescent bulbs is an unacceptable design for fire emergencies.
Therefure, provide a modified design which satisfies the staff's positions for emergency lighting or justify the present design en some other basis.
The justification should include a discussion of the physical separation and electrical independence between the normal and emergency lighting and a discussion of how these lighting circuits are protected from the effects of accidents (such as fires in a common room or space) and natural phenomena such as earthquakes.
'N O
031.060 The description of the fire detection systems in (E.1. a)
Fire Plan Section E.1.a are inadequate. Provide the following additional inforJationt (1) : tate if the fire detection syste,m3 are class 1, per NFPA 70, or not, and (2) Justify not providing a class A fire detection system.
i (3) If the fire detection circuitry is not class 1,
+
per NFPA 70, describe the physical separstion criteria which assures that f 391ta in the detection circaitry will not cause simultaneous fires in redundant 3&fety division aross.
0 31.0 61 (RSP)
The description of the fire detection aystem power copply (3.1.d) does not appear to be complete. It is the staff's i
position that the fire detectica system should be designed such that it can be nanually connected t0 an onsite source which is class 1E or automatically to a non-class 12 source which satisfies the esquirements of NFPA 72D Section 2260 in the event of a suetained loss of offsite power. Therefore, provide a modified design which meets,the staff's position.
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FIRE REVIEW PROBLEM AREAS 1.
It is not clear that the actual penetrations which are referenced in response to staff position 03(d) were tested.
It appears as if the e
applicant's response is limited to the material only.
2.
The Flamtro,1 cable referenced in the applicant's response to staff position D3(g) was replaced at Diablo Canyon because it coundn't pass a water submersion test.
3.
The applicant may not have considered the potential for, nor consequences of, radio interference on Class IE protective relaying in the response to staff position 05(d).
-4.
On page 2-175, the applicant appears to have neglected the recirculation flow control valve hydraulic system.
5.
In the response to staff position 03(a), the applicant indicates that he may use materials other than steel for the cable trays.
6.
The response to staff position E.2(f) indicates that the applicant may be using Class 1E sources for the fire pumps.
It will be interesting to see how he can do it and still satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.75.
7.
The applicant should be requested to identify the location of the Division III battery and provide a discussion similar to the one pro-vided on pages 2-211 and 2-212.
8.
The information whicn is presented in the appendices indicates that the consequences of fires in large vertical cable bundles is unknown to the applicant; therefore, his position on fire stops and penetration testing seems to be inadequate.
.