ML20214G708
| ML20214G708 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1971 |
| From: | Grill R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Stello V US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0152, CON-WNP-152 NUDOCS 8605220423 | |
| Download: ML20214G708 (3) | |
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l Nov 2 9 tgn Y. Stelle, Chief, Boiling Water Raseter Branch Me. 4 pBILumART EEp0RT ON E&Er0ED 2 EUCLEAR p0NER STATION - knerET No. 50-397 It will be the practice of this brameh in the future to perform a preliminary review en each desket as soon as practicable after that decket reaches sur branch. This praHaimary review is not intended to take the place of our samal full-scala review. The intent is to dis-cover areas of concern at an early peint in time so that resolution may be started as soon as possible by both the project leader and the applicant in order to avoid licensing delays. A report such as this will be prepared and transmitted to you for each esse in the future.
Areas which have been cursorily reviewed for this plant are:
1.
Population Distribution. Rzelusion Radius and Low Population Zone.
Population distribution within the immediate vicinity of this plant is entremely sparse being only 20 persons withis five miles and less than 500 within 10 miles. Based en 1970 data there are less than 180,000 people within a, radius of 50 miles. The population there-fore would seem to be no problem in this docket. The exclusion radius of 916 meters and the law population sone are also judged acceptable.
2.
Personnel Protection and Control Room Habitability under Accident Conditions.
The applicant in this case has provided some information about the criteria used for designing rediatism shielding in this plant.
However, a great deal more detail will be required to judge adequacy in this area. Details of equipment arrangement and maintenance precedures affecting permeasel empoestes will be required from the applicant. More detail will also be required on design of control roen protective systems. Details of the air moving and cleaning equipment, amargemey respiratory equipment and calculations of desee and dose rates to control room aperators from all postulated incidents, both radielegical and unendielegical will be required.
Detailed precedures will aloe be required for energemey safe shut-down of the reactor la case control reen habitability la denied for any reason.
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Accident Deses.
Rough assident doses were salaulated using the parameters supplied by the appliaast for three aseident eases, less-of-coolant accident, refueltag aseident, and control red drop accident. As you can see from the attaahed table all doses emespt for the loss-of-coolant i
at.&ident are eenfertably below Part 100 guidelines. However, the lese-of-soolant aseident desee approach 400 rem standard safety guide assusptions of classical type F diffusion conditions with one meter per second wind velocity were utilised. We have reason to believe that the diffusion conditions en the Banford site will not be this favorable which would mean doses will be correspondingly higher.
Areas not Reviewed:
a.
Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems.
The lack of information contained in the PSAR coupled with our current lack of knowledge about the effectiveness of p.esently designed radwaste treatment systems precludes our doing a valid i'
review of this area at this time. We are currently giving high priority to a comprehensive and detailed review of radwaste treatment systems for all plants and will be able to more l
intelligently review the Hanford 2 application when this review is completed.
b.
Heteorology.
The current workload and lack of staff have not allowed us to review the applicant's meteorological program on this docket.
This information will be supplied to you when workload permits.
If you have questions regarding this preliminary review or suggestions how these reviews sould be improved to be more helpful to your group, please contact me.
Detailed question lists and other input will be forthcoming as our review progresses.
R. F. Crill, Chief Site safety Branch Division of Reactor Licensing ect R. Zavadoski CRESS emce >.....M..
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NOV 2 919M V. Stello, Chief, Boiling Water Reactor Branch No. 4 PRELIMINARY REPORT ON HANFORD 2 NUCLEAR POWER STATION - DOCKET NO. 50-397 It will be the practice of this branch in the future to perform a preliminary review on each docket as soon as practicable after that docket reaches our branch. 'Ihis preliminary review is not intended to take the place of our usual full-scale review. The intent is to dis-cover areas of concern at an early point in time so that resolution may be started as soon as possible by both the project leader and the applicant in order to avoid licensing delays. A report such as this will be prepared and transmitted to you for each case in the future.
Areas which have been cursorily reviewed for this plant are:
1.
Population Distribution, Exclusion Radius and Low Population Zone.
Population distribution within the immediate vicinity of this plant is extremely sparse being only 20 persons within five miles and less than 500 within 10 miles. Based on 1970 data there are less than 180,000 people within a radius of 50 miles. The population there-fore would seem to be no problem in this docket. The exclusion radius of 916 meters and the low population zone are also judged acceptable.
2.
Personnel Protection and Control Room Habitability under Accident Conditions.
The applicant in this case has provided some information about the criteria used for designing radiation shielding in this plant.
However, a great deal more detail will be required to judge adequacy in this area. Details of equipment arrangement and maintenance g
procedures affecting personnel exposures will be required from the applicant. More detail will also be required on design of control room protective systems. Details of the air moving and cleaning equipment, emergency respiratory equipment and calculations of doses and dose rates to control room operators from all postulated incidents, both radiological and nonradiological will be required.
Detailed procedures will also be required for emergency safe shut-down of the renctor in case control room habitability is denied for any reason.
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V. Stello NOV 2 91971 3.
Accident Doses.
Rough accident doses were calculated using the parameters supplied by the applicant for three accident cases, loss-of-coolant accident, refueling accident, and control rod drop accident. As you can see from the attached table all doses except for the loss-of-coolant accident are comfortably below Part 100 guidelines. However, the loss-of-coolant accident doses approach 400 rem standard safety guide assumptions of classical type F diffusion conditions with one meter per second wind velocity were utilized. We have reason to believe that the diffusion conditions on the Hanford site will not be this favorable which would mean doses will be correspondingly higher.
Areas not Reviewed:
a.
Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems.
The lack of information contained in the PSAR coupled with our current lack of knowledge about the effectiveness of presently designed radwaste treatment systems precludes our doing a valid review of this area at this time. We are currently giving high priority to a comprehensive and detailed review of radwaste treatment systems for all plants and will be able to more intelligently review the Hanford 2 application when this review is completed.
b.
Meteorology.
The current workload and lack of staff have not allowed us to review the applicant's meteorological program on this docket.
This information will be supplied to you when workload permits.
If you have questions regarding this preliminary review or suggestions how these reviews could be improved to be more helpful to your group, please contact me.
Detailed question lists and other input will be forthcoming as our review progresses.
R. P. Grill, Chief Site Safety Branch Division of Reactor Licensing cc:
R. Zavadoski
4 MOf. DRY AC%EMBEk 1971 RECAPITULATION RECAP PAGF FRACTION OF DOSE (REFS)
PART 100 CRITERIA THYROID WHOLE HODY THYROID WHOLE BOD' CASL f; UMBER 397 HANFORD 2 LCSS OF CCCLANT ACCIDENT EXCLUSION DI ST ANCE 3.85eE 07 2.706E 01 1.285E 00 1.083E Cf-LOh PCPULATICf4 ZONE 2.613E 02 8.400E 00 8.711E-01 3.360E-0 CASE AUMBER 397 H AN F,r1R D 2 REFUELING ACCIDENT c'
EXCLUSION 01 STAT;CE 1.b06E 01 2.478E 00 5.019E-02 9.912E-0.
Luh PCPULATICN 2Cf;E 1.828t 00 3.009F-01 6.C94E-03
,1.204E-0, CASL NUf4BER 397 HANFOP.0 2 CCNTROL RCD DROP ACCIONT EXCLUSICN DIST ANCE 4.553E 00 2.7300-01 1.518E-02
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LOh PCPULA110N ZONE 5.528E-01 3.315E-02 1.843E-03 1.326E-0 l
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