ML20214E550

Revised Three Pump Emergency Feedwater Sys Reliability Analysis for Crystal River Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3

ML20214E550
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River, 05000000
Issue date:	10/31/1981
From:	Enzinna R, Jeffery Lynch BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20214E454	List: ML20214E450 ML20214E550 ML20214E580 ML20214E655 ML20214E723
References
32-1126985-01, 32-1126985-1, NUDOCS 8705220143
Download: ML20214E550 (68)

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{{#Wiki_filter:- -.. C o.I<. f:!< 32.Il269c. '0 1 Three Pump Emergency Feedwater System I Reliability Analysis I For The i ,i Crystal River 1 l Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 3 + i,- i? t i 7 o 1 j 4 t I i 4 Awi.na october 1981 Babcock & Wilcox 1 $$85'$0b$S0$00ffj2 9 SUPERSEDED

Y 32-11.269 80-01 f r 5 6 I:"'" ?~MP 1 EMERCENCT : m A Il STS m W A*I*.! T ASf TS*S FOR 3 CUSTAL 3. ITER NCC*.IA2 GIhEA7-G STATION L" NIT NO. 3 i (Contract 582-7087) I Plant Performance Engineering Sabcock and Wilcox f Nuclear Power Generation Division O P.O. Box 1260 Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 ff,.A t1 C~ 6 = Prepared By ( Prepared By b /t I 1, h I i 'Y \\' s N' f. 4 k.* ?,k !_.' *,'7 7*

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C10000-~2i 1-1 2.0 OISC12 !ON OF ALL*YSIS 2-1 2.1 Taul: Tree A=alysis 2-1 2.2 Eu=a= Fam%1K:7 A=alysis 2-2 D

2.3 Failure Da:a 2-2 g 4 2.4 2'issics Success Def1=itics 2-3 I 2.5 Ass - 7:ie:s 2-3 2 3.0 IIsT S 3-1 3.1 Quas:1:a:1ve Results 3-1 3.2 I=portant Contribu: ors to System 7:ava' ? mbi.* 1:7 3-1 4.0 CONCLOSICES ALD 3ECO2225DAIIO:*S 4-1 Refere :es Appendix A - Faul: Trees A-1 Appendiz 3 - Humas Reliabill:7 Ivan: Trees 3-1 Appendiz C - System Descrip:fon Overview C-1 7 l U b I SUPERSEDED

1 us er m-s 32-1126985-01 3-1 C Tscal 217er-3 "hree ?=p I2 45 la11a5111:7 Iv4 a:1: 3-! lasults Ct.,,d m i c y o fi c h g,, li57 he N RC 3-2 Impor:as: C stribu: cts to Usavailabili:7 of he C.ystal 3-5 liver-3 hree ?=p ITJS Desigs options 1 t A 1 A L*S" 07 ? 03.IS Diesel ?igure la C-3 Diesel Fi;;ure 15 C-4 Diesel Figure le C-5 Turbise Fig =:e la C-6 Turbise Figure Ob C-7 urbine Figure 2: C-8 Turbine Figure 2d C-9 3ase Case Figure 3 C-10 .I o t SUPERSEDED

82-II269 85-01 his report prese::s a s--= 7 of.he a alysis _4. hods a:d resui:s of the p oposed rys-4 ?.".ver-3 I=erge.: 7 yee& a:er (II"J) Systas hree pt.- p configuratic. De objective.s of.his study were to: 1. Perfor= a de. ailed a=alysis o assess the relative reliabili:7 of each of he proposed :.- design options. 2. de::1fy do '-=*: crs:ributors to sys:en := availability 3 for each design option. 3. Co= pare the relatise reliabill:1es of each of the proposed N design opzio=s so de reliability increase associated with each fesis: =ay be used as inpu: to a cos: be=efi: a alysis. "his repor: doc =es:s _he analysis =a:h:>ds used i=:1 di:3 asst prio s ada and a=alytical :ools a= ployed. The resul:s are presented in bod qua=:1:a.ive and qualita:1ve ta=s. The zu=arical results include probabili:7 of f ailure per de=asd and probability of failure. par year of the G systen to prope:17 i=1tiate. The qualitative results include ide=tification of major failure c=utributors, discussion of their significance vi_h respect ro system reliability, and conclusions drawn from the results. 9 3 The additica of a third M pu=p does not ir pe: the unavailability a 1 of the Control Teed Only Good Generator, or Overfill Protection systmas. herefore, this analysis addresses only the impact the addition of the 1 third m pump has on the initiation system. see A si=plified systen description and piping and instrumentation diagrass for the :vo pt=:p system and for each of the

• .ree pu=p system options are included in Appendiz C.

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l 82-11269g5-93 ~W cp:1:ss were evalua:ed for -Je third IW p :p, a :::bine driver a=d a m:or driver vi_h dadicated diesel genera:::. . addities, ve stes= s.pply options for.he :::bi a drivers a=d three p'.=:p su=:1== op_ ions were evaluated. N dedicated diesel generator was considered to be scre favorable a power source for the mo :: driven pu== has diesel assera::: 23. A grea:e increase is reliabi'.ity is expected due to _he diversity i=: reduced by the dedica:ad diesel ge: ara:o and :he avoida ca of J pore::ial -- : node failure of diesels 3A and' 33. Also, loss of offsite and onsi e power figures sig=ifican:17 is exis:1 g pla== risk studies. On this basis _he ep.:ics of a motor drive pu=p povered by diesel genera:o 33 was so: :==sidered. Th'*is Key ~s O'e-o ~s~ - l' 2 ' 9 FC~t* * ~ ,s e,. 3j - g 16 T 3,f-C O P.n, v % c o m. +1 E, \\ e, m 5 D. t l-2 I SUPERSEDED l

32 -II 2 69 s s- 01 2.0 3 ESC!rON ?? MUJ.TS!S yaul: :ee a:alysis was.he p *-= y =e. hod used to evaluate :he Crystal liver 3 m sys:es :h.ee pu=p dasig: op 1::s. ! sed as a basis for ec=pariso=,.he reliability of.he two ::ai= sys:e was ob:ai ed fro: .he report "I=argency yeedva:e Sys:e= 0; grade Ra11ah111:7 Analysis. for the C.ystal liver Nuclear Ge=arating Statio: i: No. 3" ( '.). Once.he faul: ::ees were cess::ucted for each ep:10, i=portas: -' '-=' e 3 cuts se.s were found usi=5 he yaul: :ee A=alysis ?:ogra=, ITA? (2). a yailure data, ob:ai=ed fro = publicly available sources, were the: 8 d used to quas:ify these cut sets. Sc=a= e:To: probabili:ies used is the i qua= ifica:1c: vere developed usi=g the senhodology dese:1 bed is See:Lon 2.2. "lhe results of :his analysis i==1ude he dr= d-=9: ce==:ibutors to sys as failure and system u=ava11abili:1es. Successful systen operation, faul: tree analysis, human reliability-analysis, and failure data are discussed is the following ' sections. 1 2.1 yaul: Tree Analvsis 1 9') yaul: Tree Analysis consistent vi-d the =e:hodology described in the yault Tree Handhook. NCIEG-O/.92 (1) was used to evaluate the reliability y ~ of the EWS. The courplete fault trees for the Ey*JS are included is Appendix A. ? 8' The fault trees were constructed to a level of detail sufficient to f identify all relevant common hardware is the system. This level of-l analysis allowed identification of hardware which'vould, if failed, t 1 .I 2-1 SUPERSEDED

82-1126985-01 reduce desig=ed redu=da==y or cause the failure Of ::her hardware. 7:ere was so atta=p: := ac::== f:: c====:a11. ',es 1 pesed by exta:=al eve =:s such as fires, floods, :: aar.hquakas. = addi:1:= to =er'-

• -=*_

f ailure of hardware, f ailure causes due to hu=a= ac_ic=s a=d :es: or ai=:e=a=ce activities were *- '_;ded. Se :-.:cer code y.A? (2) was used fe qua=:ifica.ics f the faul: I

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',g of basic eve =: i= porta =ce, a=d ide=:ification of =a'or b, contribut=:s :o sys:e= failure. J 2.2 H.=:an Reliabiliev Analvsis T e E.:=a= Reliabili:7 A=alysis (E?.A) was perf :=ad consis:e=: vi_h the =e:hodology described i= '.'-"'.I ' 2-1273. Ea=dbeck of E -*- Reliabi'in Analvsis vi:h I:: basis en Nt: lear ?ever Pla=: A:.>11 cations (3). Se basic h=.a= error rates are fo sd i= Chapter 20. of Reference.3. Nu=erous data bases for component. (hards.are) failure ra:es are ava*1=%1e; however, few da:a bases exist for hu=a= error ra:es. A :ee'- dque developed a: Sa=dia

• abora:: ries (3) was used _o qua=tify hu=as error probabilities. ? obability tree diagra=s for the hu=an. asks of interes:

vere constructed and are prese=:ed i= appendix 3. k 2.3 Failure Data (o m 32-/lEb N O <. 3 2-n 2 e as-oo) Generic component failure data were obtained fro = publicly av=41=hle sources. These data were updated, or :made plan: specific, by using as the componene failure data obtained fract Crystal River-3 experience. law.sg=.).l w ce ; sitEP A byd's Mw

-2 SUPERSEDBD

s 3 2 - 1 1 ~n 6 9 8 0 - 01 2.4 Missi:: Iuccess Oefi_irie: der to a7a.na:e Ohe i=pa : :f ::=petes: fail::ea c sys:a= reliabilig a: en.ici: defisi:iss of =issies sus:ess is required. ~ For 1:1:ia.i:2, sys:e===availabdi'-'es were cal:21a:ed for :vo cases; the ft:s: case represe=:s s:rie:17 au:c=a:i: ini:1a:1:n of the syste=, a d the see:nd case m'

• us =perat::s :: in:e-tere to correc:

? sys:e= failures withi: 23 inu:es. 2'issi:= success is defi ed as a::ais-Eo =es: ef adequa:e fi:2 fr:: a: leas: c=e pu_p :s a: leas: :e stea= ge= era:::. 2.5 Ass-_,:ie s In evalua:i=g.he IT.;S reliabili:- the follevi=g ass.:=p:1c=s were =ade: 1. he - aricus sys:e= :::fi;;nra ie:s a=d fluid sys:e= =c=po e:: identifiers are as des:-ibed 1: Appe d'v C and as depic:ed i: Figures 1 through 3. 1. Se :vo pu=p base case desi;= is as depicted-aci dese:1hed is "I=ergeng Feed-2:er Sys:e= Cpgrade Zeliabili 7 A=alysis for :he Crysal liver Nuclear Generating Station E=i: No. 3", B&W Docuse== No. 32-1112.*.34-00, April 1951. 3. One code safe:y valve stuck open was conserva ively censidered a failure of that steam genera:cr to supply adecyate s:eas to drive 42 a turhise drives pu=p. ? 4. For a Loss of Offsite Power (LDO?) trassiest or a non-LOO? transient it was assumed that all code safety valves on bc.h stems generators h would open. 5. Degraded failures were not considered, hat is, co= pone =cs were an assused to operate properly or were treated as failed. For ar m le, the failure race for code safen valve fails :o reseat does not dis:inguish between degraded failures a=d catastrephic failures. This is a ec servatiss sisce e:caerie=ce has show= -&c is =ost l isstances where code safe n valves do not reseac a: the specified i }O 2-3 SUPERSEDED

l 32-1126985 32-1126985-01 se:pois they da resea: a: a s: 4-t.at lever sa:pcin: that =ay stiE be censidered a success, e d rarely do.he code safety valves fail :s resea: en_irely. 6. All E71C (Emergesey yeedwa:e: Isi_1a:1:n & Cc=:rol) relays are solid state. > 7. O:17 one EW pu=p is allowed i: preventive ai=:e:cce at a time. 3. The motor-driven EW pu=p and its dedicated diesel ge:arator are :alcan on: of service for preve::ive mai :e=asce s*m ':ceously. 1 j 9. ~he ' hird IW pu=p, whether notor or turbi=a drive =, vill have its =ai= and al:e:na:e suction valves, EyT-1A and u s-11, interloc: cad 43 in the same way as for pu=ps E37-1 a=d E77-2. 13. The *M-d EW pu=p, if mo:or drives, vill be actuated per E?IC cha==el A or 3. If the turbine drives pc=p is choses its s:ec ad=issi== valve (in any of :he pr: posed cesfig.::a_'o s) vill be actuated per A. I i b ai 2-4 \\\\ SUPERSEDED

32-1126985-01 3.o IzS--, 3.* Ouar:1:a:1re Insults Syste= =avai~ abilities vere cal:=la ed fo: the.hree p=p F;; desig= op:ie=s described i Appe~ O. Res21:s of the : e ;- p systa= reliabili:y analysis (Inference 1) are repea:ed here f r ce=- pariss: purposes, !=av=2hilizies vere ca".:ulated f:: two cases:

he firs: case represes:s s::ie:17 au:::a ic i=i ia:i::, ed the 4-se::si case allo.s opera:::s :s i=:e-re=e := cc::ec: systa= failures vithi: 20 =inutes.

j D ? cia: es:i=a:es of sys:es =1avai* abilities a=d f ailures per year are preses:ed i Table 3-1. A discussie: ;:f :he i=p ::a=: failure

ibutors for each desig: =ption f:11:vs, i_p:::a=: failure con-

-ibu:::s are sc=sarized i= Table 3-2.

3.2 b erta=: Contribu: ors to Sesta= !=availabili-- 3.2.1 Wo '==o Svsta= 3.2.1.1 I?".' Initiation (fu11v au:o=arie i=iria: ice) O1 1. ?u=p IF?-1 =avai?mhili:7 is de_-i=ated by.1:ss =f cffsize power 2 and subseque== diesel se=erator failure. ? 2. Fu=p IFP-2 unavailabili:y is do=inated by ser S="' cal f ailure of s:ma: admission valve 157-5 or pu=p mechanical failure. 4* 3. A =ajor contribu:=r to iznavailabili:y oa either or both ::ai=s is i= advertent failure :o :==14 p pumps af ter.pu=p sais:enance. 3.2.1.2 IIT I:1_1a io= (includes eserare: correc:ive ae ion) 1. he major contributor :o pu=p IFF-1 unavailabill:y is loss of i ! offsite power and subseque=t diesel generator fidare or pu:2p s

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~i i l 1 3 2 - 1 3 ~o g 9 u a. n 01 =echa=1 cal f a11=e. 2. ? =:p IFF-2 =ava11abili:7 is de.i=a ed by being =u: cf service for ~='-:enance or pcp =mehanical failure. 3.2.2 Sree ?=s Svste= with Mo:cr Driven -d ?== and Dedicated Diesel Ge=e rator ~41:h a moto: driven --d pep povered by a dedicated diesel ge=erator the usav=d 'm%ili y of p=p EI?-3 is do-d-=:ed by fa11=a of the 4 dedicated diesel generator. I=pertant failure cast:1bu:::s fo: he n [ o:her two pN ::ains are :he same as for the :vo pu=p syste= (Section 3.2.1). 3.2.3 nree ?=s Srsta= With urbi=e 3-ive: hird Pu=s rbine driven pu=p u=availabili:7 is do_._' sated by faiiure of -de u s:ca= generator code safe:y valves to reseat. However, i is i= porta =:

o =c e assu=ptie=s 3,4 and 3 i= Sec.io: 2.3 vith regard to the code safety valves.

Unavailability of the so:or drive = pu=p, IFF-1, is dc=1:a:ed by diesel genera:or 3A failure and loss of offsite power. An i=por:a=: = avail-9 abili:7 con==ibu:or in he au::sacic initiation cases (i.e., so a operator cor:cc ive action) is failure of the operator to realiss pu=ps after maintenance. c, 4 Another i=portant contributor to unavm47 =hility for the auto =atic er ini iation cases is failure of EFIC Cabinet A inverters. Both the stea= ar' 4 =sion valve for the turbine driven third pu=p EF?-3 and pump EF?-1 receive an EFIC (2:annel "A" %d H=H_m sig=al. nus a failure of E7IC Cabinet A (dominated by inverter failure) nay resul: in failure to initiate of both :notor d=iven pump EIP-1 and zurbine drive = pu=p 3-2 k SUPERSEDED

32-1126985-01 3 2 - 1 I C6 9.~. 5 - 01 I??-3. (~his ce=cern does ': apply to the dedica:ed diesel driven -hird pu=p op io=s because.he diesel ".*.1 he i=i._'a.ed by IIIC A or 3 sir =' e). In.he case of indepe=de== stea= supplies for each :urbi=e driven pu:zo (Option 2b), addicie:a1 failure scenarios become i=pertan:. . is is because ei' daa ica of -he staan supply cross co:see: results Y i= fewer flow paths for pu=p steam supplies. It is setewor.hy that I havi.sg cross-con =ected s:ca= supplies presen:s so additional i=por:a== failure contribu: ors over the i=depe=de:: stems supplies. ' is is because: First, he :vo sets of double : heck valves is the staan lises separating the genera: ors provide a=ple separa:ics of :he two s:ca= generators. And sececily. he probability of obtai=ing vet s:aa= duc to single or double stea= ge: era or I W overf4?' is very s=all with the installacien of :he E7'C (I=argency Teedwater I=itiatics and Control) syste= (Reference 1). Palle intuitively, it seems that cross-co:.. ected staan supplies say provide more potential for common mode failure than fadspenden: s:ca= supplies, the results show that the independent steam supply configuration has a greater unavailability 9 because each pt=np has fewer steam supply flow paths. Co:non mode fadlure 1 rends to effect both steam supply options relatively equally because e um n :n de failure is not highly dependent on steam supply piping 6 configuration. Experience shows that dr==4nant con ributors to common

node failure tend to be system interfaces, external events, and human error.

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32-1126985-01 C.-.._.___.._ _-- _._ _,.._._.-,. 3 .. u _ _ 3.. 3 _w_ Se.=_availab'

• i:7 evaluati: i=ii:a:es :ha a =c::: drive: third p=p

-i.h dedica:ed diesel genera::: -(2 ic s *a,1b,1:' resul:s is 7 be::e: systa= re'iabill:7 # =- a :::Si=a driven ' '-d ; :=p (2p-dons 2a.25,20,2d). ~iis is due : the 11versi:7 i=:::duced by. adding the otor drive =, diesel powered W. ? F:: tha :::bi=a drive stea= supplies the ress.~ :s ' d'-= e _ha: the a c: ss-co_=ected s:cas supply (Op:1:s Oa) is = ore re'.iah'.e "-*- :he independe= s:ez= supply config= atics (Op:ic= 'b) is: :he reas ns discussed in See:ica 3.0. 2:ee differe:: p=p su::10: c figura:i: s were evalca:ec a:d de erd-=d c: represent ::~y slight differe=:es in reliabili:7 S e redu= dan: sue:ica line ::_fii; uratic: i= yi;;=es 15 a=d 2d is by a s=all arg1= the cst reliable because 1: allsvs pu=p suctic: heade: =ai:ite=a=ce to be perfor=ed separately on each of he :vo sec_ic=s of.he header. Se redu= dant suction valve configurati:n is yigures 1: a=d 2: is the nex: =ost reliable. Ar'" g a valve i= parallel to 2x-102 reduces the probab111:7 of suction lise flau blocka;;e; bu: does no: reduce the probability of tha sucti=n line bei=g inadver:e=:1y lef: clesed after 1 1 ? sais:enance because both valves would be closed as a coupled ac:1cs to a perform header saintenance. The existing suction configuratio: (yigures la and 2a) is only slightly less reliable -Jan the other confi;;uratio=s. The difference in unavailability between the three sue ion configurati. s e 1s so small that we conside: it to be insignificant. l 6-1 n L' SUPERSEDED l

32-11ggg35_93 Se negligible differe=ce 1: reliabili:7 cf he ari::s sue:i:: c==.figurati =s is due largely :: ratic: =f he pr babili:- Sf '-*-d 1:adver:e== failure to reepc: valva CT *.03 af:er heade: _ain:e=a=:e. Ois hu=a= error pr:babili:7 is ' '-':ed by va".- e li=eup checki=g procedures before s:artup and me hly fic.r res:s af e: s:ar p. 5 s A ::s:/benefi: evalua:10: ca be perf : med by 710 ida ?:ver Corpora:10: -? t

s de:e ' e.ine:her a.hird I?%~ pu=p sh:uld be iss:alled. Al hough o

addi: ice of a third pu-p represe :s a substas:ial decrease i: = avail-7 a3 abili:y, 3&k' believes :ha the vo p=p sys:e= p = posed is Raferes:e - =ay have an adecuately s=all u=availabili:7

e :ve-p=p sys:e= shou.id

~~ be carefully c==sidered, espe:ially i: Ligh: Of :he prop sed upgrades i==1udi=g the Ey:'C syste a=d fluid systa= c'..a ges, e d rece s =datic s =ade 1: See:ics 1.0 of Reference I.. ~he cos:s associa:ed with installa: irs of a third I?"4 pu=p (iscluding ~ pla=: dov :i=e) can be vaighed agai=s: expected benefits. Risk reduction beneft:s, :neasured in ta =s Of plan: release pr:babilities, ca= be quas:idied usi=g existing plant risk studies as a-basis. Ces:/be afi: 9 goals for risk reductics have been suggested ra=g1=g fre:: 5100 to S1000 1 per : nan-ren aver:ed. 1 i e e i In addition to risk redue:1on, ':he third IW pu=p ay provide 'other be=efits ie such as iscreased plant availabilley due to reductic: of forced outages caused by technical specifica:1cn 1*- d :s, and mduction of regulatory em pressu:e. i [ fI i 6 m,c. n e y n w >.e (a 113 ?. g. u~)frn p ' b >m .) 6 t,. y6 e & w..; c.

1 32-1126985-01 u =asC:s 1.

3. E. Rcber:s a=d 3. T. Ea.asi, 7e=* : Tre e ** 'boek, :C7IG-0492, Seve=ber 1978.

2. E G 2. Co eurer - Aided Ta=l: Tree Analvsis. 3abcock and 'a'ilecz Doc =-: Nc=ber NP O-3 336, Feb:,.ary 6, 1.950. 3. A. 3. Svain, E. I. Go --=, Ea=dbeck of E.=as 3411abi'i v _halvsis ud - :-basis e-Nuclear ?ever Pla=: Asclicatie=s, 5;3.IG/CR-1275, i October 1960.

l..

I=e-te==v Feedvarer 3rste= Tetrade Reliabi*i-- .1-= 'vsis for be } Cr-stal Ei-e- Nuclear Genera:1=2 5:atic T_i: 50. 3, Sabcock and ~~'ilcox Socsen: St=:bar 32-1.123434-00, April 1973. m-n2seo h nk D 1 SUPERSEDED

32-1126985-01 1 A22CCU A ran: r== - 5 9 7 1 .s l I I' SUPERSEDED a

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OE'112 985-by' A 1 PuuP EFP 3 FAILS A7 r% i EL EFP-3 EFP O ON ONLY OPTION ONLY \\/ \\/ TURBINE PUNP DIESEL PUMP EFP-3 FAILS EFP -3 FAILS 4A A.\\ a-2 t I i gl SUPERSEDED ~

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3 .. w swa ned W lhM AII IURBINE PUMP Efr 3 FAILS All ~ i 1 I TURBINE PUNP IURBINE STEAN PullP EFP-3 1 RAIN C EFP 3 NECilANICAL ADMISSION VALVE ASV-5A Falls 10 SUCTION FAILURE IN PN OPEN FAILURE CRU IAML, d-2 h o h3-F,., N u [h) (f3 M i; {Ffil c) O Ci} Rd c;s 7 O N W 4

q sann .s. 4 imme. 6, sent A TURBINE PUNP EIP-3 MlCHANICAL FAltuRE Al3 HQ SIEAt 10 CHECK VAlV MLCllANICAL ORIVE TURIINE IP 3A Flot IAI URI W 1 Putf EIP 3 M SLOCKAGE m m a p (X ~ ,,,A,,,, A y M e m O m (D m e IE aCHANICAL ICHANICAL 8 FAILURE DI ) IAILURE Of O [fr.3 10- [IP -3 10 H SIAR1 RUN tlP3TIFS ETP3llIR

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g .w m,g uses n.w ande ~ ~ ~ ' A PUNP EFP-3 I IN P.M. AIO rm \\ PLIt'INADVERIENTLY EFP-3 (EFT ISOLATED Ce t*@ (AND AllfRP.M. h3 pn DEDICATED %rr:0 DIESEL) e Q IN P.N. w .itl A20 N p"e3 EPf3AZPM g e '$[3 0). (iD CO Y h. OPERATOR E D ysp FAILS 10 EIV-3A 8 p.q.. I K-All0N ^ W) LEri O< VALVE g, N ~1 EFV3ZlRE UV3AnC

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1 / 32-1126985-01 TUREiNE PUWP LFP-2 Fil$5 ? / 4 \\.' s' N12 7% l I TUR3t NE PUNP TURSINE STE n PUNP EFP 2 TRAlt: 3 EFP.y VALVES Fall SUCil0N gg p,y, .blUEI . TO OPEN FAILURi 'ACTUAil0N CIRCUlt /3 1 /2 n N13 s A I CHANNEL PERATOR I B 3py FAILURES ACTUATION FAILS ) A-12 AFETRPCP i, k 3 g \\ 'l SUPERSEDED

02-1126980'01 ,Q. - 1. u :s i i i1 ; 11-. / ~ 8 -1 G i i g t y E

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g M O #CS M4"4 54*e d ** -= M i 20 II N0 sIEAN FRON sGA/sGB N20 yg H2! T ce h3 (A ANY OF NOV ll[CK VALVE 8 CODE SAFETY siOP CIIECK NsV 186/ N Msv-55/NsV 50 Nsy.lg; VALVES Fall 11 ryg srunious -rtos to itEsEAT Closure HLOCKAGE g gg CA csvsci.as Msysszsc Nsvisors Pf1 csvssus NsyssAsc usvieno o m 0 . O ~ u

oo th,N~ C g. 4C, CN CgDo0'OW o1 OMI WWI C 4 " n n iu u "' an k( n " i 5 r 0 e n s r e u 1 [uP"R r U i 'l P l I P[ I A I e S n i t i enSo l i P u f cm e [' i i r< a 1 P l 2 E 2N P M P U M P U I S P l P l I R I A 0 [ I N l P, i h o UN u .i P o o i n ca l' K c c S S V l 7 z i z O ci V i M. N F L V P I i O t i S n" B f e!, l t o, Z n[ c 0 el, V = e I E e 1 R E' E R P W U I O L E P I A 0 [: I 1 f.C UP. ,. Q,3 n {A d C7gRgT t {

$$'1.ih69sg-93 88=1126985-0.U 1" 8.@4gY T POWER 5 I* h FAILURE TO EP-1 2 gg'O f N23 j@ : n' ;a ~ hh h 6 U l s ec I E N N f l GENERATOR \\ g I LOOP l { DE3A FAILS 1 TO START OR ( IN P.N. Co LOOPZZZZ A~II DG3AZZFS I .a i i ) l SUPERSEDED 37

32-Il26985-01 1 = .== E

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32-1126985-01 S$*llab985-Uh 39 ' l l 2 69 g5 - 01 N5 %5 $a DC POWER FAILS N..:4 N54 t SATTERY OI GENERATOR 3A~33 togp DE A/0633 FAILS IAllS y SA3AZZAN LUDPZZZZ 7,-25 DG3AZZFS 3 BA35ZZAM LOOPZZZZ DG38ZZFS 2 l + J 1 ) SUPbd.F?NPTtole:"JD rf r-:p Pc M --,pw. ---w-- --.,,y q m ,_e- -,-n ---w y

l 82-112698o-01, 1 O e i mm=, m., - m = = m.m ; -, - 7 8 O 6 2: l l 4 l-Y' SUPERSEDED

e. m l 82-1126985-01. A_r %20? @caur #C u *~'* * 'y i=1:1ste 7.:a:g e :y Festeare: 1 4 b n 1 A e - C b 3 C b 3 C 1 ,1 l b I 4 C C 1 SUPERSEDED Y7

m._m c===t e - 10- 869aIT-54 ~ A = operator fails to recog=i=e the need for U4, lov."._4 pt:=p head alar:n l A = operator reads message incc rec-J.y 3 = operator fails to recos=12e the need for n a lov Steam Generator + alar: E J 3*= operator reads=== age incorrectly C = operator f ails to initiate ask of -=-=y actuati=g n J. once the ? need is recognized a I .s i e e T i I ? a e i D ut subra8. ta) a

"' =:' 32-1126985-01 Opera:c fails :o _s=ually cpen s:aa= ad=issien alve A 1 d i 1 a C b e b 3 d D 3 c C 1 b d 'D c C Y l 0 D i i SUPERSEDED W

32-1126985-01 AS 5Z20? (cas:'d) f ails to recog 1,2e tha need to Cyc vs.lve, cc fl:-J A = operatCT 4-d4-= tion free: pu=p A = reads low flow ala=m=== nee incorrectly l 3 = operator falls to recog=1== the need to open valve, low pe=p 1p alarm 3 = reads low paop i? =1= = ===== incorrectly 1 l C = *1* 7 operator fails to initiate task of opening valve once ~ given the i=s=ruction by the control roo= operator D = *'=7 operator manipulates wrong valve ? .9 1 l 54 SUPERSEDED l

l i CT5"C?.8/CT;32?"/C 133.m! Opera::: i=adver:en:17 leaves OST valve ::: sed af:e sh::ie heade: ai=:enas:e. 82-1.126985-01 a 6 s 5 3 p / / d 3 e (_ s 7 I "A" = naistainer fails to use precedure j "3" = maintainer omits step usi=g procedure (< 10 itects), no checkoff o "C" = maintainer omits step not usisc procedure (5 items) "3" = first checker fails to detect error of omission (on a list of valves) [ "E" = se d checker fails to detect arror of omission (on a list of valves) "5" = f:t.,ucucy of header maintenance per shutdown "2" = probabilley of E3*J demand before fi.se sonthly punp flow cast B-5 /[ F 4.# V} wI M'! ?" 7'. f.e*k li". * (c.v "

p P

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- p.

1 c s I = d 3- ,a b 3 = e 3 b Y e I 7 f o i e l 1 B-6 />~ SUPERSEDED

..._ _ _,.:. a... a-2 failur. Of ch.ci.: (2nd :p.ra::: :: -=' :ai:. ) te disc:-e: 3 = .=== f :=iss10: failurs := us. ch.:k-off,r: vision f ;;;c.du. ;;:p.:17 C = o 2.=.:= = - 1=, .== a f c.u s u= =,:.=, eh.eu ef f,=e a=. ;,,.c- = a = op.- n or = a . = = of o= u,1== =,1=, =3.:2 Off,:. u ur. = =,. c, va.1v.s s:1:ks during r.s:::a:ic= 1 = - = 3.:.:= f.tc., = :..:=.. s:uu=, vc.. _=,:.:. - 8 1 32 1126985.-01 6 t 7 1 I I t ".D SUPERSEDED $3

=. s'.'?3 / =. :.~-_n3 'CD'S%~n operator fails to open talve u.-4. u. -/IT~-3A, ich had bee:

• ft :1: sed af:e:

.e p.=:p preve= ive rai=ta=a:ce. 32-1126985-Or / / a /

• /

<40 1 g a~ 3 b c C ? 1 .t a k A = operator ignores =1m m, low pu:sp iP alarm l A = operator fails to tend =1mr m massaga correctly 3 = operator selects wrong switch to trip off pump C = operator in 1-414 =7 3=

• 1 d * *- fails to initiate taak of opening valve epon receiving instructien to do so D = operator in 1-414 = 7 3.e t a e fails to locate proper valve n,

A. t, t.,,. w.w L. w F

1.a...u? Cperator f ails to properly se_:ch suc_1== frc= Co=de=sa:e Storage Tars

s altersa:e I W Suetic:

3 - 11 p e g gg _91 ~112 985-fy o i 4 e E b 3 g ? e t g c 0 A = fails to notice low CST meter r== ding e 3 = ignores A? pump suction alarm C = fails to read message indf r = ting no pu=p iP D = fails to carry out plant procedure to switch suction when CST level is low i E = does not switch suction valves in correct order, fails to follow a logical procedure C = selects wrong M77 switches ) SUPERSEDED ST

1 l \\ i 1 32-1126985-Of 4 ~ I' AP?ICC C STS nf 3mit ? 203 Om? r.' .f O I 9 i { ( h ,i i 7 i F i 1 7 l SUPERSEDED f'

-m,w_- .1 ++k.e a A4 %.b m4m wAwea w a,m ,r.a a w

---

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4 32 - 112 6 9 C 5 .01-c.o s sm :ss-s o a.o A descripzi= cf the :vo p. p IT-l '::=figurati:= o.t.id :he resui:s of thda study are :s be compared ca= be f =d i: he **I arge:cy l Teodvate: Sys:e= Cpgrade Reliabili:7 A=alysis f:: :he :ystal 11ver-3 Nuclear Ge= ara 1=g 5.a.io= ::1: No. 3," (Ref ere=:e 4). A s1=plified sche:aa-de of.he two pu=p : fluid sys:e= ::=figura.io= is show: 1= Figure 3 ef this repor:. f J 0 As with the :vo pu=p systa=,.the three pu=p-systa= is capable of supply 1=g ITT :o ei:her or bo:h stem: ge=erators (SGs) f::= either of evo vater sources u= der automatic or mm mi 1:1.ia io=. Also, as.sta:ed in See:1o= 1.5 Amst. p:1o=s, the third M pt. p, whe he: turhise.or.=c:or drive =, vill be ac:uated per II!C cha==e1 A or 3. C.1 Su==a. - 3es e:1>tio: of 3esit= - Alte=atives t 4-a C.1.1 Diesel Drivec ?u::p Desirn i, 1. 3ase 3esig= (Option la) - The -k4-d M pu=p is a :notor driven { pu:p powered by a dedicated' diesel generat:r. hus the base a desis: co=sists of =otor, turbi=e, and diesel driven pu=ps. 7 g S e diesel driven pu=p is auto =atically started with =o ti=a dalay. See Figure la. i 9 0>tions Ib. Diesel driven razy base desig= plus a redundant i f suction line as shown i= Tigure 2b. I Ic. Diesel driven pur:p base desig= plus a bypass 4 i around esisting suction valve. See Figure ic. 1 iI a C-1 i ,M.A' wa.J s,r-s e

3 2 _17 ~e 6 9 o a_ - 01 n w -.,

= t= e =- 1, e= >==,,1

2. 3ase Oasi;;: (Op:1= 22) he.iird II'J p== is a : abina drive n=p. 2hus. he base desigs := sis:s od ve :urbine driven pu::ps and ose =otor drive = pu=p. Se '-d ;=p is au:=a:izal.17 s:ar:ed vi_h so ti=a delay. See Tig.::e 2a. Op:1=s 25. T=bise drives ;.::p base desi;;= plus independes: stea= supply lines as pe Fi;;=e 25. 2c. Turbine drives pu=p base desi;;= plus a bypass around. i the existis;; sue:1:= valve as she : i: Figure 2. O 2d. Turbise drives pcp base desi;;= plus a redundas: sue _1on line. See Fig = e 2:. V. 1 O _t d

~

SUPERSEDED

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