ML20214A278
| ML20214A278 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1982 |
| From: | Krimm R Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Grimes B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8611190361 | |
| Download: ML20214A278 (1) | |
Text
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KDV.05 '86 15:56 FEMA WASH FED CTR 2 P.03 i
Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 b
MAR 3 0 W82 C ), jf MEMORANDUM FOR: Brian Grimes l
Director Division of Emergency Preparednese U
'Nuc1 at R atory Commission
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FROM:
- 1 hard rirE # 7 #M Assistant Assochate Directot Office of Natural and Technological Hazards
SUBJECT:
Evaluation of the November 6,1980, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant Exercise Attached is a copy of the Post-Exercise Evolustion prepared by the Federal,
Emergency Management Agency, Region V, on the most recent Davis Besse Nuclear k
Power Plant joint exercise conducted on November 6,1980.
Ale.o included is the State of Ohio response to the recommendation for corrective action atade;by Region V following the November 6,1980, exercise.
The November 1980 Post-Exercise Evaluation by Region V indicates that the exercise demonstrated a lesel of preparedness of fsite adequate to protect the health and safety of the public in arose around the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Significant areas of the state plan and site exercise judged deficient Plant.
have been corrected by the State and work is continuing on mince deficiencies not yet totally resolved.
Region V personnel had a meeting with representatives from the State of Ohio on March 12, 1982, at which.further corrective actions necessary for Davis-Besse were discussed.
A second foll-scale exercise for the Davis-Besse facility la tentatively scheduled for September 1982.
287-0200 for Contact Vernon Adler, Chief, Technological Hazarda Division, at additional information.
Attachments 8611190361 820330 PDR ADOCK 05000346 F
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POST-EXERCISE EVALUATION STATE OF OHIO, OTTAWA COUNTY AND TOLEDO-EDISON COMPANY EXERCISES OF THE PEACETIME RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, PORT CLINTON, OHIO November 6, 1980 PREPARED BY FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS DIVISION, REGION V FEDERAL CENTER BATTLE CREEK, MICHIGAN 49016
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TABLE OF CONTENTS I.
INTRODUCTION................................................
1 1.
FEMA Responsibilities - Role of the Regional Advisory Committee (RAC)................................
1 2.
Exercise 0bjectives.....................................
1 3.
Critique................................................2 4.
Public Meeting..........................................
2 5.
RAC Evaluation 0bjectives..............................
2 6.
Participating State and Local Organizations............. 2 7.
Federal Observer Team..................................
2 8.
Evaluation Criteria.....................................
3 9.
Remedial Action Procedures..............................
3 10.
Review and Approval Procedures..........................
4 II.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
5 III.
EXERCISE SCENARI0...........................................
6 Synopsi s and Cri tique..................................... 6 Recommendations............................................~7 IV.
EVALUATIONS.................................................
8 A.
ASSIGNtiENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES (0RGANIZATION CONTROL)... 8 State E0C...............................................
8 l
Re c ommen da ti o n s......................................... 8 Ottawa County E0C.......................................
8 Recommendations.........................................
8 B.
ON-SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION (A licensee-related function on1y)..........................................
9 C.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPORT AND RESOURCES............... 10 State.................................................. 10 Re c o mme n d a t i o n s........................................ 10 D.
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM........................
11 State /Loca1............................................
11 Re c ommen d a ti o n s........................................ 11 E.
NOTIFICATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES....................
12 State /Loca1............................................
12 Re c omme n da ti o n s........................................ 12
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
F.
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS................................
13 State /Loca1.............................................
13 Re c omme n da ti o n s......................................... 1 3 G.
PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION........................
14 State...................................................
14 Recommendations.........................................
14 Ottawa County...........................................
14 Re c o mme n d a ti o n s......................................... 14 H.
EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT...................... 15 State...................................................
15 Recommendations.........................................
15 Ottawa County...........................................
15 Re c omme n d a ti o n s......................................... 15 I.
ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT.....................................
17 State...................................................
17 Re commen da ti o n s......................................... 17 Ottawa County...........................................
17 Recommendations.........................................
17 J.
PROTECTIVE RESP 0NSE.....................................
18 State /Loca1............................................. 18 Recommendations......................................... 18 K.
RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE CONTR0L........................... 19 '
PAGs / Fi el d. As s e s smen t................................... 19 L.
MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH SUPPORT....................... 20 State / Local............................................. 20 Recommendations......................................... 20 M.
RE-ENTRY AND REC 0VERY...................................
21 State / Local.............................................
21 Recommendations......................................... 21 N.
EXERCISES AND DRILLS....................................
22 0.
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING................ 23
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I.
INTRODUCTION On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.
I 1.
FEMA's imediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility-Radiological Emergency Planning include:
a.
Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans for adequacy.
b.
Determining whether the plans can be implemented, based upon observation and evaluation of exercises conducted in these jurisdictions.
Coordinating the activities of all of the involved Federal i
c.
and volunteer agencies.
(1)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
(2) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
(3) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
(4) Department of Energy (DOE)
(5) Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
.(6) Department of Transportation (DOT)
(7) Department of Agriculture (USDA)
I Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Advisory Committee (RAC) which is chaired by FEMA.
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Formal submission of emergency plans to the RAC by the States, involved local jurisdictions is, in each case, followed i
closely by the exercising, critiquing, and evaluation of these plans.
A folloup public meeting is held to acquaint the citizenry with contents of the plans, answer questions about l
them and receive suggestions on the plans.
- 2. A radiological emergency exercise was conducted November 6, 1980 between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the State of Ohio, Ottawa County, and the Toledo-Edison Company to assess the adequacy of the Peacetime Radiological Emergency Response Plans and prepara-tions to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency involving the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant, operated by Toledo-Edison Company near Port Clinton, Ohio.
1
3.
A critique of the November 6 exercise was held at 10:00 a.m.
November 7, 1980, at the Port Clinton American Legion Hall, Port Clinton, Ohio.
4.
A public meeting was conducted at 1:30 p.m., November 7,1980, at the Port Clinton American Legion Hall, Port Clinton, Ohio.
5.
General RAC objectives for the operational phase of the plans were to exercise and evaluate the following elements as described in the
-All-State Letter to State Emergency Services Directors in Region V, August 28, 1980:
Comunications and Warning Accident Assessment Capability of Field Assessment Teams Use of Protective Action Guides (PAGs)
Public Information
" Evacuation Methodolosy that would be used Provisions for Re-entry and Recovery of the Affected Area Direction and Control Comments on those general areas follow. The basic planning document on which the State and local plans were developed was i
NUREG 0654-FEMA REP-1.
6.
Participating organizations included:
a.
TheOhioDisasterServicesAgency(DSA)andthoseStateagencies
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having supportive roles, including the Department of Health, Department of Transportation, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
Site of operationsi The State EOC (Armory) at Wor.thington and the State Comunications Van on-the-scene.
j b.
Ottawa County - through the agents of the County Disaster i
Services Agency, the Sheriff, and the Board of Comissioners.
1 Site of operations:
the Ottawa County EOC (Courthouse) at Port Clinton.
l c.
Toledo-Edison Company, owner / operator of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Center (EOC) and the emergency on-site building (EOF)gency C Power Station.
Site of operations:
Davis-Besse Emer l
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7.
Federal Observers were:
l OBSERVER AGENCY SITE FUNCTION 1.
P. McCollough FEMA RAC Chairman i
2.
P. Frost FEMA State E00 Comunications 3.
B. Menczer NRC State EOC Comunications and Direction and Control t
[
4.
J. Pagliaro NRC State EOC Accident Assessment Protect'ive Action Guides i
l Re-entry / Recovery 5., D. Trites FEMA State EOC Public Information i
Direction and Control
1 OBSERVER AGENCY SITE FUNCTION
- 6. J. Devlin Center for State EOC Overview Planning and Research
- 7. D. Meyer FEMA State EJC byerview
- 8. F. Egland FEMA Ottawa Co. FC',
Communications 9.
J. Millen FEMA Ottawa C:. EOC Communications 10.
R. Tedeschi EPA Ottawa Co. EOC Radiological Health 11.
B. Grant NRC Ottawa Co. EOC Radiological Health 12.
E. Jascewsky DOE Ottawa Co. EOC Protective Action Guides Re-entry / Recovery 13.
H. King FEMA Ottawa Co. EOC Public Information i4.
K. Gerber FEMA Ottawa Co. E0C Evacuation 15.
W. Curtis FEMA /
Ott awn Co. EOC Evacuation Host Centers Red Cross 16.
G. Rapp FEMA Ottawa Co. EOC Direction and Control 17.
B. Williams FHA Ottawa Co. EOC Transportation 18.
G. Barber Center for0ttawa Co. EQC Overview Planning and Research 19.
L. Rice Center for Planning and Research 20.
F. Bourgin FEMA Ottawa Co. EOC Overview 21.
E. Robinson FEMA EOF Facility-Communications 22.
B. McMahan FEMA Communications Communications 23.
G. Wenger FEMA Van Overview 24.
S. Swanson FEMA Overview 25.
B. Bailey FEM [
Secretary 8.
Major functions witnessed by Federal observers were evaluated in accordance with the following criteria:
Capability outstanding; excellent demonstration Capability good; exceeds minimum' standards - some improvements recommended.
Capability acceptable; meets minimum standards - significant improvemen'ts neecec.
E Capability weak; does not meet minimum standards - significant improvements needed.
Capability not demonstrated or lacking.
9.
State and local jurisdictions are required to take remedial actions responsive, on a point-by-point basis, to the formal recommenda-tions of the RAC.
One month from receipt of this document State and local jurisdictions should submit to the RAC the corrective measures they have taken or intend to take.
If remedial act;ans cannot be instituted immediately, then a detailed plan scheduling and implementing remedial actions must be provided.
Recommendations for correcting deficiencies are listed in continuing numerical sequence following the critique of each observed function.
Herein is an example of the format to be used when indicating remedial actions.
CRITIQUE:
"The exercise was terminated without proper reduction from the ' General Emergency' classification."
Sample:
RECOMMENDATION #1 - Remedial Action:
Exercise Controllers have been directed to terminate future exercises after the nuclear plant is released from " General Emergency" status and appropriate re-entry and recovery actions are taken according to State and local plans and procedures.
10.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, Radiological Emergency Planning, Washington, D.C., that any deficiences noted in the exercise have been corrected and such corrections incorporated in the plan.
A State which seeks review and approval by FEMA of its plan, with annexes, shall submit an application for review and approval to the FEMA Regional Director of the Region in which the State is located.
The application, in the form of a letter from the Governor, or other State official as the Governor may designate, shall contain one copy of the completed State plan with an indication that deficiencies have been corrected.
Upon receipt of a State plan from the Regional Director, the Associate Director shall cause copies of the plan together with the Regional Director's evaluation, to be distributed to the members of the Federal Interagency Central Coordinating Comittee (FICCC) and other FEMA offices with appropriate guidance relative to their assistance in the FEMA review process as described in 44 CFR Part 350, Federal Register, Volume 45, Number 123
- Tuesday, June 24,1980 (Review and Approval of State and local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness).
The Associate Director shall conduct such review of the State plan as deemed necessary prior to its being forwarded to the appropriate NRC licensing bodies.
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II.
EXECUTIVE SUWARY It was the unanimous consensus of Federal observers at the exercise that the overall objective of the exercise was achieved and that plans and preparations were demonstrated to be adequate to protect the public in event of a radiological emergency at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant. Observers were particularly impressed with the high level of leader-ship displayed by key participating. officials at both State and local levels.
Radiological equipment was the best available, and the radiological health teams were knowledgeable in its use.
The State news media kit was excellent, and the participation of the Ohio National Guard in support of the State and local emergency response is a special asset to Ohio.
The State is to be comended.
The exercise took place at two primary locations:
the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at Worthington under the direction of the Ohio Disaster Services Agency; and the Ottawa County E0C at Port Clinton, under the direction of the Ottawa County Disaster Services Agency.
Regional Advisory Comittee (RAC) members assigned the task of formally observing activities at both State and County EOCs and at designated field positions (State communications van, Davis-Besse plant EOF, and evacuation center.
In addition, there were approximately an equal number of other observers or visitors from other utilities and States invited to attend. Altogether, the large number of observers may have hindered somewhat the exercising of emergency operations.
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III.
EXERCISE SCENARIO SYNOPSIS AND CRITIQUE:
There was a simulated Waste Gas Decay System failure at the David-Besse Nuclear Power Plant with, at the same time, radioactivity content in the system much higher tnan allowable or physically achievable.
Radiation monitor signals were assumed to fail to cause the plant ventilation system to isolate the Auxiliary Building exhaust as they are designed and tested to do.
In addition, all simulated operator actions taken to isolate the system were stopped by the Control Room Observer to allow for simulation of the necessary failures needed to permit the excessive off-site consequences to be reach.
Two personnel were working in No. 2 Mechanical Penetration Room.
During their maintenance activities, one individual tripped, broke his ann and became contaminated with radioactive material. The Control Room was informed and an UNUSUAL EVENT was declared.
Carroll Township EMS and Magruder Hospital were notified and, responded.
For the reason given above, the activity in No. 1 Waste Gas Decay Tank was simulated to be above allowable limits.
A crack then developed in one of the tank's manual isolation valves and began releasing its contents into the Auxiliary Building atmosphere.
The signal from the radwaste exhaust ventilation radiation monitors alarmed in the Control Room.
However, the trip functions for the ventilation system did not work and radioactive gases began discharging out the Station vent.
Auxiliary Building evacuation was announced as required. An " ALERT" classification emergency was declared.
Station Radiation Monitoring Teams were dispatched and the emergency centers for the Station and county were activated.
State personnel went to a standby status.
Over a short period of time, the crack in the valve began to degenerate and airborne radiation levels in the Auxiliary Building fncreased and a Station vent radiation alarm was received.
Meteorological instruments indicated the wind was blowing from the north-northeast toward the south-southwest.
The valve degenerated further and radiation levels out the Station vent increased dramatically.
A " SITE EMERGENCY" was declared and the State Emergency Operations Center was activated with designated personnel dispatched to Ottawa County.
Field monitoring teams were deployed and all major comunications networks were implemented to transfer information.
Roadblocks were set up in a two-mile radius as prescribed in the County Standard Operating Procedures.
The Station Chemistry personnel then reported significant radiation levels were ana lyzed using the Emergency Sampling System and a " GENERAL EMERGENCY" was declared.
Mock evacuation of persons in a two-mile radius 6
was initiated.
A portion of Lake Erie in the vicinity of the plant was cleared of boaters (simulated) in the event of a wind shift.
An evacua-tion center was set up to receive evacuees.
Field monitoring teams reported increased levels of radiation beyond the two-mile radius along the plume centerline.
Roadblocks were moved to a seven-mile radius along the plume pathway and personnel evacuation (simulated) continued.
At about this time, the Waste Gas Tank pressure was reduced to where the release was terminated.
However, efforts to monitor the plume continued.
Preliminary actions were made by the county to prepare for transport of persons from the Riverview Nursing home, if required.
NOTE: At this point, the scenario time jumed approximately six hours and thus required the v&rious response groups involved to consider a shift change for those personnel that had been working for a consecutive 10-12-hour period.
Plant recovery continued with no projected potential for additional off-site radiation releases. Also, field monitoring readings at this time indicated that the plume was dissipating.
Off-site recovery began.
Field monitoring teams surveyed the areas of evacuation for possible re-entry.
Results were favorable and the efforts of all participants involved were directed towards recovery and re-entry.
Upon satisfactory completion of these phases of emergency response, the event ended.
The radiological emergency on which the exercise was based was hypothetical and not indicative of the probability of, or possible scope of, an accident.
It was, however, designed to familiarize participants with all aspects of the emergency response plans and to demonstrate the operability and compatibility of the Toledo-Edison Company, Ottawa County, and State of Ohio Emergency Response Plans, which have been significantly revised over the past year to conform to new Federal guidelines.
There was some evidence at the State EOC of lack of sufficient and realistic exercise play. More exercise inputs by the exercise monitor could have assured more staff benefits on the part of all operational staff members present.
Also, more intensive interchange between State and local levels could have been exercised.
j RECOMMENDATION:
1.
In order to derive maximum training benefit for all participants, staff and field exercise inputs should be introduced as needed to assure l
maximum participation by all concerned (
Reference:
NUREG0654N.1).
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IV.
EVALUATIONS A.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY (ORGANIZATION CONTROL)
STATE EOC:
The exercise clearly demonstrated to Regional Advisory Committee (RAC) observers that the primary responsibilities for emergency response had been assigned and that supporting organizations at each level were aware of their responsibilities.
Each principal organization activated appeared to have adequate staff to respond initially and operate around the clock for several days, but there was an incomplete demonstration of shift change capabilities at both the State and Ottawa County EOCs.
The major strength demonstrated during the exercise was the overall comit-ment to a professional performance of responsibilities as demonstrated by the high level of leadership by key participating officials, the Directos of the State and county disaster services agencies, and the County Radiological Analyst in particular.
Participation by the Ohio National Guard in the emergency response was especially noteworthy. They were in comand of helicopter and jet air support on a large scale.
Not every State has enlisted this support, and observers found it to be a highly commendable innovation.
In conclusion, it was the consensus of observers that the capabilities of the State to respond to a nuclear accident were ou11 Qnding.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
2.
In future exercises, a complete shift change should be implemented to demonstrate provision for lines of succession for all emergency response personnel.
(Reference NUREG 0654 A.4).
OTTAWA COUNTY EOC:
The Ottawa County EOC Direction and Control function was rated by observers as outSfdDding.
However, regular internal briefings were needed and order could have been maintained better.
Support from local government officials was comendable.
Observer reports indicate that the flow of information within the County EOC was occasionally restricted or uncoordinated.
For example, the School Board representative within the EOC misinterpreted a State-relayed recomenda-tion to evacuate a two-mile radius of three designated emergency planning zones and ordered the evacuation of Port Clinton schools unnecessarily.
- Also, the Red Cross representative did not get the message that an evacuation was in process until much after the evacuation announcement.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
3.
County EOC Direction and Control functionaries should make an effort to tighten up coordination and internal order.
Regular verbal briefings and announcements for all participants within the EOC should be implemented to improve both information flow and coordination.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 A.1, A.2, J.10).
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9 8.
ON-SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION Section B, NUREG 0654 FEMA-REP 1 pertains only to licensee responsibilities for emergency response, and is not included in the exercise evaluation of State and local plans.
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C.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPORT AND RESOURCES 1
The State adequately demonstrated a good capability for contacting and requesting the use of available Federal ref3urtes.
It should be noted that a primary objective of the exercise is nat to exercise the Federal response program, but is intended to assure that the interface exists among State and Federal agencies for activating available resources.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
I None.
7 4
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D.
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM STATE / LOCAL:
Use of the standard emergency classifications and action level scheme as described in the utility, State, and local response plans was adequately demonstrated during the exercise.
It is concluded that the State's implementation of this section of their plan is good with one exception.
Re-entry was authorized prior to the posting of a reduction from the
" GENERAL EMERGENCY" classification on the status board.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
4.
Re-entry should not be authorized until a " downgrade" from " GENERAL EMERGENCY" is posted and announced.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 D.3, M.1).
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E.
NOTIFICATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES STATE EOC:
The State's notification and alerting system was rated by observers as good, exceeding minimum standards.
Some improvements, however, are recommended.
State EOC activation was prompt and efficient.
OTTAWA COUNTY EOC:
Notification and alerting functions at the county level were considered above p e by observers.
The Ottawa County E0C staff was on duty within 30 minutes following notification of the " ALERT" classification.
The EOC had been set up in advance of the exercise.
Phone alert was sometimes slow.
Although provisions were made for reliable communications organization and 24-hour per day manning of the communications link as required by NUREG 0654 II.4.1, there was room for some operational improvement. Messages and actions taken were sometimes slow; there was confusion in one important case regarding the plan definition of an " UNUSUAL EVENT"; and emergency.
capacity was restricted to just eight incoming telephone lines.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
5.
The Ottawa County Sheriff's dispatcher would benefit from further training regarding the approved plans (such as definitions of an
" UNUSUAL EVENT) and from using some sort of forms to record notification calls made and received.
It was felt that notification would also proceed more quickly if call lists were split up between two or more people.
Emergency capacity should be increased (more phone lines connected) to ensure that E0C communications would be kept open.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 E.1, E-5, and F-1).
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F.
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS STATE /0TTAWA COUNTY:
Observers rated the State's internal communications system above average.
Use' of closed-circuit TV monitors for status reports was excellent, with the exception that the top half of the status board was not visible on the monitors due to technical camera limitations.
More internal verbal communications between field operations of both the Ohio Department of Transportation and the National Guard, and the Ottawa County EOC need improvement.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
6.
Consideration should be given to the Ottawa County Engineer's expressed desire for a radio tie-in to both the Ohio Department of Transportation and the National Guard, which would provide a needed direct communications link between these field teams and the County EOC.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 F.1).
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G.
PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION STATE / COLUMBUS:
Press briefings were announced to be hourly, but in fact, were sporadic.
In addition, the press briefing officer demonstrated a lack of ability to reply to the technical questions.
OTTAWA COUNTY JOINT MEDIA CENTER:
Within the joint media center, briefings to the media were good with a few minor exceptions.
Questions and answers could not always be heard by everyone in the room.
The State DSA Public Information Officer was very capable and fully aware of his role. An excellent news kit was distributed to the media.
In one case the Public Information Officers did not understand the 10-mile evacuation recommendation and clarification was delayed.
Equipment (type-writer, copying machines, etc.) was not displayed, but was said to be available.
if needed.
Some news conferences lasted too long, keeping personnel away from assigned duties.
The status board was available, but was not used.
There was good coordination among spokespersons from the State, county, and utility prior to news conferences.
Utility involvement was extremely i
helpful to the overall Press Center effectiveness.
Announcements of several significant news items, such as termination of release and the re-entry order were delayed until regularly scheduled news conferences.
In some cases, spokesmen answered questions during briefings that were outside their area of expertise.
2 A few reporters gained unwarranted access to the Ottawa County EOC.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
7.
Press briefings at the State Press Center in Columbus should be regularly scheduled, as intended, and the press briefings efficer should be assisted by a technical advisor.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 G.4).
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H.
EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT STATE:
The State Emergency Operations Center at Worthington was rated above average.
The EOC facility and equipment were outstanding and there was good lighting, seating, desk space, and ventilation.
Security arrangements were good.
State EOC displays were judged to be very good.
However, the status board did not reflect all protective actions - stored-feed sheltering of down-wind cattle, for instance.
The use of closed circuit TV worked well except that the top section of the status board was not visible on TV monitors, necessitating strategic erasure.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
8.
State E0C displays need to be improved, perhaps with more flexible camera equipment, or alternative method.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 H.3).
OTTAWA COUNTY:
The Ottawa County E0C was rated acceptable.
However, it was crowded and noisy.
(This may not have been the case in a real emergency with observers absent.) Accommodations meet minimum standards, but significant improve-ments are recommended.
The Ottawa County E0C Operations area is located in the assembly room at the courthouse, which is arranged by use of movable partitions.
Present planning fails to provide optimum use of the adequate space, specifically failing to provide for representation by all major agencies at the main table.
For example, schools, Red Cross, and the National Guard repre-sentatives were not privy to conversations leading to decisions because of their locations and some confusion resulted.
While the supporting staff of each department or agency need not be at the main table, the chief or principal representative should better enable comunication with staff members by phone or in person.
There was good security to ensure that all persons entering the Ottawa County E0C had an official pass.
However, no sign-in/ sign-out sheet was used, so additional people could have gained access at various times by merely swapping passes.
All persons in the State and local E0Cs had identifical yellow passes with red lettering, with names printed so small that they couldn't be easily read.
Thus, there was no way to readily distinguish between participants, official cbservers, visitors, etc.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
9.
Ottawa EOC space should be rearranged, enlarging the area at the " horseshoe table" to accommodate the principal representative of each department or agency with emergency response assignments.
This can be achieved by moving the portaole partitions and using the door farther back in the room as th! entrance.
It is understood that protected space in the new building aljacent to the courthouse is earmarked for a future EOC location and only needs finishing.
Hopefully, this can be accomplished and configured to permit optimum operational response for such emergencies.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 H.2, H.3).
O 10.
A color coding system for passes should be developed that readily distinguishes participants, official observers, visitors, etc. Once this system is in place, some control measures can be implemented where necessary, during future exercises to limit the impact of observers and visitors on operations.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 N.1, N.2, and N.4).
- 11. A roster of scheduled participants and observers should be available to security officers, and a sign-in/ sign-out sheet employed. Also, in real emergencies, the secure area should include the entire first floor of the courthouse.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 H.4).
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I.
ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT STATE:
The State demonstrated a good capability for providing methods, 1 equipment, and expertise for rapid assessment of real or potential radiological hazards existing in the liquid or gaseous pathway.
This included activation, notification, transportation, communications, and monitoring equipment.
i The speed with which the team was dispatched was considered slower than desirable.
Teams could have been dispatched by helicopter rather than take auto, but the State apparently considered this option and discarded it.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
None.
OTTAWA COUNTY The Ottawa County nuclear emergency plan requires clarification of one issue. Although not required by NUREG 0654, the County's plan calls for a county field assessment team to make radiological measurements independently of the measurements taken by the State team.
This function was not performed during the exercise.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
11.
Ottawa County should review whether it really wants to make its own field measurements, and if it does, this activity should be included in future exercises.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654, I.8, P.4).
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J.
PROTECTIVE REP 0NSE STATE / LOCAL:
The State Emergency Plan includes a range of protective actions for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public and provides guidelines for choosing such actions during an emergency.
During the exercise, the State demonstrated an above average capability to make appropriate decisions regarding protective actions during an emergency in outstanding fashion.
Procedurally, evacuation response went generally well.
No traffic control measures were observed, however.
Local government did not seem sufficiently involved with hosting.
There were no participants on which to exercise Ottawa County's hosting capability.
RECOMMENDATION:
13.
Evacuation and hosting response capabilities should be more fully demonstrated at future exercises.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 J.10 and N.1).
w
K.
RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE CONTROL STATE:
The exercise demonstrated that the capability to control radiological exposure for emergency workers was considered by observers to be good and the means for accomplishing this objective were present.
Exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Life-saving Activity Protective Actions Guides were available, but workers may have been allowed to stay too long in radiologically-affected areas, which would have resulted in their overexposure.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
14.
Responsible radiological personnel should monitor the radiological situation concerning the cumulative dose received by essential workers in affected areas to assure that such workers are adequately protected and that existing exposure control guidelines are ' ' lowed.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 K.3).
19
L.
MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH SUPPORT STATE / LOCAL:
The exercise demonstrated the capability of the State and local jurisdictions to cope with contaminated and injured individuals and provide them with medical services.
The State and local levels of emergency government took the necessary steps to insure adequate planning for medical problems which may occur.
It was evident that transporation of injured persons to hospital facilities had been arranged for and that the capability existed on a stand-by basis during the exercise.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
None.
l l
M.
RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY STATE / LOCAL:
The State and local emergency response plans contain instructions for re-entry, recovery and post-accident operations.
Re-entry was authorized prior to the posting of a reduction from the
" GENERAL EMERGENCY" classification on the status board.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
15.
See Recommendation #3.
~
N.
EXERCISES AND DRILLS STATE / LOCAL:
The annual exercise, conducted to evaluate major portions of the State and local jurisdiction emergency plans, was considered by observers to be outstanding.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
None.
M
~
0.
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING-Radiological emergency response training of RAD Health teams is con-sidered by observers to have been good, but some improvement is recommended.
Although the Radiological Health team was knowledgeable regarding the use of radiological equipment, it was not clearly demonstrated that they understood how to interpret the collected data correctly.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
16.
Radiological Health teams should be provided more training in using radiation detection equipment in order to function at a maximum level in their assigned positions.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 0.4).
-,