ML20214A208
| ML20214A208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/07/1986 |
| From: | Merschoff E, Petrosino J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214A194 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900403 NUDOCS 8611190304 | |
| Download: ML20214A208 (10) | |
Text
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ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA PEPORT INSPECTION INSPECT.'ON N0.: 99900403/86-02 DATES: 07/14-16/86 JN-SITE HOURS:
20 CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS:
General Electric Company Nuclear Energy Business Operations (NEBO)
ATTN: Mr. W. H. Bruggeman, Vice-President and General Manager 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 45125 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT: Mr. J. J. Fox, Senior Program Manager TELEPHONE NUMBER:
(408) 925-6195 NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: General Electric Company (GE) NEB 0, currently is the central design, engineering and nuclear plant services center for all of the domestic GE nuclear activities regarding comercial nuclear power generating plants.
S
- 4 ASSIGNED INSPECTOR:
a de J. 4./etrosino, Reactive Inspection Section (RIS)
Date OTHER INSPECTOR (S): None.
APPROVED BY:
/'
// 7 1 E. W. Merrchof f, Chief, endor Program Branch Date INSPECTION BASES AND SCOPE:
A.
BASES: Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50.
B.
SCOPE: To review the corrective actions perforced by GE on two vendor related deficiencies.
PLANT SITE APPLICABILITY: Big Rock Point (50-155); Browns Ferry I/2/3 (50-259/
260/296); Clinton 1(50-461); Cooper Station (50-298); Dresden 2/3 (50-237/249);
(continued on next page) 8611190304 861107 99 EMVGEt 00 03
e OPGANIZATION: GENERAL FLFCTRIC COMPANY
~
SAN JOSL. CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900403/86-02 RESULTS:
PAGE 2 of 8 PLANT SITE APPLICABILITY (continued): Duane Arnold (50-331); Fermi 2 (50-341);
Fitzpatrick (50-333); Grand Gulf 1/2 (50-416/417); Hatch 1/2 (50-321/3661; Hope Creek 1 (50-354); Lacrosse (50-409); LaSalle 1/2 (50-373/374); Limerick 1/2 (50-352/353); Monticello (50-263); Nine Mile Point 1/2 (50-220/410); Oyster Creek 1 (50-219); Peach Bottom 2/3 (50-277/278); Perry 1 (50-440); Pilgrim 1 (50-293); Quad Cities 1/2 (50-254/265); River Bend (50-458); Shoreham (50-322);
Susquehanna 1/2 (50-387/388); Vermont Yankee 1 (50-271); and Washington Nuclear 1 (50-397).
A.
VIOLATIONS:
Nnne.
B.
t!ONCONFORMAt:CES:
1.
Contrary to Criterion VII, " Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services," of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, GE failed to perform effective source evaluation surveys at Conax Buffalo and Conax Florida to assure that components procured for SLC explosive valve replacement parts were properly controlled during fabrication (86-02-01).
Speci Mc examples of improperly procured components are listed by GE purchase order (P0) number as follows:
a.
P0-205-XN109 Fitzpatrick 3-SLC explosive valve replacement kits b.
P0-205-XN510 Fitzpatrick 3-SLC explosive valve replacement kits c.
P0-205-XK789 Perry 2-SLC explosive valve replacement kits d.
P0-205-XN337 Shoreham 6-SLC explosive valve replacement kits e.
P0-205-XN338 Grand Gulf 8-SLC explosive valve replacement kits
ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
~
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION N0.: 99900403/86-02 RESULTS:
PAGE 3 of 8 f.
P0-205-XN381 Limerick 3-Explosive chamber devices 9
P0-205-XN733 Limerick 2-SLC explosive valve replacement kits h.
P0-205-83L460 Limerick 10-SLC explosive valve replacement i
kits I
1.
P0-205-XN642 Pilgrim 3-SLC explosive valve replacement kits J.
PO-205-XN722 Hatch 8-SLC explosive valve replacement kits k.
P0-205-XN723 Nine Mile Point 2 3-SLC explosive valve replacement kits l
1.
P0-205-83L418 Susouehanna 7-SLC explosive i
valve replacement I
I kits m.
P0-205-83L438 Susquehanna 12-SLC explosive valve replacement kits 1
2.
Centrary to Criterion XVI, " Corrective Actions," of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, GE failed to take adequate measures to assure that the vendor performed corrective action to establish a nuclear CA progran for its SLC explosive valve component manufacturing.
Specifically, the vendor was permitted to use a MIL-I-45208 inspection and test program instead of the required ANSI N45.?
ouality assurance program (86-02-02).
C.
UNRESOLVED ITEMS:
None.
ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 1
REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900403/86-02 RESULTS:
PAGE 4 of 8 0.
STATUS OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS:
Not addressed during this inspection.
E.
OTHER FINDINGS OR COMMENTS:
1.
Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System Explosive Valve Components GE's disposition of a January 1984 nonconformance regarding the failure of a nuclear basic component manufacturer to implement a nuclear QA program was reviewed and discussed with GE personnel, a.
Background
The Vermont Yankee (VY) nuclear plant recently discovered that both pathways of the SLC system failed to fire and had been inoperable for approximately 18 months. The root cause of the failure was incorrectly wired explosive primer chamber (EPC) assemblies which were manufactured by the Conax Corporation. VY later determined that it had received six incorrectly wired EPC assemblies from Conax. Therefore, the NRC conducted an inspec-tion at the Conax Corporation facilities to review the circum-stances of the failure and to determine how incorrectly wired EPC assemblies were able to go undetected through several tiers of product verifications within the vendor's required nuclear quality assurance program.
The Conax Buffalo Corporation (CBC) facility was inspected by the NRC on April 14-18, 1986 and the inspection was continued on April 28-30, 1986 at the Conax, St. Petersburg, Florida (CF) f acility (reference NRC report #99900323/86-01).
During the inspection it was revealed that Conax had not estab-lished a nuclear QA program to control the manufacture of nuclear basic components at its Florida facility.
- Instead, Conax Flcrida imposed a military inspection and test program on the control of its nuclear items. Additionally, it was revealed that Conax Puffalo did not impose its ANSI N45.2 QA program on all of its SLC replacement component manufacturing. Rather, if the component part number was prefixed by four numbers, no APSI N45.2 program was imposed. Those components that were~
prefixed by an "N" were manufactured under an ANSI N45.2 progran.
=.
~
ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900403/86-02 RESULTS:
PAGE 5 of 8 It was noted during the NRC inspection at the CBC facility that GE had previously identified the failure of Conax to control the manufacturing of certain safety-related components in accordance with the required ANSI N45.2 QA program, but did not take adeouate actions to ensure that Conax corrected the problem.
GE identified this nonconformance on GE deviation disposition request (DDR) numbers 30021-30024, dated January 31, 1984.
However, no vendor corrective actions to prevent recurrence were delineated on the DDRs. Therefore, this issue was scheduled for a follow-up at GE's offices.
b.
GE Documents Related to SLC Issue 1.
GE Supplier deviation disposition request (DDR) numbers 30021-30024, written 2/2/84, approved 2/6/86, Conax Buffalo Corporation (CBC), subject: Vendor manufacturing explosive valve replacement kits, MPL #C41-F004, without imposing the required ANSI N45.2 nuclear QA program requirements.
2.
GE Nuclear Power Systems Engineering Department Memo, dated 2/1/84, from G. L. Moore, subject: Trip report to CBC on 1/25-27/84 - to resolve questions in connection with the SLC explosive valve.
3.
GE Nuclear Power Systems Engineering Department Memo, dated 1/27/84, from J. Boseman to H. Ehsen, subject:
Potential 10 CFR Part 21 reportable condition regarding SLC explosive valve replacement kits (MPL #C41-F004),
subject:
SLC explosive valve replacement kits were not manufactured in accordance with ANSI N45.2 contract requirements.
a.
GE Quality Assurance Engineered Equipment & Installation Department GA Systems, Audit Report, dated 10/3-6/83, Conax Corporation - Buffalo, New York and St. Petersburg, Florida, subject: An ANSI N45.2 and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 audit which determined that "Conax was in compliance with quality practices as stated in their QA manual."
5.
GE Quality Assurance Engineering & Services Memo, dated 7/29/86, from C. L. Lewis to Conax Supplier File, subject:
Clarification of Conax audit report of 10/3-6/83 "The October 1983 intent of subject audit report was the approval of only the Conax Buffalo facility."
i.
ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900403/86-02 RESULTS:
PAGE 6 of 8 c.
Discussion A review was performed of the documents listed above and it was found that GE was aware that Conax was not supplying the SLC system replace-ment components in conformance with its procurement requirements. The 10 CFR Part 21 reportability memo (b.3) listed above indicates that 70 SLC system replacement components were not manufactured in accordance with an ANSI N45.2 QA program or equal.
Instead, the replacement components were manufactured to a MIL-I-45208. military inspection and test program which addresses only a portion of a typical nuclear 0A program. A review of several Conax certificates of conformance during the Conax inspection indicated that a MIL-I-45208 program was used in lieu of the required ANSI N45.2 CA program.
General Electric identified on DDR #30021-30024, item b.1 above, that Conax failed to control the manufacturing operation of its SLC explo-sive valve replacement parts (except for part numbers that were pre-fixed by "N") in accordance with the required ANSI N45.2 OA program.
The DDRs accepted the deviating hardware on a "use-as-is" disposition based on a statement that SLC replacement hardware was acceptable as recommended by Conax because the QA program " employed" at Conax Florida contains the same program elements required by ANSI N45.2, and that the attached GE trip report shows acceptability of the OA program that was implemented. However, the NRC inspector determined that both of the ducuments that GE based their hardware acceptance on, (b.2 and b.4 above) were in error. Specifically:
1.
GE memo, b.2 above, improperly concluded that the program implemented at the Conax Florida facility..."has all of the ANSI N45.2 elements in place," based on GE-Conax discussions at Buffalo without any GE inspection or visit to the Florida facility.
2.
GE audit report, b.4 above, concluded that Conax Buffalo and Conax Florida was in compliance with quality practices as stated in their nuclear QA manual. However, NRC-GE discussions determined that only Conax Buffalo was in compliance and that Conax Florida was inadvertently added to the audit report. A GE clarification letter (b.5 above) was subsequently submitted to the GE files and the NRC inspector.
Additionally, GE memo, b.3 above, indicates that even though the explosive valve components were not manufactured in accordance with an ANSI N45.2 program the hardware is acceptable. The memo states that "it is apparent that adequate quality assurance
i.
ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION N0.: 99900403/86-02 RESULTS:
PAGE 7 of 8 provisions are provided by the MIL-I-45208 program when manu-facturing the functional explosive element of the valve." However, the MIL-I-45208 program does not address several important ANSI N45.2 attributes such as:
(1) establishment and execution of a QA program; (2) QA/QC inspectors independence from cost and schedule; (3) design change control; (4) qualitative and quantitative accept-ance/ rejection criteria; (5) document review, approval and control; (6) control of special prccesses; (7) inspections performed by individuals other than those who performed the work; (8) inspection hold / witness points; (9) indoctrination and training; and (10) internal audits to verify adequacy / execution of program. How-aver, the GE conclusion in the above memo (b.3) was incorrect as evidenced by 12 nonconforming explosive primer chambers that went undetected through the Conax quality assurance test inspection and verification system at Florida.
Ultimately, GE's disposition of this matter resulted in Conax Florida's continuing to manufacture nuclear components without a QA program.
d.
Conclusion The failure of Conax to comply with the GE procurement document ANSI N45.2 OA program requirements was adequate.ly identified by GE However, GE failed to procure nuclear basic components in accordance with their purchase order document QA recuirements, and did not take adequate steps to ensure that Conax performed corrective action tc prevent recurrence at the Conax f acilities.
1.
Elma Power Supplies:
A review was performed to determine if GE had addressed workmen-ship, overheating and other similar problems that have been identified with Elma's ferroresonant power suppliet. GE has adequately addressed and has taken corrective actions to pre-vent field failures of the power supplies.
F.
PERSONS CONTACTED:
G. P. Ferguson, QCE-QAEt,S, GE/ NEB 0 K. Utsumi, EDE, Sr. Engineer, GE/NEBC R. A. Luoma, EDE, Sr. Engineer, GE/ NEB 0 R. T. Kern, EDE, Engineer, GE/ NEB 0 J. J. Boseman, Principal Engineer, GE/ NEB 0
i.
ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTIOF N0.: 99900403/86-02 RESULTS:
PAGE 8 of 8 F.
PERSONS CONTACTED (continued)
C. L. Lewis, QCE, GE/ NEB 0 T. Gachowski, Manager, GE/ NEB 0 E. Y. Gibo, Syste a Engineer, GE/ NEB 0 H. P. Williams, Manager, GE/ NEB 0 J. J. Fox, Senior Project Manager, GE/ NEB 0 G. B. Stramback, Safety Evaluation Manager, GE/NE80
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