ML20213F334

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Responds to IE Compliance Bulletin 86-003 Re Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of air- Operated Valve in Min Flow Recirculation Line,Previously Investigated in IE Info Notice 85-094.Potential Nonexistent
ML20213F334
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire, 05000000
Issue date: 11/10/1986
From: Tucker H
DUKE POWER CO.
To: Grace J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, IEIN-85-094, IEIN-85-94, NUDOCS 8611140158
Download: ML20213F334 (2)


Text

O DUKE POWER GOMPANY P.O. box 33180 CHARLOTTE. N.C. 28242 IIAL !!. TUCKER TELEPHONE voce parammur (704)373 4531 wiza.aAm emonocrios November 10, 1986 Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Catawba Nuclear Station Docket Non. 50-413 and 50-414

Subject:

IE Compliance Bulletin 86-03 Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-Operated Valve In Minimum riow Recirculation Line

Dear Dr. Grace:

The above referenced IE Compliance Bulletin required that each licensee review their facility to determine whether or not a single-failure vulnerability in the minimum flow recirculation line of any ECCS pumps could cause a failure of more than one ECCS train.

This concern was previously investigated as a followup to IE Information Notice 85-94.

From this review it was concluded that the McGuire and Catawba ECCS pump

.ainimum flow lines are adequately designed to protect the pumps (McGuire and Catawba designs are essentially identical).

The issue of single failures and deadheading ECCS pumps was discussed extensively with the Staff during the operating license review of Catawba. This issue was discussed in response to questions 440.36, 440.110, and 440.142 as well as in Catawba FSAR Tables 6.3.2-5 and 6.3.2-6.

The issue was closed in Supplement 2 to the Catawba SER (Section 6.3.2).

As a result of these reviews, we have concluded that McGuire and Catawba do not have the potential for a single failure causing the failure of more than one ECCS train as discussed in the subject Bulletin.

8611140158 861110 PDR ADOCK 05000369 G

PDR hlo

Dr. J. Nalson Grecs, RIgion21 Adninistrator November 10, 1986 Page Two I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements set forth herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Very truly yours, i

a Hal B. Tucker LTP/42/slb Attachment xc: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr. K. Jabbour Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Mr. W. T. Orders NRC Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station Mr. Darl Hood Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555

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