ML20213E634
| ML20213E634 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1983 |
| From: | Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Knight J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0665, CON-WNP-665 NUDOCS 8310310119 | |
| Download: ML20213E634 (2) | |
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- y Distribution Docket File ASB Rda. File OCT 2 41983 ASB "enbers LRubenstein MEMORANDUti FOR
James P. Knight, Assistant Director for Components and Structures Engineering, Divis;on of Engineering FROM:
L. S. Ruoenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systens, Division of Systems Integration
SUBJECT:
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 - IflTERIM OPERATION JUSTIFICATION - DOCKET NO. 50-397 We have reviewed the interim operation justifications for WMP-2 provided by your memorandums dated July 29 and October 5, 1983, for those components which are part of systems for which the Auxiliary Systems Branch has primary responsibility.
It is our understanding from discussions with your staff that this interim justification is applicabls to either the second refueling or March 1985, whichever comes first.
The justifications numbered 1, 2,. 3, 4, 5, and 23, are concerned with com-ponents in the Containment Instrument Air Supply (CIAS) System and the bottled nitragen backup system.
The CIAS provides air for operation of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS).
The ADS. is only required when HPCS is inopera-tive.
Following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) with failure of the HPCS system and failure of the CIAS system and any of the component (s) identified in the interim operation justifications, the accumulators will still provide a minimum of one operation of the ADS.
With the reactor pressure reduced, the low pressure systems can provide makeup water to the reactor.
Chnuld additional operation of the ADS be necessary, the nitrogen bottle systen can be initiated manually.
Interim operation justification Number 2 concerns the use of an unqualified isolation valve in the CIAS system.
Should this valve fail, a check valve provides the required isolation from the nitrogen bottle system.
The reactor building outside air isolation valve position switch ROA-POS-V/1 does not have the documentation required for being considered as a qualified switch (interim operation justification Number 17). This switch provides indication of the emergency ventilation damper position for valve ROA-V-1.
l The damper and its associated solenoid valve are qualified, as is the redun-dant damper (R0A-V-2).
Therefore, isolation will be achieved automatically considering any single failure concurrent with the LOCA.
Contact:
J. Ridgely X29 A l
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Jam:s P. Knight OCT 2 41983 Interim operation justification Number 19 concerns the motor operators (SW-M0-187A and 188A) for the valves which connect the Standby Service Water System (SSWS) to the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (SFPC) System heat exchanger when the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System is not avail-able.
These valves are nomally closed and no single failure can result in a motor opening a valve.
Since no spent fuel will be stored in the spent fuel pool until the first refueling, the SFPC system will not be needed during the first cycle; thus, no backup cooling is required.
These motor operators will be qualified by the end of the first refueling.
The failure of nonqualified remote manual control switch RRA-RMS-FN/2 for testing the air handling unit fan RRA-FN-2 is addressed by interin operating justification Number 26.
The failure of the nomally open contacts of this switch due to a HELB will have no effect on the operation of the RHR equip-ment in this compartment.
The failure of this switch as a short-to-ground would prevent RRA-FN-2 from operating and thereby adversely affect the RHR equipment in this compartment. The redundant RHR equipment will not be affected, and therefore, the RHR system will perform its intended safety-related functions.
Based on our review, we conclude that the Washington Public Power Supply System has demonstrated that the operation of WNP-2 without the qualified equipment as identified in the interim operation justification items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 19, 23, and 26, does not represent an undocrisk to the health and safety of the public for an interim period of operation.
c&r.1 @ed by L 2., M a..s d a L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems Division of Systems Integration cc:
R. Mattson
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