ML20213E072
| ML20213E072 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1986 |
| From: | Bailey J GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GN-1155, NUDOCS 8611130005 | |
| Download: ML20213E072 (5) | |
Text
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Georcis Ibwxr CompIny Fbst Offica Box 282 Waynzsboro, Georgia 30830 Telephone 404 554-9961 404 724-8114 Southern Company Services, Inc.
Fbst Office Box 2625 Birmingham, Alabama 35202 Telephone 205 8704011 g
November 5, 1986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation File:
X3BL01 Attention:
Mr. B. J. Youngblood Log:
GN-1155 PWR Project Directorate #4 Division of PWR Licensing A U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Ref:
(1)
J. A. Bailey to B. J. Youngblood, letter of October 10, 1986, GN-1108, regarding fire protection.
(2)
J. A. Bailey to B. J. Youngblood, letter of October 24, 1986, GN-1136, regarding fire protection.
NRC DOCKET NUMBERS 50-424 AND 50-425 CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NUMBERS CPPR-108 AND CPPR-109 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PIANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 OPEN ITEM 7:
FIRE PROTECTION
Dear Mr. Denton:
Confirming our conversation with your staff on November 4,1986, Georgia Power Company has developed the following information regarding fire protection issues at VEGP. This information supplements that supplied in the referenced correspondence.
Missing Fire Dampers:
It has been discovered that nine fire area boundary HVAC penetrations on VEGP Unit I are not equipped with fire dampers as required by Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, paragraph C.5.a.4.
The penetrations of concern involve ductwork which enters the large auxiliary building pipe chase (fire area 1-AB-LD-PC) from fire area 1-AB-LD-B.
The duct passes through the pipe chase and returns to fire area 1-AB-LD-B.
A similar condition exists on Unit 2.
Sketch 1 shows the approximate location of the subject ducts and penetrations inside the pipo chase. This sketch was developed from FSAR figure 9A-7.
Sketch 2 was de veloped from FSAR figure 9A-8.
These sketches have been provided to clarify the location of the pipe chase and the subject penetrations relative to other auxiliary building fire areas.
As reflected in an upcoming amendment to Appendix 9A, the pipe chase contains no combustible material. The chase is normally inaccessible and contains no safe shutdown or safety-related mechanical equipment, electrical components or cable. Since all the HVAC penetrations which do not contain rated dampers 8611130005 861105 kO(j PDR ADOCK 05000424 o
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o Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation November 5,1986 Page 2 open from the chase to the same fire area, no potential exists for a fire to spread from one safe-shutdown component to the redundant component. The pipe chase is common to both units, but is provided with a temporary 3-hour fire wall for unit separation prior to Unit 2 operation. This wall will be removed because of operational considerations when Unit 2 is placed in service.
It should also be noted that the ducting is not open to the pipe chase. The Unit 1 duct openings are all into fire area 1-AB-LD-B.
Because the pipe chase contains no combustible material it is not reasonable to consider the chase as a pathway for fire propagation from one room to another except through the HVAC ducting. As the subject rooms are not separated at the floor elevation, no material gain in protection would be realized by installing fire dampers in the ducting.
For these reasons an approval of a deviation from paragraph C.5.a.4 is requested for these nine penetrations.
Use of Fire Rated Damming Board as a Partition in Silicone Foam Penetrations:
Our October 24, 1986 letter discussed the use of fire rated damming board to partition silicone foam penetrations and prior tests of partiticaed penetrations. In the November 4,1986, meeting in Bethesda, the results of an additional proprietary test of partitioned penetration openings was discussed.
The 30" by 30" tested penetration opening was subdivided into two sections using 1" thick M-board, a non-combustible material similar to the Carborundum hot board used at VEGP. The penetration was sealed with a silicone foam and was subjected to the fire test in a floor configuration. The test configuration drawing contained in the test report specifies that the M-board is to be wedged into the penetration opening. This is similar to the method of installation at VEGP. Each section of the subdivided openings contained a penetrating tray section and a penetrating 4" conduit.
The test assembly was subjected to a 3-hour fire test utilizing the standard time / temperature curve as described in ASTM E-119.
The fire test was followed by a hose stream test in accordance with the criteria of ASTM E119. The test assembly satisfied the limiting end point temperature criteria, did not pass flame during the course of the test, and successfully withstood the hose stream test.
This additional information provides further clarification for the basis for the use of the silicone foam penetration seals in a subdivided configuration.
The subject test was not identical to the VEGP installation, but is sufficiently similar to provide assurance that the VEGP installation is adequate.
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation November 5,1986 Page 3 Should you require additional information, please let me know.
Si cerely,
~
f:.
J. A. Bailey Project Licensing Manager JAB /caa Enclosure xc:
R. E. Conway NRC Regional Administrator R. A. Thomas NRC Resident Inspector J. E. Joiner, Esquire D. Feig B. W. Churchill, Esquire R. W. McManus M. A. Miller L. T. Gucwa B. Jones, Esquire
- 0. Batum G. Bockhold, Jr.
Vogtle Project File I
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