ML20212M606
| ML20212M606 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1986 |
| From: | Glenn J SENATE |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212M594 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8608260413 | |
| Download: ML20212M606 (8) | |
Text
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'21Cnifeb Stafes Senafe WASHINGTON. O C.
20510 July 30, 1986 Office of Congressional Affairs Director Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, NW Washington,iD.C.
20555 i
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l
Dear Sir:
Enclosed please find correspondence that I have received from Mary Gibson concerning similarities between Chernobly and US commercial power plants.
I would appreciate your most expeditious attention to this matter.
Please respond directly to Mary Gibson.
However, for my office records please send a copy of your response to Mr. Brian Dettelbach of my staff.
Best regards.
Sincerely, John Glenn United States Senator JG/bdm i
Enclosure f
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July 24, 1986 Mary Gibson 2817 Hampshin Rt.
- leveland Hts., Ohio 44118 Senator John Glenn 503 Hart Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510' y
Dear Sgnator Glenn,
}
f Aeoording to a recent report by the Union of Geneerned Scientists (Chernobyl's Message: Look Again at Gentainments in the United States, Nancy Maxwell, Nucleus; 8:)-7, Summer 1966) the Chernobyl plant bore striking simi1=rities to Geneml Electrie plants Mark I, II and III) of which Ferry 1 is one currently in operation i
and Ferry 2 under constmotion. "eth are Mark III models.
Like Chernobyl, the G.E. Mark III model has a defective containannt wall er building that aan rupture under unusual stress such as that experienced in a major aooident from which mdioattive material can escape. Given that there are differ-enoes betweenG.E.'s WH=g water master (BWR) and the Soviet BWR the principle used is the same; a pressure suppraesien containment system. The problem is the j.
pressure suppassion system must keep paos with the flow of steam into the eestain-ment. If it does not POW. This beoones a problem because the pressure contaissent
'i is too small. It also subject to the danger of "by-pass lcakage" which osuses increased pressure and can rupture a oontainment.
Another inherent danger in the design is the risk of hydrogen explosinn.
t Hydrogen is released in "even relatively mild accidents". It was a 4drogen explosion that blev the roof off the Chernobyl plant. The systems in place at i
Chernobyl (for safety) were almost identical to those used in the 0.E. plants.
What is noteworthy is that the Chernobyl plant blev up during s. shutdown.
proceedum. Apparently air was allowed into the plant during the shutdown proceedung in order to save time by giving the esployees faster access to the plant and thereb; saving money. American plants consistently use this asas proceedure for the same reasons.
d bert Fellard,"Three Mile Island
! i According to another article in Nuslaus by e
,j Look-Alikes Still Without Safety Changes" p.3 the Davis-Besse plant, buile by
'i Babeook & Wilees, has the basio design as Three Mile Island Unit 2 and is still i!
under operutton without safety modifications in place as specified W the ME NIC l
after the Three Mile Island partial meltdown in 1979. An sooident at the Drais-I Besse plant in June 1985 was very simi1=r to Wt at Throe Mile Island. -
The NH0's orders for short term and long term recommended safety modifications at the BW plants have been largely ignored 4 tis manufacturwr and the utilities operating them. Yet these facilities remain in operation. Stronger action naast be taken in these matters.
4 Sinos water is the oooling element used in these plants I wonder how safe 4
they would be under conditions of drought.
- oerely, a
Mary Gib 4
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- ,$k Gruq' jo,;
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8
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rE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 esbtad'$
gg EDO PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL FROM:
DUE: 08/22/86 EDO CONTROL: 002024 DOC DT: 07/30/86 SEN. JOHN GLENN FINAL REPLY:
TO:
OCA FOR SIGNATURE OF:
GREEN SECY NO: 86-818
.DENTON DESC:
ROUTING:
ENCLOSES LETTER FROM MARY GIBSON CONCERNING SIMILARITIES BETWEEN CHERNOBYL AND U.S.
COMMERCIAL POWER PLANTS DATE: 08/08/86 ASSIGNED TO: NRR CONTACT: DENTON l
l SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:
l REPLY DIRECT TO CONSTITUENT WITH COPY
'TO SEN. JOHN GLENN.
I NRR RECElVED:
AUGUST 8, 1986 2' DBEB'El5ERO T~ b,/
j*
ACTION:
-__% ccr NRR-ROUTING:
DENTON/VOLLMER i
PPAS l
MOSSBURG
l OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET PAPER NUMBER:
CRC-86-0818 LOGGING DATE: Aug 5 86 ACTION OFFICE:
M 6DO AUTHOR:
J. Glenn--Const Ref AFFILIATION:
U.S.
SENATE LETTER DATE:
Jul 30 86 FILE CODE: ID&R-11 USSR
SUBJECT:
Similarities between Chernobyl and US commercial power plants ACTION:
Direct Reply DISTRIBUTION:
SPECIAL HANDLING: None NOTES:
Mary Gibson DATE DUE:
Aug 20 86 SIGNATURE:
DATE SIGNED:
AFFILIATION:
O Rec'd Off. EDO Date W-T - 9%
Time 9 : /I+
E DO -- 002024 e
3Cnifeb States Senafe WASHINGTON D.C.
20510
)
July 30, 1986 Office of Congressional Affairs Director Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, NW Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Sir:
Enclosed please find correspondence that I have received from Mary Gibson concerning similarities between Chernobly and US commercial power plants.
I would appreciate your most expeditious attention to this matter.
Please respond directly to Mary Gibson.
However, for my office records please send a copy of your response to Mr. Brian Dettelbach of my staff.
Best regards.
Sincerely, M
John Glenn l
United States Senator JG/bdm Enclosure i
l
., 'c... s. n 8
a July 24, 1986 Mary Gibson l
2817 Hampshire 141
- leveland Hts., Ohio 44118 i
Senator John Glenn l
503 Hart Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510
/
C/
Dear Sgnator Glenn,
j i
j Accoding to a recent report by the Union of Concerned Seientists (Ghernebl's Nessages Look Again at Gontainments in the United States, Mangy Maxwell, ; Nucleus; 8:3-7, Suommer 1986) the ChernoW1 plant bore striking minHarities to Geno mi Electrio plants Mark I, II and III) of which Perry 1 is one currently in opemtion and Perry 2 under constmotion. %%h are Park III models.
Like Chernobyl, the G.E. Fark III model has a defective containment wall or i
building ht oan rupture under unusual stmas such as ht experienced in a najor aooident from which mdiesttive material can escape. Given ht there are differ
- 4 enoes between0.E.'s boiling water mastor (WR) and the Soviet WR the prhahia used is the same; a pressure suppression containment ayaten. The pa hlen is the pressure suppassion system must keep paos with the flew of steem into the sentain-
[
mont. If it does not POW. This becomes a problem because the pressure sontainment is too small. It also subject to the danger of "by-pass leakage" which causes increased pressure and aan rupture a containment.
Another inhemnt danger in the design is the risk of hydmgen explosion.
Myd a gen is aleased in "even relatively mild sooidents". It was a hyd a gen explosion h t blev the roof off the Chernobyl plant. The systems in place at Chernobyl (for safety) were almost identical to b se used in the G.E.-plants.
What is noteworthy is ht b Chernobyl plant blev up during a shutdown.
proceedum. Appenntly air was allowed into the plant during the shutdown paceedure in order to save time by giving' the esployees faster access to the plant and thereb;
!~
saving money. American plants consistently use this same proceedure for the same masona.
{
According to another article in Huolous by debert Pollard,"Three Mile Island Look-Alikes Still Without Safety Changes" p.3 the Davis-Besse plant, builg by Baboook & Wileos, has the basio design as Rree Mile Island Unit 2 and is still under opemtion without safety modifications in place as specified by the M NaC after the Three Nile Island partial meltdown in 1979. An sooident at the Davis-Besse plant in June 1985 was very similar to that at Three Mile Island. -
The NBC's orders for short tem and long term roosemonded sare%y modifications at the BW plants have been la'.*gely ignored by tle manufactuar and the utilities operating them. Yet these facilities reamin in operation. Stronger action must be taken in these matters.
Since water is the cooling element used in these plants I wonder how safe they would be under canditions of drought.
- cerely, C
x.ry oi
I J
DISTRIBUTION:
$JG 2 2 IS85 Central Files PDR-HDenton/RVollmer PPAS R8ernero Mossburg (2024)
RWHouston Brandenburg (2024)
BSheron ED0 R/F Ms. Mary Gibson FMiraglia RHouston R/F 2817 Hampshire Rd.
Cleveland Heights, Ohio 44118
Dear Ms. Gibson:
Your letter dated July 24, 1386 to Senator John Glenn has been referred to me for response.
We are aware of and studying both similarities and differences in design between Chernobyl and nuclear power plants licensed to operate in the the United States, including boiling water reactors of which Perry is one example.
Although we do not yet have a full explanation of the Chernobyl accident from the Soviets, information available to us at this time indicates that Chernobyl did not have a full containment system surrounding the reactor core itself although it appears to have been designed to withstand piping failures in some parts of the plant and did employ a pool of water directly below the reactor.
Following the international meeting in Vienna, Austria during the week of August 25, 1986 at which we expect to learn more details of the Chernobyl accident and the design and operating features of this plant, we wiil be preparing a complete report on the accident and a subsequent report addressing implications for licensing and regulations in the United States.
With respect to the Mark III containment design as at Perry, its configuration and design basis are such that it meets the Commission's requirements and with substantial safety margin with respect to its ability to withstand internal pressure from a very large pipe break in the primary system.
By pass leakage refers to potential pathways for escape of airborne material including steam, without passing through the suppression pool.
The safety concern for excessive by pass of the suppression pool is that the pool also acts as a filter, to remove significant quantities of radioactive material that might be present under certain accident conditions, and by pass could allow a more direct pathway to the atmosphere.
As to the matter of hydrogen releases, the Perry plant, like all the Mark III designs, employs a hydrogen control system with igniters that can be activated at low hydrogen concentrations to assure burning of the hydrogen well below levels that would produce a detonation.
You refer in your letter to the accident at Chernobyl occurring "during a shutdown procedure," and that " air was allowed into the plant during the shutdown procedure in order to save time --." Our present information is that the operating personnel at Chernobyl were attempting to conduct a unique j
test with the reactor at relatively low power and that this test had nothing i
to do with routine shutdown procedures.
In addition we have no information that would indicate that Chernobyl operating personnel allowed air into any part of the plant where it would not normally be present.
Your statement that "American plants consistently use this same procedure for the same reasons"
r
~
1 i
- I appears to be a reference to the practice authorized by the NRC of deinerting Mark I and Mark II containments beginning 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to reaching cold shutdown in preparation for a plant outage where personnel access to con-tainment is required.
A similar 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period is permitted on plant restart before full compliance with the relevant Technical Specifications on the inert atmosphere is required.
These periods of deinerting and reinerting represent only a very small fraction of the operating time and are judged not to represent a significant risk.
Your letter also referred to an article in " Nucleus" regarding the Davis-Besse plant which has a Babcock and Wilcox reactor.
You indicated that according to the article, the Davis-Besse plant is still under operation without safety modifications in place as specified by the NRC after the Three Mile Island (TMI) partial meltdown in 1979.
Following the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident, the NRC issued post-TMI requirements for all licensees of operating plants and applicants for operating licenses and holders of construction permits.
The Toledo Edison Company, the licensee for the Davis-Besse plant, has completed 86% of these post-TMI requirements and is scheduled to complete the remainder by the end of 1987.
Your letter also refers to the event that occurred at the Davis-Besse plant in Jane 1985.
The NRC's Incident Investigative Team concluded that the root cause of this event was "the licensee's lack of attention to detail in the care of plant equipment".
The Davis-Besse plant has been shutdown since this event and it will not restart until the NRC is satisfied that the necessary work has been completed.
The NRC is concerned that even though the utilities that have B&W plants have made a significant number of improvements in their plants since the TMI accident, the number and complexity of events in the B&W plants has not decreased as expected.
As a result, the NRC staff has initiated a reassessment of the B&W plants.
This activity will include an assessment of the thermal-hydraulic design, instrumentation, control and power supplies along with a j
review of operating experience and operator training and response.
The NRC l
believes that the B&W reactors can safely continue to operate while the NRC
~
reassesses the B&W plant design requirements.
j Finally you indicate a concern for the safe operation of plants under l
conditions of drought.
Each operating license has conditions on the availability of an adequate supply of water to assure the ability to safely l
shutdown and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.
A severe drought may, however, limit some plants' ability to continue operation at l
full power.
Sincerely, l
Original Signed By:
bNhR.
nton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc:
Senator John Glenn
- See Previous Concurrence bDR/BR* bbR/bSRO*
bR/PWRL bR/BWR*
bb bR f
OFC NAME RWHouston BSheron FMiraglia RBernero R/ol'Imer HRDenton DATE 8/ 19 /86 8/
/86 8/ 20 /86 8/ 20 /86 8/
/86 8/ q /86 l
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