ML20212L015

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Presents Views Re Fitness for Duty Policy Statement & NRC Cavalier Attitude Toward Drug & Alcohol Abuse.Commission Should Establish Clear Requirements for Util Fitness for Duty Programs & Guidance for Program.Served on 870202
ML20212L015
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/30/1987
From: Asselstine J
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To: Markey E
HOUSE OF REP., ENERGY & COMMERCE
References
CON-#187-2390 OL, NUDOCS 8703100071
Download: ML20212L015 (2)


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January 30,1987 Y

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The Honorable Edward J. Markey 6Ff u s.- :

Cosmittee on Energy and Cosmarce socCu,

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United States House of Representatives Washington, D. C.

20515 Du r Mr. Markey:

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On Deces6er 9,1986, the Comission responded to your letter of November 7 in which you expressed concerns about the Cosmission's Fitness for Duty-Policy Statement.

I was away on official travel and was unable to a

participate in the preparation of the December 9 letter. You also wrote to the Comission on December 8,1986.

In that letter, you indicated that, based upon a Consission letter about alleged alcohol and drug abuse at Seabrook, you feel that the Consission has a cavalier attitude toirard drug and alcohol abuse. I did not join in the Commission's Jsnuary 20,198F response to your letter. My views on the issues presented by both letters are set out below.

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I did not join in either letter because both of the Commission's responses are based on the same premises: that the Commission need not issue regulations on fitness for duty because it is best to let the utilities do what they want in this area, and that the Cosmission can focus instead.on specific safety problems associated with alcohol and drug abuse.

In my opinion, that approach is flawed. As the Comission has pointed out so often in the past, the NRC has limited resources and we must, to a large extent, rely on our licensees to construct and operate plants safely.

However, the Connission can require that a utility have an adequate program, audit to detemine whdher the program is being carried out effectively, and ensure that specific, identified deficiencies are corrected. This is the approach the Comission has taken on any number of safety issues. However, on fitness for duty the Comission has chosen to rely only on the last of these three elements -- resolution of specific, identified safety problems. The Comission does not require that a licensee have any fitness for duty program, nor does it inspect to ensure that the program is being carried out effectively.

In my opinion, the Connission should do both. The Comission should establish clear l

requirements for utility fitness for duty programs and should establish clear guidance on the essential elements of an effective program. The Connission should then make fitness for duty programs a ragular part of the agency's inspection program. Such requirements and guidance would have two l

Very useful effects.

First, regulations would provide the Comission with much more enforcement flexibility. The Comission's policy statement is unenforceable so even I

what little guidance it does provide would be irrelevant should the Comission feel the need to correct a problem at a particular plant. The Comission would have to rely on its general authority under the Atomic Energy Act to take action. Thus, the Comission's ability to take 8703100071 B70130 m

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.2 enforcement action would deper.d upon its ability to identify an imediate

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threat to health or safety or to tie a specific safety. problem to a lapse in the licensee's fitness for duty program, However, waiting until a specific safety problem surfaces or anLimediate threat occurs and then trying to correct a fitness for duty program is not the most efficient or effective way to ensure that licensees have adequate programs. Rather, the Comission should set out the gralidrules ahead of tins and inspect to 3

enFJre compliance.

Second, clear requirements a.nd guidance would ensure that all utilities would at least start from the same point. The Commission policy statement

'is too amorphous to provide much guidance, and the elements of the t

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industry's EEI guidelines are discretionary. Thus, the individual.

utilities retain broad flexibility to do as much or as little as they want in developing a fitness for duty program. The result has been quite predictable: there are wide variations in the scope and quality of individual utility fitness for duty programs. To cite just one example, i

not all utilities have as an element of their programs a random drug testing requirement -- an essential element, in my view, of an effective

' program. Comission requif aments and inspections would ensure that all utt'ities have at least the core elements essential to an effective program and properly implement thosa elements.

An additional concern I have with the Commission's response to your letter of December 8,1986 is that the Comission did not mention the fact that even the Fitness for Duty Policy Statement, nebulous as it is, does not apply to construction sites. Developing a policy statement or requirements 3

for an operating plant is much easier than developing one for a i

construction site because1 9 construction site presents different problems

.and issues that must be, resolved. For example, many more people work on a construction Site, and turnover in the workforce,is much' higher than at an operating rea' tor. In addition, construction workforces tend to rely more c

heavily on transient workers. Also, there are usually a number of contractors on site who pr.? vide their own employees. Since not everyone works for the ucility, it is harder for the utility to implement an

effective fitness for duty program. Because of these and other difficulties and because with operating reactors there is a more imediate health and safety risk, the Comission chose to focus its initial fitness for duty efforts on operating reactors.

I agreed with that decision because I felt it was important to move ahead with requirements for operating reactors. However, the Comission should not ignore the construction site problem. We should, therefore, begin developing apprcpriate requirements for construction sites as well.

J I hope that this infomation is helpful to you.

Sincerely, 6,.

I am

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James K. Asselstine L

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