ML20212K710
| ML20212K710 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1987 |
| From: | Gad R ROPES & GRAY, TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#187-2705 OL, NUDOCS 8703090398 | |
| Download: ML20212K710 (22) | |
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^c BSCKETED USNRC FILED: M, arch 2, 1987
'87 11AR -6 41 :15 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 0FF:CE #F SELEETARY NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OCCKETg EPvirt before the-ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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l In the Matter of
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TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC
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Docket Nos. 50-445-OL COMPANY, et al.
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50-446-OL
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(Comanche Peak Steam
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Electric Station,
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Units 1 and 2)
)
)
APPLICANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CASE'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS (APPLICANTS' INTERROGATORIES, SETS 1987-1,2,3)
Applicants submit this Memorandum in opposition to CASE's " Motion for Protective Order and Memorandum in Support"'(Feb. 17, 1987) (" CASE Memo") and_in support of Applicants' motion pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
52.740(f) to compel answers to Applicants' Interrogatories, Sets 1987-1, 2,
3 (filed herewith).
F B703090398 870302 PDR ADOCK 05000445 g
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-e INTRODUCTION CASE apparently would have discovery be a one-way street; litigation on the merits an ever-receding horizon.
The Motion for Protective Order is compatible'not with the Rules of Practice but with a theory of litigation by attrition: wear down Applicants, divert the Applicants' resources and avoid a head-on battle on the merits at all costs.
Applicants' view of what is proper is a tad different: While CASE, as an intervenor, is entitled to reasonable opportunity to prepare its case, it is not allowed to tie up these proceedings ad infinitum.
For this reason, answers to Sets 1-3 must be compelled and, where CASE has not yet formulated its position on the matters at issue, a reasonable deadline must be set for CASE to do so.
At issue on this motion are three sets of the interrogatories the Applicants have addressed to CASE.
These interrogatories attempt two separate goals: to flush out the " generic flaws" in the CPRT Program Plan CASE has previously trumpeted, and to force CASE to come to grips at the earliest possible date with the merits of whether the CPSES facilities are built to applicable standards.
Sets 1 and 2 seek to find out in what ways, if at all, CASE believes that the CPRT Program Plan has defects that render the CPRT effort, if implemented perfectly, incapable of providing the requisite level of confidence about the CPSES facilities.
Set 3 asks for CASE's reaction to eleven CPRT
- t;
. [t '
.Results-Reports published by Applicants and as.to which-CASE.
received notice of publication between April and' September,.
- 1986.
~Answerstto those interrogatories would advance the-primary purpose of. discovery: narrowing issues for trial.
It mustlbe' remembered, as the' Supreme Court has instructed, that the various' instruments of discovery together; serve "as
'a device.
.to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties," Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,.500 (1947).
Issues are to be narrowed during discovery."in order that at the trial it may be necessary to produce evidence only on a residue of matters that are found to be actually disputed and controverted."
8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil,.62001 at 15 (1st reprint 1978).
See also Texas Utilities Generating Co.
(Comanche' Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2),
LBP-81-25,. 14 NRC 241, 243 (1981)
(" discovery is liberally granted to enable the parties to ascertain the facts in complex. litigation, refine the issues, and prepare for a more expeditious hearing or trial"), quoting, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1),
1.
[
LBP 78-20, 7 NRC 1038, 1040 (1978).
.The process of narrowing issues is unusually crucial in this proceeding, since the single admitted contention lacks l
any definition or limitation of an otherwise literally i
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globa11 adequacy of construction and design scope.
While conceivably each and every aspect of construction (or design) could actually be contested, that is not inevitable (nor, Applicants submit, likely).
It is for this reason imperative that the Board-reject CASE's Motion for a Protective Order and grant' Applicants' Motion to Compel.- In light of the public interest in obtaining a prompt hearing on the merits, it is also essential that a reasonable schedule be set for CASE to disclose its positions on the substantive matters probed in Interrogatories Sets 1987-1, 2,
3.
CASE's objections, and supporting argumentation, can be disposed of easily.
Strikingly, CASE has failed to cite a single decision of any tribunal in support of any of its arguments.
Some, such as the argument that the work product qualified privilege for documents means that CASE need not respond to interrogatories, are simply wrong.
Others, such as CASE's contention that the "in process" rule protects them from disclosing their litigation posture, simply f
1 As the Applicants have previously noted (" Applicants' Response to CASE's Objections to Motion for Establishment of a Hearing Schedule" (4/7/86) at 3 n.3),
while the Applicants acknowledge that this Board has previously ruled that design issues are within the scope of Contention 5, they do not acquiesce in that ruling.
As long as CASE or the Board expects to litigate design issues, however, it is imperative that orderly procedures for such litigation be devised, promulgated and implemented.
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misapply, sound legal principles.
The resulting mishmash is Lwholly unpersuasive.;and,-Applicants' submit,-should be'of'no-force and:effect'other than to have delayed briefly CASE's responses tolthe three sets of Interrogatories Applicants properly have Laerved.
ARGUMENT CASE organizes its arguments'along the lines of what-it styles six " general"=and three " specific" objections.2 There is no-discernible distinction between the objections described as general and those denominated specific.
The only unifying principle Applicants perceive in CASE's Memo
-is the position that.an intervenor in a contested proceeding may propound, but:need not respond to, discovery requests.
That is not the' law.
The Rules of Practice are equally applicable to intervenors and applicants in contested proceedings.
E.g.,
Pennsylvania Power and Light Co.
Applicants note that the third general objection --
a i.e.,
that interrogatories addressed to CPRT implementation issues are premature -- is facially improper because CASE fails to specify the interrogatories to which this-objection purportedly
- applies.
" objection should be plain enough=and specific enough so thatLthe court can understand in what way the interrogatories are claimed to be objectionable."
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Moore's Federal Practice (1984 ed.) 133.27 at'33-164, earlier edition quoted'in, Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317, 323 (1980).
At a minimum, this y
rule' requires specification of which requests are l
believed to be objectionable.
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-(Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, UnitsIl and 2),.
ALAB-613, 12.NRC 317, 338-39 (1980).
("The [intervenor's]
filings evidence a belief'that a 'public interest' litigant with-limitedLfinances may disregard key provisions of the Rules of Practice.
Simply as a matter of fairness, a licensing board may not waive the discovery rules for one.
side and not the other.
A litigant may not make
-serious allegations against another party and then refuse to reveal whether those allegations have any basis.")
1.
Schedulin( Implications of the Instant Dispute Before turning to the arguments advanced by CASE, the Applicants believe it appropriate to address the broad issue presented by this discovery dispute.
That. issue is when-CASE must turn its attention toward the merits of Contention
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5, and in particular toward the merits of conclusions being reached by CPRT.
The Applicants respectfully submit that the' time for CASE so to focus its energies is at least now.
The Applicants' interrogatories are designed to elicit answers to two broad questions: First, what position does CASE take on the theoretical adequacy of the CPRT Program Plan, and what is the basis for that position?
Second, does CASE intend to litigate the merits of conclusions contained in eleven CPRT Results Reports, all of which have been available to CASE for at least six months, and, if so, what is CASE's basis for disputing conclusions reached by CPRT?
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-The inference Applicants draw from CASE's Memorandum is.
that CASE 11s not yet' capable of;providing answers to-those.
.; questions.:
CASE's inability is troubling.
g Applicants start from the unassailable premise that an expeditious hearing on the meritanis required, if not as:a matter'of Applicants' right,Dat least as a matter of the public~ interest: "For if a plant 'is safe and environmentally sound,' it should be ' approved promptly';
- while,
'if, on.the other hand, the plant fails to pass muster, the public interest would be served if this fact is known sooner rather than later.'"
Public Service Company of-Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units-l'and'2), ALAB-374, 5 NRC 417,'422 n.8 (1977),. quoting, Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Facility),
ALAB-296, 2 NRC 671, 684-85 (1975).
The Commission's governing guidance is explicit:
"The Commission expects licensing boards to set and adhere to reasonable schedule.
.for proceedings."
Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing' Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 454 (1981).
CASE's conduct at least since April, 1986, to date is inconsistent with the prompt hearing required under Marble-i CASE has not admitted to this incapacity in sworn 8
answers, as required by the Rules of Practice (see Point 2, below).
However, throughout its Memorandum CASE admits that it is not prepared to take positions on any l
issues which are the subject of those interrogatories.
i
f Hill.
As made clear by CASE's inability to respond substantively to Interrogatory Set 1987-3, CASE has pursued other matters (presumably including Program Plan adequacy litigation) at the expense of-devoting time and effort to evaluating CPRT Results Reports.
The eleven Results Reports that are the subject of these Interrogatories were issued between April and August, 1986, and CASE was given official notice of their release not later than September, 1986.4 Indeed, CASE examined the Working Files for each.of those Results Reports not later than August, 1986.5 Yet CASE has The Results Reports and the date of notification to CASE of their release and the availability of the Working Files for inspection are as follows:
Results Report Date I.a.4 4/4/86 II.b.
4/4/86 I.b.3 4/4/86 III.d 4/4/86 VII.b.2 4/4/86 I.a.3 6/4/86 VII.a.4 6/4/86 I.a.5 8/14/86 VII.a.5 8/14/86 III.a.4 8/21/86 I.d.3 9/16/86 s
The dates of inspection by CASE of the Working Files for those Results Reports are as follows:
Results Report Date II,b 4/21/86 III.d 4/21/86 VII.b.2 4/21/86 I.b.3 4/21/86 VII.a.4 7/17/86 yl'...
not come back to the Working Files for further review and has not taken any other discovery relating to those Results
-Reports _in the intervening months.s There would be nothing objectionable,-if CASE decided to limit its trial preparation to what it has done to date.
However, CASE apparently is unwilling to do so, as evidenced by the fact that it takes the position that it is still unprepared to tell Applicants which Results Reports conclusions CASE will, and which it will not, contest on the merits.
Even more troubling, perhaps, is that CASE has declined even to offer a date for providing answers to these questions.
Applicants submit that this troublesome situation requires action by the Board.
Applicants therefore move in the first instance to compel CASE's answers to Interrogatories Sets 1987-1, 2, and 3.
As it appears that CASE's truthful answer is that CASE has not formulated its positions, Applicants further move the Board to set a timetable for CASE to provide substantive responses to those interrogatories and to interrogatories Applicants have or I.a.3 7/17/86 I.a.4 4/21/86 I.a.5 8/21/86 VII.a.5 8/21/86 III.a.4 8/21/86 s
CASE propounded one set of interrogatories regarding Results Report I.a.4 on May 15, 1986.
Applicants responded to those interrogatories on June 5, 1986.
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lsoonwill be propounding seeking CASE's position on the substantive. conclusions of additional Results= Reports.7'
- CASE's Memorandum apparently anticipates this position,
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for, CASE argues that' responding to-Applicants' contention
. interrogatories "would result in diversion of a substantial percentage of CASE's person-power devoted to this case" and:
therefore answers-should not be required.
CASE Memo. at 5.
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To the extent CASE seeks to justify its conduct by pointing to the rigors of preparing for the " theoretical adequacy"' litigation, we submit-that such assertions strain credibility.
The " theoretical adequacy" litigation:was advertised, and we therefore presume sold, on a promise of expedition.
The anticipated expedition -- a function of the ability of the parties to litigate methodological questions anterior to
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implementation -- had little prospect'when asserted (because of the advanced stage of implementation then obtaining) and much less today (since implementation is all'but completed on the hardware side ~and in high gear on the design side).
Nor has CASE conducted the
" theoretical adequacy" preliminaries authorized by the Board consistently with a goal of expedition.
The 30-day period for discovery authorized by the Board has stretched into 6' months and counting, primarily because CASE used the opportunity to paper the Applicants with more than 500 interrogatories (many, if not most, of which were either redundant or unrelated to " theoretical adequacy"), resulting in the necessity for numerous objections (all but a handful of which have been sustained).
And while the Applicants have attempted to work cooperatively with one of CASE's representatives to expedite the " theoretical adequacy" depositions, that effort has been thwarted by the insistence of another of
,ja CASE's representatives that the time within which CASE may designate deposition witnesses remains open, notwithstanding this Board's prior order setting a fixed l
window.
The " theoretical adequacy" notion, whatever is aboriginal merit, is a concept that has succumbed to the excess burden with which CASE has freighted it.
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' CASE's': position'is fundamentally _ wrong.'
That position.
says, in essence,?that CASE may choose _-to avoid grappling-with the merits-of Contention'5 while Plan adequacy
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litigation continues.
See CASE Memorandum at 7_(CASE will not invest significant. effort in reviewing tP2 released Results Reports "at least until the CPRT Pla. adequacy issue has been briefed by [ CASE] and the final _Results' Reports, particularly VII.C., have been issued.").
Marble Hill bars that stance.
If-CASE elects to. pursue theoretical adequacy litigation, it must do so consistent with-its obligations to respond to. discovery on the merits, as illustrated by Sets 1987-1, 2,
3.
- Diversion'of resources" is not a valid objection to merits discovery.'
2.
" Prematurity" of Discovery of CASE CASE states that "[t]he principal objection to.this-discovery is that it is premature."
CASE Memo. at 3.
The alleged " prematurity" alternately is explained as a need for CASE to complete "its CPRT discovery," CASE Memo. at 1, or as arising from the fact that the interrogatory answers.
" depend on implementation" of ISAPs, CASE Memo. at 2, and is justified by the assertion that to the extent Applicants l
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8 It is also wrong in the sense that CASE attempts to advance that position under the aegis of the "in l
process" doctrine, which is wholly inapposite.
See i
Point 3, belcw.
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- o seek to know CASE's position on potentially litigable issues,'"what CASE centends
. will be answered by CASE when it so contends in its own way.
CASE Memo. at 2.
At the outset, it should be observed that contention interrogatories generally are permitted and indeed-encouraged in contest NRC proceedings.
" Discovery of the foundation upon which a contention is based is not only clearly within the realm of proper discovery, but also is
-necessary for an applicant's preparation for hearing."
Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-17, 17 NRC 490, 494 (1983).
This
. aspect of the discovery process is so crucial that an intervenor's failure to substantiate contentions in response to applicant's contention interrogatories may lead to narrowing or dismissal of a contention.
E.g.,
Duke Power Company.(Catawba ~ Nuclear Station,- Units 1 and 2),
LBP-83-29A, 17 NRC 1121 (1983).
Applicants have propounded proper contention interrogatories.
The vast majority ask whether CASE intends to litigate on the merits statements from completed Results Reports, which are unquestionably relevant and thus proper subjects of discovery.'
l Indeed, relevance is demonstrated by the fact that CASE l
has repeatedly demanded production not only of the Results Reports but also of the related Working Files. l l
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'Nor areLthese proper-interrogatories premature merely because " CASE.has'no final position ready for presentation-to this Board, CASE Memo. at 3 (emphasis added).
'The-short and simple answer is that if CASE cannot provide a complete answer, it must so respond in writing under oath, 10 C.F.R.
52.740b(b).'E.g., Houston Lighting & Power Co.
(South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-80-11, 11 NRC'477, 478-79 (1980) ("A party.may,'of course, indicate areas of its case which are still under development and where incomplete substantive answers are all.that can be furnished.
But, we stress again that a party must, in response to discovery requests, identify the information, if any, which it possesses and on which it is basing its contentions.").18 18 CASE likewise must disclose what working files it has reviewed, whether it has propounded interrogatories and its reasons for doing so.
These questions concern matters going to the weight of evidence CASE may offer, would be proper subjects of cross examination and thus are properly inquired into on discovery.
E.g.,
Montecatini Edison Sp. A. v.
E.
I. duPont de Nemours &
Co.,
434 F.2d 70, 72 (3d Cir. 1970) (affirming lower court's allowing discovery of documents that might be helpful in cross-examination).
See generally 8 Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 52015 (1st reprint 1978).
Further, contrary to CASE's suggestion at page 8 of its Memorandum, a proponent may take discovery from its adversary even of facts already known (or are thought to be known) to the proponent at least apart from circumstances manifesting a purpose to harass or impose burden.
E.g.,
Mitchell v.
Savine, 25 F.R.D. 275 (D.
Mass. 1960) (endorsing same on ground that one purpose 13 -
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The "In' Process" objection-CASE also argues that'it need not respond to these
' interrogatories (or apparently any discovery, since CASE advancesLno' limiting principle)'.on the grounds that. CASE's
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work in.this proceeding 'is "in process" and responding to
' discovery "would reflect mid-course positions ~and'aupporting data which CASE would not otherwise develop." ' CASE Memo.
at 4.
The argument that Applicants have asked CASE to prepare
" supporting-data which CASE would not otherwise develop" may l>e disposed of with dispatch.11 That would be an improper of discovery is to obtain admissions from adverse party); Wright & Miller, supra, 52014.
Unlike situations where CASE has called for massive original research by the Applicants, the interrogatories at issue call for information that the Applicants believe they already-have (i.e.,
regarding the Working Files examined by CASE and interrogatories propounded by CASE) and were
- designed for confirmation.
Responding to them would
-have imposed far less burden on CASE than did preparation of the Motion for.a Protective _ Order, a fact that unfortunately casts doubt upon'the bona fides of that motion.
Finally, it should be observed that CASE's professed inability to provide any response to the interrogatories calling for disclosure of CASE's assertions regarding inadequacies in the Program Plan is belied by CASE's repeated prior assertions of the existence of " generic flaws" and the like.
(See the cited materials in the interrogatories themselves.)
If, in fact, those prior assertions were fraudulently devoid of basis (a proposition CASE's present assertion of empty cupboards logically suggests), then such must be disclosed in substantive responses.
11 CASE makes the same argument as page 2 of its Memorandum (characterizing Set 1987-3 as asking CASE "to prepare E
c.
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'. k request.
It is not Applicants'.
The Applicants have asked CASE.to' state.its contention on the matters covered by the subject Results Reports and the basis for the contention.
If the. answer to that question ~1s "NONE," CASE may so-state.12 The remainder of CASE's-argument obviously intends to piggyback upon the "in process" argument doctrine that shields CPRI deliberations from view for the limited. time CPRT needs to complete its work.
CASE thus argues that what it characterizes as " preliminary positions" are undiscoverable because "in process."
It contends that discovery of CASE should be denied because " CASE has only a small handful of people and diversion of any one of them to answer 'in process' discovery would result in diversion of a substantial percentage of CASE's person-power devoted to this case."
CASE Memo. at 4-5.
We note that CASE has now acknowledged the' validity of the "in process" objection properly invoked, but observe that CASE has woefully misapplied that concept.ta 4
i studies and analyses which it would not otherwise prepare.
.").
12 Note, however, that while CASE need not do any research to formulate positions, CASE must suffer the consequences of failing to substantiate its contention.
See Point 1, above.
1 Applicants note again that CASE's staffing levels do not 18 change its discovery obligations.
Intervenors and-Applicants are held to the same standards of responding l :
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the "in process" doctrine exempts nothing from disclosure.
It is purely a timing doctrine.
It says only that information otherwise subject to discovery need not be disclosed until' completed.
The finding'that work is still "in process" postpones, but does not preclude,. discovery.
- Second, "in process" is a narrow exception to the discovery rules.
The temporary delay in providing access to developing facts and non-legal opinions is accepted only where.their premature disclosure would mar the ultimate work product and where disclosure of the work still "in process" would end up delaying the proceedings as a whole.
Protection of work "in process" extends no further than necessary to serve those twin goals of enhancing the quality of the ultimate analysis and bringing an action to trial more quickly.
Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Consumer Products Safety Commission, 600 F.Supp. 114, 117-18 (D.D.C.
1984); In re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D.
- 595, 618-19 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
Neither rationale remotely supports CASE's position.
There is no deliberative process at issue.
The interrogatories do not ask CASE for any ongoing analyses of to discovery requests.
"[T]he fact that a party may have personal or other obligations or possess fewer resources than others to devote to the proceeding does not relieve that party of its hearing obligations."
Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 454 (1981).
16 -
5-aspects-of construction of-the CPSES facilities.
Applicants merely ask what positions CASE intends to take in this litigation, and why.
There'is nothing "in process" about those positions.
As to the possibility that CASE has yet to formulate positions,.see Points 1 and 2, above.
-The "in process" principle should not be applied in the manner sought by CASE, further, because to do so would have the perverse effect of retarding rather than expediting this proceeding.
CASE frankly concedes that it has not evaluated, and does not in the near future intend to evaluate, Results Reports conclusions.
CASE's attempted justification is that formulating positions on these core issues "would result in a diversion" of CASE's resources, the diversion presumably being from litigating CPRT Program Plan theoretical adequacy.
That position puts the proverbial cart before the horse, with much the same results one goes nowhere.
The object of this proceeding is to dispose of Contention 5.
Litigation over the " theoretical adequacy" of Applicants' methodology of gathering and evaluating evidence cannot interfere with that overarching goal.
While CASE is entitled to choose where to direct its resources, it is not entitled, under the "in process" rubric or otherwise, to delay litigating the merits simply because its energies are directed to other matters.
If CASE does have limited resources, it must elect 17 -
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Where_to concentrate them.
"In process".is not a talisman that can'be invoked to-avoid that election.
4..
The Work Product Objection
' CASE further. advances the position that "[tlo the extent the analyses and positions requested are prepared'by CASE's attorneys or representative, they are trial preparation materials.
CASE Memo, at 2 and id. at 6.
The trial preparation and work product doctrines protect disclosure of documents, not positions.
These doctrines simply have no application to the instant interrogatories.
10 C.F.R.
52.740(b)(2); Fed.
R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3); 8 Wright &-Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, $2023 at 194 n.16 (1st reprint 1978) and cases cited.14 1*
This authority also disposes of CASE's puzzling stance that certain interrogatories " seek an attorney's thinking process."
CASE Memo. at 3.
The interrogatories _ask only for CASE's positions.
CASE is a party.
CASE must disclose its positions even if they happen to coincide with those of CASE's attorneys.
CASE also makes the mysterious claim that Applicants have engaged in a " data dump" purportedly intended to strain CASE's " ability to quickly absorb the information."
CASE Memo. at 5.
In support, CASE appended to its Memo as Attachment A a total of twenty pages of documents, which CASE asserts it recently received from Applicants.
Those documents consist of Cygna billing explanations and two one-page nonconformace reports.
The characterization of Applicants' continuing negotiated document production as a " data dump" is overblown advocacy pushed to extremes.
It also is entirely irrelevant to these interrogatories.
CASE does not claim any relation 18 -
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CONCLUSIONL
- Having ~ requested intervention in these proceedings", ' CASE
.must accept the responsibilities imposed upon intervenorsi
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-It is the intervenor's1" ironclad obligation to examine the-publicly available documentary material' pertaining.to'thef
'_ facility'in question ~with sufficient care to enable it to n'
uncover-[promptly]'any information that could~ serve' as the' NV
-foundation for a specific contention.'
Duke Power Co.
(Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC--
~460, 463 (1982), rev'd in part and aff'd on this point, CLI-83-19, 17'NRC.1041 (1983) ($ateintervention).
It is-p the intervenor's obligation to respond to interrogatories propounded to.it,. including " contention" interrogatories.
d' E.g.,.Public Service Company of New Hampshire" (Seabrook
. Station, Units 1 and 2, LBP-83-17, 17 NRC 490, 493-94 (1983):
"To the extent the interroga3ory seeks to uncover v
and examine the foundation upon which an answer to a specific. interrogatory is based, it is proper, particularly j 'l where, as here, it related to the interrogee's own
-contention.
Interrogatories which inquire into the basis of a contention serve the dual purposes of narrowing the issues i
i between the materials " dumped" in discovery and the completed Results Reports.
CASE inspected the Resultm,'
Reports (and associated Working Files) at issue between April and August,.1986.
CASE's ability or inabilir.y to respond to the interrogatories therefore'obviously has nothing to do with any supposed " data dump" in unrelated areas.
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-and preventing surprise at tr a.l" An intervenor may not i
- indefinitely simply say "Not yet. "
Seabrook, supra, 17 NRC at 49'1.
TEXAS dTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY For the Owners of CPSES By' its attorneys,
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Thomas G.
- Dignan,
~~Jr.
R.K. Uad III Willin+.a S.
Eggeling Kathryn A.
Selleck' s
Ropes & Gray L-225 Franklin Street
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Boston, MA 02110 4
(617) 423-6100 Dated: March 2, 1987
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00LKETLD USNRC CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 37 mR -6 N1:15 I, R. K. Gad III, one of the attorneys for the Applicants 1987,gfric aF Stt hiARY@ Mg y O W ce herein, hereby certify that on March 2, within document by mailing copies thereof, postage prepaid, to:
Peter B. Bloch, Esquire Mr. James E. Cummins Chairman Resident Inspector Administrative Judge Comanche Peak S.E.S.
Atomic Safety and Licensing c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Board Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory P.O.
Box 38 Commission Glen Rosa, Texas 76043 Washington, D.C.
20355 Dr. Walter H.. Jordan Ms. Billie Pirner Garde Administrative Judge Midwest Office 881 W. Outer Drive 3424 N. Marcos Lane Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Appleton, WI 54911 Chairman Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555
)
Lawrence J.
Chandler, Esquire Mrs. Juanita Ellis Office of the Executive President, CASE Legal Director 1426 S.
Polk Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Dallas, Texas 75224 Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 l
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P' f{
Renea Hicks,' Esquire Ellen Ginsberg, Esquire.
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Assistant Attorney General
. Atomic Safety and Licensing l
Environmental-Protection Division
' Board Panel P.O.
Box 12548, Capitol Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
' Austin, Texas - 78711 Washington, D.C.
20555 Anthony Roisman, Esquire Mr. Lanny A.
Sinkin t
Executive Director.
Christic Institute Trial Lawyers for Public Justice 1324 North Capitol Street 2000 P Street, N.W.,
Suite 611 Washington, D.C.
- 20002 Washington, D.C.
20036:
Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom Mr. Robert D. Martin Administrative Judge Regional Administrator 1107 West Knapp Region IV Stillwater, Oklahoma 74075 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Suite 1000
' 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Arlington, Texas 76011 Elizabeth B. Johnson Geary S. Mizuno, Esq.
Administrative Judge Office of the Executive Oak Ridge National Laboratory Legal Director P.O.
Box X, Building 3500 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830
-Washington, D.C.
20555 Nancy' Williams Cygna Energy Services, Inc.
101 Cali'fornia Street-Suite 1000 San Francisco, California 94111 Tl i
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