ML20212H605
| ML20212H605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1987 |
| From: | Corbin McNeil Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NLR-N87031, NUDOCS 8703060166 | |
| Download: ML20212H605 (4) | |
Text
. _ _ __ _ _ _ _.____ _ _. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Public Service Electric and Gas Company Corbin A. McNeill, Jr.
Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 603339-4800 Vice President *
' Nuclear FEB 27 EST NLR-N87031 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION
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NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-354/86-41; 86-47; 86-50 I
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354
-Public Service Electric and Gas Company has received the Notice of Violation dated January 27, 1987, which relates to the inoperability of both reactor building / suppression chamber vacuum breaker assemblies from June 28, 1986 to August 8, 1986 and to the inoperability of all safety relief valve acoustic monitors between June 28, 1986 and September 11, 1986.
Our response to the Notice of Violation is provided in the attachment to this letter.
Sincerely,
~
C Dr. T. E. Murley Regional Administrator Region I Mr. D. H. Wagner Licensing Project Manager Mr. R. W.
Borchardt SEo I Senior Resident Inspector f
8703060166 070227 PDR ADOCK 05000354 G
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[ ATTACHMENT J PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC, AND ' GAS COMPANY-
- HOPE CREEKsGENERATINGESTATION:'
RESPONSE.TO NOTICE OF? VIOLATION R
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'NRC. Ins'pections ' 50-354/86-41-and 50-354/86-50 identified two
.problemsfwith regard.to the' operability ofLthe. reactor:
building / suppression chamber vacuum breaker assemblies:and the.
l safety: relief valve' acoustic monitors.
VIOLATION 150-354/86-41-01 and.50-354/86-50-01~
> L A ~.
(Contrary tx) Technical Specification Limiting / Condition for-10peration-(LCO) 3.6.4.2,-both reactor building / suppression chamber vacuum breaker assemblies:were inoperable'with-the reactor'atJvarious. times in the power operation,~startup or hot shutdown condition 1between June 28, 1986 and-11:45 a.m. on August 8, 1986.- During that time, the reactor was not placed in the startup, hot; shutdown, or cold shutdown-conditions ~~within;the time required by LCO 3.0.3.
The
= vacuum breaker-assemblies were inoperable in that _
differential pressure transmitter sensing lines, which sense suppression chamber'and-reactor building relative pressure, were reversed when connected to the differential pressure transmitters.- In this configuration, the butterfly valve in
.the assembly would have remained closed when required to
- .open dueltx) a vacuum in the suppression chamber and would i
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4 thave opened.when. required to remain closed on increasing
-suppression chamber pressure.
B.
Contrary to Technical Specification LCO 3.3.7.5 which 6
~ indicates the required number of operable channels for safety / relief valve position indications, all acoustic monitors'on all safety relief valves were inoper ble at various times ~with the reactor in either the power operation, hot' standby-or hot shutdown conditions between Junes28, 1986-and September 11,~1986.
The acoustic monitors were inoperable in that their power supply was not uninterruptible and the monitors, as such, would not have functioned in the event of a loss of power.
RESPONSE
PSEEG does not dispute the violation.
The reactor building / suppression chamber vacuum breaker assembly inoperability was caused by the incorrect identification of the Hi/Lo tubing connections on the tubing installation drawings which were used for the actual installation of the tubing.
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.The1 safety-relief valve acoustic monitor linoperability was EdiscoverediviaEa loss.of~ indication during-loss.of. power-
-testing.- Investigation revealed that the acoustic monitors were jnot: powered-from:an=uninterruptible power sup' ply.
An uninterruptible. power supply should have been provided as a c
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? result of a proper application.of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97 guidelines.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN AND'RESULTS ACHIEVED
.A.
- As'a result'of this finding,.a design change wasLimplemented Lwhich corrected the installation drawings and the tubing.
connections to the. instruments in the field.
The vacuum
~
~ breaker assemblies were then retested and found to be in
-compliance with system design requirements.-
Also, steps have been taken in an effort to assure that other) problems similar to this do not exist.
These other
. applications have'been reviewed by field walkdown and document review'and have been found to be correctly installed.
Other differential transmitters were verified to be operating correctly by a review of in-service data and related documentation.
This information is available onsite for NRC review, if requested.
B.
Safety Relief Valve Acoustic Monitors 4
As a result of_this finding, a design change was' implemented to change the power supply for the acoustic monitors from non' class lE interruptible' power.to non class IE uninterruptible (battery / inverter backed) power.
The
. acoustic monitors will now remain operable in the event of a j
loss of offsite-power.
To provide a continuing level of confidence that other 1
similar inadequacies do not exist, actions have been taken l
to assure'overall compliance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97 requirements.
These actions included:
i l'
l.
A review of Reg. Guide 1.97 against the Hope Creek FSAR for the application of these requirements into Hope Creek design.
2.
A review of FSAR Table 7.5-1 and exceptions listed in FSAR Section 7.5 for accuracy of power supply type.
This review entailed a comparison to controlled drawings and is documented for independent review, if requested.
3.
A review of all non class lE power supplies associated i.
with class lE circuits / devices for consequences of power failure on class lE circuits.
The results of this review have been documented for independent review, i f l
requested.
As a result of these reviews, no deficiencies, other than those
. detailed by the NRC Augmented Inspection Team in Inspection i
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- Report'- 50-354/86-50 were discovered.
The actions-taken~in response to'those items identified in the Notice.of Violation were completed in November, 1986..PSE&G feels-that the causes of these violations have been corrected and-adequate measures _have been taken to prevent recurrence.
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