ML20212D928
| ML20212D928 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1987 |
| From: | Eric Michel, Roberts R SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212D439 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-5, NUDOCS 8703040236 | |
| Download: ML20212D928 (33) | |
Text
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,,4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
)
(EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT CHIEF INSPECTOR RICHARD C. ROBERTS AND DEPUTY INSPECTOR EDWIN J. MICHEL ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY REGARDING CONTENTION EX 34 -- NOTIFICATION TO THE PUBLIC'IN THE EVENT OF SIREN FAILURE l
February 27, 1987 i
l 0703040236 070227 l
PDR ADOCK 05000322 G
PDR r
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l 1
. _ ~. _
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board i
1 I
)
1 In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
)
(EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
i l
l DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT CHIEF INSPECTOR RICHARD C. ROBERTS i
AND DEPUTY INSPECTOR EDWIN J. MICHEL ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY REGARDING CONTENTION EX 34 --
j NOTIFICATION TO THE PUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF SIREN FAILURE l
j I.
Introduction l
l Q.
Please state your names, occupations and professional backgrounds.
A.
My name is Richard C. Roberts.
I am the Assistant i
i Chief Inspector, Office of the Chief of Headquarters, County of Suffolk Police Department.
My name is Edwin J. Michel.
I am the Commanding Officer of
[
the Communications and Records Bureau, County of Suffolk Police Department.
I hold the rank of Deputy Inspector in the Police i
Department.
i i
a f
Statements of our qualifications and experience are attached to our testimony concerning Contention Ex 40 -- Mobilization and Dispatch of Traffic Guides during the February 13, 1986 Shoreham Exercise.
Our Contention Ex 40 testimony also explains the general organization and structure of the Suffolk County Police Department ("SCPD").
II.
Purcoses and Conclusions Q.
What is the purpose of this testimony?
A.
The purpose of this testimony is to address Contention Ex 34, and to discuss concerns regarding LILCO's ability to notify the public in the event of siren failure following an emergency at the Shoreham plant.
Based upon LILCO's performance during the FEMA-graded exercise of February 13, 1986 (the
" Exercise"), we have identified, as did FEMA, a number of inadequacies in LILCO's ability to provide adequate notification to the public in the event of failure of the LILCO siren system, which lead to certain conclusions, i
0 What are these conclusions?
i A.
It is our understanding that LILCO is required under NRC regulations to establish means to provide early notification l
and clear instruction to the public within the plume exposure l
pathway EPZ.
Egg 10 CPR Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV.D.3; - _--
NUREG 0654, S II.E and Appendix 3 thereto.
In our opinion, however, the February 13 Exercise demonstrated that LILCO is incapable of implementing those aspects of its offsite Emergency Plan for Shoreham (the " Plan") which are relied upon by LILCO as the means for providing prompt notification of a Shoreham emergency to the public in the event of siren failure.
We understand that the same basic conclusion was reached by FEMA.
Egg FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment Report
(" FEMA Report") at xiv, xv and xvil; 57, 58; 64, 68; and 74, 75-76.
As a result, LILCO failed to satisfy the Exercise objective related to its backup public alerting scheme (objective FIELD 5).
III.
Contention Ex 34 Q.
Please state Contention Ex 34.
A.
Contention Ex 34 reads as follows:
The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is incapable of providing prompt notification to the public in the event of a siren failure, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E 5 IV.D, and NUREG 0654 S II.E.
According to the LILCO Plan, in the event of siren failure, Route Alert Drivers will be dispatched to drive through the area around the failed siren and broadcast, through loudspeakers, a notifi-cation message.
LILCO Plan at 3.3-4; OPIP 3.3.4.
During the exercise,'LILCO attempted to demonstrate the capability of implementing this procedure, and to support compliance with the regulatory requirements for prompt notifi-cation and alerting of the public, in response to " free play" messages postulating the failure of three sirens (one in each staging area's territory).
One Route Alert Driver was dispatched from each staging area to drive 3-
O L
through the simulated siren failure areas identified in the messages.
In all three cases, however, the notification process took much too long, and demonstrated LILCO's fail-ure to comply with the regulatory requirement of prompt public notification.
Specifically, as of 9:52, 90 minutes after the siren failure message had been re-ceived by the EOC, the Port Jefferson Route Alert Driver had completed only one half of his route.
FEMA Report at 57, 58.
Thus, he would not have completed his entire route until about three hours after receipt of the e
failure message.
Similarly, the Riverhead Driver did not complete his assigned route until 78 minutes after the failure message had been received by the Riverhead Staging Area and one hour and 41 minutes after the EOC received the message of the failed siren.
The Patchogue Driver completed his route 70 minutes after receipt of the failure message at the Patchogue Staging Area.
FEMA Report at 68, 74.
Accordingly, the results of the exer-cise preclude a finding that LILCO complied with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S IV.D, and NUREG 0654 S II.E, and demonstrated LILCO's inability to implement its Plan.
The exercise also demonstrated LILCO's failure to satisfy objective FIELD 5.
The exercise results thus demonstrated a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan which pre-cludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
Q.
Do you agree with contention Ex 347 A.
Yes, although from our review of the documents produced during discovery, the times required for LILCO's Route Alert Drivers to complete their assigned routes were longer than stated in the contention.
4
i As Contention Ex 34 explains, LILCO relies upon Route Alert Drivers to provide backup to the LILCO siren system.
Should one or more of any of LILCO's 89 fixed sirens fall to activate during a Shoreham emergency, these Route Alert Drivers, according to LILCO's Plan, are to be dispatched to drive through the areas around the failed sirens so that a notification message could be broadcast, through loudspeakers, to the public.
Egg LILCO Plan at 3.3-4; OPIP 3.3.4.
Other officers of the Suffolk County Police Department have previously testified as to why LILCO's proposal to use Route Alert Drivers to alert the public in the areas around failed sirens to an emergency at Shoreham is both impractical and unworkable.
Egg Regensburg gi al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 13-22.
There is no need or reason to repeat that testimony here.
Rather, in this testimony we look at LILCO's performance during the February 13 Exercise, which demonstrated that LILCO's route alerting scheme is inherently flawed.
Q.
Please explain.
A.
During the Exercise, it is our understanding that LILCO attempted to demonstrate the capability of implementing its route alerting / siren backup procedure -- and thus its ability to implement its Plan, to comply with the NRC's regulatory requirements for prompt notification and alerting of the public, and to satisfy one of the Exercise objectives -- in response to
" free play" messages from FEMA postulating the failure of three sirens, one in each territory of the three LILCO staging areas.1 We understand that one Route Alert Driver was dispatched from each staging area, with instructions to drive through the simulated siren failure areas identified by FEMA.
In all three cases, however, the notification process observed by FEMA 2 took much too long, thereby demonstrating LILCO's failure to comply with the regulatory requirements regarding prompt public notification.
Q.
Please explain more specifically what you mean by your testimony that the notification process observed by FEMA took "much too long."
A.
It is our understanding that as of the time of the February 13 Exercise, LILCO was required to demonstrate that its route alerting personnel had the capability of providing notification, within 45 minutes after the simulated failure of LILCO's siren system, to any segments of the EPZ population that 1
Actually, prior to the Exercise LILCO was advised, particularly through FEMA's release to Exercise participants of the Exercise objectives, including objective PIELD 5, that it would be called upon to demonstrate the route alerting provisions of its Plan.
In any event, during the Exercise FEMA used one
" free play" message to simulate the failure of all three LILCO sirens (sirens 26, 45 and 89).
A copy of this FEMA " free play" message is attached to this testimony as Attachment 1.
2 According to the FEMA Report, a Federal evaluator was assigned to follow the entire run of each Route Alert Driver that was deployed by LILCO.
FEMA Report at 20.
would not have been initially notified of an emergency at Shoreham.
Egg NUREG 0654, S II.E and Appendix 3 thereto; ggg also Deposition of FEMA witnesses Kowieski, Baldwin and Keller at 104 and Ex. 32 thereto (January 29, 1987) (hereafter, "Kowieski et al. deposition").
In fact, the FEMA personnel assigned the task of evaluating LILCO's three Route Alert Drivers on the day of the Exercise were explicitly instructed to verify whether route alerting was completed within 45 minutes after LILCO learned, by virtue of the FEMA " free play" message (Attach-ment 1), of the simulated failure of sirens 26, 45 and 89.
Because none of the Route Alert Drivers observed by FEMA com-pleted his route alerting task within the 45-minute period, FEMA found that objective FIELD 5 was only partially met, and identi-fled the performance observed as an " Area Requiring Corrective Action" ("ARCA").
- Egg, e.g.,
Kowieski at al. deposition of January 29, 1987, at 104; FEMA Report at 57, 64 and 74.
Subsequent to the February 13 Exercise, however, FEMA Region II was instructed by FEMA's Washington Headquarters that the failure of LILCO's Route Alert Drivers to complete their assigned routes within 45 minutes could not be identified as an ARCA; rather, only an " Area Recommended for Improvement" was permitted.
Egg Kowieski gi al. deposition of January 29, 1987, at 104-05, 107 and Ex. 31 thereto.
This instruction was made specifically with respect to FEMA's evaluation of the Shoreham Exercise (id.),
and despite the fact that during other FEMA exercises in New York c
State where route alerting had required in excess of 45 minutes, FEMA Region II had identified such as a " Deficiency" -- the most serious of the FEMA classifications.
Sgg Kowieski gi al.
deposition of January 29, 1987, at 109-10 and Ex. 32 thereto (at page 5).
We disagree with FEMA's after-the-fact decision to change its rating regarding the performance of LILCO's Route Alert Drivers from an ARCA to an " Area Recommended for Improvement."
In fact, given LILCO's failure to provide complete backup notification within 45 minutes on any of the routes observed by FEMA, we believe, consistent with other exercises within New York State, that a " Deficiency" should have been found by FEMA.
Nevertheless, FEMA concluded in its Report that the time required for each of LILCO's three Route Alert Drivers to drive through the simulated siren failure areas was " excessive."
FEMA Report at xiv, xv and xvii.
We agree with this FEMA conclusion.
Indeed, in light of the route alerting times reported by FEMA, no other conclusion is possible.
For example, according to FEMA, alerting about half of the siren coverage area (siren #26) from the Port Jefferson Staging Area took 90 minates.
FEMA therefore concluded that it would have taken about three hours for the entire route to have been covered.
FEMA Report at 57.3 As a result, FEMA recommended that 3
Elsewhere in the FEMA Report, FEMA implies that it only took (footnote continued) _.
1 1
4 Y.
s LILCO's plans for backup route alerting "be reviewed and revised as necessary to reduce the time needed for route alerting."
FEMA Report at 58.
(footnote continued from previous page) about 90 minutes for the Port Jefferson Route Alert Driver to complete his route after the FEMA " free play" message indicating that siren #26 had not sounded and that backup route alerting would be required had been received at the Port Jefferson Staging Area.
FEMA Report at 58.
However, the Exercise Evaluation Critique Form which was completed by the FEMA evaluator who observed the Port Jefferson Route Alert Driver, and that evaluator's written comments concerning the time required for the Port Jefferson route alerting to be carried out (copies attached as Attachment 2), make clear that the 90-minute period was just the time from when the siren coverage route was started until about one-half of the route was completed.
In fact, our review of FEMA's comments from the day of the Exercise indicates that it took about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 50 minutes from the time that the LERO Emergency Operations Center ("EOC") in Brentwood received the FEMA " free play" message until the time that the Port Jefferson Route Alert Driver completed one-half of his route.
The breakdown, according to FEMA, was as follows:
8:10
" Free play" message (siren #26) given by FEMA to EOC 8:22 Message received at Port Jefferson Staging Area 9:07 Route Alert Driver deployed from staging area 9:30 Siren coverage route started 11:00 Route alerting aborted with only one-half of the route completed.
ggg Attachments 1 and 2 to this testimony.
It should be pointed out that documents generated by LERO players during the Exercise indicate route alerting times that are somewhat different than the times reported by FEMA.
With respect to the Port Jefferson Staging Area, the most noteworthy differ-ence is that the Route Alert Driver, according to LILCO, was
" dispatched" from the Port Jefferson Staging Area at about 8:35.
Egg Attachment 3 to this testimony.
We are not aware of what the LERO players intended by their use of the word " dispatched," and (footnote continued) 9-
Similarly, the Route Alert Driver dispatched from the Riverhead Staging Area did not complete his assigned route until 78 minutes after the FEMA " free play" message (indicating that LILCO siren #89 had failed) had been received by the Riverhead Staging Area.
FEMA Report at 74; FEMA Admission No. 109.
Not reported by FEMA was the fact that one hour and 42 minutes elapsed between the time that the LERO EOC received the message from FEMA and the time that the Riverhead Route Alert Driver completed his route.
Egg Attachments 1 and 4 to this testimony.
Nevertheless, based upon the time that it took the route to be completed following receipt of the FEMA " free play" message at the staging area (78 minutes), FEMA, as previously noted, found LILCO's performance to be an " Area Recommended for Improvement,"
leading to the same recommendation as had been made in connection with the Port Jefferson Staging Area.
FEMA Report at 75-76.4 The third Route Alert Driver evaluated by PEMA fared no better.
According to FEMA, it took about 70 minutes from the time that the Patchogue Route Alert Driver was dispatched before (footnote continued from previous page) we therefore have relied upon the FEMA generated documents in our testimony.
In any event, the LERO times only highlight the same conclusion reached by FEMA and us:
that the times required for LILCO's three Route Alert Drivers to drive through their simulated siren failure areas on the day of the Exercise were excessive.
4 FEMA also criticized the map provided to tne Riverhead Route Alert Driver, since it had no mileage or distance scale, thereby making it difficult to determine where to begin and end the route alerting.
FEMA Report at 74, 75.
4 4
he could complete his route.
FEMA Report at 64.5 As a result, FEMA again earmarked LILCO's performance as an " Area Recommended for Improvement," causing FEMA to recommend that LILCO's plans for backup route alerting be " reviewed and revised" to reduce the time needed for route alerting.
FEMA Report at 68.
5 As with its evaluation of the Port Jefferson Route Alert Driver, elsewhere in the FEMA Report (at page 68) FEMA implies that it only took about 70 minutes for the Patchogue Route Alert Driver to complete his route after receipt of the FEMA " free play" message at the Patchogue Staging Area.
Cf. LILCO Admission No. 176; FEMA Admission No. 107.
However, the Exercise Evaluation Critique Form which was completed by the FEMA evaluator who observed the Patchogue Route Alert Driver, and that 3
evaluator's written comments concerning the time required for the Patchogue route alerting to be carried out (copies attached as ),
make clear that the 70 minute period was just the time "from dispatch to completion."
In fact, one hour and 40 minutes passed between the time that FEMA first notified the LERO j
EOC of the. simulated siren failure (siren #45) for the Patchogue Staging Area and the time that the Patchogue Route Alert Driver l
actually completed his route.
The breakdcan, according to FEMA, was as follows:
8:10
" Free play" message (siren #45) given by FEMA to EOC 8:25 Message received at Patchogue Staging Area 8:40 Route Alert Driver deployed from staging area i
8:59 Siren coverage route started i
9:50 Route completed.
i Eg; Attachments 1 and 5 to this testimony.
J l
Again, we are aware that there are some differences between the toute alerting times reported by LILCO and PEMA.
However, with respect to the Patchogue Staging Area, the reported ti.T,es are quite similar, with one exception: according to LILCO, the i
Patchogue Route Alert Driver did not complete his route until i
10:30.
Egg Attachment 3 to this testimony.
If the 10:30 time reported by LILCO is correct, then the time required to drive the simulated siren failure area on the day of the Exercise was longer by 40 minutes than reported by FEMA.
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Q.
Do you have any other concerns arising from the Exercise regarding LILCO's proposal to use Route Alert Drivers to alert the public in the event of failure of LILCO's siren system?
A.
Yes.
In our opinion, although the route alerting times reported by FEMA demonstrate that LILCO is incapable of providing prompt notification to the public in the event of siren failure, those times are nevertheless much lower than would likely be the case during an actual Shoreham emergency.
Q.
Please explain.
A.
There are many reasons for why we believe that LILCO's route alerting times during an actual Shoreham emergency would be much longer than was the case during the February 13 Exercise.
Unlike on the day of the Exercise, during an actual emergency at Shoreham there would likely be traffic congestion getting to and along the routes to be driven by LILCO's Route Alert Drivers.6 This would, of course, add to the time required to drive the areas around failed sirens.
In addition, during an actual 6
Even before evacuees begin to evacuate, traffic within the EPZ would likely become congested as a result of pre-evacuation
- trips, i.e.,
trips that people may take to prepare for evacuation.
Pre-evacuation trips would include, for example, travel from work to schools and/or homes and travel from homes and/or work to banks, stores, gas stations and other such facilities.
Egg cenerally Cordaro at al., ff. Tr. 2337, at 58-59.
We would expect there to be a substantial number of such pre-evacuation trips by people preparing to evacuate.
As a result, traffic within the EPZ would, in all likelihood, rather quickly become heavily congested.
Egg Roberts at al., ff. Tr.
2260, at 9-11.
emergency, there would likely be interruptions to the driving times of LILCO's Route Alert Drivers by persons asking for information or instructions after they had heard the broadcast messages.
Also, it must be recognized that the time required to alert the population around failed sirens may vary widely, depending upon the location of the sirens within the EPZ.
Q.
Why would the location of failed sirens have any impact upon the time required for LILCO's Route Alert Drivers to drive their assigned routes?
i A.
It is our understanding that LILCO generally relies on its sirens to provide notification of a Shoreham emergency to the population within approximately 5-6 square miles of each siren location.
Some siren territories, however, are much smaller --
less than one-half of the 5'-6 square-mile area covered by most of LILCO's sirens.
The area covered by siren #26 is such an area.
l Even with respect to the typical LILCO siren coverage territory, the time required to drive through a 5-6 square-mile area may vary widely, depending upon such factors as the number of neighborhoods and roadway miles within and the characteristics l
l of the communities (e.q.,
street patterns) of the area.
This fact was highlighted during the February 13 Exercise, when one l
j Route Alert Driver (for the siren (26 area) required more time (90 minutes) to drive only one-half of his airen route than was I
13 -
i required by the other two Route Alert Drivers to drive all of their routes.
This discrepancy is probably at least partly explained by the fact that even though the area around siren #26 is considerably smaller than are the areas around sirens 45 and 89, it is also more densely populated.
Egg alsq Attachment 2 to this testimony (comment that "long notification time requirements may exist for the radii around other Shoreham sirens").
Q.
Do you have any other concerns regarding LILCO's route alerting proposal?
A.
Yes.
As has been previously discussed (agg Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 14-16), during a Shoreham emergency LILCO intends to rely upon telephone survey reports obtained by Marketing Evaluations, Inc. to verify whether its sirens have activated.
- Egg, e.a.,
OPIP 3.3.4.
LILCO assumes that it would take up to 90 minutes for this survey to be completed.
Even if i.
this assumption is accepted as true (something we do for purposes of this testimony only, since in our opinion it is unrealistic to l
assume that siren verification via such a telephone survey could be completed within 90 minutes), it must nonetheless be i
recognized that LILCO might not even be aware that Route Alert Drivers need to be dispatched until 90 minutes or more after the sirens relied upon by LILCO to notify the pubile had failed to l
activate.
We do not believe that PEMA took this into account in 1
l 1
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f conducting its evaluation of LILCO's route alerting proposal, since Marketing Evaluations did not participate in the February 13 Exercise.
Egg LILCO Admission No. 4.7 4
l We also have concerns about LILCO's ability to notify and mobilize its Route Alert Drivers in a timely fashion, after l
failed sirens have been detected.
These concerns, however, have previously been aired before the Licensing Board and will not be repeated here.
Egg Regensburg gi gl., ff. Tr. 4442 (Emergency l
Planning Contention 26 -- Notification of Emergency Response j
Personnel); Monteith gt al., ff. Tr. 7381 (Emergency Planning Contention 27 -- Mobilization of Emergency Response Personnel).
i Q.
P1 base summarize the concerns and conclusions you have 3
l made with respect to Contention Ex 34.
I t
A.
In our opinion, the February 13 Exercise revealed that, I
even under the best of circumstances, LILCO's Route Alert Drivers are incapable of providing prompt notification to the public in
~
the event of failure of LILCO's siren system.
Indeed, based upon the results of the Exercise, it must be concluded that there would be significant delays in alerting entire segments of the i
7 We are aware that the FEMA " free play" message postulating i
the failure of the three LILCO sirens during the Exercise (agg I ) did refer to Marketing Evaluations as having t
" called" to report the siren failures.
According to the FEMA l
message, this " call" was made approximately 20 minutes after l
LILCO's sirens were activated.
Of course, during the Exercise, i
LILCO's sirens were never activated.
LILCO Admission No.
6.
1 i
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1 1
population to an emergency at Shoreham.
LILCO's inability to implement the backup notification scheme set forth in its Plan precludes finding reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken by LILCO in the event of a Shoreham accident.
Q.
Does that conclude your testimony?
A.
Yes.
i l
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ATTACHMENTS Route Alerting Message (Simulated Siren Failure), dated February 13, 1986 Exercise Evaluation Critique Form for Objective FIELD 5, Port Jefferaon Staging Area, dated February 13, 1986 and Route Alerting Message (Simulated Siren Failure), dated February 13, 1986 (containing comments of FEMA evaluator for Port Jefferson Route Alert Driver)
Route Alerting Assignments for Siren Malfunctions, containing route alerting times reported by LERO (from OPIP 3.3.4, Att. 3), dated February 13, 1986 Route Alerting Message (Simulated Siren Failure), dated February 13, 1986 (containing comments of FEMA evaluator for Riverhead Route Alert Driver) and Memorandum for the Record from J.
Levensen re completion of Riverhead route alerting, dated February 13, 1986 Attachment S Exercise Evaluation Critique Form for Objective FIELD 5, Patchogue Staging Area, dated February 13, 1986 and Route Alerting Message (Simulated Siren Failure), dated February 13, 1986 (containing comments of FEMA evaluator for Patchogue Route Alert Driver)
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SHOREHAM EXERCISE 6J~C-i ROUTE ALERTING MESSACE (Simulated Siren Failure)
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Message:
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at LERO EOC via Exercise Controller Initiating Event: Approximately 20 minutes after siren activation.
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MARKETING EVALUATIONS, INC. HAS CALLED AND REPORIS THAT SIREN NUMBERS 26, 45 AND 89 HAVE FAILED 10 ACTIVATE.
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EVALUATOR HUST IDENTIFY DEFICIENCY (IES) OR CORRECTIVE ACTION (S) IF OBJECTIVE IS NOT HET OR PARTLY HET.
THERE MAY BE MORE THAN ONE (1) DEFICIENCY OR CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THIS OBJECTIVE. A SEPARATE RECOMMENDATION HUST BE PROVIDED FOR EACH DEFICIENCY OR CORRECTIVE ACTION TilAT IS IDENTIFIED.
Ot rx ord oox RECOMMENDATION
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04CX ud 00X RECOMMENDATIOw DEFECIENCY Please state briefly
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AREA FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION the problem area l
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i SHOREHAM EXERCISE l
ROUTE ALERTING MESSACE
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(Simulated Siren Failure)
LERO EOC) ggay A h 4 Evaluator's Name Siren i Time Consnents 3.
Route Alert Driver (s)
-band 99 Offf M d 0903SI
/Q deployed from Staging 09/7 M4 Area MM 4.
Route Alert Driver (s)
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completed Route.
(Enter time route was completed.)
THIS IS AN EXERCISE l
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l SHOREFJM EXERCISE - February 13, 1986 I4 CATION:
lY NMd W Becord naawamsm:
TDE (Message delivered):
10 :00 FEM: J.
Lewtrtsto MESSME:
(In your message please include time <xanunication was received.)
Rou*t Olu*una had bzancorno&d of og51 Ant Cluu 19 u$ethiad aioa :
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ATTACHMENT 5
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..gm EXERCISE EVALUAT10H CRllIQUE IOld EXERCISE: Shoreham DATE Febrv ry 13. 1986 Evelisator's Itemet C. Serici:s Patchogue Staging Ares ye g IDCAT10 elf CDielE3fTS AllD REColeEleAT10tl5 l
EVAIDATOR(S)
ASSICletEllT p,
event-ISE ORJECTIVE Allo 191dTS OF REvig i
(Cood Performance or Deficiency -
I t 0)eelElftS factasally describe your raservation) the obelity to provide tack up pufelic eierting, if K. sertree Port Jefferson
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OSJECTIVEt Staging Aree
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-strate necessary, le the event of partial stren system feltiere.
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this objectlwe is ef fected by the legal
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T *..1 Completion of route within 45 ethutes ef ter
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d to mount public address systems on the route h r[v e,(
hrat = c a-a m ert-s L(30 esy elect not de-anstrate the asunting and operation o^
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- electing wohicles.
le this le the case, It will be possible to cafte$
N. h.'d Should LERO elect to sownt the PA systems en the 6_ ;{ [%m e. b, l. M
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dit l wehicles, the pettle alerting messages will not be broadcast.
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. ROD 17 ALERTING MESSACE
.4-M' (Simulated Siren Failure)
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Suffolk County, New York Date:
February 13, 1986 Hessage:
Route Alert From:
C. Connolly, E00 Team Leader To:
Coordinator of Public Information at IJtRO EOC via Exercise Controller Initiating Event:
Approximately 20 minutes after siren activation.
Nessage:
MARKETING EVALUATIONS, INC. RAS CALLED AND REPORTil THAT SIREN NUMBERS 26, 45 AND 89 RAVE FAILED TO ACTIVATE.
Evaluator i
Signoff Time Comments 1.
Message given to controller by Team Leader at LERO EOC (Team Leader at LERO EOC) 2.
Message dispatched from Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator to Lead Traffic Guide
~
at Staging Areas (Evac. Ops.
Evaluator at LERO EOC)
Evaluator's Name Siren #
Time Comments 3.
Route Ale-t Driver (s)
_ (. S o, n't k <
d5 0T40_
Au!W o deployed from Staging
~
Area
_ Amn-No Pak 4
M 4t s t i
4.
Route Alert Driver (s)
C. b e*c k c
_O950 completed Route.
(Enter time route was completed.)
THIS IS AN EXERCISE l
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