ML20212D007
| ML20212D007 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 02/25/1987 |
| From: | Gad R Citizens Association for Sound Energy, ROPES & GRAY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#187-2646 OL, NUDOCS 8703040041 | |
| Download: ML20212D007 (21) | |
Text
2Wh o
COLKETED USNRC FILED: February 25, 1997
'87 ma -2 P4 30 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
?_OL i
4, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION outm E..L-before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD,g
)
In the Matter of
)
)
TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC
)
Docket Nos. 50-445-OL COMPANY, et al.
)
50-446-OL
)
(Comanche Peak Steam
)
Electric Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
)
)
APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO CASE MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES (SET 12)
INTRODUCTION The instant motion seeks to compel Applicants to provide further answers to all or portions of six of the eight interrogatories propounded in Set 12.
The gravamen of the motion is either that CASE does not understand Applicants' answers, or in retrospect wishes it had asked a different question.
A motion to compel is an inappropriate vehicle by which to attempt to remedy such problems.
Set 12 deals with a complex subject -- statistical sampling and methods of quantitative analysis -- requiring specialized education, training and experience to understand.
The answers were provided by people who have D703040041 870225 (DN ADOCM 05000445
]e h0 PDN
.p Dm. _,-
't v
~,z those qualifications and who found the interrogatories largely unintelligible as framed.
The Applicants nevertheless went to great lengths to attempt to answer the questions Applicants could best guess CASE might have had in mind.
Applicants have thus already done far more than they were required to do in response to the interrogatories at issue.
The great bulk of this dispute is resolved by referring to a fundamental tenet of discovery law it is the duty of the person asking interrogatories to frame intelligible questions.
"(Aln interrogatory must be specific in order that it need not be necessary for the party that is being examined to exercise discretion or judgment in determining what is intended to be covered by the interrogatory."
Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co.,
16 F.R.D.
350, 351 (D.D.C. 1954).
Thus, objections were sustained to an interrogatory "so garbled as to be undecipherable or so vague and misleading as to be beyond the bounds of relevancy.
Tsangarakis v. Panama _ Steamship Co.,
41 F.R.D. 219, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1966), and it has been held that no response is required to an interrogatory based on false premises, Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 16 F.R.D. 537 (D. Del. 1954).
See also Heritage Furniture, Inc. v. American Heritage, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 319, 320 (D. Conn. 1961) (reference in (interrogatories) to "early American furniture" stricken as "so indefinite and lacking in precision as to render them not susceptible.of being answered intelligently"); Banana Service Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
15 F.R.D.
106, 109 (D. Mass. 1953)
(interrogatories must provide reasonably clear indication of information sought); Cheers v. Chester Upland School District, 28 F.R.
Serv. 2d 535 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (proponent bears task of separating wheat from chaff in boilerplate, repetitious and ambiguous interrogatories).
Moreover, a motion to compel can only compel answers to questions asked.
It is wholly improper to seek, as CASE repeatedly does in its motion, to compel an answer to questions asked for the first time on that motion, just as it would be ludicrous to move to compel a witness to answer a different question than was asked at deposition, and frivolous to take an appeal after trial from the court's refusal to allow a question that was " clarified" (i.e.,
asked properly) for the first time on appeal.
The time to
" clarify" one's thinking is before interrogatories are served.
These deficiencies are particulary pernicious at this stage of the proceedings, for which the Board set a discovery plan and time limits.
The Board's August 18-19 scheduling order granted CASE the opportunity to propound one wave of interrogatories.
See Tr. 24,650, 24,585. CASE has availed itself of that liberal discovery order to deluge Applicants with 12 separate interrogatory sets containing 460 separate interrogatories (which in fact, with subparts, total well over 500).
CASE's attempt to launch a second wave of follow-up interrogatories is wholly unjustified and should not be countenanced by the Board.1 The foregoing disposes of the great bulk of the substance of CASE's motion.
With respect to CASE's apparent quarrel with Applicants' supposed failure to contact CASE before responding to the interrogatories, CASE Memo. at 1, Applicants note only that they have complied one hundred percent with the rules governing discovery in NRC contested proceedings and that a respondent discharges completely its discovery responsibilities by objecting to objectionable interrogatories.
No more should be, or is, required.
INTERROGATORY NO. 1 CASE's argument on Interrogatory No. 1 -- to the effect that Applicants' reference to prior statements is ambiguous CASE also cryptically asserts a possible claim "to also 1
engage in depositions" if Applicants do not further respond to Set 12 interrogatories.
CASE Memo, at 4.
When, as and if CASE should file a motion asking the Board to revoke or revise its prior orders on the procedures to be followed in respect of discovery regarding the CPRT Program Plan " theoretical adequacy,"
the Applicants will respond in due course (perhaps proposing some revocations and revisions of their own).
The fact of the matter is that CASE has filed no such motions to date.
To the contrary, CASE was noticed 12 depositions within the time set by the Board (which the Applicants have gone to great lengths to facilitate and cooperate with CASE about).
4
4 A
c
^
and therefore incomplete, see CASE Memo at 5 -- is disingenuous.
The question asked for concurrence with four aspects of rather precise statements (taken out of context) made by the Applicants in a prior legal pleading.
Compare Interrogatory 1 with " Applicants' Memorandum in Response to Board's Memorandum (Statistical Inference from CPRT Sampling)" (Jan. 31, 1986)
(" Sampling Memorandum") at 16.
The attempt in Interrogatory No. 1 to take things out of context and put words in a witness' mouth was rebuffed by the perfectly straightforward response to the effect that the Applicants' position on the four points is precisely what it was stated to be in the Sampling Memorandum.
This is a complete and sufficient response to the question posed.
CASE further asserts that Applicants' answer is somehow defective because Applicants have provided a further explanation of a term -- quantif3 -- used in the Sampling Memorandum passages at issue.
As the interrogatory simply asked Applicants to affirm their belief in statements previously made, Applicants could simply have referred to the original statements (properly understood in their original contexts).
Applicants went further in an attempt to aid CASE's understanding.
Successful or not, the attempt certainly does not provide ground to compel further answer.
CASE's final argument, that it is entitled to an unqualified and unamplified "yes" or "no" to this question, is without basis in law.
A witness is required to supply an
-S-
unqualified "yes" or "no" only where the witness is satisfied that answer would truthfully, accurately and completely answer the question posed.
This proposition is fundamental to the system of law as we know it, and applies equally to interrogatories as to deposition or trial questions.
Applicants have answered the question; a motion to compel does not lie to force a witness to change his answer or t'o put words in his mouth.
Such a motion lies only to require a respondent to supplement evasive or-incomplete answers.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3); 8 Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, $2285 at 775 (1st reprint 1978).
INTERROGATORY No. 3 Applicants fully answered parts a(1)-(3) of this interrogatory with the introductory response that the questions "are confusing and not susceptible of being answered as framed."
As a matter of completeness, Applicants repeat here the full text of the response, which clarifies painstakingly the manner in which the question is confused and unintelligible as drafted.
Applicants observe, however, that in the process of meticulously pointing out i
the problems with CASE's question, Applicants have responded i
substantively to the extent possible.
i "Anrwer "a(1)-(3).
These questions are confusing l
and not susceptible of being answered as framed.
I, ' !
i
In general, the actions that are being taken are der 7ribed in Program Plan, Appendix B; Program.
Plan, Appendix C, Action Plan VII.c; Program Plan, Appendix D; and CPP-006.
Please note that
'for each attribute defined for the population, samples will be identified of a size to provide a 95/5 statistical screen (per Appendix D) on HWA attributes.'
Program Plan, Appendix B at 9.
"In addition, we point out that the author of the question has misinterpreted the relationship between the 95/5 (or other value) screen for deficiencies and the process of identifying and tracking adverse trends of deviations.
Trending of deviations is an overlay upon the quantitative screen for deficiencies, in order to enhance the level of reasonable assurance obtained, but there is no direct connection between quantitative deficiency screen and trending of deviations.
"The question's use of the phrase 'a 95/95 confidence level that any potential deficiency or trend of deviations will have been identified' further impedes our ability to respond, since the Program Plan's statement of
'95/5' is not a confidence interval on 'any' deficiency if 'any' statement means that, means more than one.
Rather, the '95/5 if the population passes the screen, there is a 95%
confidence that the frequency of screened-for items distributed among the populkaion was less than 5%.
(Note also that it simultaneously establishes a less than 95% confidence of the detectability of any phenomenon of somewhat less than 5% frequency and a higher confidence of the detectability of a phenomenon of a higher than 5% frequency.)
The '95/5' statement, therefore, represents a statement of the confidence in the existence or non-existence of a systematic problem of a nature that tends to produce screened-for items at or above any stipulated frequency.
To the extent that any of the items enumerated in sub-sub-parts (i) through (iii) and (v) of sub-part (a)(2), or anything else, has the potential for producing deficiencies, the confidence that the deficiencies will be detected depends upon the frequency of the produced deficiencies and is stated above; if the frequency of produced deficiencies is 5% or greater, the confidence that the phenomenon will be detected is 95% or greater.
"It should be further understood that, unless a particular craftsman's work or a particular inspector's work has been defined as
'the population' under investigation, the level of assurance of detection of characteristics about the individual's work cannot be quantified in the absence of data about the frequency and distribution of the individual's work among the population.
However, CPRT is investigating hypotheses about the combined product of the input of the craftsman, the inspector, the over-inspector (e.g., Authorized Nuclear Inspector), if any, the testing and maintenance process (to the extent applicable), and any other input with a potential for affecting the resultant quality of that product.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to structure re-inspections that limited themselves to conclusions about one of the inputs apart from the others, and such investigations would yield data that, at least in the first instance, would be less useful to the accomplishment of the CPRT Program Plan goals.
We suspect that the question confuses sample re-inspections for the purpose of characterizing the population of hardware with investigations (which might or might not include additional re-inspections) for the purpose of testing particular hypotheses of root cause (assuming the necessity of investigating root cause)."
Applicants also provided a full response to subpart (a)(4).
CASE does not argue that the original interrogatory was capable of being answered.
It rather purports to " clarify" (i.e.,
rewrite) the interrogatories.
That is improper.
See
" Introduction," supra.
CASE moves to compel an answer, over the Applicants' I
objection, to subpart (b)(2) of interrogatory three.
This subpart, which is not an interrogatory but a document request, stated:
" Provide documentation to support your response to (1) above."
The "(1) above" reference was a technical question to which the Applicants provided a detailed technical answer (with which CASE raises no quarrel).
The objection to the request to "[p]rovide documentation to support your answer" was that:
"The Applicants further object to sub-part (b)(2) of this interrogatory (which is actually a request for the production of documents) on the ground that '[p]rovide documentation to support your response' fails to describe the documents requested with the specificity required by the Rules of Practice."
CASE's entire argument in support of its motion to compel consists of the ipse dixit that "This is clearly specific enough for Applicants to be able to identify and supply that documentation."
Motion to Compel at 11.
What now appears clear is that what CASE had in mind was for the Applicants to canvas the entire body of literature relevant to statistical sampling and quantitative analysis, identify all of the literature that supports the methodology being employed by CPRT, and produce that literature.
Such a request not only fails to identify the documents requested with sufficient particularity to avoid the necessity of original research on the part of the respondent, but CASE l
l now acknowledges that such original research is precisely what it was looking for.
As CASE subsequently has acknowledged, such demands are not proper.
CASE Motion for Protective Order and Memorandum in Support (Feb. 17, 1987) i L
at 7.
See also 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, $2174 at 550 (1st reprint 1978) and cases cited.
CASE also seeks to compel an answer to part (c), to which Applicants objected.
Sub-part (c), which is quoted in full in the margin, called for detailed information about the implementation of the sampling program in the various Action Plans.2 Applicants' response is tripartite.
- First, Applicants stand on their objection that the subject matter of this interrogatory concerns implementation of the CPRT Program Plan beyond the scope of discovery authorized by the Board on August 18-19, 1986 (even to the extent, if any, that limited inquiry into implementation may be contemplated).
See generally Applicants' Response to CASE's
" Motion to Compel" (Nov.
6, 1986) at 23-33.
Second, the interrogatory is objectionable to the extent, if any, that it may seek information concerning CPRT "in process" implementation work.
No discovery of how CPRT implements the Program Plan can take place while the implementation effort remains in process.
"In-process" 2
c.
(1)
For each ISAP, which possible strata have been identified by the Applicants?
l (2)
Where is such identification contained in Applicants' documentation?
Provide it if it has not already been provided.
l (3)
Provide documentation for all work that was found for each of the strata.
10 -
I
discovery poses twin perils: (i) it will divert essential resources from carrying out the Program Plan effort, thereby delaying this entire proceeding; and (ii) it will chill CPRT's intellectual work, thereby crippling the entire CPRT effort.
"In-process" discovery would serve no useful purpose.
It is not permitted in this proceeding, as CISE acknowledges.
CASE Motion for Protective Order and Memorandum in Support (Feb. 17, 1987) at 1, 4; Tr. 24,758, Tr. 24,770, Tr. 24,772-73.
See also, Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 600 F.Supp. 114 i
(D.D.C. 1984); In Re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D.
595 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Applicants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoenae (Dec.
5, 1986) at 8-13.
Third, to the extent CPRT implementation work apparently sought has been completed, Applicants note that CASE has been provided with full and free access to the results reports and voluminous supporting files.
Any order
" compelling" Applicants to give CASE access to files to which CASE already has access would serve no useful purpose.
i l
l INTERROGATORY NO. 4 i
Interrogatory No. 4 was responded to in two ways, each wholly dispositive of CASE's motion.
First, its patent objectionableness was pointed out.
The action plans make abundantly clear how inspections (if any) should be structured and what attributes should be inspected for l
r l l l
L
s implementation results.
As such, the inspections themselves are either CPRT implementation work (if completed) and thus beyond the scope of what has been authorized for this effort, or they are "in process" and hence undiscoverable at this juncture.3 Second, the Applicants responded that, as is set forth in the Program Plan, the Program Plan does not call for a sepcific attribute-by-attribute comparison to the original inspection program -- therefore CPRT does not have the comparison CASE seeks -- but all the data necessary to make such a comparison have previously been provided to CASE.
Even were the question not objectionable, this is an unchallengably adequate response.
Nothing in-the Rules of Practice requires the Applicants to do original research for CASE that CASE has all the materials necessary to do for itself.
There is nothing to compel.
Finally, Applicants note that the issue of comparing the attributes tested in the CPRT program with those tested in j
the original inspection program was addressed at a pre-hearing conference held in the CPA case on April 22, 1986.
At that time, the Board was apprised of essentially the same information conveyed in response to this a
And if completed are in any event accessible to CASE in the Results Reports and associated files.
See Response to Interrogatory No.
3, above.
i i
\\
e' interrogatory --
i.e.,
that there is no necessary identity between what attributes CPRT inspectors are looking at-and what attributes were looked at by CPSES inspectors.
See Tr.
24,353-55.
That CASE may not_yet understand this concept-does not diminish its wisdom.
There is'nothing to compel.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6 i
CASE's interrogatory no. 6 contains twelve subparts (and
~ numerous further subdivisions) spanning nearly six full single-spaced pages of text.
CASE's quarrel with-Applicants' response begins with part (g), which in substance asks Applicants to identify and produce all documents "which support Appendix D" to the Program Plan.
i Interrogatory No. 6(g)(i).*
That request is fatally overbroad.
In addition, a party cannot be forced to characterize documents as supporting (or weakening) a position because that sort of characterization can be done only with the advice of counsel and thus is trial preparation privileged pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
i' 52.740(b)(2) and Rule 26(b)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P.
See Shelton
- v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986)
(attorney may not be forced to state whether documents relating to similar incidents exist, because attorney's Part (g)(iii)'s reference to "such documents" refers back to the phrasing in part (1). l l
7,y
selection of documents from vast number of documents reveals work product); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.,
93 F.R.D.
138' 144 (D. Del. 1982); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
- Kodak, Co.,
74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (binders of documents that attorneys deem are relevant to case enjoy a prima facie privilege from discovery under work product doctrine).
CASE argues with respect to subparts (h), (i) and (j) that it is entitled to know who developed Appendix D.
Though mindful that the Board has adopted a contrary ruling with respect to certain issues, see Tr. 24717-35 (compelling answers to Interrogatory Set 3, Nos.
1, 2, 4), Applicants restate and repeat that the who and how of development of Appendix D and other portions'of the ' Program Plan is absolutely irrelevant to whether that methodology, if implemented perfectly, is adequate to its assigned task.
See Applicants' Response to CASE's " Motion to Compel" (Nov.
6, 1986) at 23-33.
j Applicants further note that subpart (j) on its face calls for a tremendous effort.
That subpart in essence asks l
Applicants to reconstruct a meeting held a year ago.
Even if it were possible to do so, Applicants submit that the enormous burden of the task would tip the balance against l
disclosure.
A meeting conceivably touching upon development t
of one aspect of the Program Plan is relevant, if at all, only in a very marginal manner.
Any relevant information I
that conceivably could b'e gathered by badgering the meetings' attendees for their recollection of that meeting (separated from their recollection of other meetings) and distilling those multiple, and likely not one hundred percent 1 consistent, recollections is highly unlikely to provide CASE with anything beyond what it knows already or could readily gather from materials it has at hand.5 Applicants submit, therefore, that as a matter of discretion the Board should decline the motion to compel this Interrogatory even if the Board adheres to the relevancy concept articulated at the December 15, 1986 pre-hearing conference.8 Applicants are at a loss to understand what CASE seeks to compel with respect to subpart 6(1).
Applicants' answer is an undertaking to cause those validly and timely served i
2 s
Which materials include (or will when the program is completed include) the sampling methodology that i
actually was employed, together with the'results obtained, both of which will speak for themselves as to the adequacy of the CPSES construction.
l 8
CASE advances arguments in support of sub-part (j)(iii) of this interrogatory that we do not comprehend.
The interrogatory sought detailed information regarding the formulation of a legal pleading that was submitted to the Board (the Sampling Memorandum).
That document is not a factual affidavit.
It is not evidence, nor was it offered in evidence, nor is there presently before the Board any decisional matter on which it might be construed as evidence; the document, rather, was submitted and signed by legal counsel.
Discovery about the formulation of the document is, so far as Applicants are aware, unprecedented.
l 1 t i
l l
C with deposition subpoenaes to appear in response.
Does CASE ask the Board to order Appplicants to force individuals to appear in response to an untimely subpoena?
One invalidly served?
The motion to compel further responses to this subpart is incomprehensible.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7 CASE contends that Applicants have not answered the question "in the precise detail" sought by CASE.
CASE's
" argument" in support consists solely of a " clarification" which asks a radically different question.
Applicants fully answered the question posed.
Interrogatory No. 7 as served upon Applicants asked how, if at all, changes in construction or design of the Project would be reflected in the CPRT sampling program.
Applicants' answered that question.7 CASE's " clarification" is that "[wle want to know just what is being sampled.
." and then asks a series of questions that j
CASE-evidently believes will shed light on that subject.
l l
CASE Memo. at 27-28.
Applicants take no position on the question of whether CASE's " clarified" (i.e.,
totally new) interrogatory would give CASE the information it really intends to seek, whether i
l 7
In part by pointing out that the question was founded upon an incorrect premise.
One cannot state "how"
~
l something that isn't going to be done will be done.
l A
the information sought is readily obtainable in the documents Applicants have made available to CASE, or even whether the " clarified" interrogatory is comprehensible.
The Applicants repeat that'a motion to compel is not the proper time to ask a new question.
If CASE wanted an answer to a different question, it was CASE's privilege and duty to take the care to set forth the question they want answered.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8 CASE again effectively concedes that the question posed
-- in this instance, whether there is a "possible causal relation between sampling.
.and the breakdown in design and design QA/QC for pipe supports" -- was defective. See CASE Memo. at 29.
That interrogatory is not comprehensible unless someone understands the phrase " causal f
connection between sampling and the breakdown.
The answer supplied was that the Applicants do not understand that phrase (and therefore cannot answer the interrogatory).
That is a complete response.s 8
While not necessary to a determination that the motion to compel must be denied, it bears observation that the Applicants' response is eminently reasonable.
- First, t the phrase " causal connection between sampling and the
- breakdown" does not, on itsl face, make any sense.
1Rather, the question is hopelessly unintelligible, f
because the implicit assumpt* ton that present sampling could be the cause of past q7ents contradicts
" causality" in this universe, at least as understood in the modern world.
See generally I.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reasea (1787);
D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human e.
l m
Further, CASE is not allowed to compel an answer to an er.tirely different (not merely clarified) question, on a motion to compel, although it attempts to do so (see CASE Memo. at 30).
Moreover, even if it were' permissible to change questions in midstream, the new question has nothing to"do with sampling -- it asks generally about the how and what of CPRT's root cause analysis of alleged deficiencies in quality assurance and other areas, see CASE Memo at 29 --
and thus lies beyond the scope of Set 12.
- Finally, Applicants have already explained the concept of root cause analysis under auspices of the CPRT Program Plan, see generally Applicants' Response to Board Concerns (Dec.
1, 1986), and they have already answered interrogatories advancing the same issues as appear to be contained in the
" clarified" questions.
Thus, for example, it is helpful to refer to the portion of Applicants' response to Interrogatory a(1-3) of this set, insofar as that answer states that "[t]here is a fundamental difference between a program that tests the adequacy and acceptability of a i
Understanding (1758 rev.).
If, on the other hand, CASE meant to ask about a connection between other (wholly unidentifie3) sampling and some other historic event, the question is miles away from anything relevant to CPRT Program Plan adequacy.
It thus is hardly surprising that CASE's Motion to Compel abandons the original interrogatory in favor of a new one.
! i
F k
++
P facility and of a program that singles out and tests only one aspect (such as QA/QC) of the process by which the facility was created.
CPRT is the former."
Any order to compel would merely order redundant, wasteful work.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Compel should be denied.
Rgspes ully submitted, t
t
'i J
Thomas G. Dignan, Jr.
R.K. Gad III William S.
Eggeling Kathryn A.
Selleck Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, MA 02110 (617) 423-6100 Dated: February 25, 1987 t
i I
l l
, I L-
r p:
e COLnE*if y.m; CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Ig Na -2 P4 :30 I, R. K. Gad III, one of the attorneys for the Applicants herein, hereby certify that on February 25, 1987,fkhmadeserviceof
~
p :' w the within document by mailing copies thereof, postage prepaid, to:
Peter B. Bloch, Esquire Mr. James E. Cummins Chairman Resident Inspector Administrative Judge Comanche Peak S.E.S.
Atomic Safety and Licensing c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Board Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory P.O. Box 38 Commission Glen Rose, Texas 76043 Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Walter H. Jordan Ms. Billie Pirner Garde Administrative Judge Midwest Office 881 W. Outer Drive 3424 N. Marcos Lane Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Appleton, WI 54911 Chairman Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Lawrence J. Chandler, Esquire Mrs. Juanita Ellis Office of the Executive President, CASE Legal Director 1426 S. Polk Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Dallas, Texas 75224 Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 i
i I
e o
e Renea Hicks, Esquire Ellen Ginsberg, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Environmental Protection Division Board Panel P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Austin, Texas 78711 Washington, D.C.
20555 Anthony Roisman, Esquire Mr. Lanny A.
Sinkin Executive Director Christic Institute Trial Lawyers for Public Justice 1324 North Capitol Street 2000 P Street, N.W.,
Suite 611 Washington, D.C.
20002 l
Washington, D.C.
20036 Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom Mr. Robert D. Martin Administrative Judge Regional Administrator 1107 West Knapp Region IV Stillwater, Oklahoma 74075 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 1000 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Arlington, Texas 76011 Elizabeth B. Johnson Geary S. Mizuno, Esq.
Administrative Judge Office of the Executive Oak Ridge National Laboratory Legal Director, P.O. Box X, Building 3500 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Washington, D.C.
20555 Nancy Williams Cygna Energy Services, Inc.
101 California Street Suite 1000 San Francisco, California 94111 l
D
/
1 n
R.
K.
Gad I
\\
'