ML20212C635

PNO-OSP-88-002:on 880309,during Walkdown of Unit 2 Control Room Panels,Nrc Shift Manager Noted That Control Switch for 2A-A CCP Was in Pull-to-Lock Position,Which Would Inhibit Pump from Automatically Starting on SI Signal

ML20212C635
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	03/15/1988
From:	Richardson S NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:
References
PNO-OSP-88-002, PNO-OSP-88-2, NUDOCS 9710300065
Download: ML20212C635 (1)

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'() PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-OSP-88-002 This preliminary notification constituto EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is all that is known by tha <

~0SP staff-on this date. {

FACILITY: Tennessee Valley Authority Licensee Emergency Sequoyah Unit 2 Classification:

Docket No. 50-328 Notification of Unusual Soddy-Daisy Tennessee Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Er.ergency X Not Applicable

SUBJECT:

INOPERABLE CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMPS On March 9, 1988 at 7:30 p.m., during a walkdown of the Unit 2 control room panels, the NRC Shift Manager (Senior Resident Inspector) noted that the control

< switch for the 2A-A centrifugal charging pump (CCP) was in the " Pull-to-lock"

! position, a position which would inhibit the pump from automatically starting on a safety injection (SI) signal. In the plant's existing Mode 3 condition, Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 requires that both CCPs be operable. To be l p operable, they must be in the "A-Auto" position to ensure they automatically l ('j start on an SI signal. When questioned, two operators indic ted that the 2A-A CCP " Pull-to-Lock" switch position was not a problem. Follo ing a rbrief

~

i explanation of TS 3.5.2 requirements by the NRC shift manager, the>2A-AiCCP

control switch was put in "A-Auto" position. t ,

i3 A subsequent review of the reactor operator's log indicated =that earlier that day, both tha 2A-A and 2B-B CCPs were inoperable for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 24 min 1tes (i.e, CCP 2B-B was undergoing post-maintenance surveillance testing toaorove operability and CCP 2A-A was in " Pull-to-lock"). With both CCP'Finoperable.

TS 3.0.3 required the licensee to fix the condition within 1 hournor initiate action to place the Unit in Mode 4. LiketherequirementsofTSi.5.2,this requirement was not recognized /perfnemed by the reactor operator.

Additionally, a review of the operator's turnover checklist (used to ensure proper control panel switch positions) revealed that the existing

" Pull-to-lock" 2A-A CCP switch position was_not recognized or corrected at the time of shift turnover nor was the Shift Supervisor immediately notified by the operators after the NRC identified the problem. The licensee also apparently failed to make a report to the NRC Operations Center within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> as required.

Both licensee management and the NRC inspection staff are currently reviewing the occurrence and the potential generic implications. This information is current as of 12:00 p.m. (EST) on March 11, 1988.

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S. Richardson, 492-3286 Cl CONTACT:

Chm, Cmrs, C/R Distribution:

9710300065 880315 GPA, GC, CA, PDR, Historian,

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