ML20211Q616
ML20211Q616 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Palo Verde, Hope Creek, Diablo Canyon, Cook, 05000000, Fort Saint Vrain, Bailly |
Issue date: | 07/23/1986 |
From: | Holahan G, Holanhan G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
References | |
NUDOCS 8607250192 | |
Download: ML20211Q616 (22) | |
Text
T A SS 1W6 s
MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Gary M. Holahan, Director Operating Reactors Assessment Staff
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING ON July 21, 1986 - MEETING 86-25 On July 21, 1986, an Operating Reactor Events meeting (86-25) was held to brief the Office Director, the Division Directors and their representatives on events which occurred since our last meeting on July 14, 1986. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.
The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. In addition, the assignment of followup review responsibility was discussed. The assignments made during this meeting and the status of previous assignments are presented in Enclosure 3.
t Completion dates have been assigned for items in Enclosure 3. Each assignee should review Enclosure 3 with regard to their respective responsibilities.
Note that several assignments are approaching the due date. Please be responsive i and advise ORAS (D. Tarnoff, X27864) if the target completion date cannot be met.
M/
Gary M. Holahan, Director Operating Reactors Assessment Staff
Enclosures:
As Stated
! cc w/ Encl.:
l See Next Page DISTRIBUTION. _
Central File.- . 9 NRC PDR ORAS Rdg ORAS Members
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2-cc: R. Vollmer K. Heitner J. Taylor H. Berkow C. Heltemes D. Wagner T. Murley, Reg. I M. Haughey J. Nelson Grace, Reg. II E. Adensam J. Keppler, Reg. III J. Wigginton R. D. Martin, Reg. IV W. Jones J. B. Martin, Reg. V M. Licitra R. Starostecki, Reg. I G. Knighton S. Ebneter, Reg. I H. Schierling R. Walker, Reg. II S. Varga C. Norelius, Reg. III E. Johnson. Reg. IV D. Kirsch, Reg. V H. Thompson F. Miraglia R. Bernero T. Speis W. Russell T. Novak F. Schroeder W. Houston B. Sheron D. Ziemann D. Crutchfield G. Lainas V. Benaroya W. Regan D. Vassallo E. Jordan E. Rossi R. Baer E. Weiss R. Hernan S. Showe S. Rubin i
- - - - ~ - - _ , ____..m. . . _ _ _ _ - _ , _ _ _ _ ._ ... _-., . _ , , , , . . . . _ _ , - . _ _ . . _ , . _ _ . - _ _ _ _ . . - - , _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . . _ _ ,
R SS M ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (86-25)
JULY 21, 1986 NAME DIVISION NAME DIVISION G. Holahan ORAS/NRR W. Swenson ORAS/NRR M. Virgilio ORAS/NRR A. Nolan INEL/ EGG W. Haass IE/VPB M. Caruso ORAS/NRR M. Licitra NRR/PBD7 D. Wagner NRR/BWD3 M. Haughey NRR/BWD3 R. Benedict NRR/BF0B T. Greene NRR/F0B J. Clifford NRR/PPAS D. Muller NRR/BWD2 W. Regan NRR/PBF0 H. Berkow NRR/SSPD D. Lynch NRR/SSPD C. Ader 0CM/TR G. Murphy ORNL/NOAC M. Chiramal AE0D C. Miller NRR/PWRB H. Bailey IE/DEPER G. Lanik IE/DEPER A. Dromerick IE/DEPER L. Marsh NRR/DPLB W. Paulson NRR/PWRB I. Ahmed NRR/PWRB B. Jones IE/DEPER E. Weiss IE/DEPER R. Hernan NRR/PPAS R. Ramirez NRR/ DBL E. Jordan IE R. Baer IE/DEPER F. Rowsome NRR/DHFT C. Thomas NRR/PWRB F. Schroeder NRR/PWRB F. Miraglia NRR/PWRB R. Bernero NRR/ DBL D. Tarnoff ORAS/NRR
. ENCLOSURE 2 s
OPERATING REACTOR EVENTS BRIEFING 86-25 JULY 21, 1986
.. FORT ST. VRAIN PROBLEMS IN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS CONTROL SYSTEM HOPE CREEK RECURRENT SPURIOUS LEVEL INDICATION PROBLEMS D.C. COOK UNIT 2 START JP WITH 2 0F 4 POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS IN0PERABLE PALO VERDE UNIT 1 REACTOR TRIP WITH COMPLICATIONS OTHER EVENT OF INTEREST DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2 THREE RECENT REACTOR TRIPS e--- - - . . . - . - , .- - - - - .-, .-------.,,re,,, , , . , , w-, - -
FORT ST. VRAIN - PROBLEMS IN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS CONTROL SYSTEM JULY 16, 1986 - (K. HEITNER, NRR)
PROBLEM: SINGLE FAILURE DESIGN WEAKNESS IN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) UNDERVOLTAGE START SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE: ONE OF SEVERAL SINGLE FAILURE WEAKNESSES DISCOVERED IN EDG CONTROL SYSTEMS DISCUSSION:
DEC. 18, 1984 - FAILURE OF DIESELS LED TO REVIEW OF EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEMS JULY 10, 1985 - STAFF CONCLUDED THAT FORT ST VRAIN COULD BE OPERATED SAFELY IN INTERIM WITH OTHER P0TENTIAL EDG SINGLE FAILURE AND INDEPENDENCE PROBLEMS SEPT. 13, 1985 - LICENSEE SUBMITS RESULTS OF SYSTEM REVIEW.
STAFF FINDS PROBLEMS PERSIST:
- COMMON RELAYS
- LOGIC FAULTS THE LICENSEE WILL PROPOSE RESOLUTION FOR THE EDG PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED TO DATE PRIOR TO RESTART F0LLOW-UP:
STAFF TO COMPLETE ITS REVIEW 0F EDG CONTROL SYSTEMS BY END OF AUGUST 1986; THEN MEET WITH LICENSEE ON ALL EDG CONTROL PROBLEMS l
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HOPE CREEK - RECURRENT SPURIOUS LEVEL INDICATION PROBLEMS (M HAUGHEY, NRR) l PROBLEM:
HPCI STARTS ON 7/14, 7/15, 7/17, AND 7/20 AS A RESULT OF LEVEL
- TRANSMITTERS SPIKING LOW CORE SPRAY START (AND INJECTION) ON 7/14 AS A RESULT OF ERR 0NE0US LEVEL INDICATION SIGNIFICANCE
POTENTIAL FOR PLANT TRANSIENTS FROM UNEXPLAINED INADVERTANT ECCS STARTS ON LOW VESSEL LEVEL DISCUSSION:
HPCI HPCI STARTED ON ERR 0NE0US LEVEL 2 INDICATION HPCI TURBINE TRIPPED BY OPERATOR PRIOR TO WATER INJECTION BECAUSE TRANSMITTER INDICATING PROPER WATER LEVEL N0 SOLID STATE LOGIC MODULES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH HPCI ACTUATION LOGIC CORE SPRAY ERR 0NE0US LEVEL 1 AND LEVEL 2 CHANNEL "A" LOCA SIGNAL RECEIVED "A" LPCI AND HPCI PUMPS STARTED BUT WERE MANUALLY SECURED "A" CORE SPRAY PUMP INJECTED 6,000 GALLONS INTO REACTOR VESSEL N0 SOLID STATE LOGIC MODULES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH CORE SPRAY
^
ACTUATION LOGIC FOLLOWUP: I REGION I ONSITE 7/15 AND 7/16 TO DISCUSS ISSUE WITH LICENSEE LICENSEE STILL INVESTIGATING PROBABLE CAUSES
O ESF ACTUATIONS AT HOPE CREEK BEFORE JULY 14, 1986 4/13 B CHANNEL FAILURE OF "RONAN" 4/20 B CHANNEL UNEXPLAINED 4/25 A CHANNEL UNEXPLAINED 4/26 A CHANNEL HUMAN ERROR 5/2 A AND C CHANNEL HUMAN ERROR 5/6 D CHANNEL UNEXPLAINED 5/6 A CHANNEL HUMAN ERROR 5/13 D CHANNEL UNEXPLAINED 5/13 D CHANNEL UNEXPLAINED 5/15 D CHANNEL HUMAN ERROR 5/19 B CHANNEL HUMAN ERROR 5/25 D CHANNEL HUMAN ERROR 7/3 B CHANNEL HUMAN ERROR
PSE8G TASK FORCE TESTS TO INDUCE TRANSIENTS TO ACTUATE ESF USE OF 150 MHZ AND 450 MHZ WALKIE TALKIES AT 10C026 (CHANNEL D LOCAL INSTRUMENT RACK)
ACTUATION OF AN EMI SOURCE IN 10C640 (DIVISION 4 RHR AND CORE SPRAY RELAY VERTICAL BOARD)
M0MENTARY INTERUPTION OF DC POWER TO 10C640 PERFORMANCE OF SENSOR CALIBRATION ON B21-N091D, REACTOR WATER LEVEL TRANSMITTER VALVING OF A PRESSURE TRANSMITTER INTO SERVICE IN THE REVERSE ORDER OF THAT GIVEN IN THE CURRENT igg CALIBRATION PROCEDURE VALVING OF A TRANSMITTER INTO SERVICE BY-NORMALIZING CYCLING 0F EQUALIZING VALVES OPENING OF DRAIN VALVE ON THE VARIABLE LEG
PSE8G TASK FORCE POSSIBLE ROOT CAUSES OF ESF ACTUATION INVESTIGATED COMMON ELECTRICAL SUPPLY PROBLEM ACTUAL REACTOR VESSEL TRANSIENT PRESSURE TRANSIENT ON THE COMMON REFERENCE LEG FOR THE INSTRUMENTATION f
PSE8G TASK FORCE RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (JUNE 1986)
PRIOR TO INITIAL CRITICALITY BACKFILL THE INSTRUMENT LINES INSTALL QUICK DISCONNECTS ON LOCA INSTRUMENTATION REVIEW ALL OF THE SUBJECT INCIDENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED WITH IaC TECHNICIANS LONG TERM REVIEW AND REVISE ALL ASSOCIATED SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES TO ASSURE THE PROPER VALVING METHODS ARE ADDRESSED
- INCLUDE INSTRUMENT VALVES IN THE TAGGING, REQUEST, AND INQUIRY SYSTEM, AS APPLICABLE TECHNICIAN TRAINING
O D. C, COOK UNIT 2 - STARTUP WITH 2 0F 4 POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS INOPERABLE JULY 7, 1986 (W. JONES, IE)
PROBLEM:
UNIT WAS IN MODES 1 AND 2 WITH 2 0F 4 POWER RANGE NIs IN0PERABLE SIGNIFICANCE 1 INDICATION OF MAINTENANCE PRACTICE / MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT PROBLEM CIRCUMSTANCES:
PLANT RETURNING FROM REFUELING OUTAGE BEGUN MARCH 1986 NI 41 WAS MADE INOPERABLE MAY 19 OR 20, 1986, DISCREPANCY BETWEEN DRAWING AND TAGS FOR NI 41 LEADS WAS DISCOVERED, PROBLEM WAS APPARENTLY NOT RESOLVED AT THAT TIME, RESULTED IN LEADS BEING SWITCHED, CHANGE FROM MODE 3 TO MODE 2 AT 1617 ON 7/07. (3 0F 4 NIs REQUIRED IN MODE 2.)
NI 42 MADE INOP JULY 7, 1986, WHEN DETECTOR WAS DISCONNECTED FROM DRAWER AND CONNECTED TO REACTIVITY COMPUTER TO PERFORM REACTIVITY MEASUREMENTS FOR LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING, SUBSEQUENTLY, NI 42 LEADS WERE RECONNECTED IMPROPERLY (SWITCHED). APPARENTLY DISCREPANCY BETWEEN TAGS AND DRAWING WAS NOTED BUT NOT BROUGHT TO SUPERVISOR'S ATTENTION, HAD THE MAY 86 DISCREPANCY BEEN RESOLVED, THIS SECOND PROBLEM WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.
CHANGE FROM MODE 2 TO MODE 1 AT 0038 ON 7/11.
AT APPROXIMATELY 9%, OPERATORS NOTED ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR OF NI 41 AND 42. CAUSE WAS FOUND TO BE SWITCHED LEADS. (PROBLEM DISCOVERED AT 0414 ON 7/11-- PROBLEM CORRECTED AT 0430 ON 7/11.)
THE OTHER 2 POWER RANGE NIs AND 2 INTERMEDIATE RANGE NIs WERE OPERABLE. (INTERMEDIATE RANGE TRIP SET POINT IS 25%,)
FOLLOWUP:
REGION AND LICENSEE WILL:
- DETERMINE EXACT NATURE OF SWITCHING 0F LEADS, CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE LACK OF RESOLUTION OF CAUSE OF MAY 86 PROBLEM, DETERMINE WHY THE OCCURRENCE OF SWITCHED LEADS ON 7/7 WAS NOT BROUGHT TO MANAGEMENT'S ATTENTION.
REGIONAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION BASED ON TECH SPEC VIOLATION AND POSSIBLE PROGRAMMATIC MAINTENANCE BREAKDOWN.
s COOK 2 NI MARTIX
' TAGS PRINT / DRAWING l MAY 1986 NI 41 TAGS INCORRECT PRINT CORRECT
'l JULY 1986 NI 42 TAGS CORRECT PRINT INCORRECT
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PALO VERDE UNIT 1 - REACTOR TRIP WITH COMPLICATIONS JULY 12, 1986 (E. A. LICITRA, NRR) '
PROBLEM:
COMPLICATIONS FOLLOWING REACTOR TRIP SIGNIFICANCE:
RECURRENCE OF PREVIOUS PROBLEMS ENC 0UNTERED DURING POWER ASCENSION TESTING CHALLENGES TO SAFETY SYSTEMS CIRCUMSTANCES:
REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO RCS LOW FLOW INDICATION (2 0F 4 CHANNELS)
TURBINE TRIP DUE TO REACTOR TRIP LOSS OF NON-ESSENTIAL LOADS (EXCEPT RCS PUMPS) DUE TO GRID VOLTAGE DIP CHARGING PUMPS TRIPPED DUE TO LOW SUCTION PRESSURE (VALVE 536 FROM RWT DID NOT OPEN)
VALVE 536 OPENED FROM CONTROL ROOM, CHARGING PUMPS RESTARTED AND' "E" PUMP DID NOT PROVIDE FLOW (TURNED OFF)
SAFETY INJECTION AND CONTAINMENT ISOLATION ACTUATION DUE TO LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE - 2 RCS PUMPS MANUALLY TRIPPED MAIN STEAM ISOLATION ACTUATION DUE TO LOW SG PRESSURE ENTERED EXCESS-STEAM DEMAND RECOVERY PROCEDURE (7 MINUTES AFTER START OF EVENT)
PROCEEDED TO TERMINATE THE EVENT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT (TOTAL TIME APPR0XIMATELY 1 1/2 HOURS)
9 FOLLOWUP:
LICENSEE PERFORMING A REANALYSIS OF A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SHEARED SHAFT EVENT TO SUPPORT A PENDING TECH SPEC CHANGE FOR RCS LOW FLOW TRIP SETTINGS LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT FAULTY ELECTRICAL C0$NECTION WAS ROOT CAUSE OF VALVE 536 NOT OPENING: CONNECTION WAS REPLACED AND TESTED SUCCESSFULLY LICENSEE FOUND PROBLEM WITH "E" CHARGING PUMP TO BE A BAD BLADDER ON PULSATION DAMPENER - BLADDER WAS REPLACED CAUSE OF LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LEADING TO SIAS WAS DESIGN WEAKNESS IN NON-SAFETY PORTION OF STEAM SYSTEM WHICH CAUSED AN OVERC00 LING 0F PRIMARY SYSTEM, PROBLEM PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED DURING A 1/9/86 EVENT AT PALO VERDE UNIT 1. LICENSEE STILL EVALUATING FOR PROPER DESIGN FIX - IN THE INTERIM, SECOND STAGE REHEATER FOR TURBINE WILL BE ISOLATED 10 PREVENT RE0CCURRENCE REGION V, IE, AND NRR CONTINUING TO REVIEW THE EVENT WITH LICENSEE UNIT IS CURRENTLY IN MODE 3
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TO ' s F7 NEATER CONDENSER *A* ORAIN F0 FC TANK T THI DRwG. TYPICAL f // 4 0 kEAyE I SEPARATOR RElEATERS
REFERENCES:
FSAR F {1,82-1 Sg 2,
s3 OTHER EVENT UF IllTEREST
.g DI ABLO CANYON UNIT 2 - THR[E- RECENT REACTOR TRIPS l
, JULY 3, 5, 9, 1986 (Hi-SCHIERLING, NRR)
PROBLEM:
THREE REACTOR TRIPS:IN ONE WEEK PERIOD Y
SIGNIFICANCE: 5 ig MULTIPLE CHALLENGES TO PLANT SAFETY., SYSTEMS .
PROBLEMS WITH LOW POWER OPERATION ARD CONTROL SYSTEMS STEAMGENERATORLEVELCONTR0E'PitdllLEMS i DISCUSSION:
7;]I-f E.
JULY 3 - REACTOR TRIP FROM 9% POWER DUE TO TURBINE TRIP ON
~
LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM LOSSOFCONDENSERVACUUMDUEITOISOLATIONOFSEALINGSTEAM FROMCOLDREHEATSTEAMRELIEFjVALVES SI INJECTION DUE TO FALSE SI? SIGNAL RESULTING FROM PRESSURE TRANSIENT IN STEAM LINES JULY 5 - REACTOR TRIP FROM 19% POWER DUE TO HIGH-HIGH STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL IN S/G 2-1 FEEDWATER FLOW / STEAM FLOW MISMATCH RESULTED IN S/G LEVEL INCREASE OPERATORS WERE ADJUSTING FLOW CONTROL ON S/G 2-2 AND TRANSFERRING LEVEL CONTROL TO AUTOMATIC OPERATORSUNABLETOCLOSEFigWCONTROLVALVEINTIME JULY 9 - REACTOR TRIP FROM 149T: POWER DUE TO MAIN FEED PUMP. TRIP
- MFW PUMP 2-1 TRIPPED FOR UNKNOWN REASON, CONTROLLER FOR MFP 2-2 HAD BEEN WORKED ON AFWPUMPSSTARTEDASREQUIR$D DIESELGENERATOR2-2STARTEf0NM0MENTARYUNDERVOLTAGE i FOLLOWUP: F LICENSEE EVALUATING PROCEDURES AND LEAKING CHECK VALVES IN SEALING STEAM SYSTEM q.
LICENSEEEVALUATINGMFWPUMPTRhP LICENSEEEVALUATINGPOSSIBLE(fERACTIONBETWEENS/GLEVEL CONTROLLERS DUE TO RECENT MOD ((ICATIONS RESIDENTTOFOLLOWLICENSEEACT, IONS
- 3 .
e REACTOR SCRAM
SUMMARY
WEEK ENDING 07/20/86 I. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA DATE SITE UNIT POWER RPS CAUSE COMPLI- YTD CATIONS TOTAL 07/14/86 SALEM 2 100 A EQUIP / ELECT. NO 3 07/14/86 SAN ONOFRE 2 100 A EQUIP / ELECT. NO 6 07/15/86 SALEM 2 4A EQUIP / ELECT. NO 4 07/16/86 SALEM 2 60 A EQUIP /MFW PMP NO 5 07/17/86 LACROSSE 1 98 A EQUIP / INVERTER NO 10 07/17/86 SAN ONOFRE 1 3A EQUIP / ELECT NO 1 07/17/86 CATAWBA 1 85 A EQUIP /TURB-GEN NO 7 07/17/86 SUEDUEHANNA 2 22 M EQUIP /RCS LEAKA NO 3 07/18/86 INDIAN POINT 2 100 A PERSONNEL /MAINT YES 6 07/18/86 COOK 2 69 A EQUIP /SG REG VL NO 3 07/19/86 HCPE CREEK 1 1A PERSONNEL NO 5 07/19/86 PEACH BOTTOM 3 83 A EQUIPMENT NO 4 07/20/86 CALVERT CLIFFS 1 98 A EQUIP /ELECTR. NO 2 a
e
SUMMARY
OF COMPLICATIONS SITE UNIT COMPLICATIONS INDIAN POINT 2 LOSS OF SOME AC POWER ONE RCP COULD NOT BE RESTARTED s
I
~
s II. COMPARISON OF WEEKLY STATISTICS WITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 07/20/86 SCRAM CAUSE POWER NUMBER 1986 1985 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS (5) AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD (3)(4)
- POWER >15% -
EQUIP. RELATED >15% 9 4.6 5.4 (68%)
PERS. RELATED(6) >15% 1 2.0 2.0 (25%)
OTHER(7) >15% O O.3 0.6 ( 7%)
- Subtotal **
10 6.9 8.0
- POWER <15%
EQUIP. RELATED <15% 2 1.6 1.3 (54%)
PERS. RELATED <15% 1 1.0 0.9 (38%)
OTHER <15% 0 0.1 0.2 ( 8%)
- Subtotal ** ,
3 2.7 2.4
- Total *** .
13 9.6 10.4 MANUAL VS AUTO SCRAMS TYPE NUMEER 1986 1985 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD MANUAL SCRAMS 1 0.8 1.0 t AUTOMATIC SCRAMS 12 8.9 9.4 i
, ,.w.-a.. ,- - - - - - - , , , - - , , , pr - - - - - - - - -
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NOTES
- 1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW 0F 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK 0F INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT SUNDAY. SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN R0D MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE.
UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.
- 3. 1985 INFORMATION DERIVED FROM RECENT ORAS PRELIMINARY STUDY OF UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIPS IN 1985. WEEKLY DATA DETERMINED BY TAKING TOTAL TRIPS IN A GIVEN CATEGORY AND DIVIDING BY 52 WEEKS / YEAR.
- 4. IN 1985, THERE WERE AN ESTIMATED TOTAL OF 541 AUTOMATIC AND MANUAL UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIPS AT 93 REACTORS (HOLDING FULL POWERLICENSES). THIS YIELDS AN AVERAGE RATE OF 5.8 TRIPS PER REACTOR PER YEAR AND AN AVERAGE RATE OF 10.4 TRIPS PER WEEK FOR ALL REACTORS.
l l S. BASED ON 100 OPERATING REACTORS
- 6. PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.
l l 7. "0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES(LIGHTNING),SYSTEMDESIGN,ORUNKNOWNCAUSE.
1
ENCLOSURE 3 C
p Page No. 1 07/22/B6 OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETINS FOLLOWUP ITEMS AS OF MEETING 86-25 ON JULY 21 , 1996 (IN ASCENDING MEETINS DATE, NSSS VENDOR, FACILliY ORDER)
TASK DESCRIPil0N SCHEDULE CLDSED DATE COMMENTS MEETIN6 FACILITY RESPONS! ELE COMPLET. EY DOCUMENT, NUMBER / MSSS VENDOR / DIVISION /
DATE(S) MEETING,ETC.
MEETING EVENT DESCRIP. INDIVIDUAL DATE NRR / HOUSTON W RESOLVE THE QUEST 10N OF THE 10/30/06 0 FEN // FOLLOWUF ACTION TO B6-10 OYSTER CREEK
/ / BE INCORPORATED IN 03/31/E6 SE / LEVEL / ACCEPTABILITY 0F BLIND SWITCHES AND DELETION OF DAILY CHANNEL / / REVIEW 0F JUNE SWITCH SETPOINT CHECK 1,1986 EVENT AT DRIFT LASSALLE NRR /HOLAHAN 6. DETERMINE STATUS AND 09/20/96 OPEN //
B6-21 VERMONT YANKEE
/ EFFECTIVENESS OF STAFF AND / /
06/23/B6 SE / PROBLEMS WITH SCRAM LICENSEE ACT10N DN / /
SOLENDID YALVES POST-MAINTENANCE TESTINS (BL 23-28). DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION NRR /RDSA F. CONSIDER REVIEWING ELECTRICAL 08/30/06 0 FEN //
86-21 TURKEY POINT
/ SYSTEM OF PLANT WITH SIMILAR / /
06/23/B6 W / POTENTIAL FAILURE OF ALL SWINS BUS DESIGN / /
EMER6ENCY DIESEL SENERATORS NRR / HOUSTON W. DBTAIN AND REVIEW INFORMATION 09/29/66 0 FEN //
B6-23 FERRY
/ RELATED TO RECURRENCE OF FIRE / /
07/07/06 6E / FIRE IN OFFBAS CHARC0AL AND INVESil6 ATE PROPOSED / /
BEDS ACTIONS NRR / HOUSTON W. DETERMINE APPROFRIATE 09/30/E6 0 FEN //
B6-23 MULTI
/ RESULATORY REQUIREMENTS PASED / /
07/07/06 NA /
EWRS-RESIDUAL ON RECSMMENDATIONS DISCUSSED AT / /
HEAT REMOVAL BRIEFING PUMP / WEAR RINS FAILURES -
FDLL0iUP hRP /EERLihSEF C. ASSURE NRR AND IE COORDINATION OB!30/G6 0 FEN //
B6-23 MULT!
/ TO DETEFMINE THE HEED FOR AN IE / /
07/07/E6 NA /
PWRS-INADEGUATE EltLETIN / /
DESIGN OF ECCS FUMP MINIMUM FLOW PATHS m