ML20211P293
| ML20211P293 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1997 |
| From: | Joshua Wilson NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Liparulo N WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9710200152 | |
| Download: ML20211P293 (5) | |
Text
_____ __ _ _____________________-_______ - -_ -
October 9, 1997 Mr. Nicholas J. Liparuto, Manager Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Analysis Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division Westinghouse Electric Corporation P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230
SUBJECT:
AP600 INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSES, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
Dear Mr. Liparulo:
The enclosure to this letter contains requests for additionalinformation (RAls) or corrections conceming Revision 3 of the AP600 Tier 1 information including the inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC). These requests cover the following review Containment Systems, Human Factors, Radiation Protection, Reactor Systems, and areas:
Quality Assurance, if you have any questions regarding this matter, you may phone me at (301) 415-3145.
Sincerely, original signed by:
l Jerry N. Wilson, Senior Policy Analyst Standardization Project Directorate l
Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 52 003
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: bee next page DISTRIBUTION:
b Docket File :
PDST R/F JRoe PUBLIC DMatthews TQuay JNWilson TKenyon BHuffman
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Mr. Nicholas J. Liparuto Docket No. 52 003 l
Westinghouse Electric Corporation AP600 l
9 cc:
Mr. B. A. McIntyre Mr. Russ Bell i
Advanced Plant Safety & Ucensing Senior Project Manager, Programs j
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Nuclear Energy Institute Energy Systems Business Unit 1776 i Street, NW 4
P.O. Box 355 Suite 300 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Washington, DC 20006 3706 Mr. Cindy L. Haag Ms. Lynn Connor Advanced Plant Safety & Ucensing Doc-Search Associates Westinghouse Electric Corporat!on Post Office Box 34 Energy Systems Business Unit Cabin John, MD 20818 Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Dr. Craig D. Sawyer, Manager Advanced Reactor Programs Mr. Sterling Franks GE Nuclear Energy U.S. Department of Energy 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-754 NE 50 San Jose, CA 95125 19901 Germantown Road Idaho Falls,ID 83415 Germantown, MD 20874 Mr. Robert H. Buchholz Mr. Frank A. Ross GE Nuclear Energy U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 175 Curtner Avenue, MC 781 office of LWR Safety and Technology San Jose, CA 95125 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, MD 20874 Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.
Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott Mr. Charies Thompson, Nuclear Engineer 600 Grant Street 42nd Floor AP600 Certification Pittsburgh, PA 15219 NE 50 19901 Germantown Road Mr. Ed Rodwell, Manager Germantown, MD 20874 PWR Design Certification Electric Power Research Institute 3412 Hillview Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94303
RAls for AP600 !TAAC 640.151 1.1 - Definitions Your response to RAI 640.54 is unacceptable. AllITAAC for buildings and systems should require an inspection of the functional arrangement of the structures, systems, and components. Functional arrangement (for a system) means the physical arrange-ment of structures, systems, and components to provide the service for which the system is intended.
640.152 2.1 - Reactor Your response to RAI 640.34 is unacceptable. The Nuclear Fuel System and the Control Rod Drive System require Tier i design descriptions consistent with the significance of these systems. These systems also require an inspection of the functional arrangement, similar to the fuel and control rod systems ITAAC for the System 80+ design.
2.2.2 Passive Containment Coolino System 640.153 Your response to RAI 640.57(a) requires clarification. The acceptance criteria for ITAAC 8. a) li) specifies a water level without units or relative location.
640.154 Your response to RAI 640.57(b) is unacceptable. Provide an ITAAC that verifies that the water coverage fractions, at the upper annulus drain elevation, for each of the three phases of PCS flow are consistent with the design basis assumptions that are used to determine the evaporated flow as described in Section 7A of WCAP 14407 (Rev 1). These values need to be consistent with the observations from the cold Water Distribution Tests. In addition to the coverage fraction (percent of the circum-forence), the uniformity of the PCS flow around the circumference at the upper annulus drain elevation must be verified.
640.155 Your response to RAI 640.57(g) is unacceptable. The steelJacket to-concrete air gap is a key assumption in your safety analyses. Provide an ITAAC that verifies the air gap (refer to your response to RAI 480.636). This verification should be based on the expected shrinkage of the concrete over plant life, the type and pour of the concrete, and other key construction features.
640.156 2.7.5 - Radiologically Controlled Area Ventilation System The ITAAC for this section states that " testing will be performed to confirm that the VAS maintains each building at a slightly negative pressure". The airborne radioactiv-ity coocentrations listed in Chapter 12.2 of the SSAR for the containment, fuel handling building, and auxiliary building are based on assumptions that a minimum ventilation flow can be maintained in each of these areas. Therefore, in order to ensure that the specified airbome radioactivity concentrations in each area are not exceeded, Westinghouse should modify the ITAAC to verify that the design minimum ventilation flow rates for the containment, fuel handling building, and auxiliary building can be maintained.
Enclosure
1 2
l 640.157 3.2 Human Factors Engineering l
Many of the acceptanos criteria (e.g., page 3.2 3) state that 'a report exists...". It abould be readily apparent to a knowledgeable individual what is required for the typeloontents of the report. If not, then the report needs to be identified and the required contents described in the 88AR. Currently, many ITAAC refer to a report but, there is no clear reference to the report, either by title or content, in the SSAR.
You should review all references to a report in the acceptanos criteria and verify that the subject repori ls described, as appropriate, in the 88AR.
640.158 3.3 Buildin;s Table 3.3 5 contains ITAAC for the Ni structures as well as for the annex and redweste buildings. Therefore, Westinghouse should modify the sentence on page 3.3 3 to add the words annex, radweste, and" between the words *NI" and
" buildings". -
640.15g 3.4 Initial Test Program (ITP)
Your response to RAI 640.46 is unacceptable. This ITAAC needs to be modified to include a description (consistent with 88AR Section 14.2.3, " Test Specifications and Test Pmedures') of the role of test specifications and procedures, including program administrative procedures, in the control and conduct of the AP600 ITP (refer to the enclosed page 3.5-1 from ABWR ITAAC, which provides an acceptable Tier i description). The iTP has an essential role in verifying that the AP600 systems have been constructed in accordance with the approved design and will perform as predicted in the SSAR. The development of test procedures, conduct of the tests, and safe execution of the test program, are important considerations in ensuring that the as built facility is in accordance with the certified design and applicable regula-tions. Therefore, a description of the role of the test specifications and procedures, including program administrative procedures, is required in Tier 1 to ensure NRC control of the ITP as it relates to ITAAC and to control the preparation of and changes to the procedures by the licensee.
640.160 3.5 Radiation Monitoring Table 3.5 5, Area Radiation Monitors, lists only the following two radiation monitors:
Primary Sampling Room and Technical Suppo1 Center Area Monitor. Presumably these two monitors are listed because they are used during emergency response conditions to monitor area dose rates in vital areas. The control room is a vital area where plant personnel will be stationed following an accident and therefore the main control room area monitor should be included in Table 3.5 5c Also, the output from the containment high range area monitor serves as one of the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signals. Modify Table 3.5 5 to include the main control room and containment high range area monitors and any other area monitor which would be used to monitor dose rates in vital areas following an accident.
'640.161' Your responses to RAls 640.51,640.52, and 640.53 require clarification. Your explanation of the design scope, boundaries, and interfaces in the SSAR is not clear and is inconsistent with your CDM. Refer to Section 1.1.2 of the ABWR design control document for an acceptable description of the dcsign scope.
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i 3.5 initial Test Program L
Design C:::%3en i
De ABWR Inidal Test Program (ITP)is a program that will be conducted following completion of construedon and construction-related inspections and tests and extends g
to commercial operadon. he test program will be composed of preoperadonal and startup test phases. The general objecdve of the 117 is to conarm that performance of the ambuilt facility is in compliance with the design charactedsdes used for SSAR safety evaluadons, t
he preoperadonal test phase of the ITP will consist of those test activities conducted I
pdor to fuel loading. Preoperadonal testing will be conducted to demonstrate proper
- performance of structures, systems, components, and design features in the assembled plant. Tests will include, as appropdate, logic and interlocks test, control and instrumentation funedonal tests, equipment funcdonal tests, system operational test, and system vibradon and valon measurements.
The startup test phase of the 177 will begin with fuel loading and extends to commercial C,,'
operadon. ne primary objecdve of the startup phase tesdag will be to conarm integrated plant performance with the nuclear fuel in the reactor pressure vessel and the plant at various power levels. Startup phase tesdag will be conducted at Ave test condidons dudng power ascension: open vessel, heatup, low power, mid-power, and high power. The following tests will be conducted during power operadon tesdag:
(1) Core perfonnance analysis.
(t) Steady < tate tesdag.
(S) Control system tuning and demonsundon.
(4) Minor and major transients.
Tesdng during all phases of the ITP will be conducted using step by step wduen procedures to control the conduct of each test. Such test procedures will delineate established test methods and applicable acceptance criteria. The test procedures will be developed from preoperational and startup test speci5 cations. Approved test procedures will be made available to the NRC approximately 60 days prior to their intended use for preoperational tests and 60 days prior to scheduled fuel loading for startup phase tests. The preoperational and startup test speci8 cations will aho be made '
available to the NRC. Administratively, the TTP will be controlled in accordance with a startup administrative manual. This manual will contain the administrative
- (p requiremenu that govern the conduct of test program, review, evaluation and appros31 of test results, and test records retention.-
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