ML20211N724
| ML20211N724 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1986 |
| From: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Lautenberg F SENATE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211N729 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8612180297 | |
| Download: ML20211N724 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000354/1986041
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UNITED STATES
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DEC 111986
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The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Lautenberg:
Thank you for your inquiry of November 13, 1986, addressed to the NRC Office of
Congressional Affairs which requested information relative to the safety of
the Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station in Salem County, New Jersey.
Before discussing the specific concerns at Hope Creek, it is important to say
that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission always places plant safety first in
considering actions responsive to plant events or conditions. While the NRC may
ultimately assess civil monetary penalties or take other enforcement action
against a licensee when safety problems are identified at a nuclear facility,
our immediate concern is whether the nuclear facility should continue to operate
with a particular identified safety problem.
In this regard, the NRC has frequently applied its authority under law to
constrain plant operation until identified safety problems are resolved. This
may take the form of an order modifying the license to require some specified
corrective action prior to further nuclear plant operation. In other cases, the
Regional Administrator may obtain a commitment from licensee management to
refrain from operation until a specified series of corrective actions is
completed. The effect of these actions is to obtain technically adequate
resolution of safety concerns prior to further plant operation.
Enforcement
actions, such as civil monetary penalties, are applied well after the safety
concerns are put to rest.
Ms. Yashinsky's letter, which was attached to your correspondence, highlights
three issues at Hope Creek:
the quality of startup testing, the reversed
sensing lines, and the Bailey logic modules. To assure the quality and
completeness of testing, the NRC Region I office has supplemented the two
full-time resident inspectors on site with additional inspectors from the
Regional office to continually monitor the preoperational and startup test
programs at the Hope Creek site.
This intensive review resulted in an NRC
concern that the preoperational test program may not have been complete, due
partly to a large number of test exceptions. As a result of this concern,
the licensee agreed to complete an additional series of tests prior to initial
plant startup.
Our inspectors agree that the licensee maintains an aggressive schedule to
complete the startup test phase; however, we have not found this to be a plant
8612180297 861211
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safety concern. It should also be noted that one purpose of this test program
is to identify construction and operational problems such as the reversed
sensing lines.
With respect to the specific hardware problems noted in your letter, the
licensee, Public Service Electric ard Gas Company, identified the reversed
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sensing lines on August 8, 1986, and immediately shut the plant down to repair
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the lines and assess the significance of the design error. As discussed with
the NRC at a meeting held in Region I on August 22, 1986, several reviews and
evaluations were conducted, which confirmed that no similar design errors
existed in the plant. This meeting is documented in the attached NRC Inspection
Report 50-354/86-41.
The Bailey logic modules, utilized at Hope Creek for plant control functions,
present another set of concerns which the NRC has dealt with on several
occasions over the last year. The Bailey solid-state logic modules represent a
unique situation in that they are not used at any other nuclear power plant
licensed by the NRC. As a result, considerable effort has gone into reviews of
their application and inspection of their failures. The plant operating license
was issued with a condition that the licensee establish a reliability program
for these devices and report the results to the NRC prior to the end of the
first refueling outage.
In addition, a special NRC team inspection following
the September 11, 1986 loss of off-site power test identified additional
concerns regarding Bailey logic module design and testability. As a result,
two meetings were held with the licensee, three additional loss of off-site
power tests were conducted, and the plant remained shut down for over a month
while evaluations were completed. The plant shutdown, pending completion of
evaluations and review by the NRC inspection team, was agreed to by the licensee
and confirmed in a letter from the Region I Regional Administrator.
In addition,
significant improvements in reliability analysis and on-site testing capability
for the Bailey modules, were developed and agreed to by the licensee. The
special team Inspection Report, 50-354/86-50, is attached for your review.
On a broader perspective, the NRC will not hesitate to limit nuclear facility
operation in order to assure the health and safety of the public. Recent
examples of power reactors which were shutdown for NPC/ licensee agreed upon
analysis or modifications include: Pilgrim, Davis Besse, Sequoyah, Browns
Ferry, Palisades, and Rancho Seco.
In sumary. the NRC will continue to place priority on reactor safety, and,
as illustrated above, will take appropriate actions to ensure that technical
concerns are deal + with thoroughly before plant operation is allowed to
continue or resume.
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Should you have additional questions in this matter, please contact us again.
As you requested, a copy of your correspondence is attached.
Sincerely,
&L&&
ictor Stello, Jr.
. Executive Director for Operations-
. Attachments:
As stated
DISTRIBUTION
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Docket No. 50-354
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EDO PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL
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FROM:
DUE: 12/04/86
EDO CONTROL: 002325
DOC DT: 11/13/86
SEN. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG
FINA'. REPLY:
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FOR SIGNATURE OF:
GREEN
SECY NO: 861216
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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
DESC:
ROUTING:
ENCLOSES LETTER FROM KATHY YASHINSKY RE Ep
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ON QUALITY TESTING AT NUCLEAR POWER PL 4TS
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DATE: 11/18/86 %
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET
PAPER NUMBER:
CRC-86-1216
LOGGING DATE: Nov 17 86
ACTION OFFICE:
AUTHOR:
F.R.
Lautenberg--Const Ref
AFFILIATION:
U.S. SENATE
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LETTE;t CATE:
Nov 13 86
FILE CODE: ID&R5 Hope Creek
SUBJECT:
Places emphasis on quality testing at nuc plants
ACTION:
Direct Reply
DISTRIBUTION:
OCA to Ack
SPECIAL HANDLING: None
NOTES:
Kathy Yaskinsky
DATE DUS:
Dec
1 86
SIGNATURE:
DATE SIGNED:
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AFFILIATION:
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