ML20211N695
| ML20211N695 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1986 |
| From: | Aamodt M AAMODTS |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#386-825 86-519-02-SP, 86-519-2-SP, LRP, NUDOCS 8607030190 | |
| Download: ML20211N695 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
Before the Presiding Board
)
In the Matter of DocketNo.LRh 9
5
)
ASLBP No. 86g
,02 SP INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE. ISLAND UNIT 2 )
0 d5,SFCRO.a.,
j LEAK RATE DATA FALSIFICATION
)
June 30, 19 f7;[(,jbyq l
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AAMODT RESPONSE TO 01 REPORT MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION i
1.
Introduction.
4 The Aamodes were granted an extension of time until today to respond to the NRC Office of Investigations (01) report concerning i
j the involvement of 10 licensed operators in the falsification of t
I leak rate reports at TMI-2 prior to the accident. This response includes comunents about the report, suggestions of additional l
documents and witnesses and a motion for a summary disposition of an issue of the instant proceeding.
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2.
Comments.
4 We do not object to the inclusion of the OI report and appended exhibits into the record of the instant proceeding subject j
to the cross-examination of the report's authors and investigators.
We object to the findings of the OI report concerning the i
involvement / awareness of the 10 operators. The investigators must be subjected to a thorough cross-examination to demonstrate their
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rationale for finding that six operators were not involved in what j
the investigators admitted was a company practice and where there 4
i 8607030190 860630 PDR ADOCK 05000320 g
PDR "D S63
was censorvctiva cvideaco th:t thasa cp;rators wara involvcd/tware.
The OI's conclusion that supervisory personnel and management in general were responsible for the leak rate falsifications is of the utmost importance to the instant inquiry. OI found that the i
" Operations Department Management clearly fbstered" an attitude which t
caused leak rate report falsifications and the practice of discarding tests (which showed excessive leakage) was attributed to the operators'
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immediate supervisors. See Synopsis.
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) stated a similar i
conclusion in their report released in May 1986:
"...a conscious decision was made by Shift Supervisors, and possibly management per-sonnel, to disregard the requirements of the technical specifications (concerning leak rate tests and reports)". See NRR report at 3.
(1)
The conclusions of the 01 and NRR reports clearly direct the Board to the proper focus for its quiry, i.e.,
the identification of supervisory and management personnel who were responsible for fostering leak rate repcrt and test falsifications. (1)
Individual supervisory and management persons,. implicated as responsibt's for leak rate falsifications, are mentioned by name in the interviews conducted by the OI and NRR investigators and appended to the OI report. The Board should focus its investigation on these individuals. (2) The issue of involvement of the first-line employees, (1) The Board has sustained, as it should,i the objections of Messrs.
Miller and Herbein to the reports' " ambiguous" references to management. The ambiguity should now be remedied by the Board's investigation of individua'1's' involvement / awareness.
(2) We will provide the Board with a complete list from the interviews appended to the OI report.
That task is not completed due to the number of interviews and pages involved. We would again suggest adding the evidence from the U.S. Attorney's Statement of Facts before the Middle District Court, February 1984, which inculpated individuals in management identified by job title.
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the operators, has been thoroughly investigated and can be summarily disposed by the Board on the basis of the OI and NRR investigations.
See Section 4 below.
i We motion below that the Board dispose of the less criticat and sufficiently resolved issue of the involvement of the 10 licensed operators who have been thoroughly investigated by OI and NRR in order to allow the Board and parties to focus on the investigation o( super-visors and managers. Although 01 and NRR did not undertake to investi-gate operatore who are no longer licensed by NRC, the evidence developed j
by OI and NRR provides a basis to make a similar summary disposition of i
j the issue of the involvement of these operators.
3.
Addition of Documents and Witnesses.
l Additional documents need to be incorporated into the record i
and additional witnesses need to be called for the following reasons.
I The Board's investigation of supervisors and management will be 4
arduous. These individuals have persistently denied their awareness of the operators' manipulations of the leak rate tests. They have denied any intent to deceive the NRC in discarding tests above the leakage limits. Some have denied discarding tests. These. denials were made under cross-examination by the NRC investigators. It is unlikely that any of these individuals will change their testimony.
j The Board's investigation of management would be the first NBC investigation. It would be at the disadvantage of being conducted in a hearing without prior depositions. Other investigations (GPU's and the Department of Justice's) came to widely disparate conclusions con-cerning management individuals. The GPU investigation (Stier report) found no managers involved in or aware of leak rate report falsificational i
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l the U.S. Attorney named several individuals by job title. In view of the adamant conclusions of the OI and NRR reports concerning management involvement, the Stier investigation is.now shown to be unreliable., The j
evidence of the DOJ investigation is not available to the Board unless the Board pursues it.
In order to overcome some of the obstacles discussed above, we propose that the Board subpeona the minutes of the monthly meetings of 4
the shift supervisors for the year prior to the accident. These minutes were of sufficient interest to the company at the time ~ ' the leak rate issue broke wide-open in the TMI-1 restart proceeding that the company requested a shift supervisor's copy and had not returned it a year later.
See Ex. 12, p.34(Mehler).
We again request that the Board incorporate into the record all memoranda concerning leak rate testing that were generated within the Metropolitan Edison Company for the ye,ar prior to the accident. We also request the subpeona of the minutes of the meetings of the Metropolitan Edison board of directors for the same time period. The management persons under suspicion have repeatedly denied awareness of/
involvement in leak rate falsifications; those who were involved / aware are unlikely to change their testimony unless confronted with compelling evidence.
Since the testimony of at least one employee is that the practice of manipulating leak rate tests started at TMI-1 during startup, Michael Ross (Supervisor of Operations), the persons alleged to have the most comprehensive kn edge of the operation of Unit 1, should be called to i
testify concerning this allegation.
See Ex.12,pp. 24,43(Mehler). Again, we would request that the manager of training at TMI be called to testify
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about the procedures taught in the training department to conduct a test and to report a test.
We again urge the calling of the U.S. Attorney who found, as did the OI and NRR investigators, that management was responsible for the leak rate practices and who has knowledge concerning individual responsi-bility.
4.
Motion for Summary Disposition.
We move the Board to summarily dispose of the issue of the in-volvement of the operators at TMI-2 in the falsification of leak rate 4
tests and reports by finding that all operators were involved in/ aware of the leak rate falsifications.
This motion is derived from the following evidence provided in the OI and NRR reports and their attachments.
j a.
Leak rate tests in excess of technical specifications were routinely discarded in violation of NRC regulations.
(3)
Since tests were run at least once on every shift, there were at least 540 tests run during the six months prior to tit I
accident. Only 161 were reported to the NRC. (4) The e.hifts (5) reported about the same number of tests./ Therefore, all shifts discarded tests.
(3)
Ex.3,pp.
(Booher); Ex.12,pp.8-12(Mehler); Ex.10,pp.18-9(Cooper);
Ex.13,pp.49-51(Congdon); Ex.14,pp.9-35(01sen); Ex.17,pp.17-25(Hitz);
Ex.19,pp.28-30(M111er); Ex.23,pp.
(Hell); Ex 21,pp.10-13(Chwastyk);
Ex.32,pp.
(Conway); Ex.24,pp.
(Faust); Ex.25,pp.11-25(Zewe)
Ex.27,pp.12-13(McGovern); Ex.28,pp.19-30(Germer); Ex.30, pp.
(Gutherie); Ex.31,p.9(Bryant).
(4)
Ex.7 (01 Report!, Table 5 (5)
Id.
i The operators, without exception, did not log the time a test was begun as was required by regulation.
This fact could not have gone unnoticed,for the time period involved with the large number of tests run,by all other operators.
(The log is open to all control room personnel.)
The primary performance of the leak rate test rotated among the operators on a shift. (6) However, the other operators had to be informed that a test was being performed so that improper actions, that would influence the test, would not occure or, if they did occur, would be communicated to the operator performing the test.
At the end of October 1978, all operators had been informed that discarding leak rate tests was contrary to NRC regulations.
The o'perators signed a document to this effect.- (7)
Therefore, all leak rate tests discarded during the five months prior to the i
accident were willfully discarded by the operators in violation of NRC regulations. At least 300 tests were discarded during those five months.
(At least 450 were run and about 130'wer'e reported.)
(6)
Id. (page 2)
(7) The operators initialed the company's response to the LER identified by the NRC inspector on October 18, 1978.
t
The fact that the operators routinely did not log the time a test was begun concealed the fact that tests were being run and discarded. The routineness of this ommission also indicates intent as did the testimony of at least four employees interviewed by the OI/NRR investigators.
(8)
The practice of discarding leak rate tests was common l
knowledge among the entire operations staff. ((9)
The operators were directed to discard leak rate tests in excess of technical specifications. (10)
It is, therefore, clear that all operators were complicit in discarding leak rate tests in excess of technical specifi-cations and concealing this information from the NRC.
b.
Leak rate tests reported to the NRC were manipulated by a number of schemes to influence the test in the direction of minimizing the leakage measured. Of the 161 tests reported in the six month period prior to the ac'cident, 131 tests were manipulated. (11) Thus, 69 7. of the tests reported, were found to be manipulated by the operators. This is a conserva-tive estimate since the investigators were not able to discern from their examination of charts and other records all mani-pulations which may have occurred. (12) The estimate also does not include the manipulations that were undertaken and failed so that the test was discarded. However, despite this conservatism, (8)
Ex.10, p.64 (Cooper); Ex.13,pp.49-51 (Conadon):
Ex.14 (01 son) _see OI report at p.23, para.1; Ex.28, pp.19-30 (Cermer):
(Hartman had testified likewise in earlier interviews.)
(9) See references in Footnotes 3 and 8 (10) 01 Report at Synopsis; Ex.9, pp.10-11 (Smith); Ex.12, pp.18-22 (Mehler);
Ex.13, pp.2--25(Congdon); Ex.23 (Mell)' Ex.25,pp.11 25 (Faust), etc.
l (11)
Ex.7, Table 5.
(12) ~ OI Report at 15, para.2;16 para.3
i the OI/NRR investigators found that manipulations of the test (13) 1 occurred on all shif ts./ All operators investigated by OI/NRR were involved in these manipulations. (14) Other operators, not investigated, admitted manipulating the tests. (15) Other operators, who neither were investigated nor admitted mani-pulating the tests, had to have been involved: Although one operator had primary responsibility for the test, other operators on shift were informed that the tests were being performed and were to communicate their actions which would influence the test or to refrain from such actions.
The manipulations required the actions of other operators.
Further, the manipulations could not have consistently escaped the notice of other operators.
Jogging of water additions for the sole purpose of influencing the test, hydrogen additions at the end of a test, feed and bleed operations and unstable plant conditions during a test could not have gone unnoticed by operators working the control room panel who were informed when a test was being run. (16)
Further, when a test in excess of limits was obtained, a shift supervisor testified that there was a collegial effort to find the cause. (17)
(13) NRR Report; OI Report. Ex.7 Table 5.
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(14)
Id.
(15) OI Report, Ex.1 (Hartman, Blessing, Iljes, CofanktM).
(16) ~
0I Report Ex.12, pp.46,75 (Mehler)
(17)
Id. p.27.
1 addition of hydrogen. (23) The operators learned to manipulate tests by use of hydrogen. (24) The operators felt pres'sured to get
" good" tests. (25) They were " told" to discard ' ests showing t
excessive leakage so that the NRC inspector would not see them. (26)
The operators continued to manipulate and discard tests after they had been informed that NRC regulations prohibited these actions.(27)
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The operators were told to' hide tests beyond the limits from the NRC inspectors after they had signed a document that in-dicated that they should discontinue discarding tests. (28)
There can be no question that the operators' actions after October 1978 were entirely deliberate. After October the plant became increasingly leaky, and the percentage of manipulated tests that were identified increased. (29) d.
The fact that operators on a shift act as a team supports the universal participation of operators in the falsification of leak rate reports. It would be difficult if not impossible for an operator to buck his shift. (30)
All operators who remained throughout the leak rate falsifica-tions at Unit 2 can most reasonably be presumed to have been complicit in these practices.
(23) 01 Report at 14 (24)
Id.
(25)
Hartman testimony ; OI Report, Ex.57(51e'ssing); Ex.1 at 6, para.1.
(26) See Footnote 8.
(27) OI Report, Ex.7, Table 5; at 31, para.7; Ex.24 (Faust).
(28) OI Report at 37; Ex.30, pp.40-45 (Gutherie).
(29) 01 Report at 31, para.7; Ex.24 (Faust).
(30) Testimony to this effects was provided in the THI-1 Restart hearing by the engineer in charge of procedures, Henry Shipman.
The manipulations of the tests were not the result of the operators' haphazard approach to the test (as OI concludes).
The manipulations were willfully performed. It was common a
knowledge that hydrogen additions could influence the tests. (18)
However, the additions had to be made near the end of the tests.
(10) Since OI found that hydrogen additions were consistently made near the end of the tests (20), OI cannce reasonably con-4 I
ciude that the additions were the result of carelessness.
J The jogging of water additions were a deliberate and tedious action.
The recording of a part of a water addition is hardly the result of carelessness.-
1 c.
The deliberateness of the manipulation and discarding of tests is supported by the following evidence: The practice of discarding tests.'sisted since the startup of TMI-1. (21) e The addition of hydrogen to influence the test was common knowledge. (22) A loopseal, evidently not standard plant design, was incorporated into the construction of both units, which permitted the manipulation of the leak rate tests by the judicious (18) OI Report, Ex.5 and 6 (Blessing); Ex.16 (Coleman); Ex.11 and 13 (Congdon); Ex.18 CJright)) Ex.21 (Chwastyk); Ex.24 (Faust);st 14 (Hartman).
(19) OI Report at 14.
}
(20) OI Report, Ex.7, Table 10.
(21) OI Report, Ex.12, p.
(Mehler).
(22) Sre Footnote 18.
i 11 1
e.
Further pursuit of the involvement / awareness of the operators is pointless. The operators were doing as they were told. They were acting like good employees are expected to act. Many were out of the Nuclear Navy where it was expected that each level of command obeyed the one above it.
Others' sole training (other i
than at THI) was in elementary and secondary schools where students
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are inculcated with their responsibility to follow the teachers' L
i j
wishes -- right or wrong. Few had as much as a years' advanced i
education and the opportunity to be encouraged to assert independent thinking and to ' swim upstream'. The NRC does not; have appeared to have encouraged whistleblowers. (31)
The NRC inspector's action following his discovery of the discard of leak rate tests could i
not have encouraged the operators to take heroic action. (32) l
- f. 'The single troubling aspect of the operators' behavior, at i
this point, is their lack of forthrightness when faced with their improper actions. However, some operators were forthright in admitting their involvement and awareness. We believe that the l
lack of forthrightness was a product of the training the operators received (33) and 'is not due to basis dishonesty.
Some must i
j have real concern that honesty is the most advantageous policy in i
i the nuclear industry. Others may not be able to humble themselves to admit their participation in the falsifications of tests.
]
(31)
The NRC took no heed of Harold Hartman's allegations concerning leak rate falsifications until he appeared on public television.
i (32)
The inspector did not enter a notice of violation as would have 3
l been expected.
(33)
To falsify leak rate reports.
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l 12-We believe that any further pursuit of the actions of the operators should be to identify those deserving of commendation because of their willingness to speak out despite the risks to them personally and inspite of the negative examples of their management and the NRC. These operaters, particularly Harold Wayne Hartman, Jr.,should be singled out for an award. Absent Hartman's courage and persistence, the entire matter of the falsification of leak rate reports would have remained undisclosed. An action awarding Hartman (and possibly others) would have far-reaching positive effects on the morale of operators with positive implications for public health and safety.
This pioneering action to support whistleblowers would encourage all employees to take action where they believed it was needed.
It would put all employees on notice that from this point forward they are accountable for their actions and their' awareness of others actions relative to 8
procedural adherance.
[RIspectfullysubmitted ka?ud [h. k&
- MarjorieM.Aamodt June 30, 1986 l
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- 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Presiding Board
)
In the Matter of
)
Docket No. LRP
.hfEU
)
)
ASLBP No. 86-519-02 SP INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE. ISLAND UNIT 2 )
'86 R -2 m a LEAK RATEsDATA FALSIFICATION
)
) June 30,1986
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K T?NGkhyj{'
BRANCH This is to certify that copies of the document AAMDDT RESPONSE TO OI REPORT, }0 TION FOR SUtefARY DISPOSI"JON was served by deposit in U.S.
Mail, first class delivery, June 30,
- 86. -
MJ
. Marjorte M. Aamodt
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/Chie/,~ Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulat,ory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 James B. Burns, Esq.
Isham, Lincoln & Beale Presiding Board, the Honorables 3 First National Plaza James L. Kelley, Chairman Suite 5200 Glenn O.
Bright Chicago, IL 60602 Jerry R. Kline Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Michael W. Maupin U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hunton & Williams Washington, D.C. 20555 707 E. Main St.
P.O.
Box 1535 Jack R. Goldberg, Esq.
Richmund, VA 23212 Mary Wagner, Esc.
Office of the Executive Legal Director.
Smith B. Gephart, Esq.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Killian & Gephart Washing ton, D.C.
20555 216-210 Pine Street Dox 006 Ernest L. Blake, Esq.
I risburg, l'A 1 */108 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge l
1800 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Marj ie M. Aamodt liarry it. Voigt, Esq.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Ave., N. / W.
Suite 1100 Washington, D.C.
2n0'16 l
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