ML20211H387

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Prepared Statement of MD Phillippe Re Facility Leak Rate Data Falsification.Certificate of Svc Encl.Related Correspondence
ML20211H387
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 11/03/1986
From: Phillippe M
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
References
CON-#486-1347 LRP, NUDOCS 8611050114
Download: ML20211H387 (6)


Text

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,,, a i rn COHRMN UNITED' STATES OF AMERICA DOCKETED UStiRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE PRESIDING 83OARD 86 NOV -3 P2 :3'7

.0FF:CE 0! E. 1 M 00CKEi!NG A M t'VKE CRANCH

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In the Matter of

)

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INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE ISLAND

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Docket No. LRP UNIT 2 LEAK RATE DATA

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((/)- 32 )

FALSIFICATION PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK D.

PHILLIPPE My name is Mark D.

Phillippe and I live in La Place, Louisiana.

I am presently employed by Louisiana-Power & Light Company as a Quality Engineer--Nuclear at Waterford 3 steam-electric station.

Prior to becoming employed by Metropolitan Edison Company, I spent five and one-half years in the United States Navy nuclear program.

After being honorably discharged from the Navy ~in-October of 1976, I began my employment with~

Metropolitan Edison Company as an auxiliary operator.

I became a control room operator in training in May of 1978 and received my reactor operator's license in July of 1979.

During late 1978 and up to the time of the accident, I was assigned to "C" shift, which was comprised of shift supervisor Brian Mehler, shift foreman Chuck Adams, and control room operators Marty Cooper and Joe Congdon.

Beginr'ng in January hO SOO O

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1979, I stopped working on shift and spent my time in training to take the NRC-administered examination for my reactor operator's license.

I recall taking the exam just before the March 28, 1979 accident.

In'the course of my training as a control room operator, I was trained that the technical specifications required that a leak rate test showin~g unidentified leakage of less'than one gallon per minute be obtained once every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Due to l

plant oscillations that occurred frequently during 1978-1979, it was often difficult to conduct a leak rate test under steady state conditions, as required.by the technical specifications.

For this reason, it was accepted practice on my shift to perform at least one leak rate test per shift to obtain an acceptable leak rate test result.

During 1978-1979, it was my. observation that leak rat'e test results were sometimes erratic.

I believed this was due at-least in part to deficiencies in the computer program that calculated the leak rate tests.

I thus came to regard leak rate test results with skepticism.

In particular, I and my

'shiftmates deemed it necessary to corroborate leak rate test results in a number of instances by examining other plant parameters and by identifying and quantifying leaks.

If we judged a leak rate test result to be invalid, we presumed that the result did not reflect actual unidentified leakage, and thus discarded it.

On that basis, we discarded leak rate test results showing unidentified leakage in excess of one gallon r

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t per minute,.as well as some leak rate test results showing unidentified leakage of less than one gallon per minute.

Prior' to the accident, I' was never aware of a leak rate test result showing unidentified leakage in excess of one gallon per minute-on our ' shift that was not ultimately found to be invalid.

It was also the practice of my shift to invalidate and discard leak rate test results when a water addition had.been made during the test or when water t.1d been removed from reactor coolant inventory, such as by pumping down the drain tank.

During 1978-1979, I was never aware of anyone on my shift adding water during a leak rate test in an effort to falsify the test result.

I recall being informed that the addition of hydrogen during a leak rate test could improve the test result.

I do not recall who informed me of this phenomenon.

I do not remember learning of this effect through participation in an experiment to determine the effect of adding hydrogen during a leak rate test.

I can state that neither I, nor to my knowledge anyone on my shift, ever added hydrogen during a leak rate test for the purpose of falsifying a leak rate test result.

During 1978-1979, I was aware that one of the level transmitters was unreliable on occasion.

I assumed that'my superiors were aware of such problems and would implement corrective actions.

I also assumed that a' level transmitter would be tagged out of service if it were unfit f'r use.

I o

never used a level transmitter that was tagged out of service a

to perform a leak rate test; nor did I ever switch level transmiters during a leak rate test for the purpose of improving the test result.

I have only a vague recollection of Licensee Event Report 78-62.

I can recall no change in the way my shift interpreted the 72-hour requirement during 1978-1979.

Nor can I recall any specific corrective action, other than insuring that identified leakage was documented.

I would like to point out that I signed six leak rate tests that were analyzed by NRR.

There were no water or hydrogen additions during five of them.

The sixth test (NRR #43) was deemed invalid by NRR because they felt a feed and. bleed operation was conducted during the test.

I understand that MpR disagrees with that conclusion and believes the' test was valid.

Although my present job does not require an NRC operator's license and I do not currently hold'a license, I am employed in the nuclear industry.

Now that the Board has called upon me~to testify, I would like to clear my name of any involvement-in leak rate improprieties.

I never. falsified a leak rate test, nor was I aware of any other operator on my shift who did so.

I would be most appreciative, therefore, if the presiding Board I

l would officially recognize that I was not part of leak rate test falsification at TMI-2.

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' ELATED CORRESPONDENCE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NNhh NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE PRESIDING BOARD

'86 W/ -3 P2 :37 0FFICE ur i'.. : Ar r 00CKEilNG A SUVICF.

BRANCH

)

In the Matter of

)

)

INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE ISLAND

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Docket No. LRP UNIT 2 LEAK RATE-DATA

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FALSIFICATION

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE l

I hereby certify that I have served copies of " Prepared Statement of Mark D. Phillippe" by hand delivery on October 28, 1986, or, as indicated by an asterisk, by deposit in the United

~

States mail, first class, postage prepaid on October 30, 198'6, to the following persons:

Administrative Judge James L. Kelley, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Washington, D.C.

20555 Administrative Judge Glenn O. Bright Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comn.ission Washington, D.C.

20555 Administrative Judge James H. Carpenter Atomic Safety and Licensing Board' Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 t

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e.

Mary E. Wagner, Esq.

Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

  • Docketing and Service Branch (3)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Ernest L.

Blake, Jr., Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W.

Washing ton, D.C.

20037 James B. Burns, Esq.

^

Isham, Lincoln & Beale Three First National Plaza Suite 5200 Chicago, IL 60602 Michael W. Maupin, Esq.

Hunton & Williams P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, VA. 23212

  • Ms. Marjorie M. Aamodt-200 North Church Street Parkesburg, PA 19365
  • Ms. Marjorie M. Aamodt P.O. Box 652 Lake Placid, NY 12946

--- A vd M - a s.

t Jamb W. Moeller i

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